Priority Acquisitions LLC v. Medallion Gold Inc. et al

Filing 15

ORDER by Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. DENYING PLAINTIFF'S #10 EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER. (ndr, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/26/2024)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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PRIORITY ACQUISITIONS LLC,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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MEDALLION GOLD INC, et al.,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S EX
PARTE APPLICATION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
Re: Dkt. No. 10

Defendants.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

Case No. 24-cv-01793-HSG

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I.

LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a temporary restraining order may enjoin

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conduct pending a hearing on a preliminary injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). The standard

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for issuing a temporary restraining order and issuing a preliminary injunction are substantially

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identical. See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839, n.7 (9th

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Cir. 2001). A plaintiff seeking preliminary relief must establish: (1) that it is likely to succeed on

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the merits; (2) that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3)

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that the balance of equities tips in its favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. See

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Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Preliminary relief is “an extraordinary

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remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”

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Id. at 22. A court must find that “a certain threshold showing” is made on each of the four required

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elements. Leiva-Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2011). Under the Ninth Circuit's

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sliding scale approach, a preliminary injunction may issue if there are “serious questions going to

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the merits” if “a hardship balance [also] tips sharply towards the [movant],” and “so long as the

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[movant] also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the

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public interest.” All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011).

II.

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DISCUSSION
Plaintiff acknowledges that a Notice of Default was recorded on the property at issue on

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September 12, 2023, over five months ago. Dkt. No. 10-3 at ¶ 8. A Notice of Trustee’s Sale was

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recorded on the property on February 27, 2024, nearly a month ago. Id. at ¶ 9. And Plaintiff filed
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this case on Friday, March 22, 2024, but waited until March 25—less than one business day before
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the scheduled sale—to file its TRO application. Dkt. Nos. 1, 10. Plaintiff’s counsel did not give

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any Defendant notice of its intention to seek this TRO until barely over 24 hours before the sale is
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scheduled to occur. Dkt. No. 10-2 at ¶¶ 2-3.1 Counsel provides no explanation whatsoever for

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this timeline, and the Court finds this conduct at a minimum to be unreasonable and unfair to
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Defendants. There is no reason given as to why this issue could not have been raised days, if not
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weeks or months, earlier to allow Defendants a fair opportunity to substantively respond before
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United States District Court
Northern District of California

the sale date, and to allow the Court a reasonable amount of time to consider the application. So
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the Court finds this manufactured “emergency” far from compelling.

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The balance of the equities does not favor entry of a TRO under these circumstances. The
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Court views Plaintiff’s unjustified decision to raise this issue at the eleventh hour to be at best

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unreasonable, and at worst a bad-faith and manipulative effort to deprive the Defendants and the
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Court of the time needed to reasonably assess the merits of the request. Moreover, unlike many of
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the cases of this sort that come before the Court, the movant here does not claim that he lives at
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the property. See Dkt. No. 10-3. The Musson Declaration says that “Priority Acquisition LLC is,
and at all relevant times herein was, the owner” of the property at issue. Dkt. No. 10-3 at ¶ 2. But
in the next paragraph of the declaration, Mr. Musson represents that “[o]n or around March 22,
2017, I purchased the Property.” Id. at ¶ 3. Regardless, whether the owner of the property is an

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entity or an individual, there is no suggestion in the application or supporting declarations that Mr.
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Musson (or anyone else) lives in the home and is at risk of eviction. So the claims raised in the
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complaint, if successful, could be remedied by money damages, and do not implicate the type of
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immediate loss of one’s residence that has been held to constitute a potential irreparable harm.

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This lack of reasonable response time forced Defendants to file a very cursory opposition around
two hours after the TRO application was filed. Dkt. No. 12.
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And the Court also finds that, absent true emergency circumstances not present here, it is not in

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the public interest to countenance this tactic of delaying the timing of the application to try to

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force the Court to accept a TRO as a fait accompli, rather than timely seeking relief in a good-faith

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effort to allow a response and adequate consideration.

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Because Plaintff fails on this record to make a clear showing of entitlement to the
extraordinary relief sought, the application for temporary restraining order is DENIED.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 3/26/2024
______________________________________
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge

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