Hajro et al v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services et al
Filing
107
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS by Judge Paul S. Grewal granting in part and denying in part 93 Motion for Attorney Fees (psglc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/15/2012)
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE DIVISION
MIRSAD HAJRO and JAMES R. MAYOCK,
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND
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IMMIGRATION SERVICES; T. DIANE
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CEJKA, Director, National Records Center;
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ROSEMARY MELVILLE, District Director of )
San Francisco; JANET NAPOLITANO,
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Secretary, Department of Homeland Security; )
ERIC HOLDER, Attorney General, Department )
of Justice,
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Defendants.
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Case No.: 08-1350-PSG
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
(Re: Docket No. 93)
Plaintiff Mirsad Hajro (“Hajro”) and Plaintiff James R. Mayock (“Mayock”) (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) seek recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs from Defendant United States Citizenship
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and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), T. Diane Cejka (“Cejka”), Rosemary Melville (“Melville”),
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and Janet Napolitano (“Napolitano”) (collectively “Defendants”), pursuant to the Freedom of
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Information Act (“FOIA” or “the Act”), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). Having considered the parties’
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papers and oral arguments, the court GRANTS-IN-PART Plaintiffs’ motion.
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Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
I. BACKGROUND
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The long history of this case is detailed in the court’s October 12, 2011 order denying-in-
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part and granting-in-part the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment.1 In this order, the court
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repeats only those facts relevant to the pending request.
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In November 2007, Hajro filed a FOIA request with the USCIS’s National Records Center
to obtain a copy of his alien registration file after his application for naturalization was rejected on
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the grounds that he had provided false testimony. Hajro sought expedited processing of his request
pursuant to USCIS’s system of prioritizing FOIA requests. In 2007, USCIS implemented a three-
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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track system for processing FOIA requests: “Track 1” for simple requests, “Track 2” for complex
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inquiries requiring additional time, and “Track 3” for expedited processing for individuals subject
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to removal proceedings and scheduled for a hearing before an immigration judge.2 Hajro’s
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expedited processing request was denied; USCIS did not provide him with its decision or his
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records until March 2008.
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Mayock was the plaintiff in a 1992 suit resulting in a settlement agreement (“Settlement
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Agreement”) with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”)3 regarding its pattern and
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practice of violating various provisions of FOIA. He sued in his role as an immigration attorney
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who made FOIA requests to INS to obtain his clients’ alien registration files. Following the
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Settlement Agreement, Mayock continued, at times, to make FOIA requests for his clients. As in
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See Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., 832 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1100-03 (N.D. Cal.
2011).
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See Special FOIA Processing Track for Individuals Appearing Before an Immigration Judge, 72
Fed. Reg. 9017-01 (Feb. 28, 2007).
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INS no longer exists as a separate government agency. Its duties were transferred to the
Department of Homeland Security and split between USCIS, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and U.S. Customs and Border Patrol.
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Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
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the case with Hajro, USCIS failed to provide its decisions to Mayock within the limits set under
FOIA.
In March 2008, Mayock and Hajro filed suit against USCIS, Cejka, Melville, Napolitano,
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and Eric Holder in this court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under FOIA and the
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Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 702, 704, and 706. The parties each
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moved for summary judgment on the nine claims brought in the suit and this court proceeded to
rule.4 Plaintiffs prevailed on eight of their nine claims:
(1)
“Track 3” of USCIS’s multi-track policy violated the Settlement Agreement;
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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(2)
USCIS’s denial of Hajro’s request for expedited processing violated the Settlement
Agreement;
(3)
The timing of USCIS’s response to Hajro with the requested material violated FOIA
Section 552(a)(6)(A) and 6 C.F.R. § 5.6(b);
(4)
USCIS’s failure to notify Hajro of the “unusual circumstances” preventing USCIS
from processing his FOIA request within the 20-day statutory limit violated 6
C.F.R. § 5.5(c)(1);
(5)
USCIS had a pattern or practice of failing to comply with the timing requirements
set forth by FOIA Sections 552(a)(6)(A), (B), (C);
(6)
USCIS unlawfully withheld the information requested by Hajro in violation of
FOIA Section 551 et seq. and 555(b);
(7)
USCIS’s withholding of nonexempt material violated Hajro’s due process rights
because of the consequential interference with his ability to adequately appeal his
naturalization denial; and
(8)
USCIS’s adoption of the “Track 3” policy without notice and comment rulemaking
procedure violated Section 553 of the APA.
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Holder prevailed on his summary judgment motion, and all claims against him were dismissed.5
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The motions of Napolitano, Cejka, and Melville were granted as to Plaintiffs’ FOIA claims.6
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See Hajro, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 1099-1100.
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Id.
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Id.
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Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
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USCIS was granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs’ ninth claim that the “Track 3” policy
violated the Fifth Amendment guarantee of equal protection.7
The court later issued a permanent injunction mandating that Defendants comply with their
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obligations under FOIA, specifically 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6), and under the Settlement Agreement.8
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Defendants have appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where the case is currently
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pending. While awaiting the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Plaintiffs’ counsel has moved to recover
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attorneys’ fees for his representation in this court.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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FOIA authorizes the court to “assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and
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other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant
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has substantially prevailed.”9 An award of fees is not mandatory under the Act; it lies within the
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discretion of the court.10 To determine whether a fee award is appropriate, the court must consider
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whether plaintiffs are both eligible for and entitled to recovery.11 Plaintiffs are eligible if they have
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substantially prevailed on their action, which generally requires that they show two criteria have
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been met: (1) “filing of the FOIA action was necessary to obtain the information sought” and (2)
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“the action had a ‘substantial causative effect’ on the ultimate receipt of that information.”12
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Assuming plaintiffs have met the threshold eligibility requirement, the court must then
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determine whether they are entitled to fees. The court evaluates four factors: (1) “the public benefit
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from disclosure”; (2) “any commercial benefit to the plaintiff resulting from disclosure”; (3) “the
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Id.
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See Docket No. 87.
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5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E).
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See Long v. U.S. IRS, 932 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1991).
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See id.
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Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
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nature of the plaintiff’s interest in the disclosed records”; and (4) “whether the government’s
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withholding of the records had a reasonable basis in law.”13 The court also may consider
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“whatever factors it deems relevant in determining whether an award of attorney’s fees is
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appropriate.”14
If the court finds plaintiffs are both eligible for and entitled to fee recovery, plaintiffs must
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provide the court with their fee bill “for its scrutiny of the reasonableness of (a) the number of
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hours expended and (b) the hourly fee claimed.”15 If both the number of hours and the hourly fee
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are reasonable, this lodestar figure enjoys a “strong presumption” that it “represents a reasonable
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fee.”16 The court may, however, “authorize an upward or downward adjustment from the lodestar
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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figure if certain factors relating to the nature and difficulty of the case overcome [the] strong
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presumption.”17
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III. DISCUSSION
A.
Delay of Motion
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In their written objection to Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees, Defendants argued that
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the court should stay the motion pending outcome of their appeal to the Ninth Circuit.18 At oral
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argument, however, Defendants suggested that they were not, in fact, seeking a stay but merely
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opposing Plaintiff’s motion with an argument regarding its timeliness. Plaintiffs responded that
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Id.
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Church of Scientology v. U.S. Postal Serv., 700 F.2d 486, 492 (9th Cir. 1983) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
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Long, 932 F.2d at 1313-14.
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Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 n.8 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Long, 932 F.2d at 1314; see also Morales, 96 F.3d at 363-64.
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See Docket No. 99.
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Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
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their inability to collect post-judgment interest until the court issued a decision on their motion
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would be injurious, especially in light of the amount of time an appeal could take.19
The court must confess that in light of their statements at the hearing, Defendants’ present
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position is not entirely clear. But understanding that Defendants in any event believe Plaintiffs’
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request is premature, the court begins by noting it “has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an
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incident to its power to control its own docket.”20 Defendants have argued that staying Plaintiffs’
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motion is a proper exercise of that discretion in light of the interests of judicial economy to avoid
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having the court’s fee order rendered moot if the order granting Plaintiffs summary judgment is
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reversed. Defendants point to Karuk Tribe of California v. U.S. Forest Service to support their
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
position.21 In Karuk, the district court granted a stay on the plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees in
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the interests of judicial economy and to avoid overcompensation of the plaintiff.22
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Karuk is distinguishable. There, the plaintiff had lost or settled all of its claims and had
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appealed the claims on which it had lost.23 Here, Plaintiffs have prevailed on all but one of their
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claims. In light of the Plaintiffs’ success in this court and the potential loss of post-judgment
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interest that would occur absent an order regarding attorneys’ fees,24 the court will not postpone
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Plaintiffs’ motion.25 This case has been delayed enough.
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See Docket No. 100.
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Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 707-08 (1997).
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See Case No. Civ. 04-4275(SBA), 2006 WL 228943, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2006).
Defendants cite two out-of-district cases, Glaxo Group, Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 2d 772
(N.D. Ill. 2003) and 1st Westco Corp. v. Sch. Dist. Of Philadelphia, CIV A. 91-2727, 1993 WL
117539 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1991). Although informative, these cases are not binding on the court’s
determination.
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Id.
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Id.
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See Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 487 F.2d 672, 676 (9th Cir. 1973).
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Cf. Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717, 725 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting interim fee awards
under FOIA should “be available to enable meritorious litigation to continue”).
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Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
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B.
Applicability of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)
Before determining Plaintiffs’ eligibility or entitlement to fees, the court must first address
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to which of Plaintiffs’ claims Section 552(a)(4)(E) applies. As noted previously, Section
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552(a)(4)(E) provides:
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The court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation
costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant has
substantially prevailed.
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The issue before the court is the breadth of the phrase “any case under this section.” Plaintiffs
understandably seek a broad interpretation of the phrase, to include “any FOIA action whether the
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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claim is based on FOIA, the APA, the Constitution, the violation of a settlement agreement, or any
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other legal tool used to improve FOIA processing.”26 Defendants, just as understandably, argue for
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a narrow interpretation, to allow attorneys’ fees only where plaintiffs have obtained a court order
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“requiring disclosure of agency records improperly withheld.”27 The court divides the claims into
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three groups: (1) Claims Three, Four, Five, and Six, which are direct causes of action under FOIA;
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(2) Claims One and Two, which concern violations of the Settlement Agreement; and (3) Claims
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Seven, Eight, and Nine, which concern Hajro’s due process rights, and whether Defendants’ policy
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violated the APA or the Equal Protection Clause.
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1.
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To the extent that Plaintiffs’ claims secured access to documents Defendants otherwise
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Claims Three, Four, Five, and Six
withheld, both the statute and the case law support application of Section 552(a)(4)(E).28 Causes of
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action may also arise under FOIA for an agency’s pattern and practice of violating the Act’s
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Docket No. 106 at 4.
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Docket No. 105 at 4.
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See, e.g., Long, 932 F.2d at 1314 (seeking records from the IRS); Hiken v. Dep’t of Defense,
Case No. C 06-02812 JW, 2012 WL 3686747, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2012) (seeking records
from Department of Defense).
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Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
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mandates29 and for an agency’s undue delay providing documents to a requester.30 Plaintiffs’
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claims regarding Defendants’ pattern or practice of violating FOIA through untimely responses and
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Hajro’s individual claims regarding the delay of Defendants’ production, therefore, fall within the
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umbrella of Section 552(a)(4)(E)’s “any case under this section” language. Accordingly, Section
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552(a)(4)(E) applies to Claim Three (untimely response under FOIA to Hajro’s request for
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documents); Claim Four (untimely explanation under FOIA of Defendants’ decision not to
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expedite Hajro’s request); Claim Five (pattern or practice of violating FOIA’s time limits); and
Claim Six (withholding documents in violation of FOIA).
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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2.
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The applicability of Section 552(a)(4)(E) to Plaintiffs’ claims regarding the Settlement
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Claims One and Two
Agreement requires further discussion. Plaintiffs sought from this court a declaration that
Defendants’ policies and procedures for handling FOIA requests violated the Settlement
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Agreement. Obtaining a settlement agreement when a case is brought under FOIA satisfies the
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“substantially prevailed” requirement,31 but that reasoning does not apply in this case. Here, Hajro
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See Mayock v. Nelson, 938 F.2d 1006, 1007 (9th Cir. 1991); Liverman v. Office of Inspector
General, 139 Fed. Appx. 942, 944 (10th Cir. 2005); Payne Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S., 837 F.2d 486,
491 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Gilmore v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1186 (N.D. Cal.
1998).
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See Gilmore, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1187 (finding court had jurisdiction to hear case regarding
untimely responses because of substantial support that “strongly suggests that an agency’s failure
to comply with the FOIA’s time limits is, by itself, a violation of the FOIA, and is an improper
withholding of the requested documents”); see also Payne Enterprises, Inc., 837 F.2d at 491
(noting courts “have long recognized that there may very well be circumstances in which
prolonged delay in making information available or unacceptably onerous opportunities for
viewing disclosed information require judicial intervention”) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
31
See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 604 (2001) (noting settlement agreements with consent decrees satisfy the “substantially
prevailed” requirement under Fair Housing Amendments Act and American with Disabilities Act);
Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 451 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding same under 42
U.S.C. § 1988); Davy v. CIA, 456 F.3d 152, (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding same under FOIA).
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ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
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and Mayock sought to enforce the Settlement Agreement, which is not in and of itself a case
brought under FOIA and therefore not obviously within the scope of Section 552(a)(4)(E).
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger is instructive in
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determining the applicability of Section 552(a)(4)(E) to Claims One and Two.32 There, the
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plaintiff, a non-profit organization producing literature and advocating for prisoners, had
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negotiated a settlement agreement with the defendants, the California Department of Corrections
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and Rehabilitation and various state officials, regarding the defendants’ practice of censoring
prisoners’ First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights.33 After entering a settlement
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For the Northern District of California
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agreement, the plaintiff continued to monitor the defendants’ compliance with the agreement, with
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the district court retaining jurisdiction over the dispute.34 The plaintiff moved for an award of
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attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for its work monitoring the defendants’ actions, despite not
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having brought an action complaining of noncompliance or obtaining any further judicial action
regarding the substance of the earlier claims.35
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The Ninth Circuit held 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the fee provision for actions brought pursuant to §
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1983, permitted attorneys’ fees awards for parties who monitor compliance with settlement
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agreements they obtained in earlier actions in which they substantially prevailed.36 The fact that
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the plaintiff’s subsequent monitoring did not lead “to any judicially sanctioned relief” was
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irrelevant to the determination – the monitoring itself was sufficient to authorize a fee award.37
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608 F.3d 446 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Id. at 448.
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Id. at 449.
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Id.
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Id. at 452.
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Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 561
(1986)); see also Balla v. Idaho, 677 F.3d 910, 917-18 (9th Cir. 2012) (reaffirming the holding in
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Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Although Prison Legal News dealt with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not FOIA, the reasoning applies
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here with equal force.38 Mayock prevailed in the earlier litigation with INS by obtaining the
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Settlement Agreement. This case was brought to ensure Defendants’ compliance with the
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Settlement Agreement. Mayock, like the plaintiff in Prison Legal News, was monitoring
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Defendants’ compliance, and therefore is permitted to recover attorneys’ fees under FOIA’s
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provisions.39 That Mayock brought a successful action to force compliance – unlike the plaintiff in
Prison Legal News who neither brought an action nor obtained further judicial enforcement40 – is
merely additional evidence that Mayock is eligible for attorneys’ fees.41 Accordingly, Section
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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552(a)(4)(E) applies to Claim One (“Track 3” violates the Settlement Agreement) and Claim Two
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(Defendants’ response to Hajro violated the Settlement Agreement).
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3.
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Claims Seven, Eight and Nine
Plaintiffs argue that because Claims Seven, Eight and Nine are related to Defendants’
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violation of FOIA, Section 552(a)(4)(E) equally applies to them. Claim Seven involves the
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violation of Hajro’s due process rights in his immigration hearing resulting from the delay in
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Defendants’ response to his FOIA request. In Claim Eight, Plaintiffs successfully argued
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Defendants’ Track 3 policy violated the APA’s requirement of notice and comment before
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Prison Legal News that actions brought to monitor compliance are eligible for attorneys’ fees
awards).
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See Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717, 724 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that FOIA’s fee
provision is comparable to the fee provision in 42 U.S.C. § 1988); see also S. Rep. 93-854, at16972 (1974) (pointing to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b) and 2000e-5(k) in explaining purpose and function
of FOIA’s attorney fee provision). Cf. Del. Valley, 478 U.S. at 561 (looking to Civil Rights Act to
interpret Clean Air Act’s attorneys’ fees provision).
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See Prison Legal News, 608 F.3d at 452; Balla, 677 F.3d at 918.
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608 F.3d at 452.
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See Balla, 677 F.3d at 918 (noting plaintiffs who brought motion seeking compliance with
settlement agreement but was denied remained entitled to attorneys’ fees because of role in
monitoring compliance).
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ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
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instituting a new rule. In Claim Nine, Plaintiffs did not prevail on their argument that Defendants’
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policy violated the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs argue that the three claims arise out of
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Defendants’ violation of FOIA, and that due process, equal protection, and APA causes of action
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are merely tools by which to enforce FOIA.
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In support of this position, Plaintiffs point to two decisions: Mayock v. INS and Oregon
Natural Desert Association v. Locke. The district court in Mayock v. INS, the primogenitor of this
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case, awarded attorneys’ fees under Section 552(a)(4)(E) because it found INS had violated the
FOIA through its pattern and practice of untimely responses.42
In the second case, Oregon Natural Desert Association v. Locke, the Ninth Circuit
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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interpreted the term “any case under this section” in Section 552(a)(4)(E) to include “a case
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challenging the validity of a regulation governing the processing of FOIA requests” and authorized
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an award of attorney fees under that construction.43 At issue in Locke was the National Oceanic
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and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries’ regulation that defined responsive documents as those
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within the administration’s possession and control at the time that it received a request.44 In
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conjunction with seeking a court order to produce requested documents, the plaintiff also
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challenged the validity of the regulation and prevailed.45 The district court noted that the plaintiff
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was eligible for attorneys’ fees under Section 552(a)(4)(E) despite the Defendants’ claim that the
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plaintiff “was not seeking relief available under FOIA, namely, the release of documents.”46
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Because the plaintiff “was challenging a regulation which [the court] found violated FOIA,” the
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736 F. Supp. 1561, 1563 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
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572 F.3d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 2009).
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See id.; see also 15 C.F.R. § 4.5(a) (prior to amendment).
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Locke, 572 F.3d at 613.
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Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Gutierrez, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1099 (D. Or. 2006) (overruled on
other grounds).
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ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
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court reasoned it was “eligible to receive attorney fees under FOIA.”47 On review, the Ninth
Circuit agreed.48
Neither Mayock nor Locke stand for the proposition that violations of other rights – such as
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due process, equal protection, or protections afforded by the APA – that occur in parallel with
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FOIA violations permit an award of attorneys’ fees under Section 552(a)(4)(E). In both cases, the
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courts found the defendants’ actions violated the FOIA itself. In Mayock, INS’s practice and
pattern of delayed responses violated FOIA’s time limit requirements,49 and in Locke, NOAA’s
regulation regarding the cut-off dates for document searches violated FOIA’s mandates regarding
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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turning over all relevant documents within the possession and control of the agency.50 Neither
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Locke nor Mayock, therefore, support Plaintiffs’ expansive interpretation of Section 552(a)(4)(E).
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Plaintiffs also point to the legislative history of Section 552(a)(4)(E) to suggest that their
broad reading is appropriate. Congress added the attorneys’ fees provision to FOIA in 1974 as a
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method “crucial to effectuating the original congressional intent that judicial review be available to
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reverse agency refusals to adhere strictly to the Act’s mandates.”51 The history continues:
Congress has established in the FOIA a national policy of disclosure of government
information, and the committee finds it appropriate and desirable, in order to effectuate that
policy, to provide for the assessment of attorneys’ fees against the government where the
plaintiff prevails in FOIA litigation.52
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In 2007, Congress amended § 552(a)(4)(E) to extend its application to cases where plaintiffs who
obtain relief through “a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if [their] claim is
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Id.
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48
Locke, 572 F.3d at 618.
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49
See 736 F. Supp. at 1561.
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See Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Gutierrez, 419 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1286 (D. Or. 2006).
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S. Rep. 93-854, at 169-72 (1974).
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Id.
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Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
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not insubstantial.”53 In so doing, Congress endorsed the “catalyst theory” that permitted recovery
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of attorneys’ fees if the agency’s change in position resulted from only the initiation of litigation.54
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Congress also overturned the Supreme Court’s decision rejecting that theory and holding recovery
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was only permissible when plaintiffs obtained a judicial order or settlement agreement.55
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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The legislative history, to be sure, supports a policy of authorizing attorneys’ fees awards
when violations of FOIA occur, most notably when agencies improperly withhold documents or act
in an “obdurate” manner.56 But nothing in this history suggests the intrusion of parallel rights, like
due process, resulting from the same set of actions that violate FOIA – namely, withholding or
delaying the production of documents – sustains recovery under Section 552(a)(4)(E).
11
12
13
Because Plaintiffs have provided no case law that supports their broad reading of Section
552(a)(4)(E) and because the legislative history lends no further support to their interpretation, the
court declines Plaintiffs’ invitation to read expansively the recovery permissible under Section
14
552(a)(4)(E). Accordingly, Section 552(a)(4)(E) does not apply to Claims Seven, Eight, or Nine.
15
16
C.
Eligibility for Attorneys’ Fees
Having determined that § 552(a)(4)(E) applies only to Claims One through Six, the court
17
18
turns now to determining whether Plaintiffs are eligible for attorneys’ fees for these claims.
19
Plaintiffs argue that because they prevailed on their summary judgment motions on Claims One
20
through Six, they have substantially prevailed on the claims and are eligible for attorneys’ fees.
21
As to Claims One and Two, Defendants argue only that § 552(a)(4)(E) does not apply to
22
causes of action arising under the Settlement Agreement. The court has addressed and disposed of
23
24
25
26
27
53
OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 4, 121 Stat. 2524 (2007).
54
See Church of Scientology v. U.S. Postal Serv., 700 F.2d 486, 492 (9th Cir. 1983).
55
See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 532 U.S.
598, 605 (2001).
56
28
See S. Rep. 93-854, at 172.
13
Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
1
that argument; monitoring compliance is sufficient to warrant an award of attorneys’ fees.57
2
Because the Plaintiffs prevailed on summary judgment of Claims One and Two, which resulted in
3
injunctive relief requiring Defendants to comply with the Settlement Agreement, they have
4
substantially prevailed and are eligible for attorneys’ fees for Claims One and Two.58
5
6
Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs did not substantially prevail on Claims Three, Four,
Five, and Six, which involve their violations of FOIA’s requirements for processing information
7
8
requests. As Defendants explains, they had identified and provided to Hajro all of the documents
relevant to his request by March 4, 2008 – six days before Hajro and Mayock initiated this action.
10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
9
As to the court’s order that Defendants turn over the notes of an officer adjudicating Hajro’s 2003
11
application, Defendants opine that it “was not information sought by Hajro,” and so before the
12
litigation even began, “Hajro obtained all of the records he sought.”59 Defendants conclude,
13
therefore, that Hajro did not meet the necessary standard because the litigation did not cause receipt
14
of his records.
15
Underlying Defendants’ argument is an assumption that Claims Three through Six all
16
17
concern improperly withholding responsive documents in violation of FOIA. Claims Three and
18
Four, however, stem from separate causes of action: the delay in Hajro’s receipt of the responsive
19
documents and notice of Defendants’ decision. Relief for these claims, therefore, is predicated on
20
when Hajro received the responsive documents, not if he received the responsive documents.60
21
Defendants’ delivery of responsive documents prior to the initiation of the court proceedings does
22
not address the four-month delay in notifying Hajro about its decision regarding his document
23
57
See Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 451 (9th Cir. 2010).
58
See Long v. U.S. IRS, 932 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1991).
26
59
Docket No. 105.
27
60
24
25
28
See Payne Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S., 837 F.2d 486, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Gilmore v. U.S. Dept. of
Energy, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1186 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
14
Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
1
request. Hajro prevailed on his summary judgment motion regarding those claims, and as a result,
2
obtained injunctive relief ensuring that Defendants will comply with FOIA’s time limits. His
3
success on Claims Three and Four resulted in a judicial order, which satisfies the threshold
4
eligibility requirement under § 552(a)(4)(E).61
5
6
In a similar vein, Claim Five concerned not the improper withholding of responsive
documents but a separate cause of action: Defendants’ pattern or practice of violating FOIA’s time
7
8
limits. Hajro’s receipt of the documents prior to the initiation of this case does not affect whether
he and Mayock substantially prevailed in their claim that in its furnishing of responsive documents
10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
9
Defendants had a pattern and practice of violating FOIA’s time mandates. As with Hajro’s claims
11
regarding Defendants’ delay in delivering responsive documents, they prevailed on their summary
12
judgment motion on Claim Five, which resulted in injunctive relief requiring Defendants to end its
13
pattern and practice of violating FOIA. Accordingly, Plaintiffs substantially prevailed on Claim
14
Five and are eligible for attorneys’ fees.
15
Claim Six is the only cause of action concerning Defendants’ withholding responsive
16
17
documents from Hajro. Defendants’ argument, however, that the documents the court ordered it to
18
turn over to Hajro were not within his request is unpersuasive. Hajro sought any and all records
19
reflecting that he provided false testimony to an immigration officer. Of the 356 entire pages and 8
20
partial pages that Defendants initially furnished and the 12 pages it subsequently turned over, none
21
contained a reference about his alleged false testimony. Defendants withheld 86 pages under the
22
deliberative process privilege, but provided no details regarding the contents of those pages beyond
23
24
boilerplate language regarding their creation during the deliberative process. The court found that
25
Defendants failed to meet their burden to exempt those documents and ordered Defendants to
26
supply Hajro with the factually responsive document.
27
61
28
See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(I) (“For purposes of this subparagraph, a complainant has
substantially prevailed if the complainant has obtained relief through . . . judicial order . . . .”).
15
Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Defendants now claim that the document with the information relevant to Hajro’s request
1
2
does not exist, and so Hajro received all of the documents he requested in Defendants’ initial
3
disclosure.62 But even where defendants ultimately prevail on a dispute regarding proper
4
withholding of documents, plaintiffs who succeed in forcing a defendant into some action as a
5
result of the initiation of litigation has changed the legal relationship.63 That change supports
6
plaintiffs’ argument that they have substantially prevailed.64 Here, as a result of his request, Hajro
7
8
9
obtained an injunction requiring Defendants to isolate and furnish documents relating to his false
testimony, which in turn resulted in Defendants’ admission that documents with the facts he
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
requested did not exist. Hajro significantly altered the relationship between him and Defendants,
11
and as a result, he has substantially prevailed on Claim Six and is eligible for attorneys’ fees.
12
D.
13
Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees
Having determined that Plaintiffs substantially prevailed on Claims One through Six and
14
are eligible for attorneys’ fees, the court now turns to whether Plaintiffs are entitled to an award
15
16
under Section 552(a)(4)(E). The court must consider at least four factors in its determination: (1)
17
the public benefit from disclosure; (2) any commercial benefit to the plaintiff resulting from
18
disclosure; (3) the nature of the plaintiff’s interest in the disclosed records; and (4) whether the
19
government’s withholding of the records had a reasonable basis in law.65 As the parties have not
20
21
22
23
24
62
The court is troubled by this admission in light of the fact that the basis for denying Hajro’s
application centered entirely on the allegation that he falsely testified to an immigration officer.
63
See Nw. Coal. for Alternatives to Pesticides v. EPA, 421 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127 (D.D.C. 2006).
26
64
Id.
27
65
25
28
See Am. Small Bus. League v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Case No. C 08-00829 MHP, 2009 WL
1011632, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2009).
16
Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
1
2
argued any other factors for determining entitlement to attorneys’ fees, the court limits its
discussion to the four required factors.66
3
1.
4
In considering the public benefit of actions brought under FOIA, courts should “take into
5
6
7
8
Public Benefit
account the degree of dissemination and the likely public impact that might result from
disclosure.”67 “[A]n award of attorney’s fees is not favored when it merely subsidizes a matter of
private concern.”68 But “[a] public benefit may result even though the specific document is sought
for plaintiff’s sole use.”69 For example, a “ruling which establishes that the government may not
10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
9
withhold certain information pursuant to a particular FOIA exemption” or an order establishing
11
“the principle that there are some exceptional cases where the government must specifically
12
process requests for information on a priority basis” qualify as public benefits, even if the
13
documents sought were for private use.70
14
Plaintiffs sought in Claims One and Two enforcement of the Settlement Agreement, which
15
16
had been negotiated to end a previous pattern or practice of FOIA violations by INS, USCIS’s
17
predecessor. In Claim Five, Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to end Defendants’ pattern and
18
practice of violating FOIA’s time limit requirements. By obtaining injunctive relief mandating
19
Defendants comply with its obligations under the Settlement Agreement and FOIA, Plaintiffs have
20
benefitted other applicants seeking records to aid in disputes with Defendants. The public benefit
21
factor weighs in favor of awarding fees for Claims One, Two, and Five.
22
23
66
Id.
24
67
Church of Scientology v. U.S. Postal Serv., 700 F.2d 486, 493 (9th Cir. 1983).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
25
26
27
28
17
Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
As for Claims Three and Four, Hajro sought injunctive relief for potential future delays in
1
2
any subsequent FOIA requests he may make in an individual capacity. Although the injunctive
3
relief sought primarily benefited Hajro in his private capacity, it also established that in cases
4
where due process concerns arise, such as citizenship status proceedings, Defendants must expedite
5
their decisions on FOIA requests. The court thus finds the public benefit factor weighs in favor of
6
awarding fees for Claims Three and Four.
7
In Claim Six, Hajro sought documents relating to alleged false testimony leading to the
8
denial of his naturalization request. Plaintiffs do not provide specific arguments explaining how
10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
9
Hajro’s request for documents for his personal dispute with Defendants provides a public benefit.
11
They point only to the overarching goal of their case to alter Defendants’ FOIA’s policies. Hajro’s
12
request for documents for personal use may have initiated the ensuing claims, but Claim Six, on its
13
own, does not provide a public benefit. The court thus finds the public benefit factor does not
14
weigh in favor of awarding fees for Claim Six.
15
2.
16
Commercial Interests and Nature of Plaintiffs’ Interest in the Action
Courts must consider to what degree plaintiffs commercially benefit from their claims.
17
18
“[I]f the potential for private commercial benefit was sufficient incentive to encourage . . . pursuit
19
of [a] claim, it would not be improper for [a] district court to deny [an] attorney’s fees request.”71
20
Commercial interest is often considered simultaneously with the nature of the plaintiff’s interest in
21
the action.72 “If either commercial benefit will inure to the plaintiff from the information or
22
plaintiff intends to protect a private interest . . . an award of attorney’s fees is not recoverable.”73
23
24
25
Id. at 494.
72
Id.
73
26
71
Id.
27
28
18
Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Through Claims One, Two, and Five, Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to correct the
1
2
Defendants’ practice and pattern of violating its obligations under FOIA. Hajro is a private citizen
3
and nothing in the evidence before the court suggests he has any commercial interest in pursuing
4
these claims. Although he may receive some personal benefit from the change in Defendants’
5
policy, the public benefit from the injunctive relief he pursued reflects that he sought more than
6
just to protect a private interest. Mayock is an immigration attorney who may achieve some
7
8
9
financial benefit from Defendants’ change in policy, but as noted in Mayock v. INS, by pursuing
claims to correct patterns and practices violating FOIA, Mayock obtained relief “not just for
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
himself, but also for other litigants and attorneys.”74 As such, he argues that it was “more a public
11
benefit than a commercial interest.”75 The court agrees. The overarching lack of commercial
12
interest and the nature of Plaintiffs’ interests weigh in favor of granting attorneys’ fees for Claims
13
One, Two, and Five.
14
As to Claims Three, Four, and Six, as noted above, Hajro is a private person and nothing in
15
16
the evidence suggests Hajro has any commercial interests in pursuing claims for Defendants’
17
failure to comply with FOIA’s time limits or to comply with its FOIA obligations to supply
18
responsive documents. Hajro’s interest in those claims, however, was personal: he sought
19
injunctive relief to protect his private interest in speedily obtaining documents to succeed in his
20
naturalization dispute with Defendants. Although the lack of commercial interest weighs in favor
21
of granting attorneys’ fees for Claims Three, Four, and Six, the personal nature of Hajro’s interest
22
in the claims weighs against it.
23
24
25
26
74
736 F. Supp. 1561, 1563 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
75
Id.
27
28
19
Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
3.
1
Reasonable Basis in Law
The fourth factor courts must consider is to what degree the agency’s position is reasonably
2
3
based in the law. Under this criterion, “a court would not award fees where the government’s
4
withholding had a colorable basis in law but would ordinarily award them if the withholding
5
appeared to be merely to avoid embarrassment or frustrate the requester.”76
6
Defendants, perhaps with good reason, do not provide an argument suggesting their pattern
7
8
9
and practice of consistently straying from their obligations under FOIA had a reasonable basis in
law. As the court noted in its order granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs on Claims One, Two,
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
and Five regarding Defendants’ pattern and practice of untimely responses, “the experiences of
11
Plaintiffs establish a pattern or practice of violations” and Defendants failed even to assert that they
12
were in compliance with FOIA’s time limits.77 Because Defendants’ violations have no reasonable
13
basis in the law, this factor weighs in favor of granting attorneys’ fees for Claims One, Two, and
14
Five.
15
Defendants argue, however, that as to Claims Three, Four, and Six concerning Hajro’s
16
17
personal causes of action for the delay and withholding of information, the delay and withholding
18
were the result of “bureaucratic difficulty in handling” instead of bad faith. Such bureaucratic
19
inefficiency, Defendants argue, cannot be the basis of an attorneys’ fees award. Instead, according
20
to Defendants, only obdurate behavior or bad faith will tilt this final factor in Plaintiffs’ direction.78
21
22
76
Church of Scientology, 700 F.2d at 492 n.6 (quoting S. Rep. 93-854, at 172).
77
Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship & Immig. Serv., 832 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
23
24
78
25
26
27
28
See Read v. FAA, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1111 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (“[T]he Court recognizes that
delay due to bureaucratic ineptitude alone is not sufficient to weigh in favor of an award of
attorney’s fees”); Ellis v. United States, 941 F. Supp. 1068, 1080 (D. Utah 1996) (noting that where
“plaintiffs’ challenge is to the government’s delay in releasing the records rather than its
substantive claims of exemption, the reasonableness factor does not favor a fee award so long as
the government did not engage in obdurate behavior or bad faith”).
20
Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
1
Hajro’s claims, however, arise out of Defendants’ practice of consistently violating FOIA’s
2
time requirements. The delay in responding to his request was not an isolated event, such that
3
Defendants could point to bureaucratic inefficiency as the sole cause of his injury. Plaintiffs
4
brought forward at least twenty-six other attorneys who have experienced similar delays in
5
responses. Defendants failed to comply with its obligations under both FOIA and the Settlement
6
Agreement to ensure FOIA requesters with rights at risk were given high-priority status. Hajro was
7
8
9
just one victim of that pattern or practice.
The court also notes that Defendants’ inability to produce documents containing facts about
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
Hajro’s alleged false testimony suggests that Defendants’ delays and withholding may not have
11
been in good faith. Rather than admitting early in the FOIA procedures that they possessed no
12
documents responsive to Hajro’s limited request for evidence of his alleged false testimony, it
13
produced documents without that evidence and claimed the rest were exempt. Hajro was forced to
14
initiate this action to obtain from Defendants an admission that evidence upon which his
15
16
naturalization application was denied was not within its records. Defendants may seek to claim
17
that this is the result of bureaucratic inefficiency, but the evidence suggests its actions teeter on the
18
edge of obduracy.
19
20
21
The court finds that for Claims Three, Four, and Six the fourth factor weighs in favor of
granting attorneys’ fees.
Having considered the weight of the four factors on each of Plaintiffs’ eligible claims, the
22
court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees for Claims One, Two, and Five because all
23
24
four of the factors weigh heavily in favor of granting a fee award. The court finds that Plaintiffs
25
are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees for Claims Three and Four regarding the delay in responding
26
to Hajro’s request. The court found three of the four factors weighed in favor of awarding fees and
27
the fourth factor, Hajro’s personal interest in the claims, does not weigh strongly against.
28
21
Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
The court finds that Claim Six concerning the withholding of Hajro’s requested documents
1
2
is also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees. The court notes Hajro’s private interest and the lack
3
of public benefit from the disclosure of the documents weigh against a grant of attorneys’ fees and
4
only two of the four factors weigh in favor of granting attorneys’ fees: Defendants’ lack of a
5
reasonable basis in law for withholding the information and Hajro’s lack of commercial interest.
6
Although the factors are evenly split, the court weighs Defendants’ unreasonable stance more
7
8
9
heavily in light of the purposes of Section 552(a)(4)(E). Congress intended with the provision to
incentivize plaintiffs to ensure open government and vindicate their rights by removing the
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
obstacle of attorneys’ fees.79 The court thus finds Hajro is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees
11
under Section 552(a)(4)(E).
12
E.
13
Reasonableness of the Fees Requested
Having concluded that Plaintiffs are eligible for and entitled to attorneys’ fees under
14
Section 552(a)(4)(E) for Claims One through Six, the court turns now to Plaintiffs’ fee request. To
15
16
determine a reasonable fee award, the court begins with the lodestar: reasonable rates multiplied by
17
reasonable hours expended.80 The resulting figure is presumptively reasonable.81 But “[t]he
18
product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the inquiry.”82 The court may
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
79
See Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717, 724 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that “the FOIA
attorney’s fee provision shares many of § 1988’s objectives: . . . to insure that private citizens have
meaningful opportunity to vindicate their rights protected by [FOIA] . . . and unless reasonable
attorney’s fees could be awarded for bringing these actions, Congress found that many legitimate
claims would not be redressed”); Manos v. U.S. Dept. of Air Force, 829 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (same).
80
See Hiken v. DOD, Case No. C 06-02812 JW, 2012 WL 3686747, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21,
2012).
81
See id.
82
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983).
27
28
22
Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
1
2
also consider any of the Kerr factors that have not already been subsumed in the initial lodestar
determination that support either an upward or downward adjustment of the lodestar.83
3
1.
4
Attorneys’ fees awards may only include hours “reasonably expended” on the litigation.84
5
6
Hours Expended
Hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” must be excluded.85 The court
“must base its determination whether to award fees for counsel’s work on its judgment as to
7
8
whether the work product . . . was both useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance the . . .
litigation.”86 In light of the fact that “awarding attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties . . . is a tedious
10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
9
business,” the court “should normally grant the award in full” if the party opposing the fee request
11
“cannot come up with specific reasons for reducing the fee request.”87 Fees may also be recovered
12
for work performed on motions for attorneys’ fees.88
13
Plaintiffs have requested fees for three attorneys as follows:
14
Kip Evan Steinberg
15
16
17
18
19
Total Hours: 489.3
20
21
22
2007: 20.9 hours at $550 per hour = $11,495
2008: 176.1 hours at $550 per hour = $96,855
2009: 180.3 hours at $600 per hour = $108,180
2010: 22.2 hours at $600 per hour = $13,320
2011: 62.2 hours at $625 per hour = $38,875
2012: 27.6 hours at $625 per hour = $17,250
Total Fees Requested: $285,975
83
Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Kerr v. Screen Guild
Extras, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975).
84
See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.
85
Id.
86
Armstrong v. Davis, 318 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2003).
26
87
Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1116 (9th Cir. 2008).
27
88
23
24
25
28
See Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163-65 (1990); Thompson v. Gomez, 45 F.3d 1365,
1368 (9th Cir. 1995).
23
Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
1
Eric Walter Rathhaus
2
3
2008-2011: 29.3 hours at $450 per hour = $13,185
Robert De Vries
4
5
2008: 0.4 hours at $550 per hour = $220
2009: 4.8 hours at $600 per hour = $2880
6
They have requested recovery for costs totaling $2,159.12. Plaintiffs also request attorneys’ fees
7
and costs for work performed on this motion: 44.4 hours at $625 per hour, for a total of $21,500
8
and $287.17 in costs.
9
Defendants object to Plaintiffs’ fee requests as unreasonable.
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
a.
Time on Claims Ineligible for Recovery
11
Defendants argue first that Plaintiffs’ hours are unreasonable because they include time
12
13
spent on claims for which FOIA does not provide recovery, namely those claims arising under the
14
Settlement Agreement, the APA, or the Constitution. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ counsel’s records do not
15
differentiate among the various claims in this case. To the extent that the claims arising under the
16
17
Settlement Agreement fall within the undifferentiated fees, the court has already determined
Plaintiffs are entitled to fee recovery for those claims. The question remains, however, to what
18
19
extent Plaintiffs may recover attorneys’ fees for the three claims to which FOIA does not apply.
The due process, Equal Protection, and APA claims are analogous to state law pendant
20
21
claims brought alongside constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.89 Standing alone, state
22
law pendant claims cannot be the basis for attorneys’ fees recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the
23
relevant fee provision.90 But when plaintiffs prevail on their constitutional claims, they may also
24
25
26
27
89
See Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039, 1050 (9th Cir. 1985) (overruled on other
grounds); see also Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717, 724 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting courts
view FOIA and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 “as comparable”).
90
28
See Mateyko v. Felix, 924 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1990).
24
Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
1
recover for pendant claims stemming from a “common nucleus of operative facts.”91 In light of the
2
overlap in interpretations of Section 552(a)(4)(E) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988,92 the court adopts that
3
reasoning here.
4
5
6
The due process, Equal Protection, and APA claims arose from Defendants’ untimely
response to Plaintiffs’ requests for documents under FOIA. They share a “common nucleus of
operative facts” with the claims for the direct FOIA violations and for which Plaintiffs can recover
7
8
attorneys’ fees. The due process, Equal Protection, and APA claims derive from the same set of
facts as the FOIA claims: Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs with requested documents within
10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
9
the timeframe required by FOIA.93 Plaintiffs can, therefore, recover attorneys’ fees for their due
11
process, Equal Protection and APA claims. In other words, Claims Seven through Nine, standing
12
alone, do not qualify for fee recovery under Section 552(a)(4)(E). But because they accompany
13
and relate to Claims One through Six, which do qualify for fees under Section 552(a)(4)(E), the
14
court may award attorneys fees for them.
15
Plaintiffs prevailed on their due process and APA claims but lost on the Equal Protection
16
17
claim. To determine whether it should reduce Plaintiffs’ fees as a result, the court engages in a two
18
part inquiry.94 The court must first determine whether the successful and unsuccessful claims are
19
91
See Carreras, 768 F.2d at 1050.
92
See Rosenfeld v. United States, 859 F.2d 717, 724 (9th Cir. 1988).
20
21
93
22
23
24
25
26
Cf. Carreras, 768 F.2d at 1041-43 (finding fee award appropriate where plaintiffs prevailed on
state constitutional grounds for same state actions also giving rise to federal constitutional issue on
which district court refrained from ruling); Hall v. W. Production Co., 988 F.2d 1050, 1056-57
(10th Cir. 1993) (finding fee award for breach of contract claim appropriate where plaintiffs also
prevailed on ADEA claim arising out of same set of facts); Walls v. Cent. Contra Costa Transit
Auth., Case No. CV-08-224 PJH (JSC), 2012 WL 2711252, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2012)
(finding state law claims were grounds for fee award where they arose out of termination that also
gave rise to § 1983 claims).
94
27
28
See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435; Thomas v. City of Tacoma, 410 F.3d 644, 649-50 (9th Cir. 2005);
see also Judicial Watch v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 470 F.3d 363, 369 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting
Hensley’s reasoning applies to FOIA attorneys’ fees provision).
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Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
1
related, and if so, it must shift its focus to the degree of success to ascertain the appropriate fee
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award.95 Claims are related when they share a “common core of facts” or “similar legal
3
theories.”96
4
5
6
Here, the court has already found the Equal Protection claim stems from the same set of
facts as Plaintiffs’ successful claims, specifically Defendants’ untimely response to Plaintiffs’
FOIA requests. Turning to the second factor, the degree of success, the court finds that Plaintiffs
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8
achieved their goals of enforcing the Settlement Agreement and obtaining an injunction requiring
Defendants’ compliance with FOIA’s mandates despite the fact that they failed to prevail on the
10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
9
Equal Protection claim. Accordingly, the court will not reduce Plaintiffs’ fees on account of the
11
unsuccessful Equal Protection claim.97
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b.
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Block-billing and Non-contemporaneous Time-Keeping
Having determined Plaintiffs may recover for the due process, Equal Protection, and APA
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claims, the court turns to Defendants’ second objection to fees they claim were billed in 2007
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before Hajro submitted his FOIA request and received documents. Hajro filed his FOIA request on
November 19, 2007.98 Plaintiffs’ counsel billed 4.5 hours on November 5, 2007, 0.8 hours on
18
95
See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435; Thomas, 410 F.3d at 649-50.
96
See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435; Thomas, 410 F.3d at 649-50.
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20
97
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The court acknowledges the apparent incongruity of awarding attorneys’ fees for a claim to
which FOIA does not apply and on which Plaintiffs did not prevail. But as the Supreme Court and
the Ninth Circuit have both instructed, “the result is what matters,” not how many legal theories
plaintiffs use to achieve their relief. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 (noting where litigants obtain
“excellent results” “the fee award should not be reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to
prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit” because “the result is what matters”); Thomas,
410 F.3d at 650 (“At the heart of [the attorneys’ fees] inquiry is whether Plaintiff’s
‘accomplishments in this case justify the fee amount requested.’”) (quoting Thorne v. City of El
Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1142 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Mendez v. Cnty of San Bernardino, 540
F.3d 1109, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2008); Jackson v. Lombardi, Case No. C 09-01016 WHA, 2010 WL
4607839, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2010).
98
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Docket No. 1 Ex. I, Ex. J.
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Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
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November 8, 2007, and 0.4 hours on November 15, 2007.99 In response to Defendants’ objection,
Plaintiffs assert only that the time in fact was spent on this case.
In light of the fact that the events giving rise to most of the claims in this suit occurred only
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after Hajro filed his FOIA request and Defendants failed to timely respond, the court finds it
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appropriate to subtract from the fee award the hours billed before the request. The attorneys’ fees
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award, therefore, is reduced by the 5.7 hours billed before November 19, 2007. Because one of the
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
main complaints in this case was the untimeliness of Defendants’ response to Plaintiffs’ FOIA
requests, and not just the quality of the response, the remainder of Plaintiffs’ fees for 2007 should
be recovered.
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Defendants also claim Plaintiffs’ counsel engaged in block-billing and non-
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contemporaneous time-keeping, both of which, as Defendants point out, are disfavored forms of
13
recording fees.100 Plaintiffs’ counsel swore in an affidavit that the records reflect contemporaneous
14
time-keeping, save for hours calculated based on a separate Equal Access to Justice Act fee request
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not at issue here. Because statements taken under oath and under penalty for perjury are given
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“considerable weight,”101 the court accepts Plaintiffs’ counsel’s statement and rejects Defendants’
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argument regarding non-contemporaneous billing.
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As to Defendants’ block-billing argument, having reviewed the fee requests, the court
agrees that Plaintiffs engaged in block-billing in some instances. The court has identified in the
table below the dates, hours, and descriptions it has determined are unreasonable block-billing.
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99
Docket No. 94 Ex. K.
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100
27
101
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See Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007).
See Hiken v. Dep’t of Defense, Case No. C 06-02812 JW, 2012 WL 3686747, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 21, 2012).
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Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
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Date
Hours
Descriptions102
12/22/2007
7.0
1/26/2008
2.5
3/3/2008
2.7
3/7/2008
6.5
Meeting with Mirsad Hajro. Read “Freedom of
Information Act And Privacy Act Practice Before The
Department of Homeland Security” Immigration Briefings.
Legal research re FOIA and Settlement Agreement, first
draft of complaint
Meeting in Larkspur with JM to discuss and strategize
about case and review breach letter, draft complaint, and
legal research. Reviewed “The Open Government Act of
2007”. Sent breach letter to Rosemary Melville and Diane
Cejka. Emails to JM, Eric Sinrod, and Mirsad Hajro.
Email to JM with Questions re his FOIA cases. Email
exchange with Eric Sinrod re standing issue for James
Mayock in original Mayock litigation. Telephone call
with Mirsad Hajro re case. Discussed case strategy with
litigator Matt White. Reviewed Mayock federal court
decisions.
Emailed Beverly Jacklin, editor at Interpreter Releases to
obtain clear copy of document in July 27, 1992 IR at page
919 re DOJ policy on FOIA expedites. Reviewed email
reply with attached document. Traveled to federal district
court San Francisco to try to obtain copy of July 6, 1988
order by Court in Mayock case re standing and mootness.
Met docket clerk Jeff Issac at clerk’s office and reviewed
original docket of original Mayock district court case.
Discussed ordering case file from Federal Records Center.
Prepared final edits on Complaint and Exhibits.
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9
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Because Plaintiffs failed to itemize the hours required for the varied tasks for these days, the court
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is unable to determine the validity of the requests.103 As a result, the court exercises its discretion
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to reduce the hours for these block-billed entries by twenty percent, the amount noted by the Ninth
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Circuit as the middle range for time increases that occurs through block-billing.104 Out of the total
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18.7 hours, the court will subtract twenty percent, or 3.74 hours.
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102
All of the descriptions are direct quotations from Plaintiffs’ counsel’s fee request. See Docket
No. 94-5 Ex. K.
103
See Welch, 480 F.3d at 948.
104
Id.
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Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
To summarize, the court reduces the fee award by the 5.7 hours billed before November 19,
1
2
2007 and by 3.74 hours for block-billing. Defendants have not raised any other objections to
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Plaintiffs’ fee requests and so the court will grant the remaining hours. The court finds that 479.86
4
hours were reasonably expended in this four-year-plus litigation resulting in injunctions requiring
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Defendants to comply with their FOIA obligations.
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2.
Reasonable Hourly Rate
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To determine a reasonable hourly rate, the court must consider “certain factors, including
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9
the novelty and difficulty of the issues, the skill required to try the case, whether or not the fee is
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
contingent, the experience held by counsel and fee awards in similar cases.”105 The court also
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looks to “the forum in which the district court sits” 106 and to “the fees that private attorneys of an
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ability and reputation comparable to that of prevailing counsel charge their paying clients for legal
13
work of similar complexity.”107 “[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory
14
evidence – in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits – that the requested rates are in line with
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those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,
experience and reputation.”108
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Plaintiffs request fees ranging from $550 to $625 for lead counsel and $450 to $600 for
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associated counsel. Plaintiffs provide an affidavit from an expert who opines that having been
20
informed “of the nature of the case, the qualifications of Plaintiffs’ counsel, including their CV’s,
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and the hourly rates they are requesting,” in his opinion “the hourly rates requested . . . are well in
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Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1114.
106
Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008).
107
Welch, 480 F.3d at 946.
108
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105
Camacho, 523 F.3d at 980 (citation omitted).
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Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
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line with the non-contingent market rates charged for reasonably similar services by attorneys of
reasonably similar qualifications and experience.”109
The court finds the requested hourly rate is reasonable. In similar cases where parties
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4
sought to monitor and enforce consent decrees, attorneys with the same number of years of
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experience as counsel here were awarded $575 for 27 years of experience and $430 for 10 years of
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experience.110 Plaintiffs’ counsel has more experience than the attorneys in those cases: lead
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9
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
10
counsel graduated from law school in 1980 and associated counsel graduated in 1994 and 1980.
The requested rates are within comparable rates for attorneys of the same experience and for the
same type of case.111
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12
The court also finds adequate documentation for the costs requested by Plaintiffs in the
amount of $2,446.29.
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14
Accordingly, the court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees in the amount of
$318,568112 and costs in the amount of $2,446.29.
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IV. CONCLUSION
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Section 552(a)(4)(E) applies only to Claims One through Six; Claims Seven, Eight, and
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Nine are not causes of action alleging violations of FOIA. Plaintiffs are both eligible for and
19
entitled to attorneys’ fees for Claims One through Six. Because Claims Seven through Nine are
20
related to the eligible claims, Plaintiffs may recover attorneys’ fees for those claims as well.
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109
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110
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Docket No. 94 Ex. F.
See Armstrong v. Brown, 805 F. Supp. 2d 918, 921 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Valdivia v. Brown, 848 F.
Supp. 2d 1141, 1143 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
111
Cf. Hiken v. Dep’t of Defense, Case No. C 06-02812, 2012 WL 3686747, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
21, 2012) (approving in FOIA action $200 per hour for attorneys with six to ten years of
experience).
112
The total amount Plaintiffs requested – $323,760 – minus $5,192 for the hours the court
excluded.
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Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
1
Having reviewed the rates and hours, the court has determined that Plaintiffs are entitled to
2
$318,568 in attorneys’ fees and $2,446.29 in costs.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: October
, 2012
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7
_________________________________
PAUL S. GREWAL
United States Magistrate Judge
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Case No.: 08-1350
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
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