Wesblatt v. Apple, Inc et al

Filing 107

ORDER by Judge Whyte granting in part and denying in part 93 Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Claims (rmwlc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/19/2011)

Download PDF
1 2 3 4 E-FILED on 7/19/2011 5 6 7 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 8 SAN JOSE DIVISION 11 12 In re Apple and AT&T iPad Unlimited Data Plan Litigation 13 14 15 ALL CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS No. C-10-02553 RMW ORDER GRANTING AT&T MOBILITY'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY CLAIMS EXCEPT AS TO PLAINTIFF HANNA [Re Docket No. 93] 16 17 18 Defendant AT&T Mobility LLC ("ATTM") moves to compel arbitration and stay 19 proceedings against ATTM pending arbitration. On July 15, 2011, the court held a hearing to 20 consider defendant's motion. Having considered the papers submitted by the parties and the 21 22 23 24 25 26 arguments of counsel, and for the reasons set forth below, the court grants ATTM's motion to compel arbitration and stay claims except as to plaintiff Joe Hanna. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Adam Weisblatt ("Weisblatt"), Joe Hanna ("Hanna"), David Turk ("Turk"), Colette Osetek ("Osetek"), Stuart Logan ("Logan"), and Aaron Friedman ("Friedman") (collectively "plaintiffs") allege that defendants ATTM and Apple Inc. ("Apple") perpetrated a classic "bait and 27 28 ORDER GRANTING AT&T MOBILITY'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY CLAIMS EXCEPT AS TO PLAINTIFF HANNA—No. C-10-02553 RMW JLR 1 switch" fraud scheme in connection with the sale of 3G capable iPads1 for which ATTM was the 2 exclusive 3G service provider. Master Consolidated Complaint ("MCC") ¶ 1. Plaintiffs allege that 3 ATTM and Apple discontinued an unlimited data plan for iPads and that, although existing 4 subscribers could keep the plan indefinitely, subscribers lost the ability to cancel and restart the plan 5 whenever they wanted. MCC ¶¶ 42-44. The facts of this case are set forth in the court's order on 6 ATTM's first motion to compel arbitration. See Dkt. No. 50. In that order, the court limited 7 discovery to written discovery relevant to claims against Apple pending the Supreme Court's 8 decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010) (No. 09-893). In light of the 9 Supreme's Court's recent ruling in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011), United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 ATTM again moves to compel arbitration of all claims against it. 11 A. 12 During the alleged class period, customers who wished to activate 3G wireless data on the 13 iPad were required to purchase a service plan from ATTM, the then exclusive 3G provider for the 14 iPad. First, the customer followed several screens on the iPad and entered requested information at 15 each step. Decl. of Kimberly D. Eubank, Dkt. No. 25 at ¶ 4. Before the customer could complete 16 the activation process, the terms of ATTM's Session Based Wireless Data Services Agreement (the 17 "iPad Agreement") were displayed for the customer in a scrollable text box with buttons labeled 18 "Agree" and "Back" at the bottom. Id. To activate the wireless data service on the iPad, the 19 customer was required to click the "Agree" button. Id. The iPad Agreement includes, among other 20 things, an arbitration agreement: 21 Arbitration Agreement 3.2 Arbitration Agreement (1) AT&T and you agree to arbitrate all disputes and claims between us. This agreement to arbitrate is intended to be broadly interpreted. It includes, but is not limited to: • claims arising out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship between us, whether based in contract, tort, statute, fraud, misrepresentation or any other legal theory; • claims that arose before this or any prior Agreement (including, but not limited to, claims relating to advertising); 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 The iPad is a mobile computing and multimedia device with a touch screen interface manufactured by defendant Apple. It comes in a WiFi only model or a WiFi plus 3G data capable model. ORDER GRANTING AT&T MOBILITY'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY CLAIMS EXCEPT AS TO PLAINTIFF HANNA—No. C-10-02553 RMW JLR 2 1 • 2 • claims that are currently the subject of purported class action litigation in which you are not a member of a certified class; and claims that may arise after the termination of this Agreement 3 Id. Ex. 2 at 8. Moreover, the arbitration agreement expressly prohibits class actions: "You agree 4 that, by entering into this Agreement, you and AT&T are each waiving the right to a trial by 5 jury or to participate in a class action." Id. The iPad Agreement also specifies that the "law of 6 the state of [the customer's] address shall govern this Agreement except to the extent that such law is 7 preempted by or inconsistent with applicable federal law." Id. Ex. 2 at 15. B. 9 The plaintiffs are all ATTM customers: Logan, Hanna, and Friedman live in California, 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 8 Weisblatt lives in New York, Turk lives in Washington, and Osetek lives in Massachusetts. MCC ¶¶ 11 11-14; Complaint, Friedman v. Apple Inc., No. 11-01875 RMW, Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 27 ("Friedman 12 Compl."); Complaint, Logan v. Apple Inc., No. 10-02588 RMW, Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 13 ("Logan Compl."). 13 Plaintiffs allege–and ATTM's records confirm–that Logan, Friedman, Weisblatt, and Osetek each 14 purchased and activated a 3G-compatible iPad on ATTM's network between April and November 15 2010. MCC ¶¶ 55, 57; Friedman Compl. ¶ 27; Logan Compl. ¶¶ 52-53. Turk bought three iPad 16 3Gs–two on April 30 and one on May 18, 2010. Dkt. No. 25 at ¶ 7, Exh. 4. Turk activated the iPad 17 3Gs on ATTM's network on April 30, May 4, and June 20, 2010, respectively. Id. Plaintiff Hanna 18 purchased an iPad 3G, but never activated 3G service. MCC ¶¶ 61-64. Although Hanna never 19 accepted the terms of ATTM's iPad Agreement, Hanna accepted the same arbitration agreement and 20 choice of law provision when he used ATTM's website to purchase an iPhone 3GS on June 11, 21 2009. Decl. of Caroline Mahone-Gonzalez, Dkt. No. 26 ¶ 4, Ex. 1. 22 Parties Defendant ATTM now moves to compel arbitration and to stay all claims against it. 23 II. ANALYSIS 24 A. 25 Plaintiffs contend that the enforceability of the arbitration agreements of Weisblatt, Turk, Choice of Law 26 and Osetek (residents of New York, Washington, and Massachusetts, respectively) should be 27 governed by California law. According to plaintiffs, their claims arise out of conduct emanating 28 ORDER GRANTING AT&T MOBILITY'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY CLAIMS EXCEPT AS TO PLAINTIFF HANNA—No. C-10-02553 RMW JLR 3 1 from California. However, both parties agree that "it ultimately makes little difference what states' 2 laws are applied." Dkt. No. 101 at 2; Dkt. No. 100 at 9. 3 To determine the enforceability of "contractual choice-of-law provisions, California courts 4 shall apply the principles set forth in Restatement section 187, which reflects a strong policy 5 favoring enforcement of such provisions." Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 459, 6 464-65, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 330, 834 P.2d 1148 (1992). Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 7 187(2) provides in part: 8 12 The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either (a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or (b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties. 13 The parties do not dispute that the first exception cannot be met. Dkt. No. 42 at 11. 14 However, the parties dispute whether the second exception—whether application of another state's 15 law in the present case would be contrary to a fundamental policy of the State of California—is met. 16 If there is a fundamental conflict with California law, "the court must then determine whether 17 California has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular 18 issue." Nedlloyd, 3 Cal. 4th at 466 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). If so, the choice 19 of law provision is not enforced. Id.; see also Estate of Darulis, 401 F.3d 1060, 1062 (9th Cir. 20 2005); Wash. Mut. Bank v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 4th 906, 919-20 (Cal. 2001). 9 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 11 21 Here, California does not have a "materially greater" interest than New York, Massachusetts, 22 or Washington in having its law applied to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs point to California's interest in 23 protecting its citizens from fraud taking place in California. But Weisblatt, Turk, and Osetek are not 24 California citizens, and their claims concern representations made by a Georgia based company 25 (ATTM) in New York, Massachusetts, and Washington. Indeed, "California has no greater interest 26 in protecting other state's consumers than other states have in protecting California's." Discover 27 Bank v. Superior Ct., 134 Cal. App. 4th 886, 895 (2005) (Discover Bank II). It is not enough that 28 California is home to at least one plaintiff and defendant Apple, nor is it relevant that a number of ORDER GRANTING AT&T MOBILITY'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY CLAIMS EXCEPT AS TO PLAINTIFF HANNA—No. C-10-02553 RMW JLR 4 1 claims in this suit are brought pursuant to California law. Under the choice of law agreement and 2 pursuant to Restatement principles, plaintiffs' claims should be governed by the law of their home 3 states. In any event, both parties admit that it ultimately makes little difference which states' laws 4 are applied. 5 B. Arbitration Agreements of California Plaintiffs Friedman and Logan 6 In Concepcion, the Supreme Court explained that "[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme 8 inconsistent with the FAA." 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 9 concerns underlying "California's Discover Bank rule" are beside the point, because "States cannot 10 United States District Court For the Northern District of California 7 require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons." 11 Id. at 1753. However, plaintiffs argue that Cal. Civ. Code § 1668 still precludes enforcement of 12 ATTM's arbitration agreement despite the Supreme Court's negative treatment of Discover Bank v. 13 Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). The Supreme Court also held that the policy 14 Plaintiffs' argument that Cal. Civ. Code § 1668 continues to preclude enforcement of 15 ATTM's class action waiver is unconvincing. Cal. Civ. Code § 1668 is the source of the Discover 16 Bank rule that was explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 17 (quoting Discover Bank (in turn quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 1668 )). Plaintiffs' contention that their 18 modest claims "simply do not provide sufficient motivation for an aggrieved customer to seek 19 redress" on an individual basis (Opp. at 10) is the very argument that was struck down in 20 Concepcion. Other courts have reached similar conclusions. See Arellano v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 21 2011 WL 1842712, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2011) (noting that the Court in Concepcion rejected the 22 argument that an arbitration agreement is void solely because small claims might be prohibitively 23 expensive to pursue on an individual basis); Zarandi v. Alliance Data Sys. Corp., 2011 WL 24 1827228, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 2011) (same); Bellows v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 2011 WL 25 1691323, at *3 (S.C. Cal. May 4, 2011) (same). Whether brought under Discover Bank or § 1668, 26 the argument that ATTM's arbitration provision is unenforceable solely because it includes a class 27 action waiver is no longer viable. 28 ORDER GRANTING AT&T MOBILITY'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY CLAIMS EXCEPT AS TO PLAINTIFF HANNA—No. C-10-02553 RMW JLR 5 1 Plaintiffs fail to identify any terms of ATTM's arbitration agreement that might preclude 2 enforcement after Concepcion. As the Supreme Court recognized, the terms of ATTM's arbitration 3 provision are "sufficient to provide incentive for the individual prosecution of meritorious claims 4 that are not immediately settled" and "essentially guarantee[]" that aggrieved customers are made 5 whole. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (quoting Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 855- 6 56 (9th Cir. 2009)). ATTM's arbitration provision in no way limits plaintiffs' recover of attorneys' 7 fees and costs if state law authorizes it. In addition, if the arbitrator awards them more than ATTM's 8 last settlement offer, plaintiffs are entitled to double attorney's fees. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 9 Plaintiffs argue that despite Concepcion, their claims for public injunctive relief under the CLRA or United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 UCL are still exempt from arbitration. See Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of California, 21 Cal. 11 4th 1066, 1079-80 (1999) and Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc., 30 Cal. 4th 303, 316 (2003). 12 But Concepcion would seem to preempt California's arbitration exemption for claims requesting 13 public injunctive relief. See Arellano, 2011 WL 184712. 14 15 16 The recent Concepcion decision compels preemption: "When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at *6. In sum, the Act preempts California's exemption of claims for public injunctive relief from arbitration, at least for actions in federal court. 17 Id. at *2. Accordingly, the arbitration agreements for plaintiffs Friedman and Logan must be 18 enforced. 19 C. 20 Plaintiffs argue that Weisblatt's arbitration agreement is unconscionable under New York Arbitration Agreements of Plaintiffs Weisblatt, Turk, and Osetek 21 Law. Under New York law, "[a] determination of unconscionability generally requires a showing 22 that the contract was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable when made . . . ." Gillman 23 v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 73 N.Y.2d 1, 10, 537 N.Y.S.2d 787, 791 (1988). Even before 24 Concepcion, the Ninth Circuit has held that "class action waiver provision[s] . . . aren't substantively 25 unconscionable under New York law." Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 495 26 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2007). See also Nayal v. HIP Network Servs. IPA, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 27 566, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2009 ("Courts applying New York law . . . have uniformly held that class action 28 ORDER GRANTING AT&T MOBILITY'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY CLAIMS EXCEPT AS TO PLAINTIFF HANNA—No. C-10-02553 RMW JLR 6 1 waivers are not unconscionable."). Accordingly, plaintiff Weisblatt's unconscionability argument 2 fails. 3 Similarly, plaintiff Turk's arbitration agreement is not unconscionable under Washington 4 law. After Concepcion, plaintiff Turk's argument that provisions of his arbitration agreement 5 "effectively establishes barriers to bringing small claims in arbitration, thereby exempting [ATTM] 6 from liability" is untenable. Indeed, the leading case in Washington on the enforceability of 7 provisions that require individual arbitration borrowed heavily from Discover Bank. See Scott v. 8 Cingular Wireless, P.3d 1000, 1006-08 (Wash. 2007) (en banc). Because Concepcion overruled 9 Discover Bank, it also overruled decisions based on Discover Bank. United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Still further, plaintiff Osetek's arbitration agreement is not unconscionable under 11 Massachusetts law. Plaintiffs recognize that Massachusetts law requires a showing that the contract 12 provision at issue is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. As explained with respect 13 to the other plaintiffs, Osetek's substantive unconscionability arguments are preempted by the FAA. 14 D. 15 Unlike the other plaintiffs, plaintiff Hanna never accepted the iPad Agreement. Still, ATTM Hanna's Agreement With ATTM 16 argues that Hanna is bound by the arbitration agreement he accepted when purchasing his iPhone 17 3GS on June 11, 2009. Dkt. No. 26 ¶ 4, Ex. 1. Both the iPhone arbitration agreement and the iPad 18 arbitration agreement contain the same terms. Dkt. No. 24 Ex. 1. 19 Plaintiffs contend that Hanna's purchase of a different service (a data plan for an iPhone 20 rather than the iPad) at a different time (before the iPad was even introduced for sale) and in a 21 different manner (through AT&T's website rather than through the iPad) does not indicate that 22 plaintiff Hanna agreed to ATTM's Terms of Service in connection with his iPad. 23 The Supreme Court has held that: 24 [W]here the contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that an order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage. Such a presumption is particularly applicable where the clause . . . provides for arbitration of any differences arising with respect to the interpretation of this contract or the performance of any obligation hereunder. In such cases, in the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance 25 26 27 28 ORDER GRANTING AT&T MOBILITY'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY CLAIMS EXCEPT AS TO PLAINTIFF HANNA—No. C-10-02553 RMW JLR 7 1 from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail. 2 AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Commc'n Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (citations and 3 quotations omitted). But the scope of an arbitration clause is not unlimited. Rather, the court "must 4 ascertain and implement the reasonable expectations of the parties . . . ." Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. 5 Central Life Assur. Co., 85 F.3d 21, 28 (2d Cir. 1996). "Despite the presumption of arbitrability, the 6 strong federal policy favoring arbitration may not extend the reach of arbitration beyond the 7 intended scope of the clause providing for it." Id. (citation omitted). 8 The scope of Hanna's iPhone arbitration agreement is not as broad as ATTM contends. 9 Nowhere does Hanna's iPhone arbitration agreement refer to devices other than the iPhone. While United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 the iPhone arbitration agreement does explicitly require arbitration of all disputes and all claims 11 between the parties, it does not specifically provide for the arbitration of any differences in 12 interpretation arising with respect to the scope of the arbitration clause itself. ATTM contends that 13 where an "arbitration clause . . . cover[s] 'all disputes that may arise' between the parties, then any 14 dispute over any matter, whether or not it relates to a side agreement, would unquestionably be 15 arbitrable." See Inlandboatmens Union of Pac. v. Dutra Group, 279 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 16 2002). But Inlandboatmens, as well as the other precedent cited by ATTM, involve arbitration 17 provisions contained in collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs"). Here, to extend Hanna's 18 agreement to all disputes, whether or not related to the iPhone, would unreasonably extend 19 arbitration to unintended areas. The iPad and iPhone, and their respective service plans, are distinct 20 products and services. See Dkt. No. 100-1 Exh. A, 36 data plan FAQs ("Can I use my current 21 iPhone service plan with the iPad? No. The cellular plan for iPhone is separate from the iPad 22 plan."). Certainly a reasonable consumer would not contemplate that an arbitration agreement 23 regarding the iPhone would bind him to arbitrate a dispute with respect to a future, unreleased 24 device. At bottom, it can not reasonably be that both parties intended for the iPhone 3GS arbitration 25 clause to extend to all future Apple products that utilize ATTM's data network. 26 27 28 ORDER GRANTING AT&T MOBILITY'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY CLAIMS EXCEPT AS TO PLAINTIFF HANNA—No. C-10-02553 RMW JLR 8 1 Accordingly, ATTM's motion to compel arbitration with respect to plaintiff Hanna is denied. 2 Hanna's claims regarding his iPad do not fall within the scope of his iPhone 3GS arbitration 3 agreement. 4 D. Plaintiffs' Request for Arbitration Discovery 5 For the reasons already discussed, arbitration related discovery is unnecessary. The 6 argument that plaintiffs seek to support through arbitration related discovery has already been 7 addressed and rejected by the Supreme Court in Concepcion. 8 9 III. ORDER The motion to compel arbitration is granted in part and denied in part. As required by the United States District Court For the Northern District of California 10 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2, plaintiffs Adam Weisblatt, David Turk, Colette Osetek, Stuart 11 Logan, and Aaron Friedman shall pursue their claims against defendant ATTM in accordance with 12 their arbitration agreement. Their claims against ATTM are hereby stayed pending the outcome of 13 arbitration. The motion to compel arbitration and stay claims with respect to Joe Hanna is denied. 14 15 16 17 18 19 DATED: 7/19/2011 RONALD M. WHYTE United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ORDER GRANTING AT&T MOBILITY'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY CLAIMS EXCEPT AS TO PLAINTIFF HANNA—No. C-10-02553 RMW JLR 9

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?