Dreamsky Investment, LLC v. Hoang et al

Filing 20

ORDER DENYING 17 DEFENDANTS EX PARTE APPLICATION; REMANDING CASE. This action is REMANDED to Santa Clara County Superior Court because this court lacks jurisdiction and the hearing scheduled for 8/14/2012 is VACATED. Plaintiffs motion to remand (Do cket Item No. 9) is TERMINATED AS MOOT. The clerk shall close this file. Signed by Judge Edward J. Davila on 8/10/2012. (ejdlc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/10/2012) (Additional attachment(s) added on 8/10/2012: # 1 Certificate of Service) (ecg, COURT STAFF).

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN JOSE DIVISION
CASE NO. 5:12-cv-03666 EJD

DREAMSKY INVESTMENT, LLC,

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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ EX
PARTE APPLICATION; REMANDING
CASE

Plaintiff(s),
For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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v.
SUSAN HOANG, et. al.,

[Docket Item No(s). 17]
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Defendant(s).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendants Susan Hoang and Daniel X. Hoang (“Defendants”) removed the instant unlawful

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detainer action from Santa Clara County Superior Court after that court issued a judgment in favor

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of Plaintiff Dreamsky Investment, LLC (“Plaintiff”) in relation to certain real property located in

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San Jose, California. See Not. of Removal, Docket Item No. 1; see also Decl. of Kirkman J.

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Hoffman (“Hoffman Decl.”), Docket Item No. 11, at Ex. 2. Presently before the court is

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Defendants’ request for a temporary restraining order. See Docket Item No. 17. Having now

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reviewed this matter is its entirety, the court finds it lacks jurisdiction over this action and cannot

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provide Defendants the relief they request. Accordingly, the hearing scheduled for August 14, 2012,

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will be vacated, Plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order will be denied, and this action

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will be remanded to the superior court from which it originated.

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II.

LEGAL STANDARD

The issue presented here is one of subject matter jurisdiction. This term “refers to a
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CASE NO. 5:12-cv-03666 EJD
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ EX PARTE APPLICATION; REMANDING CASE

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tribunal’s power to hear a case, a matter that can never be forfeited or waived.” Union Pac. R.R. v.

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Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 130 S. Ct. 584, 596 (2009). It

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can be raised at any time during the course of a proceeding by the parties or by the court. See Fed.

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R. Civ. Proc. 12(h)(3); see also Snell v. Cleveland, 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Since this action was removed from state court, well established jurisdictional principles

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must be applied to determine whether the case is properly before the district court. Removal

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jurisdiction is a creation of statute. See Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064

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(9th Cir. 1979) (“The removal jurisdiction of the federal courts is derived entirely from the statutory

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authorization of Congress.”). Only those state court actions that could have been originally filed in
federal court may be removed. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United

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States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant.”); see also Caterpillar Inc. v.

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Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“Only state-court actions that originally could have been filed

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in federal court may be removed to federal court by defendant.”). Accordingly, the removal statute

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provides two basic ways in which a state court action may be removed to federal court: (1) the case

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presents a federal question, or (2) the case is between citizens of different states and the amount in

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controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(a), (b).

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When removal is based on the presence of a federal question, the court looks to the face of a

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well-pleaded complaint to determine whether a cause of action is created by federal law or whether

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the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of a substantial question of federal

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law. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988) (citing Franchise Tax

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Bd. of California v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28, (1983)). “[I]t must be clear

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from the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint that there is a federal question.” Duncan v.

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Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996). The complaint as it existed at time of removal dictates

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whether removal jurisdiction is proper. Libhart, 592 F.2d at 1065.

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An anticipated or even actual federal defense or counterclaim is not sufficient to confer
jurisdiction. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. at 10.

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CASE NO. 5:12-cv-03666 EJD
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ EX PARTE APPLICATION; REMANDING CASE

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III.

DISCUSSION

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In the Notice of Removal, Defendants contend that federal jurisdiction arises from both the

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presence of a federal question and from diversity of the parties. See Not. of Removal, Docket Item

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No. 1. The court disagrees.

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Plaintiff alleges a single claim for unlawful detainer against Defendants within the complaint

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originally filed in state court and attached to the Notice of Removal. See id. It is well established

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that unlawful detainer claims themselves do not arise under federal law and, therefore, cannot

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support federal-question jurisdiction. See, e.g., Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Assoc. v. Lopez, No. C 11-00451

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WHA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44818, at *1, 2011 WL 1465678 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2011); GMAC
Mortg. LLC v. Rosario, No. C 11-1894 PJH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53643, at *2, 2011 WL

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For the Northern District of California

United States District Court

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1754053 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2011); Wescom Credit Union v. Dudley, No. CV 10-8203 GAF (SSx),

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2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130517, at *2, 2010 WL 4916578 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2010).

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Despite this seemingly clear standard, Defendants appear to assert in the Notice of Removal

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that the “taking of property without due process” raises a federal question. Notably, however, a

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federal due process claim does not appear on the face of Plaintiff’s complaint, nor does such a claim

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confer federal jurisdiction to the extent it may be raised as an independent defense or counterclaim.

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See Metro Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) (holding jurisdiction must appear on the

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face of the complaint); see also Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042-43 (2009)

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(holding jurisdiction cannot rest on actual or anticipated defense). Federal question jurisdiction

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therefore does not exist.

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Morever, jurisdiction cannot rest on diversity of citizenship because both Plaintiff and

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Defendants are citizens of California. See Not. of Removal, Docket Item No. 1. As to Defendants,

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they presumably reside at the California address listed on their pleadings, which is also the address

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of the real property at issue. For Plaintiff, the complaint clarifies that “Plaintiff is a Limited

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Liability Company, organized and existing under the laws of the State of California.” See id.

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In addition, Defendants’ reference to another related case currently pending in this court

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suggests their reliance on supplemental jurisdiction. Such reliance, however, is misplaced. “The

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supplemental-jurisdiction statute is not a source of original subject-matter jurisdiction, and a
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CASE NO. 5:12-cv-03666 EJD
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ EX PARTE APPLICATION; REMANDING CASE

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removal petition therefore may not base subject-matter jurisdiction on the supplemental jurisdiction

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statute, even if the action which a defendant seeks to remove is related to another action over which

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the federal district court already has subject-matter jurisdiction.” Pacific Bell v. Covad Commc’ns

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Co., No. C 99-1491 SI, 1999 WL 390840, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8846, at *9 (N.D. Cal. June 8,

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1999) (quoting Ahearn v. Charter Twp. of Bloomfield, 100 F.3d 451, 456 (6th Cir. 1996)). Thus,

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any relationship between this unlawful detainer action and any actual or potential case for wrongful

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foreclosure is irrelevant for purposes of removal and, in turn, for this jurisdictional analysis.

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For these reasons, there is no apparent basis for federal jurisdiction. And “[w]ithout

and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact

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For the Northern District of California

jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law,

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United States District Court

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and dismissing the cause.” Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). Although the

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absence of jurisdiction in this case results in remand rather than dismissal, the court is nonetheless

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precluded from providing Defendants the injunctive relief they seek. Accordingly, Defendants’ ex

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parte application will be denied and this case remanded to the superior court for further proceedings.
IV.

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ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ ex parte application (Docket Item No. 17) is DENIED.

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This action is REMANDED to Santa Clara County Superior Court because this court lacks

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jurisdiction and the hearing scheduled for August 14, 2012, is VACATED.

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Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Docket Item No. 9) is TERMINATED AS MOOT. The clerk

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shall close this file.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: August 10, 2012
EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge

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CASE NO. 5:12-cv-03666 EJD
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ EX PARTE APPLICATION; REMANDING CASE