Walker v. Grounds et al

Filing 13

ORDER by Judge Lucy H. Koh denying 10 Motion for Discovery (Attachments: # 1 certificate of mailing) (mpb, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/6/2012)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JEFFERSON D. WALKER,

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Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN RANDY GROUNDS,
Respondent.

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No. C 11-2447 LHK (PR)
ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR
LEAVE TO CONDUCT
DISCOVERY

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Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a decision by the Board of Parole Hearings. The
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Court issued an order to show cause after finding that Petitioner had stated two cognizable
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claims for relief. First, Petitioner claims that he was denied his right to due process because he
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did not have an opportunity to be heard in response to the victim’s next of kin’s statements at his
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parole suitability hearing. Second, Petitioner alleges that California Penal Code § 3043(b),
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regarding victims’ statements in a parole hearing, is unconstitutionally broad. Respondent has
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filed an answer, and Petitioner has filed a traverse.
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Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s request for leave to conduct discovery. A habeas
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petitioner, unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, is not entitled to discovery as a matter of
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ordinary course. See Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). However, Rule 6(a) of the
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Order Denying Request for Leave to Conduct Discovery
P:\pro-se\sj.rmw\hc.11\Walker447disc

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Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, provides that a “judge

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may, for good cause, authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil

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Procedure and may limit the extent of discovery.” Good cause for discovery under Rule 6(a) is

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shown “‘where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner

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may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief . . . ’”

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Id. at 908-09 (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299 (1969)); Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d

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740, 743 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit has also described this standard as being that

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discovery must be allowed when it is “essential” for the petitioner to “develop fully” his or her

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underlying claim. Pham, 400 F.3d at 743 (quoting Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir.

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1997)).
Here, Petitioner seeks discovery that would essentially contradict or disprove the victim’s

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next of kin’s statements at the parole hearing, which accused Petitioner of sending threatening

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messages, and acting in an aggressive manner. Petitioner has not demonstrated that these items

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are “essential” for him to fully develop his underlying claims that he was not permitted to be

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heard at his parole hearing, or that Section 3043(b) is unconstitutionally broad. Petitioner’s

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request is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

1/5/12
LUCY H. KOH
United States District Judge

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Order Denying Request for Leave to Conduct Discovery
P:\pro-se\sj.rmw\hc.11\Walker447disc

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