Anderson v. Zika

Filing 26

ORDER Denying 14 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; Granting in part 16 Motion to Dismiss; Denying 19 Motion to Stay; denying 24 Motion to Compel. The complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, if Plaintiff wishes, with respect to the E ighth Amendment claim. Within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this order is filed, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint using the court's form complaint. The amended complaint must include the caption and civil case number used in this ord er and the words "AMENDED COMPLAINT" on the first page and write in the case number for this action, No. C 11-04276 EJD (PR). Failure to respond in accordance with this order by filing an amended complaint in the time provided will result in this action continuing solely on the ADA claim. The Clerk shall include two copies of the court's complaint with a copy of this order to Plaintiff. Signed by Judge Edward J. Davila on 1/8/2013. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate of Service, # 2 Form Habeas Complaint) (ecg, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/9/2013) (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/9/2013: # 3 CORRECTED Certificate of Service) (ecg, COURT STAFF).

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11

BENJAMIN ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,

12

vs.

13
14
15

BILL ZIKA,
Defendant.

16
17

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. C 11-04276 EJD (PR)
ORDER PARTIALLY GRANTING
MOTION TO DISMISS WITH
LEAVE TO AMEND AND
DENYING MOTIONS FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, TO
STAY DISCOVERY AND TO
COMPEL DISCOVERY
(Docket Nos. 14, 16, 19 & 24)

18

Plaintiff, a California inmate, filed the instant civil rights action in pro se

19

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Bill Zika of the Correctional Training

20

Facility - Soledad (“CTF”) for unconstitutional acts. Defendant filed a motion to

21

dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Docket No. 16.) Plaintiff filed an

22

opposition, and Defendant filed a reply. Also pending is Plaintiff’s motion for a

23

preliminary injunction (Docket No. 14), Defendant’s motion to stay discovery (Docket

24

No. 19) and Plaintiff’s motion to compel (Docket No. 24).

25
26
27
28

DISCUSSION
I.

Plaintiff’s Claims
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Bill Zika, the Chief Mental Health Officer at

CTF, unlawfully denied him reasonable accommodations for his mental disability by
Order Dismissing 04276Anderson_Mtd-wlta.wpd

1

1

denying him single-cell placement although it was recommended by the “mental

2

health treatment team.” (Compl. at 3-4.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Zika’s

3

reasoning for the denial was that Plaintiff must first “display aggressive, combative

4

behavior, or otherwise engage in what are essentially ‘Gladiator Fights’ in his cell with

5

another prisoner before [Plaintiff] could be considered for single-cell placement. (Id.

6

at 4.) Plaintiff claims that such reasoning demonstrates a “cruel sadistic, and culpable

7

state of mind that amounts to [d]eliberate [i]ndifference to [Plaintiff’s] overall mental

8

health needs.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that the denial also violates his rights under the

9

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). Plaintiff only seeks injunctive

10

relief, namely that: 1) he be placed in a single-person cell; 2) Defendant be compelled

11

to comply with the ADA when assessing individual needs for reasonable

12

accommodations; and 3) Defendant be ordered to abolish the practice of requiring

13

mentally ill patients to first engage in “Gladiator fights” in their cells with another

14

inmate before considered for single-cell placement. The Court found that liberally

15

construed, Plaintiff’s claims were cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Eighth

16

Amendment and the ADA.

17
18
19

II.

Motion to Dismiss
Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief are barred as he

20

is a member of pending class action lawsuits, the official and individual capacity

21

claims must be dismissed as a matter of law and Plaintiff fails to state a claim that

22

Defendant violated his Eighth Amendment rights by denying him single-cell status.

23

(Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) at 4, 6.)

24

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain

25

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts

26

are not necessary; the statement need only ‘”give the defendant fair notice of what the

27

. . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

28

93 (2007) (citations omitted). Furthermore, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule
Order Dismissing 04276Anderson_Mtd-wlta.wpd

2

1

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s

2

obligation to provide the ‘grounds of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than

3

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

4

will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

5

speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-56 (2007)

6

(citations omitted). A motion to dismiss should be granted if the complaint does not

7

proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at

8

570.1 This standard applies to all cases. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,

9

1952 (2009) (finding under Twombly and Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

10

Procedure, that complainant-detainee in a Bivens action failed to plead sufficient facts

11

“plausibly showing” that top federal officials “purposely adopted a policy of

12

classifying post-September-11 detainees as ‘of high interest’ because of their race,

13

religion, or national origin” over more likely and non-discriminatory explanations).

14

1.

Class Actions

15

Defendant first contends that Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is barred as

16

he is an individual class member in the pending class actions Coleman v. Brown, et

17

al., No. S 90–0520 LKK–JFM (E.D. Cal.) and Plata v. Brown, No. 01–cv–01351 TEH

18

(N.D. Cal.).2 Brought by California state inmates, the Coleman class-action lawsuit

19

concerns the constitutional adequacy of the mental health care provided to CDCR

20

inmates; the Coleman class consists of “all inmates with serious mental disorders who

21

are now, or who will in the future, be confined with the California Department of

22

Corrections.” (Class Cert. Order, Nov. 14, 1991, 4–5, No. S 90–0520 LKK–JFM

23
24
25
26
27
28

Twombly disapproved the “no set of facts” language in Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41 (1957). Conley had stated “the accepted rule that a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id.
at 45-46. Twombly decided that “this famous observation has earned its retirement.
The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading
standard.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562.
1

2

The Court takes judicial notice of these cases.

Order Dismissing 04276Anderson_Mtd-wlta.wpd

3

1

(E.D. Cal.).) The Plata class-action suit concerns the constitutional adequacy of

2

CDCR's inmate medical health care; the Plata class consists of “all prisoners in the

3

custody of the [California Department of Corrections] with serious medical needs.”

4

(Stip. for Inj. Relief 5, ECF No. 24, No. 01–cv–01351 TEH (N.D.Cal.).)

5

A plaintiff who is a member of a class action for equitable relief from prison

6

conditions may not maintain a separate, individual suit for equitable relief involving

7

the same subject matter of the class action. See Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 892-

8

93 (9th Cir. 1979); see also McNeil v. Guthrie, 945 F.2d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 1991)

9

(“Individual suits for injunctive and equitable relief from alleged unconstitutional

10

prison conditions cannot be brought where there is an existing class action.”). A

11

plaintiff, however, may pursue equitable relief that goes beyond that which is covered

12

by the class action. See Crawford, 599 F.2d at 893 (reversing district court's dismissal

13

of plaintiff's claims for relief that were not included in a class action challenging

14

overcrowding); accord, McNeil, 945 F.2d at 1166 n. 4 (“class members may bring

15

individual actions for equitable relief when their claims are not being litigated within

16

the boundaries of the class action”).

17

When reviewing claims for equitable relief brought by prisoners who are

18

members of the Coleman and Plata classes, a number of district courts have concluded

19

that an individual class member may proceed with a separate action for equitable or

20

injunctive relief if he seeks relief that is specific to his medical needs and the

21

circumstances of his incarceration, rather than the broad, systemic relief targeted by

22

those actions. See, e.g., Burnett v. Dugan, 618 F.Supp. 2d 1232, 1236-37 (S.D. Cal.

23

2009) (granting preliminary injunction requiring defendants to adhere to chronos for

24

plaintiff's medically-indicated housing needs because he was not seeking “relief on

25

behalf of all the other inmates in the CDCR,” nor “broad based reform of the CDCR's

26

medical practices which is the subject of the Plata litigation,” but, rather, relief that

27

was “quite narrow and specific” to him); Moore v. McDonald, 2011 WL 3684608, *4

28

(E.D. Cal., Aug. 23, 2011) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss under Plata and
Order Dismissing 04276Anderson_Mtd-wlta.wpd

4

1

allowing plaintiff to proceed with “discrete, individualized claims for equitable relief”

2

pertaining to his receipt of insulin and a special diet for his diabetes); Rincon v. Cate,

3

2010 WL 5863894, *4 (S.D. Cal., Nov. 15, 2010) (authorizing plaintiff to “maintain a

4

separate suit arising from his discrete medical condition”); Neumann v. Veal, 2008

5

WL 2705549, *2-3 (E.D. Cal., July 10, 2008) (finding plaintiff's claims for injunctive

6

relief regarding inadequate mental health care “appear to be unique to him” and

7

allowing him to proceed individually on those claims because Coleman does not

8

adequately protect his rights); Tillis v. Lamarque, 2006 WL 644876, *9 (N.D .Cal.,

9

March 9, 2006) (finding plaintiff's request for transfer to another institution for

10

appropriate medical treatment not barred by Plata because “[p]laintiff is seeking relief

11

solely on his own behalf ....”).

12

In the present case, the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff with respect to

13

being placed in a single cell does not seek broad reform or implicate the policies,

14

procedures and practices put in place by the Plata and Coleman cases. Rather, he

15

seeks specific, individualized relief from the alleged unconstitutional practice of one

16

particular prison doctor regarding Plaintiff’s condition. Accordingly, the Court finds

17

that because Plaintiff's request for a single cell concerns an individual prisoner's

18

needs, is based on his unique circumstances and is made solely on his own behalf, it is

19

not barred because he is a member of the Plata and Coleman classes; thus, he may

20

proceed with this claim for injunctive relief.

21

However, Plaintiff’s request that Defendant be compelled to comply with the

22

ADA when assessing individual needs for reasonable accommodations and that

23

Defendant alter the requirements considering single cell placement, do implicate

24

policies and procedures and do not solely concern his individual needs. Plaintiff is

25

essentially seeking to change the manner in which the entire prison operates with

26

respect to these aspects of medical care and mental health treatment, which are part of

27

the subject matter of the class actions. Therefore, these two requests for injunctive

28

relief are dismissed from this action.
Order Dismissing 04276Anderson_Mtd-wlta.wpd

5

1

2.

2

Defendant next argues that Plaintiff cannot bring this action against him in his

3

Official/Individual Capacity

official capacity or individual capacity. Plaintiff only seeks injunctive relief.
Title II of the ADA “prohibit[s] discrimination on the basis of disability.”

4
5

Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). Title II provides that “no

6

qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded

7

from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities

8

of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. §

9

12132. Title II of the ADA applies to inmates within state prisons. Pennsylvania

10

Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998).

11

With respect to his official capacity, Defendant’s argument fails. In Miranda

12

B. v. Kitzhaber, 328 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held that “Title II's

13

statutory language does not prohibit . . . injunctive action against state officials in their

14

official capacities.” Id. at 1187-88; see also Phiffer v. Columbia River Corr. Inst., 384

15

F.3d 791, 792 (9th Cir. 2004) (state is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity

16

under Title II of the ADA). However, Defendant may not be sued in his individual

17

capacity for injunctive relief. Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1155-56 (9th Cir.

18

2002).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant in his individual capacity are

19
20

dismissed but may continue against Defendant in his official capacity.

21

3.

22

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim fails to state a

23

Eighth Amendment

claim.3
Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the

24
25

Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A prison official

26

violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met: (1) the

27

deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the official is,

28

3

Defendant does not argue that the ADA claim fails to state a claim.

Order Dismissing 04276Anderson_Mtd-wlta.wpd

6

1

subjectively, deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s health or safety. See Farmer v.

2

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

3

A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition

4

could result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of

5

pain.” Id. The following are examples of indications that a prisoner has a “serious”

6

need for medical treatment: the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or

7

patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a

8

medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the

9

existence of chronic and substantial pain. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-

10

60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller,

11

104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

12

A prison official exhibits deliberate indifference when he knows of and

13

disregards a substantial risk of serious harm to inmate health. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at

14

837. The official must both know of “facts from which the inference could be drawn”

15

that an excessive risk of harm exists, and he must actually draw that inference. Id. “A

16

difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities

17

regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662

18

F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). Similarly, a showing of nothing more than a

19

difference of medical opinion as to the need to pursue one course of treatment over

20

another is insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference, see

21

Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild,

22

891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Mayfield v. Craven, 433 F.2d 873, 874 (9th Cir.

23

1970). In order to prevail on a claim involving choices between alternative courses of

24

treatment, a plaintiff must show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was

25

medically unacceptable under the circumstances and that he or she chose this course

26

in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at

27

1058; Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Farmer v.

28

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
Order Dismissing 04276Anderson_Mtd-wlta.wpd

7

According to the complaint, it was recommended by a mental health team that

1
2

Plaintiff be housed in a single cell to stabilize and improve his mental health

3

condition. This was forwarded to Defendant who denied the recommendation and it

4

would appear Plaintiff continued to share a cell. Plaintiff theorizes that he was denied

5

a single cell because there was no history of sexual abuse or assaultive behavior with

6

him and his cellmate.
Plaintiff states he needs a single cell because he is mentally ill, though provides

7
8

little information regarding his illness other than saying he has post traumatic stress

9

disorder with paranoia and auditory hallucinations. Plaintiff provides no information

10

regarding if his condition worsened due to the shared cell or why a single cell is so

11

important for his health. Plaintiff spends the majority of the complaint discussing that

12

the recommendation was denied because there was no conflict between he and his

13

cellmate. Assuming this is true, Plaintiff has still failed to allege how Defendant was

14

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, nor has Plaintiff

15

sufficiently discussed his medical needs. Nor has Plaintiff alleged that Defendant was

16

even aware of the possible medical harm that could befall Plaintiff. The complaint

17

only presents a difference of medical opinion which fails to state an Eighth

18

Amendment claim.4
The Eighth Amendment claim will be dismissed but Plaintiff will be provided

19
20

an opportunity to file an amended complaint if he wishes. If Plaintiff files an

21

amended complaint he must also include the ADA claim because an amended

22

complaint completely replaces the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963

23

F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the original

24

complaint by reference.5

25
26
27
28

Nor does this state a claim for failure to protect under the Eighth Amendment as Plaintiff
has not suffered any injury, he does not allege any specific threat from having a cellmate nor
does he allege that Defendant was aware of any threat.
4

The qualified immunity argument need not be addressed as Plaintiff only seeks
injunctive relief and qualified immunity does not preclude injunctive relief. Walker v.
5

Order Dismissing 04276Anderson_Mtd-wlta.wpd

8

1
2
3

III.

Miscellaneous Motions
As the motion to dismiss is being granted in part, Defendant’s motion for a stay

4

of discovery (Docket No. 19) is denied. As several of Plaintiff’s claims have been

5

denied, his motion to compel (Docket No. 24) will be denied without prejudice, as

6

many of the requests in the motion concern claims no longer part of this action. If an

7

amended complaint is filed with all cognizable claims or this case continues solely on

8

the ADA claim, Plaintiff may refile the motion to compel at a future date if required

9

and tailored to the cognizable claims.

10

Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction to obtain a single cell (Docket

11

No. 14) will be denied for the same reasons as discussed above. Plaintiff states he has

12

a mental illness, but provides no information regarding the illness. He states that he

13

requires daily medication, but it is not clear how sharing a cell affects this. Plaintiff

14

again focuses his argument on his belief that he must have an altercation with his

15

cellmate, before he will be allowed a single cell, yet fails to discuss his medical

16

problems or disabilities that require such a cell. Plaintiff’s argument that simply

17

having to share a cell violates the Eighth Amendment is meritless.

18

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded

19

upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural

20

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). “The proper legal standard for

21

preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate (1) ‘that he is likely to

22

succeed on the merits, (2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

23

preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and (4) that an

24

injunction is in the public interest.” Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127

25

(9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to such relief.

26
27
28

Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2004).
Order Dismissing 04276Anderson_Mtd-wlta.wpd

9

1

CONCLUSION

2

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

3

All claims are dismissed except the ADA claim regarding Plaintiff’s placement

4

in a single cell, against Defendant in his official capacity. The complaint is

5

DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, if Plaintiff wishes, with respect to the

6

Eighth Amendment claim. Within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this order is

7

filed, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint using the court’s form complaint. The

8

amended complaint must include the caption and civil case number used in this order

9

and the words “AMENDED COMPLAINT” on the first page and write in the case

10
11

number for this action, No. C 11-04276 EJD (PR).
If Plaintiff files an amended complaint he must also include the ADA claim

12

because an amended complaint completely replaces the original complaint. See

13

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate

14

material from the original complaint by reference.

15

Failure to respond in accordance with this order by filing an amended

16

complaint in the time provided will result in this action continuing solely on the

17

ADA claim.

18
19
20

The Clerk shall include two copies of the court’s complaint with a copy of this
order to Plaintiff.
This order terminates Docket Nos. 14, 16, 19 & 24.

21
22

DATED:

1/8/2013

23

EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge

24
25
26
27
28
Order Dismissing 04276Anderson_Mtd-wlta.wpd

10