Woods v. Google, Inc.

Filing 434

Order by Magistrate Judge Virginia K. DeMarchi re 421 Joint Discovery Letter Brief. (vkdlc1S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/14/2018)

Download PDF
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 RICK WOODS, ET AL., 8 Plaintiffs, 9 v. 10 GOOGLE LLC, 11 United States District Court Northern District of California Case No.11-cv-01263-EJD (VKD) Defendant. 12 ORDER RE NOVEMBER 5, 2018 JOINT DISCOVERY DISPUTE LETTER RE DEFENDANT’S SUBPOENAS TO MARTIN PEEN AND AMP GLOBAL INVESTMENTS Re: Dkt. No. 421 13 Plaintiff Rene Cabrera moves to quash subpoenas defendant Google LLC served on third 14 15 parties Martin Peen and AMP Global Investments LLC (“AMP Global”) on the ground that the 16 subpoenas are untimely. Google opposes the motion, arguing that the discovery of these third 17 parties is warranted by Mr. Cabrera’s own delay during the discovery process. In addition, 18 Google argues that Rule 45 does not permit the relief Mr. Cabrera seeks. The Court finds this 19 dispute suitable for resolution without a hearing. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the Court grants Mr. Cabrera’s request 20 21 for an order prohibiting enforcement of these subpoenas. 22 I. 23 24 25 BACKGROUND On behalf of a putative class, Mr. Cabrera asserts claims against Google for breach of contract and unfair business practices relating to Google’s AdWords advertising program. Google contends that Mr. Cabrera lacks standing to sue because his claims in this action 26 are based on ads that he bought for his business, Training Options. Dkt. No. 421 at 2. Google 27 says that it only recently discovered that Mr. Cabrera sold his business in August 2009, and it 28 seeks discovery from the buyers, Mr. Peen and AMP Global, to demonstrate that Mr. Cabrera did 1 not retain the right to sue for injuries the business suffered. Id. Google’s subpoenas to Mr. Peen 2 and AMP Global seek discovery of documents concerning Mr. Cabrera’s sale of the Training 3 Options business to Mr. Peen and AMP Global and Training Options’ customer lists. Dkt. No. 4 421 at 2, 5.1 The subpoena to Mr. Peen also seeks a deposition. Id. at 5. 5 II. LEGAL STANDARD A party may obtain discovery of any matter that is relevant to a claim or defense and that is 6 7 “proportional to the needs of case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, 8 the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ 9 resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Information need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. Id. 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 governs discovery of non-parties by subpoena. The 13 scope of discovery through a Rule 45 subpoena is the same as the scope of discovery permitted 14 under Rule 26(b). Beaver Cty. Employers Ret. Fund v. Tile Shop Holdings, Inc., No. 3:16-mc- 15 80062-JSC, 2016 WL 3162218, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2016) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 advisory 16 comm. note to 1970 amendment); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)). A party challenging a subpoena to a 17 non-party may move for a protective order under Rule 26(c). 8A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 18 R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2035 (3rd ed. 2018). Here, Google bears the burden in the first instance to demonstrate that the subpoenas seek 19 20 discovery that is both relevant and proportional, and that the subpoenas also comply with this 21 Court’s scheduling orders or that good cause exists for belated service of the subpoenas. See Koh 22 v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., No. C-09-00927-RMW, 2011 WL 940227, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 23 2011); Finley v. Pulcrano, No. C-08-0248-PVT, 2008 WL 4500862, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 24 2008); Our Children’s Earth v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., No. 13-cv-00402-EDL, 2015 WL 25 12964638, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2015). If Google meets that burden, Mr. Cabrera must 26 27 28 Copies of the subpoenas have not been provided to the Court. See Judge DeMarchi’s Standing Order re Civil Cases at 3 (requiring attachment of specific discovery material at issue and responses thereto to joint discovery dispute letters). 2 1 1 demonstrate good cause for a protective order barring that discovery. Our Children’s Earth, 2015 2 WL 12964638, at *1. 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 Google acknowledges that service of the subpoenas on November 2, 2018 does not comply 5 with the scheduling order setting a November 5, 2018 deadline for completion of fact discovery as 6 to Mr. Cabrera. See Civ. L.R. 37-3 (“Discovery requests that call for responses or depositions 7 after the applicable discovery cut-off are not enforceable, except by order of the Court for good 8 cause shown.”). The Court construes Google’s opposition to Mr. Cabrera’s motion as 9 encompassing a request for leave to serve this belated discovery for good cause under Civil Local 10 Rule 37-3. United States District Court Northern District of California 11 The Court construes Mr. Cabrera’s request to quash the subpoena as a request for a 12 protective order under Rule 26(c) that prohibits discovery from Mr. Peen and AMP Global on the 13 ground that the subpoenas are untimely. Mr. Cabrera also objects that Google lacks good cause 14 for the belated subpoenas to Mr. Peen and AMP Global. First, Mr. Cabrera insists that the 15 AdWords account at issue was at all times his personal AdWords account, and it did not belong to 16 his business. He points to documents and information produced in discovery and information 17 Google obtained or could have obtained from public sources that reveal his sale of the Training 18 Options business in August 2009. Second, Mr. Cabrera argues that the discovery he has produced 19 to date reflects that the AdWords account was not transferred to Mr. Peen and AMP Global with 20 the sale of the Training Options business, and that his contractual arrangement with Google for the 21 AdWords account precludes any such transfer. Dkt. No. 421 at 5–6. 22 Because the subpoenas are not before the Court, it is not possible for the Court to make its 23 own assessment regarding whether, as an initial matter, the discovery Google seeks is relevant and 24 proportional to the needs of the case. However, Mr. Cabrera does not appear to object to the 25 subpoenas on this ground. The issue, then, is whether there is good cause for Google to seek 26 discovery that cannot be completed before the discovery cut-off set by the Court. 27 28 The Court finds that Google has not demonstrated good cause for the belated discovery it seeks from Mr. Peen and AMP Global. Google had several months to take discovery of Mr. 3 1 Cabrera but did not seek discovery of his sale of the Training Options business until September 2 20, 2018.2 Mr. Cabrera did not delay in responding to those September discovery requests. The 3 Court is not persuaded that some dilatory conduct by Mr. Cabrera or his counsel prevent Google 4 from exploring the question of Mr. Cabrera’s standing to sue. Google argues that the question of Mr. Cabrera’s standing is critical in this case, and that it 5 6 will be unable to dispute Mr. Cabrera’s standing unless it obtains discovery that is only available 7 from Mr. Peen and AMP Global. Google relies in part on allegations in the Fourth Amended 8 Complaint for its contention that Mr. Cabrera’s claims are, in fact, based on injuries Training 9 Options suffered. Dkt. No. 421 at 2 (citing Fourth Amended Complaint ¶¶ 4-8). However, those allegations do not clearly describe an injury to Training Options as opposed to Mr. Cabrera.3 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 More importantly, Google points to no information outside the pleadings suggesting that Training 12 Options, and not Mr. Cabrera, suffered the injuries alleged in the complaint. In particular, Google 13 offers no reason for the Court to question the evidence Mr. Cabrera highlights showing that the 14 AdWords account was Mr. Cabrera’s personal account and not an asset of the business. In short, 15 Google has not shown that its belated subpoenas to Mr. Peen and AMP Global are likely to yield 16 discovery that bears on the question of standing, or on any other claim or defense. 17 Had Google served these non-party subpoenas during the discovery period, the subpoenas 18 may well have passed muster under Rule 26(b)(1). However, Google must now show good cause 19 to pursue discovery after expiration of the discovery cut-off. It has not made that showing. For 20 the same reasons, Mr. Cabrera has shown good cause for a protective order to bar this belated non- 21 party discovery. 22 IV. Mr. Cabrera’s request for an order prohibiting enforcement of these subpoenas is granted. 23 24 CONCLUSION Google may not enforce its subpoenas to non-parties Mr. Peen and AMP Global. 25 26 27 28 2 Google does not argue that this subject matter was encompassed by earlier discovery requests and improperly withheld from production by Mr. Cabrera. 3 For example, the Court finds no allegations in the Fourth Amended Complaint that Training Options (and not Mr. Cabrera) paid the “overcharges” for the AdWords account. 4 1 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: November 14, 2018 3 4 VIRGINIA K. DEMARCHI United States Magistrate Judge 5 6 7 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?