Peter Pinedo v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 27

ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL'S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. Section 406(b) by Judge Paul S. Grewal granting 22 Motion for Attorney Fees (psglc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/2/2012)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

8

SAN JOSE DIVISION

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

PETER J. PINEDO,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
)
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF )
SOCIAL SECURITY,
)
)
Defendant.
)
)
)

Case No.: 05-CV-01421-PSG
ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S
UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR AN
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES
PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)
(Re: Docket No. 22)

In this social security appeal, attorney Thomas Beltran (“Beltran”), counsel for Plaintiff
Peter J. Pinedo (“Pinedo”), moves for an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in

19
the amount of $9,288.95. Neither Pinedo nor the Government oppose the award. Pursuant to Civ.
20
21

L.R. 7-1(b), the motion was taken under submission without oral argument and the hearing

22

vacated. Having reviewed the papers and considered the arguments of counsel, the court GRANTS

23

Beltran’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees.

24
25
26

Beltran represented Pinedo during his appeal for childhood disability benefits. Pursuant to
an oral agreement with Pinedo’s sister, Frances Joan Spiller (“Spiller”), Beltran deposited
$9,000.00 that he received from Spiller into an escrow account. Beltran and Spiller agreed that any

27
28
1
Case No.: 05-1421 PSG
ORDER

1
2

disbursement from the account required approval from some competent authority. Otherwise, the
parties did not enter into any specific or written fee agreement.
Following remand by the district court, the administrative law judge awarded Pinedo

3
4

$58,778.00 in retroactive benefits. On January 27, 2011, the administrative law judge granted

5

Beltran’s fee petition in the amount of $4,419.00 for representing Pinedo in proceedings before the

6

Social Security Administration (“SSA”). The administrative law judge, however, declined to award

7
8
9

attorney’s fees related to Beltran’s representation of Pinedo in district court because he lacked the
authority to do so. SSA has withheld $14,694.95 or 25 percent of the past-due benefits awarded to

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

Pinedo for attorney’s fees. Beltran now moves for an award of attorney’s fees totaling $9,288.95,

11

an amount totaling less than 25 percent of past-due benefits.

12
13
14

In Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, the Supreme Court held that attorney’s fees may be awarded
under 42 U.S.C. §406(b). 1 The court acts as an independent check on contingent-fee agreements so
that reasonable results are achieved. 2 The relevant portion of the code section states:

15
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter who
was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part
of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the
total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment,
and the Commissioner of Social Security may, notwithstanding the provisions of section
405(i) of this title, but subject to subsection (d) of this section, certify the amount of such
fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due
benefits. 3

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

The court finds that the attorney’s fees requested by Beltran are reasonable in light of the total pastdue benefits awarded and the documentation provided in support of counsel’s motion. First, while
Beltran, Pinedo or Spiller did not enter into a specific or written fee agreement, Beltran seeks
1

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002) (“Fee awards may be made under
both [42 U.S.C. 406(b) and under the Equal Access to Justice Act], but the claimant’s attorney
must refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee, up to the point the claimant receives 100
percent of the past-due benefits.”).
2

Id. at 807.

3

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).

27
28

2
Case No.: 05-1421 PSG
ORDER

attorney’s fees that are less than 25 percent of the total past-due benefits awarded to Pinedo. This

2

amount is below the ceiling set by § 406(b). Beltran notes that he worked 37.50 hours on the case

3

and that his hourly rate is $250. 4 Second, the factors identified in Gisbrecht to warrant a reduction

4

of requested fees are reflected in the requested fee amount. Attorney’s fees awarded under 42

5

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) may be reduced from the amount authorized by a contingency fee agreement

6

“based on the character of the representation and the results the representative achieved.” 5 This

7

includes a consideration of whether counsel’s performance was substandard, whether there was

8

excessive delay by counsel which resulted in an undue accumulation of past-due benefits, and

9

whether the requested fees are excessively large in relation to the benefits achieved. 6 Here, there is

10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

1

no indication that Beltran’s performance was substandard or that there was any undue delay so that

11

past-due benefits could accumulate. Moreover, Beltran reduced his requested fees to less than 25

12

percent of the total of the past-due benefits. Having reviewed the papers and considered the

13

$4,419.00 administrative fee awarded by the administrative law judge, the court finds that the

14

requested $9,288.95 fee amount is both reasonable under Gisbrecht and below the 25 percent

15

statutory cap.

16

IT IS SO ORDERED.

17
18

Dated:

3/2/2012

19

_________________________________
PAUL S. GREWAL
United States Magistrate Judge

20
21
22
23
24
25

4

26

Under the lodestar method generally used in fee-shifting jurisprudence, Beltran would seek
attorney’s fees totaling $9,375. The amount sought is determined by multiplying the hours worked
on a client’s matter and the attorney’s hourly rate.

27

5

28

6

Id at 808.

See Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2009).
3
Case No.: 05-1421 PSG
ORDER