Hall v. Hedgpeth et al

Filing 84

ORDER 68 Denying Plaintiff's Request for Extension of Time; Granting in Part and Denying in Part 38 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program. Case is Referred to Magistrate Judge Vadas for Settlement Conference. Signed by Judge Ronald M. Whyte on 5/4/11. (jg, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/4/2011)

1
2
3
*E-FILED - 5/4/11*

4
5
6
7
8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

No. C 09-5935 RMW (PR)

RICHARD B. HALL,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME;
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN
PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; REFERRING
TO PRO SE SETTLEMENT PROGRAM

Plaintiff,
v.
ANTHONY HEDGPETH, et al.,
Defendants.
/

(Docket Nos. 38 & 68)

17
18
19

INTRODUCTION
On December 17, 2009, plaintiff, a California prisoner incarcerated at Salinas Valley State

20

Prison (“SVSP”) and proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

21

Thereafter, the court found the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint, when liberally construed, stated

22

cognizable claims that prison officials at SVSP violated his First Amendment right to exercise his

23

religion freely, his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection by favoring the religion of

24

others over his own, and his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

25

(“RLUIPA”). (Order filed February 9, 2010, at 2.)

26

On July 23, 2010, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On September 16,

27

2010, the court granted plaintiff an extension of 45 days – or until November 1, 2010 – to file his

28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Extension of Time; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program
P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.09\Hall935mfsj.wpd

1

opposition. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition. Rather, two weeks before the deadline, plaintiff

2

filed a request for an extension of time to do so. For the reasons discussed below, plaintiff’s request

3

for an extension of time is DENIED, and the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART

4

and DENIED IN PART.

5

BACKGROUND

6

The following facts are derived from plaintiff’s verified complaint (“Compl.”) and the

7

exhibits appended thereto.
Plaintiff alleges he is a member of the Reformed Christian or Calvinist religion, a group that

9

holds tenets and beliefs distinct from those held by other major Protestant religions. (Compl. at 6-8,

10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

8

13, 23, 45-55.) Plaintiff alleges that Reformed Christians at SVSP are not provided separate chapel

11

access apart from generic services designed to encompass all non-Catholic Christians. (Id. at 23.)

12

Plaintiff also contends that his requests to hold separate services for Reformed Christians at the

13

prison were denied because defendant Chaplain J. Young and defendant Community Resources

14

Manager J. Bonnifield wrongly concluded that the Protestant services already being provided were

15

adequate to serve all who practiced the basic tenets of Christianity. (Id. at 7-8, 23.)

16

On January 19, 2009, plaintiff filed an inmate grievance requesting that Reformed Christians

17

be provided a separate place of worship on Sunday mornings. (Id. at 23.) On February 3, 2009

18

defendant Chaplain Young denied the request. (Id.) Plaintiff appealed the decision to the first level

19

of review, which was denied on February 25, 2009 by defendant Bonnifield. (Id. at 23-24, 34.) A

20

second level appeal mis-labeled the request as one for “Native American Religious Services” and

21

was denied on April 7, 2009 by defendant Trexler. (Id. at 24, 36-37.) A final Director’s Level

22

appeal was denied on July 13, 2009 by defendant Grannis. (Id. at 39-40.)

23

On March 5, 2009, plaintiff filed an inmate grievance requesting a weekly time slot in the

24

chapel for Reformed Christians to study scriptures. (Id. at 12, 57.) On April 6, 2009 defendant

25

Chaplain Young denied the request. (Id.) Plaintiff appealed the decision to the first level of review,

26

which was denied by defendant Nickerson and screened out as a duplicate of plaintiff’s request for

27

Sunday worship. (Id. at 57, 62-63.)

28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Extension of Time; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program
P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.09\Hall935mfsj.wpd
2

1

On March 22, 2009, plaintiff filed an inmate grievance requesting equal access to religious

2

materials such as audio books and CD’s. (Id. at 16, 66.) On April 6, 2009, defendant Chaplain

3

Young purported to grant the request stating “[Y]ou are allowed to purchase books from any

4

legitimate book distributor.” (Id. at 66.) On April 13, 2009 defendant appealed the decision stating,

5

“Yes, I know inmates can purchase books. My specific issue is: Can I go ahead and order teaching

6

CD’s and audio books from Ligonier Ministries and receive them outside my quarterly package?”

7

(Id.) The May 13, 2009 response “partially granted” the appeal, stating:

8

You cannot purchase religious audio books from Mount Zion Chapel Library and
Ligonier Ministries because they are not an approved religious vendor. I have
provided you with a list of approved religious vendors, in which you can purchase
audio books. . . . This will be considered a special purchase not a quarterly package.

9
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
(Id. at 69.) Plaintiff appealed the decision to the second level of review, and defendant Nickerson
11
screened out the appeal on June 22, 2009, stating that plaintiff was “attempting to change original
12
appeal issue.” (Id. at 76.)
13
In his request for relief, plaintiff seeks to compel prison officials to: 1) allow use of outside
14
space on Sundays for Reformed Christians to hold worship services apart from the generic
15
Protestant services being provided at the prison; 2) grant chapel time for scripture study equal to that
16
given to other religious groups at the prison on a day of the week apart from Sunday; 3) permit him
17
to purchase and use CD’s and audio books from Reformed Christian vendors, not to be counted
18
against plaintiff’s quarterly package; and 4) provide space to keep these purchased religious
19
materials as well as other donated materials. (Id. at 11, 15, 19-20.)
20
DISCUSSION

21
22

I.

PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE OPPOSITION

23

As noted, plaintiff has moved for an extension of time to file an opposition to defendants’

24

motion for summary judgment. This order finds plaintiff is not entitled to such extension, for the

25

following reasons.

26

Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on July 23, 2010. (Dkt. #38.) The

27

court’s February 9, 2010 Order of Service gave plaintiff thirty (30) days or until August 23, 2010 to

28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Extension of Time; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program
P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.09\Hall935mfsj.wpd
3

1

file an opposition. (Dkt. #5.) On August 6, 2010, plaintiff filed a request for an extension of time

2

to oppose the summary judgment motion. (Dkt. #57.) Therein, he stated that he was still awaiting

3

discovery responses and that he had additional discovery requests he wished to serve. On

4

September 16, 2010, the court granted plaintiff an extension of 45 days or until November 1, 2010 to

5

file his opposition. (Dkt. #65.)

6

It appears that plaintiff had begun issuing discovery requests no later than July 7, 2010 when

7

the clerk returned to plaintiff a request for production of documents and set of interrogatories in

8

accordance with Civil Local Rule 26, which requires the party propounding discovery to retain all

9

originals. Another set of interrogatories was returned to plaintiff on July 28, 2010. (Dkt. #46.)

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

Plaintiff nonetheless continued to send copies of interrogatories to the court on August 6, 2010 and

11

October 18, 2010. (Dkt. ##61, 77-78.)

12

On October 18, 2010, plaintiff filed a second request to extend time to file his opposition

13

stating he had not yet received answers to all interrogatories. (Dkt. #68.) Simultaneously, he filed a

14

request to compel discovery and including his oppositions to defendants Young, Bonnifield,

15

Nickerson, and Trexler’s responses and objections to his interrogatories. (Dkt. ## 70, 72-73.)

16

On October 26, 2010, plaintiff withdrew his request to compel. (Dkt. #80.) Therein,

17

plaintiff stated that the parties had decided to meet and confer regarding the discovery disputes and

18

that they had agreed to a November 18, 2010 response deadline for certain discovery. (Id.) The

19

court has heard nothing further from any party in the subsequent three months.

20

Defendants’ summary judgment motion has been pending for over six months. The court

21

determines that plaintiff has had ample time to complete discovery and file his opposition. Plaintiff

22

having had both notice and time to file an opposition and having failed to do so, his motion for an

23

extension of time is DENIED. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is submitted.

24

The court notes, however, that plaintiff filed two declarations and a request for judicial

25

notice on August 6, 2010 at the time he made his second request for an extension. (Dkt. ## 58-60.)

26

In these documents and the attached exhibits, plaintiff disputes a number of the facts defendants

27

alleged in their motion. Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice (Dkt. #59), is DENIED as the

28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Extension of Time; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program
P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.09\Hall935mfsj.wpd
4

1

information contained in the request is not of the sort that can be judicially noticed under Federal

2

Rule of Evidence 201(b). The court will, however, treat plaintiff’s August 6, 2010 filings along with

3

his verified complaint as his opposing affidavit. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 &

4

nn. 10-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding verified complaint may be used as opposing affidavit under Rule

5

56 if based on personal knowledge and setting forth specific facts admissible in evidence).

6

II.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

7

A.

8

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is

Standard of Review

“no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

9

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. A dispute

11

as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict

12

for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

13

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

14

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue

15

of material fact. When the moving party has met this burden of production, the nonmoving party

16

must go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts

17

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough

18

evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party wins. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett,

19

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th

20

Cir. 2000).

21

A district court may not grant a motion for summary judgment solely because the opposing

22

party has failed to file an opposition. Cristobal v. Siegel, 26 F.3d 1488, 1494-95 & n.4 (9th Cir.

23

1994) (holding unopposed motion may be granted only after court determines that there are no

24

material issues of fact). The court may, however, grant an unopposed motion for summary judgment

25

if the movant’s papers are themselves sufficient to support the motion and do not on their face reveal

26

a genuine issue of material fact. See United States v. Real Property at Incline Village, 47 F.3d 1511,

27

1520 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding local rule cannot mandate automatic entry of judgment for moving

28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Extension of Time; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program
P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.09\Hall935mfsj.wpd
5

1

party without consideration of whether motion and supporting papers satisfy Rule 56), rev’d on

2

other grounds sub nom. Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820 (1996). As noted above, where the

3

plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the verified complaint may

4

be relied upon by the court as an opposing affidavit. See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460

5

& nn. 10-11 (9th Cir. 1995).

6

B.

First Amendment Right to Free Exercise of Religion

7

“Inmates retain the protections afforded by the First Amendment, ‘including its directive that

8

no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.’” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883-84 (9th

9

Cir. 2008) (quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987)). In order to establish a

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

free exercise violation, a prisoner must show a defendant burdened the practice of his religion, by

11

preventing him from engaging in activities he sincerely believes are mandated by his faith, without

12

any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884-

13

85. In Shakur, the Ninth Circuit established that, as a threshold matter, a prisoner is not required to

14

show objectively that a central tenet of his faith is burdened by a prison regulation to raise a viable

15

claim under the Free Exercise Clause. Rather, the test whether the prisoner’s belief is “sincerely

16

held” and “rooted in religious belief” determines if the Free Exercise Clause applies. Id. (finding

17

district court impermissibly focused on whether consuming Halal meat is required of Muslims as a

18

central tenet of Islam, rather than whether the plaintiff sincerely believed eating kosher meat is

19

consistent with his faith). The mandates of a religion are not merely what is minimally required of

20

adherents of a religion but include what “the individual human being perceives to be the requirement

21

of the transhuman Spirit to whom he or she gives allegiance.” Peterson v. Minidoka County School

22

Dist., 118 F.3d 1351, 1357 (9th Cir. 1997).

23

A restriction on an inmate’s First Amendment religious rights is valid if it is “‘reasonably

24

related to legitimate penological interests.’” See O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349 (quoting Turner v. Safley,

25

482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). The burden is on the prison officials to prove that the restriction of the

26

prisoner’s exercise of religion was reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective. See

27

Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 1997). A prisoner’s right to free exercise

28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Extension of Time; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program
P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.09\Hall935mfsj.wpd
6

1

of his religion “‘may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain

2

prison security.’” See Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting O’Lone, 482 U.S. at

3

348).

4

Under the Turner analysis, a court must consider four factors when determining if a

5

restriction that infringes on a prisoner’s rights is reasonably related to legitimate penological

6

interests: (1) whether the restriction has a logical connection to legitimate governmental interests;

7

(2) “whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates”;

8

(3) “the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other

9

inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally”; and (4) the “absence of ready

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

alternatives,” or, in other words, whether the rule at issue is an “‘exaggerated response’ to prison

11

concerns.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

12

C.

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

13

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) provides,

14
15
16
17

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 [which
includes state prisons], even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,
unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person (1)
is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

18

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). The statute applies to any “program or activity that receives Federal

19

financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc1(b)(1).

20

Congress intended to distinguish RLUIPA from traditional First Amendment jurisprudence

21

in at least two ways. First, it expanded the reach of the protection to include “‘any religious

22

exercise,’ including ‘any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by or central to, a system of

23

religious belief.’” Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Cutter

24

v. Wilkinson 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)). RLUIPA “bars any

25

inquiry into whether a particular belief or practice is ‘central’ to a prisoner’s religion.” Greene, at

26

986. Second, as opposed to the deferential rational basis standard of Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78,

27

89-90 (1987), RLUIPA requires the government to meet the much stricter burden of showing that

28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Extension of Time; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program
P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.09\Hall935mfsj.wpd
7

1

the burden it imposes on religious exercise is “‘in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;

2

and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.’” Greene, at

3

986 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2)).

4

D.

Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection

5

The Equal Protection Clause requires that an inmate who is an adherent of a minority
religion be afforded a “reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity

7

afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts,” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S.

8

319, 322 (1972), as long as the inmate’s religious needs are balanced against the reasonable

9

penological goals of the prison, O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987); Allen v.

10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

6

Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1987). The court must consider whether “the difference

11

between the defendants’ treatment of [the inmate] and their treatment of [other] inmates is

12

‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th

13

Cir. 2008) (citation omitted) (finding district court erroneously applied rational basis review to

14

plaintiff’s claim that defendants violated equal protection clause by providing only Jewish inmates

15

with kosher meat diet and remanding claim so record could be more fully developed on defendants’

16

asserted penological interests).

17

E.

Analysis

18
19
20

1.

Separate Sunday Worship Services

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for separate

21

Sunday worship because the Reformed Christian denomination is part of the Protestant religion.

22

(Dkt. #38 at 4.) Accordingly, defendants claim, the non-denominational Protestant service that

23

SVSP already offers accommodates plaintiff, and his attendance would fulfill his Sunday worship

24

requirement. (Id. at 4-5.) Defendants rely on the declarations of defendant Young, SVSP’s

25

Protestant Chaplain, and Mule Creek State Prison Chaplain Scott Barham to support these

26

propositions. (Dkt. ## 40, 41.)

27
28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Extension of Time; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program
P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.09\Hall935mfsj.wpd
8

1

Plaintiff has testified by way of his verified complaint and declarations, however, that the
Protestant services offered at SVSP are incompatible with Reformed Christian religious beliefs.

3

(Compl. at 6-8, 13, 23, 45-55; Dkt. #58 at 6.) Plaintiff has also submitted a letter from his pastor,

4

Steven Franks, explaining the distinction between Reformed Theology and other Protestant

5

doctrines. (Dkt. #57 at 34-57.) Mr. Franks states that “those who fully understand the differences

6

are not able to worship ‘in spirit and truth’ in churches who are not like-minded.” (Id. at 34.)

7

Plaintiff also submits evidence that Calipatria State Prison, his prior institution, held separate

8

services for Reformed Christians (Compl. at 8-9, 43-44), supporting his assertion that there are

9

recognized differences amongst the religious sects. Finally, plaintiff notes that he has been banned

10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

2

from chapel, allegedly in retaliation for his various inmate appeals and for this lawsuit. (Dkt. #58 at

11

2; Dkt. #57 at 12-30.) The CDCR has acknowledged that “plaintiff has confidential enemies” and

12

temporarily placed plaintiff in Administrative Segregation in 2010 for “self-expressed safety

13

concerns.” (Dkt. #75 at 15.)

14

Separately, defendants state that plaintiff is housed at SVSP’s Facility A, which is reserved

15

for inmates requiring the highest level of security. (Dkt. #38 at 7.) According to defendants, these

16

inmates are not allowed to gather unsupervised for any reason and, because correctional staff is

17

limited, the inmates’ activities must be limited. (Id.) Defendants fail, however, to provide any

18

evidentiary support for the assertion that correctional staff in Facility A is limited, let alone too

19

limited to allow plaintiff separate worship once weekly in an outside space. Plaintiff states that

20

SVSP’s Reformed Christians “offered to meet on the yard under the supervision of yard officers -

21

and the officer in tower - . . . [or] whatever is the least amount of strain on [the] existing program.”

22

(Compl. at 26.) Defendants offer no evidence to show that this cannot be accommodated.

23

Furthermore, that inmates may be segregated from other prisoners either for their own protection or

24

for disciplinary reasons does not deprive them of their right to free exercise, e.g. to attend religious

25

services. See Beck v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 759, 761 (5th Cir. 1988); Mawhinney v. Henderson, 542

26

F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Whitney v. Brown, 882 F.2d 1068, 1074-78 (6th Cir. 1989) (where

27
28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Extension of Time; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program
P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.09\Hall935mfsj.wpd
9

1

security concerns regarding movement of inmates are manageable, prison administrators may be

2

required to allow inmates from all areas of institution to gather together for services).

3

In sum, plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to raise triable issues regarding his

4

sincerely held beliefs, the burden on his exercise of his religion resulting from SVSP’s denial of

5

separate worship time, and his assertion that he is similarly situated to non-Reformed Christian

6

inmates but treated differently because of his sect. Accordingly, the court DENIES defendants’

7

motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s separate worship claim.

8

2.

Separate Weekly Scripture Study

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for separate

10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

9

weekly scripture study because plaintiff may already participate in SVSP’s existing weekly religious

11

group study. (Dkt. #38 at 5.) Specifically, defendant Young states in his declaration that he “leads a

12

weekly Bible study program that is available to all inmates.” (Dkt. #41, ¶ 6.) Defendant Young

13

states that “[d]uring these session, inmates are allowed to break-off into smaller groups to discuss a

14

variety of religious topics. Inmates identifying themselves as Reformed Christian, Methodist,

15

Pentecostal, Lutheran, Presbyterian, or Baptist, may separate from the larger group and discuss

16

issues particular to their own denomination or beliefs.” (Id.) Accordingly, defendants conclude,

17

plaintiff already has group study particular to his faith. (Dkt. #38 at 5.)

18

Plaintiff has submitted sufficient evidence to dispute these statements. First, plaintiff

19

submits in his declaration that defendant Young does not in fact teach the weekly Bible study at

20

SVSP. (Dkt. #58 at 3.) Rather, according to plaintiff, defendant Young sits in his office during

21

these weekly studies while inmate “elders” teach “Dispensationalism,” which plaintiff considers

22

“false teachings.” (Id.) Plaintiff also submits a declaration from fellow Christian SVSP inmate

23

Scott L. Martin. (Dkt. #57 at 5-9.) Inmate Martin states that he has been incarcerated at SVSP since

24

2006, and in that time he has never seen defendant Young lead a Bible study. (Id. at 7.) Mr. Martin

25

also testifies that he has never seen defendant Young separate the inmates into their denominational

26

groups. (Id.) Finally, as noted above, plaintiff states that he has been banned from chapel.

27

Accordingly, even assuming defendant Young conducts weekly group study that allows for separate

28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Extension of Time; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program
P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.09\Hall935mfsj.wpd
10

1

denominations to “break off,” plaintiff has no access to such study. Defendants’ unsupported claim

2

that SVSP lacks the correctional staff to accommodate plaintiff’s request also fails for the reasons

3

discussed above.

4

In sum, plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence regarding his sincerely held beliefs, the

5

burden on his exercise of his religion resulting from SVSP’s denial of separate group scripture

6

study, and his assertion that he is similarly situated to non-Reformed Christian inmates but treated

7

differently because of his sect. Accordingly, the court DENIES defendants’ motion for summary

8

judgment on plaintiff’s separate religious study claim.

9
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

3.

Purchase of Religious Materials

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for

11

purchase of religious materials because SVSP’s Operations Manual allows inmates to order their

12

own religious materials from a list of approved vendors. (Dkt. #38 at 3, 5; Dkt. #39, Ex. A.)

13

Inmates wishing to order from an unapproved vendor must make a written request that the vendor be

14

added to the list. (Id.)

15

Defendants’ evidence does not show the absence of a factual dispute. Specifically,

16

defendants never assert that plaintiff failed to follow these procedures. Indeed, plaintiff’s verified

17

complaint shows that he did make a written request to purchase materials from Ligonier Ministries

18

and that the request was denied without explanation and eventually screened out. (Compl. at 66-76.)

19

In addition, both plaintiff and inmate Martin submit declarations stating that only Christians have

20

religious special purchases tallied against their quarterly package, while other religious groups do

21

not. (Dkt. #59 at 2; Dkt. #60 at 2.) Plaintiff also states in his verified complaint that other religious

22

groups at SVSP, including Protestants, Muslims, Jews, Catholics, Buddhists, Native Americans,

23

Odinists, Rastafarians, and Wiccans, all have their own approved vendors, while Reformed

24

Christians do not. (Compl. at 16.)

25

In sum, plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence regarding his sincerely held beliefs, the

26

burden on his exercise of his religion resulting from SVSP’s denial of his request to purchase

27

religious materials, and his assertion that he is similarly situated to other inmates but treated

28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Extension of Time; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program
P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.09\Hall935mfsj.wpd
11

1

differently because of his religion. Accordingly, the court DENIES defendants’ motion for

2

summary judgment on plaintiff’s religious purchase claim.

3
4

4.

Storage of Religious Materials

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim for storage

5

space for religious materials because religious material may already be stored in the SVSP chapel

6

area. (Dkt. #38 at 5-6.) According to defendants, any religious group is free to leave its religious

7

materials in the chapel with pre-approval by the chaplain, and plaintiff is afforded the same

8

opportunity. (Id.)

9

As noted above, plaintiff states that he has been banned from chapel. (Dkt. #58 at 1-2.)

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

Accordingly, even assuming defendant chaplain Young allows chapel storage space for Reformed

11

Christian materials, plaintiff has no access to this resource. Plaintiff also states that the chapel

12

library is not secure and not maintained. (Dkt. #59 at 4.) According to plaintiff, “[a]lmost all

13

donated items are stolen out of [the] chapel library.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that there is no “Reformed

14

Christian section such as there is for other religions in the chapel library.” (Dkt. #60 at 2.) Inmate

15

Martin confirms in his declaration that Reformed Christians “have no access to the chapel” and

16

“have no religious section in the chapel to keep materials.” (Dkt. #57 at 7.) Finally, plaintiff states

17

in his declaration that, subsequent to filing this action, other inmates have stolen items from his cell,

18

including music CD’s and a CD player (Dkt. #58 at 4), supporting his claim that he currently has no

19

secure space for his materials.

20

In sum, plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence regarding his sincerely held beliefs, the

21

burden on his exercise of his religion resulting from SVSP’s denial of storage space to plaintiff, and

22

his assertion that he is similarly situated to other inmates but treated differently because of his

23

religion. Accordingly, the court DENIES defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s

24

claim for storage of religious materials.

25

F.

Qualified Immunity

26

Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims on the ground that, as government

27

officials, they are entitled to qualified immunity. The court disagrees.

28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Extension of Time; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program
P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.09\Hall935mfsj.wpd
12

1

Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability for actions taken within

2

their official discretion insofar as those actions do not violate clearly established statutory or

3

constitutional rights of which a reasonable official would have been aware. See Harlow v.

4

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity is not merely a defense to liability; rather,

5

when applicable, qualified immunity protects government officials from lawsuits and, hence, from

6

the burdens of litigation. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2001).

7

A court considering a claim of qualified immunity must determine whether the plaintiff has

8

alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right and whether such right was clearly

9

established such that it would be clear to a reasonable actor that his conduct was unlawful in the

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

situation that confronted him. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009) (overruling the

11

sequence of the two-part test that required determination of a deprivation first and then whether such

12

right was clearly established, as required by Saucier). The court may exercise its discretion in

13

deciding which prong to address first, in light of the particular circumstances of each case. Id.

14

Although the facts at trial might show otherwise, at this stage, the unresolved factual

15

allegations as viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff show a violation of his religious rights

16

as a result of defendants’ conduct, which prohibited plaintiff from engaging in religious activity and

17

from possessing religious items for no legitimate and/or permissible reason. Taking the allegations

18

as true, as this court must, plaintiff has demonstrated a violation of his rights under RLUIPA and the

19

First and Fourteenth Amendments. Qualified immunity is not appropriate at this stage because it

20

was clearly established at the time of the alleged violations that prison officials may not

21

substantially burden inmates’ right to the free exercise of religion without some legitimate

22

penological justification and because the court cannot say as a matter of law that it was objectively

23

reasonable for defendants to believe that the facts as they stand on summary judgment showed no

24

violation of a clearly established right. Accordingly, this issue remains to be resolved in further

25

proceedings, and summary judgment on defendants’ request for qualified immunity is DENIED.

26

///

27

///

28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Extension of Time; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program
P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.09\Hall935mfsj.wpd
13

1

G.

2

Defendants claim that individual defendants Hedgpeth, Grannis, Trexler, and Nickerson are

3

entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff has failed to establish a causal connection between

4

them and the alleged violation of plaintiff’s rights. The court agrees.

5

Individual Defendants Hedgpeth, Grannis, Trexler, and Nickerson

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under the
color of state law committed a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

7

States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Liability may be imposed on an individual

8

defendant under section 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the defendant proximately caused the

9

deprivation of a federally protected right. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988);

10
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

6

Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981). A person deprives another of a

11

constitutional right within the meaning of section 1983 if he does an affirmative act, participates in

12

another’s affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do, that causes

13

the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633. Sweeping conclusory

14

allegations will not suffice; the plaintiff must instead “set forth specific facts as to each individual

15

defendant’s” deprivation of protected rights. Leer, 844 F.2d at 634.

16

The court agrees that the complaint does not allege any wrongdoing as to defendants

17

Hedgpeth, Grannis, Trexler, and Nickerson. It appears that defendants Grannis, Trexler, and

18

Nickerson were named because they reviewed and denied plaintiff’s inmate appeals. There is no

19

constitutional right, however, to a prison administrative appeal or grievance system. Mann v.

20

Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). An incorrect decision on an administrative appeal or a

21

failure to handle it in a particular way therefore does not amount to a violation of plaintiff’s

22

constitutional rights.

23

Separately, it appears that defendant Hedgpeth was named because he is acting warden of

24

SVSP. “A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor

25

participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.”

26

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff has failed to allege that defendant

27

Hedgpeth did anything, or omitted to do anything, which violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Extension of Time; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program
P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.09\Hall935mfsj.wpd
14

1
2

Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED as to defendants Hedgpeth, Grannis, Trexler,
and Nickerson, and the court dismisses them from the action.

3

H.

Referral to Pro Se Prisoner Settlement Program

4

Prior to setting this matter for trial, the court finds good cause to refer this matter to Judge

5

Vadas pursuant to the Pro Se Prisoner Settlement Program for settlement proceedings on the claims

6

set forth above. The proceedings will consist of one or more conferences as determined by Judge

7

Vadas. The conferences shall be conducted with defendants, or the representative for defendants,

8

attending by videoconferencing if they so choose. If these settlement proceedings do not resolve

9

this matter, the court will then set this matter for trial and consider a renewed motion from plaintiff

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10

for appointment of counsel.

11
CONCLUSION
12
In light of the foregoing, the court orders as follows:
13
1.

Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to file an opposition to defendants’ motion

14
for summary judgment is DENIED.
15
2.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in

16
part. Defendants Hedgpeth, Grannis, Trexler, and Nickerson are DISMISSED from this action with
17
prejudice. Defendants’ request for judicial notice is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s request for judicial
18
notice is DENIED.
19
3.

The instant case is REFERRED to Judge Vadas pursuant to the Pro Se Prisoner

20
Settlement Program for settlement proceedings on the remaining claims in this action, as described
21
above. The proceedings shall take place within one-hundred twenty (120) days of the filing date of
22
this order, or as soon as practicable. Judge Vadas shall coordinate a time and date for a settlement
23
conference with all interested parties or their representatives and, within ten (10) days after the
24
conclusion of the settlement proceedings, file with the court a report regarding the prisoner
25
settlement proceedings. If these settlement proceedings do not resolve this matter, plaintiff can file a
26
renewed motion for appointment of counsel and the court will then set this matter for trial.
27
28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Extension of Time; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program
P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.09\Hall935mfsj.wpd
15

1
2
3

4.

The clerk of the court shall mail a copy of the court file, including a copy of this

order, to Judge Vadas in Eureka, California.
5.

The instant case is STAYED pending the settlement conference proceedings.

4
This order terminates Docket Nos. 38 & 68.
5
6

IT IS SO ORDERED.

7

5/4/11
Dated: __________________

8

_________________________
RONALD M. WHYTE
United States District Judge

9
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Order Denying Plaintiff’s Request for Extension of Time; Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment; Referring to Pro Se Settlement Program
P:\PRO-SE\SJ.Rmw\CR.09\Hall935mfsj.wpd
16