Plaga v. Astrue

Filing 29

ORDER by Judge Whyte granting 25 , 26 Motion for Approval of Attorney Fees (rmwlc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/4/2012)

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E-FILED on

4/4/2012

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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SAN JOSE DIVISION

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RONALD J. PLAGA

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No. C-09-01194 RMW

Plaintiff,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY FEES
PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)
[Re Docket No. 25]

Defendant.
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Plaintiff's attorney, Dolly M. Trompeter ("counsel"), moves for approval of attorney fees

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pursuant to the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Counsel requests a total award of $25,514,

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which is 25 percent of the past-due benefits awarded to plaintiff on remand. Pursuant to the parties'

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stipulation, counsel was previously awarded $5,000 in EAJA fees, which she would pay to plaintiff

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upon receiving the total requested award. Defendant Commissioner of Social Security

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("Commissioner") states that, because it was not a party to the contingent-fee agreement between

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counsel and plaintiff, it is not in a position to either assent or object to the requested fees. The

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Commissioner nonetheless offers an analysis of the request because the Supreme Court has held that

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the Commissioner has a role "resembling that of a trustee" for plaintiff.

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)—No.
C-09-01194 RMW
LJP

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This court has discretion in evaluating a request for fees under § 406(b). Crawford v. Astrue,

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586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009). In making the fee determination, the court must look first to

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the contingent-fee agreement and then test it for reasonableness. Id. (quoting Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

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535 U.S. 789, 808 (2002)). "A fee resulting from a contingent-fee agreement is unreasonable, and

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thus subject to reduction by the court, if the attorney provided substandard representation or engaged

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in dilatory conduct in order to increase the accrued amount of past-due benefits, or if the 'benefits

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are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case.'" Id. at 1148 (quoting

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Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807).

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Here, plaintiff agreed to a 25 percent contingent-fee arrangement, and the agreement was

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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approved by the ALJ on remand. There is no indication that counsel provided substandard

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representation or engaged in dilatory conduct; to the contrary, plaintiff states that he is "very

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satisfied" with counsel's work and it appears counsel was able to speed the progress of the case by

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persuading defendant to support voluntary remand. Based on counsel's records of her time spent

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representing plaintiff before this court, the requested fees equate to an hourly rate of $619.27

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($25,514 / 41.2 hours). This appears to be comfortably within the range of effective hourly rates

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that courts have approved. See, e.g., Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1153 (approving fee awards equating to

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effective hourly rates of $519, $875, and $902).

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Thus, the court finds that the requested fees are reasonable and hereby orders the Social

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Security Administration to pay directly to plaintiff's attorney, Dolly M. Trompeter, the total sum of

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$25,514 for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), $5,000 of which she shall pay to plaintiff

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Ronald Plaga in light of the previous EAJA award.

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DATED:

April 4, 2012
RONALD M. WHYTE
United States District Judge

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)—No.
C-09-01194 RMW
LJP
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