True v. Ochs et al

Filing 28

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY. After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, the Court concludes that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus must be DENIED. Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. The Clerk shall terminate any pending motions, enter judgment in favor of Respondent, and close the file. Signed by Judge Edward J. Davila on 4/29/2013. (ecg, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 4/30/2013)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

9
DAVID A. TRUE,

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

12

Petitioner,
v.

13
ROBERT M. OCHS, Warden,
14
Respondent.
15

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. C 11-05220 EJD (PR)
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS;
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY

16
17

Petitioner has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28

18

U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his state conviction from Sonoma County Superior Court.

19

For the reasons set forth below, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is

20

DENIED.

21
22

BACKGROUND
Petitioner was found guilty by a jury of receiving, concealing, or withholding

23

a stolen motor vehicle; knowingly altering a vehicle identification number; and a

24

misdemeanor violation of defacing the identifying numbers or marks of a motor

25

vehicle. On June 30, 2008, the trial court suspended Petitioner’s sentence and

26

granted him probation on the condition that, inter alia, Petitioner serve five months

27

in jail. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal reversed the conviction for

28
Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability
G:\PRO-SE\SJ.EJD\HC.11\05220True_denyHC.wpd

1

receiving, concealing, or withholding a stolen motor vehicle, and otherwise affirmed

2

the judgment. The California Supreme Court denied review. Petitioner filed the

3

instant federal habeas petition on June 25, 2011.

4
5
6
7
8

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of
Appeal:
Guy Carlson lived and worked in Santa Rosa. In 2002, he
purchased a 100th Anniversary 2003 Harley-Davidson Soft Tail
Fatboy motorcycle. The motorcycle was stolen from the parking lot
of Carlson’s employer on June 22, 2003.

9

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

12

In early 2006, appellant contacted the Sonoma County CHP
office to request a VIN verification for a motorcycle he claimed to
have built from salvaged parts. He intended to raffle off the
motorcycle to benefit the CHP’s Widows and Orphans Fund, a
charity he had supported in the past, and he needed to register the
motorcycle with the Department of Motor Vehicles. In California,
the CHP can assign a VIN to a vehicle.

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

CHP officers DeBois and Cincera inspected the motorcycle at
appellant’s towing business in Petaluma, where they became
suspicious upon noticing that the VIN number on the headstock had
been ground off. The headstock is the area on the frame where the
gas tank, headlight and forks are welded together, and is the location
where a VIN is stamped on a motorcycle. The engine number
appeared to have been altered, having been stamped in a manner that
was inconsistent with Harley-Davidson markings, and was reported
“not on file.” Appellant told the officers that he had built the
motorcycle using parts from a number of 2003 motorcycles,
including engine parts and a headstock he bought at a swap meet in
Oakland.
The case was turned over to the Sonoma County Auto Theft
Task Force (Task Force) and the motorcycle was taken into custody.
The numbers on the motorcycle were not consistent with
Harley-Davidson VINs; for example, the engine number had 14
characters rather than the 10 it should have had and the crank case
number had a false identification number. The part numbers on the
engine, transmission and frame appeared to match exactly, even
though the numbers on a Harley Davidson will have numbers of
different lengths. The VIN had been ground down and dye stamped,
even though the VINs on Harley-Davidsons are pin-stamped. [FN1]
With the assistance of Peter Simet, a Harley-Davidson identification
specialist familiar with confidential markings placed on
Harley-Davidson motorcycles for identification purposes, it was
determined that the frame, engine and transmission of appellant’s
motorcycle were taken from the motorcycle that was stolen from
Guy Carlson in 2003. Additionally, other parts such as the headlight,

28
Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability
G:\PRO-SE\SJ.EJD\HC.11\05220True_denyHC.wpd

2

1

fenders and gas tank were consistent with the stolen motorcycle.

2

FN1. Pin stamping is done with a machine that puts the
number or letter on the engine one pin dot at a time. A dye
stamp rotates and stamps a complete number or letter onto the
surface.

3
4

Appellant was interviewed by CHP Officer Monge (Monge)
of the Task Force. Appellant initially claimed to have bought the
engine and drive train for the motorcycle in Montana. Later in the
same interview, after Monge showed him a receipt from a “J. Davis”
in Odessa, Oregon, appellant said he had been driving through
southern Oregon when he saw two 2003 Harley-Davidson Fatboys
sitting in a field with a for sale sign. Appellant told Monge that after
speaking to Jon Davis, the owner, he called his friend CHP Officer
Keeran and asked him to run a check to see if the motorcycles were
stolen. According to appellant, Keeran told him that one of them
came back “clear,” so appellant bought the motorcycle along with
some other parts.

5
6
7
8
9

Appellant also told Monge that he had purchased the frame of
his motorcycle from Dan Barzee at Sonoma Custom Choppers.
Asked about the grind marks on the motorcycle frame, appellant
acknowledged to Monge that he had removed some numbers by
painting over them. Appellant told Monge that there had only been
five or six numbers on the frame, and he had ground them off. He
might have welded over them, but said he was not sure. He
explained that he had not liked the way the numbers looked.

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

12
13
14
15

Officer Keeran denied that, around June 12, 2004, he had run
the identification numbers on a motorcycle. An analysis of the
state's computer system showed that no one had run the numbers
during the time period claimed by appellant. Oregon law
enforcement was unable to track down the “J. Davis” who had
allegedly sold appellant the motorcycle engine. Dan Barzee denied
selling appellant the motorcycle frame and maintained that his shop
had never sold Harley-Davidson parts. The receipt that appellant
claimed corresponded to his purchase of the frame did not look like a
receipt generated by Sonoma Custom Choppers. Ted Green, a
co-owner of Sonoma Custom Choppers, was told by appellant that
he had won the motorcycle in a poker game with some biker friends.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22

25

At trial, appellant maintained that he had purchased the
engine of his motorcycle in southern Oregon from a man named “J.
Davis” and had purchased the frame from Dan Barzee. He claimed
the motorcycle frame had only a partial VIN when he purchased it
from Barzee. He had removed the section of the frame with the
remaining numbers intending to save it, but the piece with the
number had been lost.

26

People v. True, No. A121975, slip op. at 2-4 (Cal. Ct. App. April 20, 2010) (Ans.

27

Ex. 6).

23
24

28
Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability
G:\PRO-SE\SJ.EJD\HC.11\05220True_denyHC.wpd

3

1
2
3

DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of Review
This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

4

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that

5

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

6

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The writ may not be granted with respect to any

7

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s

8

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

9

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

12

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

13

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

14

the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

15

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the]

16

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529

17

U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). The only definitive source of clearly established federal

18

law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the

19

Supreme Court as of the time of the state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.

20

While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes of determining

21

whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

22

precedent, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and

23

only those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062,

24

1069 (9th Cir.), overruled on other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63

25

(2003).

26
27

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may
grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from

28
Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability
G:\PRO-SE\SJ.EJD\HC.11\05220True_denyHC.wpd

4

1

[the Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts

2

of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. “Under § 2254(d)(1)’s

3

‘unreasonable application’ clause, . . . a federal habeas court may not issue the writ

4

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

5

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

6

incorrectly.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 411. A federal habeas court making the

7

“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application

8

of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. The

9

federal habeas court must presume correct any determination of a factual issue made
by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

12

The state court decision to which Section 2254(d) applies is the “last

13

reasoned decision” of the state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-

14

04 (1991). When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court

15

considering a petitioner’s claims, the court “looks through” to the last reasoned

16

opinion. See id. at 805. Here, that opinion is from the California Court of Appeal.

17

C.

18
19

Claims and Analysis
As grounds for federal habeas relief, Petitioner raises the following claims:

(1) prosecutorial misconduct, and (2) a violation of the Confrontation Clause.

20

1.

21

Petitioner’s first claim is that the prosecutor committed misconduct by

Prosecutorial misconduct

22

shifting the burden of proof to the defense in his closing argument. Specifically,

23

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor stated that the reasonable doubt instruction

24

required the jury to determine whether there was a reasonable doubt of guilt based

25

solely on the evidence – rather than on any absence of evidence – that was

26

introduced at trial.

27

The Court of Appeal summarized and rejected this claim raised on direct

28
Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability
G:\PRO-SE\SJ.EJD\HC.11\05220True_denyHC.wpd

5

1
2
3
4

appeal:
Appellant argues that the prosecutor misstated the burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt during closing argument and that
the trial court compounded the error by endorsing the prosecutor’s
statements. Although we agree that the challenged portion of the
argument had the potential to be misleading if considered out of
context, we conclude that any error was harmless.

5
6
7
8
9

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Appellant focuses on the following comments: “[Prosecutor]:
I want to talk to you briefly about reasonable doubt. I don’t want to
spend a whole lot of time on it. I just want to give you the rest of the
instruction and I’ve underlined the part that was not read, and it just
said the evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because
everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. [¶]
Now, what this means is when you’re done hearing the evidence,
you are going to hear argument, which is not evidence, you are going
to go back in the jury room and you are going to deliberate and you
will have to ask - each and every one of you will have to ask yourself
do I have some sort of doubt in this case on any count that Mr. True
is not guilty? Do I have a doubt? If the answer is no, then you are
done. [¶] “If the answer is yes, then you move on to the next
question which is is my doubt reasonable? Is what I am doubting a
reasonable doubt? If the answer is no, then you are done. If the
answer is yes, then you ask the third and final question, is the doubt I
have something that is - comes from the evidence? Is it something
that has been provided from the stand or from the evidence by the
defense or by the People? [¶] You are not to speculate, you are not
to guess and that is part of the instructions that the Court gave you.
Don’t make up your own defenses essentially is what it's saying. [¶]
Use your common sense. That’s what you are here for. You are
members of our community. That's why you were chosen. Use your
common sense. Do not leave your common sense at the door.
“[Defense Counsel]: Your honor, I’m going to object. There
is no third element that [the prosecutor] argues in the reasonable
doubt instruction.

20

“The Court: It’s not an instruction.

21

“[Defense Counsel]: I think he is misstating the law.

22

“The Court: It’s not an instruction, but it is fair argument.
The objection is overruled.”

23
24
25
26
27

“A prosecutor’s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment
to the federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such
unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.
Conduct by the prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial
fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law
only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to
attempt to persuade either the trial court or the jury. . . . [W]hen the
claim focuses on comments made by the prosecutor before the jury,
the question is whether there is any reasonable likelihood that the

28
Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability
G:\PRO-SE\SJ.EJD\HC.11\05220True_denyHC.wpd

6

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

jury construed or applied any of the complained - of remarks in an
objectionable fashion.” (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 34,
44.)
A prosecutor may not suggest that a defendant has the burden
of producing evidence or proving his innocence. (See People v.
Bradford (1997) 15 Cal. 4th 1229, 1340; People v. Young (2005) 34
Cal. 4th 1149, 1195-1196.) In keeping with this rule, the prosecutor
in this case should not have urged jurors who harbored a reasonable
doubt as to guilt to ask themselves whether that doubt was supported
by evidence. Viewed in isolation, this comment tended to suggest
that appellant had the burden of producing evidence to show a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt. (See People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.
4th 800, 831-832 (Hill) [though the issue was close, prosecutor’s
statement during closing argument that there must be “some
evidence from which there is a reason for a doubt” was
misconduct].)
In context, however, the prosecutor was making the larger and
legally permissible point that the jury should base its verdict on the
evidence rather than on speculation. The jurors were instructed with
CALCRIM No. 220, which properly defined the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, and with CALCRIM No. 222, which
advised them that they must base their decision only on the evidence
presented and that the argument of counsel was not evidence.
“Although the same standard is applicable for instructions by the
court and comments by the prosecutor, it must be used with
recognition of the differing nature and force of its two objects in the
eyes of the jury. We presume that jurors treat the court’s instructions
as a statement of the law by a judge, and the prosecutor’s comments
as words spoken by an advocate in an attempt to persuade.” (People
v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 629, 663, fn.8.) Given the overall context
of his remarks and the instructions given, the prosecutor’s comments
were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v.
Katzenberger (2009) 178 Cal. App. 4th 1260, 1266, 1268-1269
[prosecutor’s argument denigrating reasonable doubt standard by
using power point presentation to compare it to jigsaw puzzle whose
picture was recognizable with several pieces missing was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt where it was followed by court reading
correct definition of reasonable doubt to the jury]; People v. Simpson
(1954) 43 Cal. 2d 553, 565-566 [instruction defining reasonable
doubt as “doubt which has some good reason for its existence arising
out of the evidence” was potentially confusing, but reversal not
required];contrast Hill, supra, 17 Cal. 4th at pp. 844-848 [“constant
and outrageous” misconduct by prosecutor in “a pervasive campaign
to mislead the jury on key legal points” might well have required
reversal in and of itself had numerous errors committed by trial court
not been prejudicial].)

25
26
27

We reject appellant’s suggestion that the court endorsed the
prosecutor’s argument, thus elevating it to the status of a jury
instruction, when it overruled the defense objection. In explaining
its ruling, the court specifically stated to counsel that the
prosecutor’s comments were not an instruction, but were “fair

28
Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability
G:\PRO-SE\SJ.EJD\HC.11\05220True_denyHC.wpd

7

1
2
3

argument.” Characterizing the argument as “fair” did not adopt its
content as a statement of the law for instructional purposes when the
court specifically stated that it was not an instruction. The jury was
advised by CALCRIM No. 200 that it must follow the court’s
instructions rather than counsel’s comments if it believed the two to
be in conflict.

4
(Ans. Ex. 6 at 8-11.)
5
Prosecutorial misconduct is cognizable in federal habeas corpus. The
6
appropriate standard of review is the narrow one of due process and not the broad
7
exercise of supervisory power. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). A
8
defendant’s due process rights are violated when a prosecutor’s misconduct renders
9
a trial “fundamentally unfair.” Id.; Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (“the
10

For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is
11
the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor”). Under Darden, the
12
first issue is whether the prosecutor’s remarks were improper; if so, the next
13
question is whether such conduct infected the trial with unfairness. Tan v. Runnels,
14
413 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005).
15
In addition, a prosecutor’s mischaracterization of a jury instruction is less
16
likely to render a trial fundamentally unfair than if the trial court issues the
17
instruction erroneously:
18
19
20
21
22

[A]rguments of counsel generally carry less weight with a jury than do
instructions from the court. The former are not evidence, and are
likely viewed as the statements of advocates; the latter, we have often
recognized, are viewed as definitive and binding statements of the law.
Arguments of counsel which misstate the law are subject to objection
and to correction by the court. This is not to say that prosecutorial
misrepresentations may never have a decisive effect on the jury, but
only that they are not to be judged as having the same force as an
instruction from the court.

23
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384-85 (1989) (citations omitted).
24
The state court’s rejection of this claim was not unreasonable. As the state
25
court recognized, taking the prosecutor’s statement in context, it was reasonable to
26
conclude that the prosecutor was arguing that the jury should base its decision on the
27
evidence rather than on speculation. Further, the impact of any ambiguity of the
28
Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability
G:\PRO-SE\SJ.EJD\HC.11\05220True_denyHC.wpd

8

1

prosecutor’s statements was lessened by the legally correct jury instructions that

2

were given on the definition of reasonable doubt (Ans. Ex. 2 Vol. 15, 24 RT 4612)

3

and how the jury should deliberate (id., 24 RT 4610-4611); on the trial court’s

4

repeated advice that counsel’s arguments were not evidence and, if in conflict with

5

the instructions, were trumped by the instructions (id., 24 RT 4612-4613); and by

6

the presumption that the jury is presumed to follow the instructions. On this record,

7

the state courts’ rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

8

application of, Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

9

2.

Confrontation Clause

Petitioner’s second claim is that his right to confrontation was violated when

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

the trial court permitted an investigating police officer to testify as to the substance

12

of witnesses’ answers to the officers’ questions.

13

The Court of Appeal rejected this claim:

14

Appellant contends the court erroneously admitted hearsay
evidence of witness statements made to Oregon State Police Officer
Lieutenant Nork during his investigation of the area in southern
Oregon where appellant claimed to have purchased motorcycle parts
from a “Jon Davis.” We conclude that any error was harmless.

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Nork had attempted to locate Davis by speaking with various
people who lived in the area where appellant claimed to have made
the purchase. Over a hearsay objection by defense counsel, Nork
was allowed to testify that the various witnesses he interviewed were
unable to provide him with information useful to his investigation.
He was also allowed to testify that he was never able to locate a Jon
Davis who was connected with the sale of any Harley-Davidson
motorcycle in the area, and that none of the three individuals listed
as Jon or J. Davis in the area’s telephone book was able to provide
useful information. Appellant argues that Nork’s testimony was
largely hearsay because it conveyed that what the various
interviewees had told Nork.

23
24
25
26
27

“‘Hearsay evidence’ is evidence of a statement that was made
other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.” (Evid. Code, § 1200,
subd. (a).) “‘Statement’ means (a) oral or written verbal expression
or (b) nonverbal conduct of a person intended by him as a substitute
for oral or written verbal expression.” (Evid. Code, § 225.)
Lieutenant Nork did not testify about any particular statement made
by the people he interviewed, but the import of his testimony was
that they told him they did not have any information about a Jon

28
Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability
G:\PRO-SE\SJ.EJD\HC.11\05220True_denyHC.wpd

9

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Davis or motorcycles sales in the area. These implied statements of
the interviewees - which were relevant only if offered for their truth suggested that no Jon Davis lived in the area and that appellant was
lying when he claimed to have purchased the motorcycle engine in
Oregon.
This case is unlike People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal. 4th 327,
cited by the People, in which a witness was allowed to testify that
her mother, the murder victim, had never said anything about her
wallet being stolen prior to her killing by intruders who entered her
home. (Id. at p. 350.) The Supreme Court concluded that the
victim’s failure to say anything about the wallet was nonverbal
conduct rather than a hearsay statement or assertion, and that it was
properly admitted to show that the wallet had been taken during a
robbery when the victim was killed. (Ibid.) In the case before us, it
was apparent from the lieutenant’s testimony that the people he
interviewed made verbal statements; the question is whether the jury
would have necessarily gleaned the content of those statements from
the testimony given. (See People v. McNamara (1892) 94 Cal. 509,
514-515 [officer’s testimony that he arrested defendant based on
information from non-testifying witness was inadmissible hearsay];
Favre v. Henderson (5th Cir. 1972) 464 F.2d 359, 362 [implied
hearsay where officer was improperly allowed to testify that he
arrested defendant based on information from unidentified
confidential informants].) We assume without deciding that Nork’s
testimony regarding the interviewees’ lack of useful information was
hearsay not subject to any exception.
The erroneous introduction of hearsay at trial requires reversal
only if it is reasonably probable that appellant would have obtained a
more favorable result had the evidence been excluded. (People v.
Garcia (2008) 168 Cal. App. 4th 261, 292, citing People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836.) There is no reasonable probability here.
Even without the testimony as to what Lieutenant Nork was told by
various witnesses, the jury would have learned that he was unable to
locate a Jon Davis in the area where appellant claimed to have
purchased the motorcycle engine. More importantly, other evidence
established that both the engine and the frame of the motorcycle that
appellant purportedly assembled from salvage came from a single
motorcycle that was stolen from Guy Carlson in Santa Rosa.
Appellant claimed to have purchased the engine from Jon Davis in
Oregon and the frame from Sonoma Custom Choppers in Petaluma.
It is highly improbable the jury would have believed that he
unwittingly purchased two major parts of the same stolen motorcycle
from two separate sources located in different states. Given the
strong inference that appellant obtained the frame and the engine
from a single source, the jury was highly unlikely to credit his story
about the Oregon purchase, even if there had been no testimony
suggesting Jon Davis could not be found.
We reject appellant’s claim that the introduction of the
hearsay evidence must be assessed under the more stringent
“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for federal
constitutional error because it violated his Confrontation Clause

28
Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability
G:\PRO-SE\SJ.EJD\HC.11\05220True_denyHC.wpd

10

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

rights under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 68
(Crawford).) A Crawford violation occurs only when the
out-of-court statement was “testimonial” in nature. (Davis v.
Washington (2006) 547 U .S. 813, 821.) This requires a showing
that the statement was made “under circumstances that imparted, to
some degree, the formality and solemnity characteristic of
testimony.” (People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal. 4th 965, 984.)
Assuming Lieutenant Nork’s testimony amounted to evidence of the
out-of-court statements by his interviewees, the record does not
establish that those statements were made with the degree of
formality necessary to implicate Crawford. An “informal statement
made in an unstructured setting” generally will not be deemed
testimonial. (People v. Morgan (2005) 125 Cal. App. 4th 935, 947.)
(Ans. Ex. 6 at 11-13.)
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that in criminal
cases the accused has the right to “be confronted with the witnesses against him.”

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Confrontation Clause applies to all out-of-court

12

testimonial statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., “testimonial

13

hearsay.” See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). Out-of-court

14

statements by witnesses that are testimonial hearsay are barred under the

15

Confrontation Clause unless (1) the witnesses are unavailable, and (2) the

16

defendants had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Id. at 59.

17

When the primary purpose of taking an out-of-court statement is to create an

18

out-of-court substitute for trial testimony, the statement is testimonial hearsay and

19

Crawford applies. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011). When that

20

was not the primary purpose, “the admissibility of a statement is the concern of state

21

and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause.” Id. In determining the

22

primary purpose of the statement, “standard rules of hearsay” will be relevant. Id.

23

And the formality of the interrogation, or the lack of it, may inform the court’s

24

inquiry as to its “primary purpose.” Id. at 1160.

25

Crawford noted that, at a minimum, “testimonial” included “prior testimony

26

at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and . . . police

27

interrogations.” 541 U.S. at 68. And, in Davis, the Supreme Court explained that

28
Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability
G:\PRO-SE\SJ.EJD\HC.11\05220True_denyHC.wpd

11

1

“police interrogations” meant “interrogations solely directed at establishing the facts

2

of a past crime, in order to identify (or provide evidence to convict) the perpetrator.”

3

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006). “[T]he most important instances in

4

which the Clause restricts the introduction of out-of-court statements are those in

5

which state actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness to

6

obtain evidence for trial.” Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155.

7

Here, the California Court of Appeal concluded that the statements were not

8

testimonial because the circumstances did not demonstrate a sufficient degree of

9

formality as implicated in Crawford. However, the Supreme Court has clarified that
formality is but one factor in determining the “primary purpose” of statements.

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160; see, e.g., Ocampo v. Vail, 649 F.3d 1098, 1108-10 (9th

12

Cir. 2011) (recognizing that police testimony describing or outlining statements

13

from a witness in lieu of the witness’ live-testimony also constitutes testimonial

14

statements subject to the Confrontation Clause).

15

Assuming without deciding that the statements about which the officer

16

testified were “testimonial hearsay,” and that the testimony violated the

17

Confrontation Clause, this Court concludes that there was no prejudice. A Crawford

18

claim, like all other Confrontation Clause claims, is subject to harmless error

19

analysis. See United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying

20

harmless error analysis to claim). In the context of reviewing a state court

21

conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, this of course means that relief is in order only if

22

the admission at issue “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in

23

determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)).

24

“In general, the inquiry into whether the constitutionally erroneous introduction of a

25

piece of evidence had a substantial and injurious effect is guided by several factors:

26

‘the importance of the testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, the

27

presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony, the

28
Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability
G:\PRO-SE\SJ.EJD\HC.11\05220True_denyHC.wpd

12

1

extent of cross-examination permitted, and the overall strength of the prosecution’s

2

case.’” Ocampo, 649 F.3d at 1114.

3

Here, as the California Court of Appeal noted, even without the challenged

investigation, he was unable to find any “Jon Davis” in the area where Petitioner

6

claimed he bought the motorcycle engine. Further, a Harley-Davidson identification

7

specialist opined that the frame, engine, and transmission of Petitioner’s motorcycle

8

were taken from a single motorcycle, and specifically, from the motorcycle which

9

was stolen from Guy Carlson. In addition, Petitioner’s statements were inconsistent

10

with the expert’s testimony, and Petitioner’s claims that (1) he asked Officer Keeran

11
For the Northern District of California

statements, Lieutenant Nork would still have been able to testify that during his

5

United States District Court

4

to run a check the alleged motorcycle, and (2) he bought the motorcycle frame from

12

Dan Barzee and Sonoma Custom Choppers were both refuted by Officer Keeran and

13

Dan Barzee. Finally, defense counsel’s cross-examination of Lieutenant Nork

14

neutralized Lieutenant Nork’s testimony by allowing him to testify that Lieutenant

15

Nork has conducted previous searches where he has not located suspects; there had

16

been problems with trespassers in the area; and Lieutenant Nork did not ask any of

17

the individuals named “Davis” whether they had stolen a motorcycle. Based on

18

strength of the prosecution’s case, and defense counsel’s minimization of the

19

challenged testimony, the Court concludes that the admitted testimony did not have

20

a substantial or injurious effect on the verdict. Accordingly, the state court’s

21

rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

22

established Supreme Court law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

23
24
25
26
27

CONCLUSION
After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, the Court concludes
that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus must be DENIED.
Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 11(a) of the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner has not made “a substantial

28
Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability
G:\PRO-SE\SJ.EJD\HC.11\05220True_denyHC.wpd

13

1

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has

2

Petitioner demonstrated that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s

3

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel,

4

529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

5
6

The Clerk shall terminate any pending motions, enter judgment in favor of
Respondent, and close the file.

7
8
9

DATED:

4/29/2013

EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge

11
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

10

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; Denying Certificate of Appealability
G:\PRO-SE\SJ.EJD\HC.11\05220True_denyHC.wpd

14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID A. TRUE,
Case Number: CV11-05220 EJD
Plaintiff,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
v.
ROBERT M. OCHS et al,
Defendant.

/

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S.
District Court, Northern District of California.
That on ___________________, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by
4/30/2013
placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter
listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an
inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk’s office.

David A. True
Sonoma County Probation Department
P. O. Box 11719
Santa Rosa, CA 95406
4/30/2013
Dated: _______________
Richard W. Wieking, Clerk
/s/ By: Elizabeth Garcia, Deputy Clerk