Perron et al v. Hewlett-Packard Company
Filing
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ORDER Granting 42 MOTION to Dismiss With Prejudice; Denying as Moot 45 MOTION to Dismiss. The clerk shall close the file. Signed by Judge Koh on 5/6/2011. (lhklc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/6/2011)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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SAN JOSE DIVISION
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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NORMAND PERRON, and G. DAVID
HATFIELD, on behalf of themselves and all
others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY, a
Delaware corporation,
Defendant.
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Case No.: 10-CV-00695-LHK
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
Plaintiffs Normand Perron and G. David Hatfield brought this class action against
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Defendant Hewlett-Packard Company (“HP”) for claims arising out of wireless connectivity
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problems allegedly caused by a defective Nvidia chip used in certain HP computers. The parties
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agree that the claims of named Plaintiffs Perron and Hatfield are extinguished by a class settlement
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approved in a separate case known as the Nvidia GPU Litigation. HP moves to dismiss with
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prejudice, or for summary judgment, on that ground. Plaintiffs’ counsel argues that the case should
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not be dismissed and instead seeks leave to amend to substitute new named plaintiffs, modify the
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definition of the class, propose a new subclass, join Nvidia as a defendant, and add a new claim
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under New York state law. The Court heard oral argument on these issues on May 5, 2011.
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Having considered the submissions and arguments of the parties, the Court GRANTS HP’s motion
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to dismiss with prejudice.
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Case No.: 10-CV-00695-LHK
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
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I. Background
On February 18, 2010, Plaintiffs Normand Perron and G. David Hatfield, individually and
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on behalf of a class and several subclasses, brought suit against Defendant Hewlett-Packard
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Company (“HP”). Plaintiffs allege that certain HP Notebook Computers incorporate a defective
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Nvidia chip that renders the HP computers unable to connect to the Internet through the internal
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wireless device. Compl. ¶¶ 8-11. They claim that HP knew of the defect around the time that its
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computers reached the market, but did not disclose the wireless connectivity problem,
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misrepresented the computers as free from defects, and failed to offer a warranty service that
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effectively remedied the defect. Compl. ¶¶ 2-5. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert five
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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causes of action, each apparently arising under California law: (1) unfair business practices in
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violation of California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq.; (2) breach of express
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warranty; (3) violation of California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code § 1750
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et seq.; (4) unlawful business practices in violation of California Business & Professions Code
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§ 17200 et seq.; and (5) fraudulent conduct in violation of California Business & Professions Code
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§ 17200 et seq. The Complaint proposes a nationwide class of all persons and entities who
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purchased certain HP computers since August 1, 2006, as well as three subclasses. Compl. ¶ 25.
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The three proposed subclasses include (1) a Consumer Subclass consisting of class members who
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purchased the computers for personal, family, or household purposes; (2) a Warranty Subclass
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consisting of class members who experienced failure of wireless capability within a year of
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purchase; and (3) a California Subclass consisting of class members who are residents of
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California. Id. The Court has not yet considered certification of the proposed Class or Subclasses,
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and no motion for class certification has been filed.
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The Nvidia GPU litigation, Case No. 08-04312 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 12, 2008), is a
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separate consolidated class action brought against Nvidia Corporation for defects in its graphics
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processing unit and media communications chip. On September 15, 2010, Judge James Ware of
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this District issued an order preliminarily approving a class settlement in the Nvidia GPU
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Litigation. Judge Ware’s order prohibited settlement class members from prosecuting any action
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that asserted claims released by the Nvidia settlement pending a determination of whether the
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Case No.: 10-CV-00695-LHK
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
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settlement should be finally approved. Because the parties agreed that the claims asserted in the
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instant action might be released by the Nvidia settlement, they stipulated to stay all proceedings in
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this action until 30 days after Judge Ware ruled upon the motion for final approval of the Nvidia
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settlement. The Court issued an order staying this case on October 7, 2010.
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On December 20, 2010, Judge Ware issued an order granting final approval of the Nvidia
class settlement and entering final judgment. Final Judgment, No. 08-4312 JW (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20,
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2010), submitted as Ex. A to Decl. or Kristofor T. Henning in Supp. of HP’s Mot. to Dismiss
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(“Henning Decl.”), ECF No. 43. Judge Ware’s order certified a settlement class (“Nvidia
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Settlement Class”) consisting of “[A]ll persons and entities resident in the United States of
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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America who purchased a Class Computer in the United States of America,” with certain
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exclusions not relevant here. Id. at 2. The definition of “Class Computer” includes the HP
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products at issue in the instant litigation. See Stip. and Agreement of Settlement and Release at 4-
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5, submitted as Ex B. to Henning Decl. (defining “Class Computer” to include HP Pavilion series
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dv6000 and dv9000 and HP Presario series 6000); Compl. ¶ 25 (defining class as purchasers of
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same HP computers). Pursuant to the Nvidia settlement agreement, Nvidia Settlement Class
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Members who have not opted out are deemed to have released any claims arising out of a specified
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defect in the Nvidia chip incorporated into the Class Computers, including Class Computers that
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exhibit certain “Identified Symptoms.” See Henning Decl. Ex. B at 8, 15-16. The “Identified
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Symptoms” include the wireless connectivity problems at issue in the instant class action. See
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Exhibit 3 to Stip. and Agreement of Settlement and Release at 4-5, submitted as Ex B. to Henning
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Decl.
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Plaintiffs Perron and Hatfield, along with a number of other individuals known as the HP
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Consumer Objectors, objected to approval of the Nvidia settlement before Judge Ware. The HP
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Consumer Objectors argued, among other things, that the Nvidia settlement would release their
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claims and those of the proposed class members in this case and another related class action,
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Nygren v. Hewlett Packard, No. 07-CV-05793 (N.D. Cal.), for little or no consideration.1 See HP
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Judge Ware granted HP’s motion for summary judgment in Nygren on June 24, 2010, and the
case is currently pending on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
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Case No.: 10-CV-00695-LHK
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
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Consumers Objections to Final Approval of Settlement at 1, submitted as Ex. C to Henning Decl.
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They also argued that because the Nvidia settlement provides only for chip replacement or
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reimbursement for repairs previously paid for by the class member, the settlement provides no
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remedy to consumers who purchased an HP computer, never made any repairs, and discarded their
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computers due to the defect.2 Id. at 12-13. This last objection apparently caused the parties to the
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Nvidia Settlement to execute an amendment to the settlement agreement directed at Settlement
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Class Members who no longer possess their HP Class Computers.3 The amendment, executed on
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December 6, 2010, reads:
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14.18 Other Litigation. This Agreement shall not preclude a Class Member who
is also a member of a class that might be certified in Nygren v. Hewlett Packard
Co., Case No. CV 07-05793 JW (N.D. Cal.), or Perron v. Hewlett Packard Co.,
Case No. CV 10-00695-LHK (N.D. Cal.), but did not participate in this settlement
because the Member no longer had a Class Computer, and did not pay for a
repair, from participating in those actions.
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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Amendment No. 3 to Stip. and Agreement of Settlement and Release, submitted as Ex. 2 to Pl.’s
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Opp’n to HP’s Mot. to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. Judge Ware granted final approval of
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the settlement over the HP Consumers’ objections, and the HP Consumer Objectors, including
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Plaintiffs Perron and Hatfield, have now appealed his decision to the Ninth Circuit.
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After Judge Ware entered final judgment in the Nvidia GPU Litigation, and the stay in this
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case expired, HP renewed its previously filed motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim4 and
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also filed a second motion to dismiss, or for summary judgment, on grounds that Plaintiffs’ claims
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were released by the Nvidia settlement. Plaintiffs then filed a motion to stay this case pending
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In the case of the HP Class Computers, chip replacement is not possible due to a shortage of
replacement parts. Accordingly, the settlement provides for a replacement computer of like or
similar kind and equal or similar value. Henning Decl. Ex. B at 10-11. Presumably, however, the
computer replacement remedy requires the class member to present and exchange the defective
computer in order to obtain a replacement.
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Although claims against HP were released in the Nvidia settlement, HP was no longer a defendant
in that case at the time of settlement and was not a party to the settlement agreement. See Henning
Decl. Ex. B at 1 (stating that the settlement agreement is made between the Nvidia class
representatives and Nvidia Corporation).
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Because the Court grants HP’s second motion to dismiss based on the effect of the Nvidia
settlement, it does not reach HP’s first motion to dismiss based on the alleged insufficiencies in the
pleadings.
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Case No.: 10-CV-00695-LHK
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
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appeal of the Nvidia settlement. In arguing the motion to stay, Plaintiffs at no point suggested that
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the “carve out” created by Amendment No. 3 to the settlement agreement would allow litigation of
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this action to continue while the Nvidia settlement was being appealed. Rather, they represented
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that a stay would conserve judicial resources because the Ninth Circuit decision in the Nvidia GPU
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Litigation would be dispositive of the claims in this case: “If Plaintiffs lose the appeal, then their
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claims in this case will be extinguished. If Plaintiffs win the appeal, then their claims here will not
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be extinguished and the litigation can resume.” Pls.’ Mot. to Stay at 2, ECF No. 48. Because it
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seemed that this case could be resolved without extensive litigation, and a stay appeared to be in
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conflict with Judge Ware’s Order of Final Judgment in the Nvidia case, the Court denied the
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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motion to stay. See Order Denying Motion to Stay at 4, ECF No. 55.
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Plaintiffs now argue that even if the claims of Perron and Hatfield are extinguished by the
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Nvidia settlement, the “carve-out” amendment should allow them to amend the Complaint to
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substitute a new plaintiff who discarded his computer and to proceed with the instant litigation.
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More specifically, in their opposition brief, Plaintiffs indicated that they intended to substitute New
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York resident Todd Anderson as the new named plaintiff in this action. In its reply, HP noted,
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among other things, that substitution of Todd Anderson would be futile, as he is not a California
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resident and therefore could not bring claims under California consumer protection statutes. HP
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also pointed out that the proposal to substitute Anderson as the named plaintiff was inconsistent
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with Plaintiffs’ representation, in their opposition to HP’s other motion, that they were limiting
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their claims against HP to California residents.5
Three days before the motion hearing, apparently in response to HP’s reply brief, Plaintiffs
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filed a motion for leave to file a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), including the proposed
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In the related case Nygren v. HP, Judge Ware granted HP’s motion for summary judgment on
grounds that the named Plaintiffs, who were not California residents, could not bring claims under
the California Unfair Competition Law. See Order Granting Def.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment at
9, Nygren v. Hewlett Packard Company, No. C 07-05793 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2010), submitted as
Ex. 6 to Decl. of Kristofor T. Henning in Supp. of HP’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 46. In their
opposition to HP’s first motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs state that they are limiting their claims against
HP to California residents, largely based on Judge Ware’s ruling. Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 1
n.1, ECF No. 58. Plaintiffs therefore did not contest HP’s challenges to the claims of Plaintiff
Hatfield, who is not a California resident. Id.
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Case No.: 10-CV-00695-LHK
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
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amended complaint. The proposed FAC would add two new named Plaintiffs, Todd Anderson of
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New York and Mark Alward of California, who did not pay for repairs and discarded their
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computers out of frustration with the wireless defect. It would also join Nvidia Company as a
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defendant and add allegations against it; redefine the class to include only those who discarded
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their computers; create a new proposed subclass of New York residents; and add a claim under a
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New York consumer protection statute. HP disputes that the carve-out amendment permits any
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amendment of Plaintiffs’ Complaint and argues that the case should be dismissed with prejudice,
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or, alternatively, that summary judgment should be entered in its favor.
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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II. Legal Standard
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal
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sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “A Rule 12(b)(6)
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dismissal may be based on either a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient
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facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534
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F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699
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(9th Cir. 1990)). In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, the court must
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accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct.
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1937, 1949 (2009). As a general rule, a district court may not consider any material beyond the
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pleadings in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Lee v. City of Los
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Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a court may take judicial notice of matters
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of public record outside the pleadings, id. at 689, including briefs, transcripts, and other court
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filings in related litigation. See Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6
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(9th Cir. 2006) (taking judicial notice of briefs and transcripts from a settlement fairness hearing,
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as well as other court filings, to determine the preclusive effect of a settlement on a motion to
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dismiss). Generally, if a court grants a motion to dismiss, leave to amend should be granted unless
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the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
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1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). If amendment would be futile, however, a dismissal may be ordered
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with prejudice. Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Case No.: 10-CV-00695-LHK
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
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III. Discussion
A. Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Complaint
In its motion to dismiss, HP argues that the Complaint in this case must be dismissed with
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prejudice because Plaintiffs’ claims are released by the Nvidia settlement. The Court agrees that it
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is clear, based upon the Complaint and the judicially noticeable filings in the Nvidia GPU
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Litigation, that the claims of Plaintiffs Perron and Hatfield have been extinguished by the Nvidia
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settlement. Plaintiff Perron’s claims stem from his September 26, 2006 purchase of an HP Presario
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V6030 that experienced wireless connectivity failures. Compl. ¶¶ 15-17. Plaintiff Hatfield’s
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claims stem from his August 3, 2007 purchase of an HP Pavilion dv6448se that experienced similar
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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wireless connectivity failures. Compl. ¶¶ 20-23. Because Plaintiffs’ computers and wireless
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connectivity problems are covered by the Nvidia settlement agreement, and neither Plaintiff chose
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to opt out, their claims were released by the Order of Final Judgment issued by Judge Ware. See
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Henning Decl. Ex. B at 4-5 (defining Class Computer to include HP Presario v60xx purchased
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between May 2006 and October 31, 2008, and HP Pavilion dv64xx purchased between May 2006
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and April 30, 2009); id. at Ex. 3 (defining Identified Symptoms to include failure to detect wireless
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adaptor in HP systems); id. at 15 (release of claims). Moreover, by objecting to and appealing the
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Nvidia class settlement, Plaintiffs have conceded that they are members of the Nvidia Settlement
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Class whose claims are extinguished by the settlement. See Reyn's Pasta Bella, 442 F.3d at 746
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(“Plaintiffs’ appearance through counsel at the Wal–Mart fairness hearing binds them to the Wal–
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Mart settlement and all of its preclusive effects”). Indeed, Plaintiffs have repeatedly represented
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that their claims are fully released by the Nvidia settlement. See, e.g., Transcript of April 7, 2011
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Hearing on Pls.’ Mot. to Stay, Decl. of Kristofor T. Henning in Supp. of HP’s Reply, Ex. 1 at 2
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(concession by Plaintiffs’ counsel that Plaintiffs’ claims were released by Nvidia settlement);
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Mediation Questionnaire filed by Plaintiffs before the Ninth Circuit, submitted as Ex. F to Henning
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Decl. (stating that HP Consumer Objectors’ claims were “settled out from under them” and
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discharged by the Nvidia settlement); Pl.’s Mot. to Stay at 2, ECF No. 48 (“If Plaintiffs lose the
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appeal [of the Nvidia settlement], then their claims in this case will be extinguished.”).
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Case No.: 10-CV-00695-LHK
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
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To the extent that Plaintiffs now argue that some of their claims survive through the “carveout” amendment to the settlement agreement, see Pls.’ Opp’n at 4, Plaintiffs conflate their
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individual claims with the claims of the proposed class. No one has suggested that individual
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Plaintiffs Perron or Hatfield discarded their computers and would qualify as someone who “did not
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participate in [the Nvidia] settlement because [he] no longer had a Class Computer, and did not pay
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for a repair,” as required by the carve-out amendment. Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 2. There may be
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individuals within the class proposed in the Complaint who would fall within the carve-out
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amendment. At this point, however, no class has been certified, and this action consists solely of
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the individual claims of Perron and Hatfield. See Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550,
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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556 n.3 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that where a court has not ruled on class certification, the action
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consists of the named Plaintiffs’ individual claims). Because there is no dispute that the individual
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claims of each of the named Plaintiffs have been released by the Nvidia settlement, the Complaint
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as it stands contains no claims that can be litigated. Accordingly, HP’s motion to dismiss the
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Complaint must be granted.
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B. Leave to Amend
The more difficult question is whether leave to amend should be given to allow substitution
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of new named Plaintiffs who fall within the carve-out amendment. The carve-out amendment
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provides as follows:
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14.18 Other Litigation. This Agreement shall not preclude a Class Member who
is also a member of a class that might be certified in Nygren v. Hewlett Packard
Co., Case No. CV 07-05793 JW (N.D. Cal.), or Perron v. Hewlett Packard Co.,
Case No. CV 10-00695-LHK (N.D. Cal.), but did not participate in this settlement
because the Member no longer had a Class Computer, and did not pay for a
repair, from participating in those actions.
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Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 2. Plaintiff argues that the amendment is intended to allow this action, Perron v.
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HP, to proceed as a class action on behalf of Nvidia Class Members who purchased one of the HP
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computers at issue in this case (such that they would be a member of the proposed class in this
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case), but who lack a remedy under the Nvidia settlement because they did not pay for any repairs
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and no longer have their Class Computer. Plaintiffs (or, more accurately, Plaintiffs’ counsel) thus
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seek to amend the Complaint to bring an action on behalf of a different proposed class, with new
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Case No.: 10-CV-00695-LHK
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
1
named Plaintiffs, asserting a new claim under a different state law, and against a new defendant.
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See Pls.’ Admin. Mot. for Leave to File [Proposed] First Amended Complaint at 2 & Exs. 1-2, ECF
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No. 66. HP argues, however, that the carve-out, at most, permits certain Nvidia Settlement Class
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Members to participate as class members in the event that a class is certified in Nygren or Perron.
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HP claims that the carve-out does not permit new claims or new lawsuits, and because no class has
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been certified in this case, the carve-out amendment does not permit continued litigation.
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Having carefully considered the language of the carve-out amendment and heard arguments
by all parties, the Court remains somewhat perplexed by the amendment. On the one hand, the
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Court agrees with HP that the language of the amendment is quite narrow in scope. It does not
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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exclude the “carved out” group from the Nvidia Settlement Class, nor does it remove them from
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the definition of “Releasing Persons.”6 Rather, the carve-out amendment explicitly refers to “Class
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Members” and suggests that this group of people remains part of the Nvidia Settlement Class,
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subject to the general release of claims, with the exception that they may be able to obtain relief
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outside the settlement in the event that such relief becomes available in the Nygren or Perron
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actions. The language used in the amendment is quite limited: “This Agreement shall not preclude
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. . . a member of a class that might be certified in [Nygren or Perron] . . . from participating in
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those actions.” Pls.’ Opp’n Ex. 2. This language suggests only that certain Nvidia class members
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may participate, as class members, in a class certified in Perron or Nygren, and that they may
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benefit from any class remedies resulting from those lawsuits. It does not suggest that Nvidia Class
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Members, whose claims are otherwise released by the settlement, should be able to institute a new
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action on a behalf of a newly defined class. Yet this is essentially what Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks to
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do within the confines of the existing lawsuit. In this sense, the amendment appears to favor HP’s
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position.
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On the other hand, it appears that HP’s position would essentially render the carve-out
amendment meaningless. On December 6, 2010, when the amendment was executed, Perron was
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“Releasing Persons” is defined to include “members of the Settlement Class who have not validly
requested exclusion from the Settlement Class pursuant to Section 9 [which concerns opt-out
rights].” Henning Decl. Ex. B at 9 ¶ 1.26.
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Case No.: 10-CV-00695-LHK
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
stayed, Nygren had been appealed, and there was no prospect that a class would be certified in
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either case in the near future. Once the settlement was granted final approval on December 20,
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2010, the named plaintiffs in both actions were barred from further litigating their claims because
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each had retained possession of their Class Computers. Accordingly, neither case could go forward
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without amendment of the complaint and substitution of a new named plaintiff who could represent
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a class of those who discarded their HP computers. If such amendment is not permitted under the
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terms of the amendment, it seems to this Court that the carve-out amendment could never have had
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any effect.7 Drawing on this reasoning, Plaintiffs have pointed out that the parties to the Nvidia
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settlement represented to Judge Ware that the amendment was not a nullity, but would in fact allow
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
1
certain HP purchasers to pursue their claims.8 Plaintiffs therefore argue that a ruling denying leave
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to amend would be contrary to Judge Ware’s intent in approving the settlement.
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The trouble with Plaintiffs’ argument is that it appears to be inconsistent with the settlement
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agreement Judge Ware actually approved and the Order of Final Judgment he issued. The Order of
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Final Judgment states: “Upon the entry of this Final Judgment, the Releasing Persons have
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completely discharged, settled, dismissed with prejudice any Released Claim, whether known or
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unknown, against each of every Released Person and the assertion, prosecution, or continuation by
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Settlement Class Members of any Released Claim is hereby permanently barred and enjoined.”
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Henning Decl. Ex. A ¶ 10. As noted above, the carve-out amendment does not suggest that those
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At the motion hearing, HP argued that its position would not render the amendment a nullity
because at the time the amendment was executed Plaintiffs had not conceded that their claims
would be extinguished by the settlement. Thus, certification of a class in Perron, by the existing
named Plaintiffs, was still theoretically possible. But the carve-out amendment must be predicated
on the assumption that the Perron plaintiffs’ claims would be extinguished by the settlement.
Otherwise, there would be no need to carve out a subset of those claims for special treatment
outside the settlement.
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At the fairness hearing, counsel for the Nvidia plaintiffs stated: “We did an amendment to the
settlement agreement that carved out now from the release HP consumers who no longer have their
computers. If they don’t submit a claim here and they can establish down the road that they didn’t
participate here because they did not have their computers, they’re free to participate in whatever
other litigation that comes along. . . So we tried to address this in terms of people who don’t have
the computers in terms of the complaint and I think we have essentially carved them out. So if they
don’t have the their [sic] computers, they’re free to do something else.” Transcript of Dec. 20,
1010 Proceedings before Judge Ware, Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 1 at 50:20-51-2, 51:13-18. When Judge
Ware asked counsel to identify the location of the carve-out language, plaintiffs’ counsel stated that
it was contained in Amendment Number 3. Id. at 51:6-7.
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Case No.: 10-CV-00695-LHK
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
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who no longer possess Class Computers and paid for no repairs are excluded from the Settlement
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Class or should not be considered Releasing Persons. Rather, the amendment explicitly refers to
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this group as “Class Member[s].” Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 2. To the extent that the amendment allows a
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group of Nvidia Class Members to actively prosecute Released Claims, as Plaintiffs argue, the
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amendment would be in conflict with the Final Order enjoining “assertion, prosecution, or
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continuation” of Released Claims by any member of the Settlement Class.
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In addition, as HP points out, Plaintiffs’ individual claims were effectively dismissed with
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prejudice on December 20, 2010, when the Final Judgment and settlement release took effect. See
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Henning Decl. Ex. B at 23 ¶ 12.2 (settlement becomes effective upon entry of Final Judgment). As
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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of that date, Plaintiffs were permanently enjoined from asserting or continuing their claims, and
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this Court was required to dismiss their claims with prejudice. See Henning Decl. Ex. A ¶ 10.
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(“Upon the entry of this Final Judgment, the Releasing Persons have completely discharged,
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settled, dismissed with prejudice any Released Claim. . . .”) (emphasis added). Thus, any order
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dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice and allowing them to continue their claims in order
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to seek amendment would violate the clear terms of Judge Ware’s Order of Final Judgment.9
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For these reasons, the Court finds that the carve-out amendment does not permit an
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individual who discarded his Class Computer and never paid for repairs to actively prosecute
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released wireless connectivity claims by becoming a named plaintiff in the instant action. Pursuant
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to Judge Ware’s Order of Final Judgment, the claims of Plaintiffs Perron and Hatfield were
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extinguished and dismissed with prejudice on December 20, 2010. This Court must give effect to
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that order now by dismissing their claims with prejudice. Whatever limited effect the carve-out
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amendment may have, it does not allow a new plaintiff to step in, revive claims that have been
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dismissed with prejudice, and actively prosecute those claims on behalf of a new proposed class.10
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Indeed, as HP pointed out at the hearing, Plaintiffs apparently seek to continue Plaintiffs’ claims
even beyond the point of amendment, as the proposed amended complaint still includes Perron and
Hatfield as named plaintiffs.
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The Court remains uncertain regarding the circumstances, if any, under which the carve-out
amendment would allow Nvidia Settlement Class Members to participate in the Perron or Nygren
actions. If, in fact, the carve-out had no meaning or counsel misrepresented its meaning at the
fairness hearing, that issue is most appropriately considered on appeal of the settlement approval.
The fairness of the Nvidia settlement, including the amendment, is not before this Court. See
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Case No.: 10-CV-00695-LHK
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
1
Nor does it allow assertion of new claims against a newly joined Defendant. Because the
2
amendment Plaintiffs seek is not permitted under the Nvidia settlement and Judge Ware’s Order of
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Final Judgment, Plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend must be denied.
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IV. Conclusion
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For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS HP’s second motion to dismiss (ECF No.
6
42), with prejudice, on grounds that Plaintiffs’ claims are extinguished and dismissed with
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prejudice by the settlement and Order of Final Judgment in the Nvidia GPU Litigation.
8
Accordingly, the Court does not reach HP’s earlier motion to dismiss (ECF Nos. 32, 45) dealing
9
with the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ claims, and denies that motion as moot. The clerk shall close the
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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file.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: May 6, 2011
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_________________________________
LUCY H. KOH
United States District Judge
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Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that a class
member who is represented by counsel as a class action fairness hearing cannot subsequently attack
the settlement collaterally).
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Case No.: 10-CV-00695-LHK
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
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