McFarland v. County of Santa Cruz et al

Filing 19

ORDER by Judge Whyte granting in part and denying in part 9 Motion to Dismiss.(rmwlc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/2/2012)

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E-FILED on

7/2/2012

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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SAN JOSE DIVISION

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SHANNON MCFARLAND,

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No. C-12-01727 RMW

Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF SANTA CRUZ, SHERIFF PHIL
WOWAK, OFFICER WILLIAM GAZZA,
OFFICER CHRISTOPHER HANKES,
OFFICER JOHN HABERMEHL, BRUCE
MCFARLAND, and DOES 1 through 100,
inclusive,

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS

[Re Docket No. 9]

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Defendants.
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Defendant Bruce McFarland moves to dismiss the claims against him. The court finds that
count seven, for intentional infliction of emotional distress, is barred by the absolute privilege set
forth in Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b), as the only wrongful conduct alleged on the part of defendant is
communicating with the police. See Hagberg v. California Federal Bank FSB, 32 Cal.4th 350, 370
(2004) (holding section 47(b) bars tort claims based on communications "intended to instigate
official governmental investigation into wrongdoing, including police investigation"). The court

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finds that count eight, for violation of Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 5150 and 5150.05(c), is not barred
by the litigation privilege, however, because sections 5150 and 5150.05(c) are more specific statutes
providing for civil liability in the exact situation alleged in the complaint. See Komarova v. Nat'l
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS—No. C-12-01727 RMW
LJP

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Credit Acceptance, Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 324, 339 (2009) ("Exceptions to the litigation privilege

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have been recognized under statutes that (1) are 'more specific' than the privilege, and (2) would be

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'significantly or wholly inoperable' if the privilege applied." (citing Action Apartment Ass'n, Inc. v.

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City of Santa Monica, 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1246 (2007))). Finally, the court finds that count nine, for

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malicious prosecution, is not viable as a matter of law because the psychiatric hold instituted under

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Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5150 did not lead to any proceeding analogous to a judicial hearing that

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could terminate in plaintiff's favor. Cf. Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal.2d 146, 152 (1941) (explaining final

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termination requirement means "the particular criminal proceeding commencing, for example, by

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complaint and arrest, must have passed through some such stage as preliminary hearing and

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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dismissal, or trial and acquittal or abandonment by the prosecuting authorities").
Accordingly, the court dismisses with prejudice count seven against Bruce McFarland and
count nine in its entirety. The motion to dismiss is denied as to count eight.

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DATED:

July 2, 2012
RONALD M. WHYTE
United States District Judge

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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS—No. C-12-01727 RMW
LJP
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