Simulados Software, Ltd. v. Photon Infotech Private, Ltd.

Filing 225

ORDER GRANTING 219 MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES. Signed by Judge Edward J. Davila on 6/4/2020. (ejdlc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/4/2020)

1
2
3
4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6

SAN JOSE DIVISION

7
8

SIMULADOS SOFTWARE, LTD.,

Case No. 5:12-cv-04382-EJD

Plaintiff,
9

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES

v.
10
11

PHOTON INFOTECH PRIVATE, LTD.,

Re: Dkt. No. 219

United States District Court
Northern District of California

Defendant.
12
13

Pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff-Appellee

14

Simulados Software Ltd. (“Plaintiff”) filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred

15

following remand of this case. Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Dkt. 219 (“Motion”).

16

Defendant Photon Infotech Private, Ltd. (“Defendant”) opposes the motion. Opposition to

17

Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Dkt. No. 220 (“Opposition”). The Court finds this motion

18

suitable for consideration without oral argument. See N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Having

19

considered the Parties’ papers, the Court GRANTS the Motion in full.

20
21

I.

Background
On May 11, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant alleging that Defendant

22

breached the Parties’ contract and intentionally misrepresented its ability to complete the contract.

23

See generally Dkt. No. 1; see also Short Statement of Case, Dkt. No. 135. The jury found for

24

Plaintiff on both claims and awarded Plaintiff $309,674 for each claim. See Judgment, Dkt. No.

25

167; Verdict Forms, Dkt. No. 165.

26

After trial, Defendant renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law. Dkt. No. 178.

27

Despite the jury award of contractual damages, the parties had a negotiated provision that limited

28

Case No.: 5:12-cv-04382-EJD
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
1

1

the amount of contractual damages to the amount of money actually received by the breaching

2

party. Plaintiff had paid Defendant $18,848 for Defendant’s services, and so Defendant’s liability

3

on the breach of contract claim was capped at $18,848. See Supplemental Brief Regarding

4

Plaintiff Simulados Software Ltd.’s “Election of Remedy” at 5, Dkt. No. 193.

5

The Court denied Defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding that

6

sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, supported the

7

jury’s findings of breach of contract and fraud. Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for Judgment

8

as a Matter of Law (“JMOL Order”), Dkt. No. 197. Defendant had questioned whether: (1) the

9

fraud claim was sufficiently independent of the contract to allow recovery under California law for
both fraud and breach of contract; and (2) the contractual provision limiting damages applied to

11

United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

Plaintiff’s fraud claim. This Court determined it did not need to address those issues because it

12

granted Plaintiff’s request to rescind the contract and awarded Plaintiff $18,848 in consideration

13

damages and $309,674 in consequential damages. Id. at 6. In the JMOL Order, this Court also

14

granted Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees in full, awarding $183,556.91 in attorneys’ fees and

15

expenses. Ibid.

16

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed this Court’s holdings that sufficient evidence

17

supported the jury’s findings on both the fraud claim and breach of contract claim. Simulados

18

Software, Ltd. v. Photon Infotech Private, Ltd., 771 F. App’x 732, 734 (9th Cir. 2019). The Ninth

19

Circuit reversed and vacated this Court’s order granting rescission because Plaintiff “failed to

20

meet the notice requirement” required to rescind a contract. Id. Defendant argued that the panel

21

should reduce the jury’s award pursuant to the contractual limitation on damages. Id. at 735. The

22

Ninth Circuit agreed “that there is an $18,848 cap on [Plaintiff’s] recovery for breach of contract.”

23

Id. “It is undisputed that [Plaintiff] paid [Defendant] $18,848, and the contractual provision limits

24

damages to the amount that [Plaintiff] paid on the contract.” Id. The Ninth Circuit, however, did

25

not address whether this provision applied to the fraud damages or if Plaintiff could recover

26

damages for both the fraud and contract claim. The Ninth Circuit also did not address or alter the

27

award of attorneys’ fees that was included in the JMOL Order.

28

Case No.: 5:12-cv-04382-EJD
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
2

Judge Bea concurred in the Ninth Circuit decision but wrote separately to note that he

1
2

would include an instruction that on remand, the district court should consider whether its award

3

of $309,674 to Plaintiff based on the jury’s fraud verdict is duplicative of its separate award of

4

$18,848. Id. On remand, the Parties briefed that issue. See Dkt. Nos. 212, 214, 215. The Parties

5

agreed that the contractual damages were capped at $18,848 but disagreed as to whether Plaintiff

6

could recover both the contractual damages and the (uncapped) tort damages awarded by the jury.

7

On January 9, 2020, this Court held that “while Plaintiff suffered two harms, breach of contract

8

and fraud,” the damages for those two claims were duplicative. Dkt. No. 217. The Court further

9

held that even though the contract damages were capped, Plaintiff was entitled to recover full

10

fraud damages. Id. Therefore, the Court awarded Plaintiff $309, 674 in fraud damages. Id.
On January 23, 2020, Plaintiff filed this motion for attorneys’ fees, requesting $21,145.50

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12

for work done on the post-appeal matters and requesting that the Court confirm that the

13

$183,556.91 awarded in the JMOL Order still stands despite the Ninth Circuit vacating the JMOL

14

Order on other grounds.
II.

15

Legal Standard
“Under the American Rule, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect

16
17

reasonable attorney’s fees from the losing party.” Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas

18

& Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 448 (2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Essex Ins. Co. v.

19

Five Star Dye House, Inc., 38 Cal. App. 4th 1252, 1257 (2006). In California, however, a

20

“prevailing party” may recover attorneys’ fees if: (1) there is a contract that provides for an award

21

of attorneys’ fees; (2) the attorneys’ fees award is authorized by statute; or (3) the attorneys’ fees

22

award is authorized by law.1 See Cal. Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1032(a)(4), 1033.5(a)(10); Cal. Civ.

23

Code § 1717(a). California Civil Code § 1717(a), which governs fee applications stemming from

24

contract actions, states:

25
26
27
28

“In a diversity case, the law of the state in which the district court sits determines whether a party
is entitled to attorney fees, and the procedure for requesting an award of attorney fees is governed
by federal law.” Carnes v. Zamani, 488 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, California law
applies to determine whether Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees.
Case No.: 5:12-cv-04382-EJD
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
3
1

1

“In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that

2

attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall

3

be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the

4

party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether

5

he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to

6

reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.”

7

Civ. Code, § 1717(a). A party is entitled to attorneys’ fees under Civil Code § 1717 “even when

8

the party prevails on grounds the contract is inapplicable, invalid, unenforceable or nonexistent, if

9

the other party would have been entitled to attorney’s fees had it prevailed.” Bovard v. Am. Horse
Enterprises, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 3d 832, 842, 247 Cal. Rptr. 340 (Ct. App. 1988). “A party

11

United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

seeking recovery of attorneys’ fees under Section 1717(a) must show that: (1) a contract

12

authorizes such fees; (2) the moving party is the prevailing party; and (3) the fees incurred are

13

reasonable.” Javaheri v. Deutsche Mellon Nat’l Asset, LLC, No. 218CV06615ODWFFM, 2020

14

WL 104995, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2020).
The court determines whether a party has prevailed on the contract for the purposes of

15
16

awarding fees. Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(b)(1). “The courts liberally construe any action involving a

17

contract as ‘on the contract’ for the purposes of Section 1717.” Bonner v. Redwood Mortg. Corp.,

18

No. 10-CV-00479-WHA, 2010 WL 2528962, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2010) (citing Turner v.

19

Schultz, 175 Cal. App. 4th 974, 979-80 (2009)). “As long as the action ‘involve[s]’ a contract it is

20

‘on [the] contact’ within the meaning of section 1717.” Brown Bark III, L.P. v. Haver, 219 Cal.

21

App. 4th 809, 821 (2013) (alterations in original).

22

III.

23

Discussion
a. Plaintiff’s Right to Attorneys’ Fees

24

“Before section 1717 comes into play, it is necessary to determine whether the parties

25

entered an agreement for the payment of attorney fees, and if so, the scope of the attorney fee

26

agreement.” Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC, 3 Cal. 5th 744, 752

27

(2017) (citing Maynard v. BTI Group, Inc. 216 Cal. App. 4th 984, 990 (2013)). In this case, the

28

Case No.: 5:12-cv-04382-EJD
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
4

1

Parties do not dispute that the contract contains a provision for attorneys’ fees. Specifically, the

2

contract states:

3

“In any litigation, arbitration or other proceeding by which a party seeks to

4

enforce its rights under this Agreement (whether in contract, tort or both) or

5

seeks a declaration of any rights or obligations under this Agreement, the

6

prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable attorney fees, together with

7

any costs and expenses, incurred to resolve the dispute and to enforce final

8

judgment.”

9

Section 9, Master Professional Services Agreement (“MSA”), Dkt. No. 12-8.
There is no question that Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract constitutes a “litigation . . .

11

United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

by which a party seeks to enforce its rights under [the] Agreement.” Id. There is also no question

12

that Plaintiff prevailed on its breach claim at trial and that the jury’s verdict was subsequently

13

affirmed by both this Court and the Ninth Circuit. Therefore, Plaintiff has prevailed on its

14

contract claim and is entitled to attorneys’ fees in accordance with the contract and Section 1717.

15

Defendant ignores the fact that Plaintiff prevailed on its breach of contract claim, and

16

instead argues that attorneys’ fees are not proper because Plaintiff’s fraud claim is not “on the

17

contract” for the purposes of Section 1717. Defendant argues that because this Court only

18

awarded Plaintiff damages on the fraud claim (see Dkt. No. 217), Plaintiff is no longer entitled to

19

attorneys’ fees pursuant to the contract. The Court disagrees. The jury, this Court, and the Ninth

20

Circuit have all found that Plaintiff prevailed on its contract claim. See Dkt. Nos. 165, 197, 207.

21

The amount of damages awarded on that claim does not change the fact that Plaintiff prevailed.

22

Brown Bark III, 219 Cal. App. 4th at 825 (“Indeed, it does not matter how or why a party

23

prevailed on the contract; it only matters that the party prevailed.”). Neither does the fact that on

24

remand this Court limited Plaintiff’s damages so as to not be duplicative. See Sears v. Baccaglio,

25

70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769 (assignee was properly found to be “prevailing party” and, thus, was properly

26

awarded his attorneys’ fees, even though assignee was denied additional damages on his cross-

27

complaint) (rehearing denied, review denied); Nielsen v. Stumbos, 226 Cal. App. 3d 301, 305, 276

28

Case No.: 5:12-cv-04382-EJD
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
5

1

Cal. Rptr. 272, 275 (Ct. App. 1990) (analyzing and applying Section 1717 to award contractual

2

attorneys’ fees to a party who prevailed but recovered no money damages).

3

Plaintiff did not allocate the fees between its two claims, and Defendant does not argue that

4

the court should perform such an allocation. Nevertheless, to the extent Defendant challenges

5

only the fees for the fraud claim, the Court further finds that Plaintiff’s fraud claim is “on the

6

contract” such that Plaintiff may recover attorneys’ fees associated with this claim.

7

“If a contractual attorney fee provision is phrased broadly enough, . . . it may support an

8

award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action alleging both contract and tort claims:

9

‘[P]arties may validly agree that the prevailing party will be awarded attorney fees incurred in any
litigation between themselves, whether such litigation sounds in tort or in contract.’” Exxess

11

United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

Electronixx v. Heger Realty Corp., 64 Cal. App. 4th 698, 708-09 (1998) (citing Santisas v.

12

Goodin, 17 Cal. 4th 599, 608 (1998)); see also Brown Bark III, 219 Cal. App. 4th at 828 (“A party

13

may recover attorney fees on a tort claim only if an attorney fee provision broad enough to cover

14

tort claims expressly identifies that party as a party entitled to its benefits.”).

15

In Exxess Electronixx, the primary case on which Defendant relies, the lease at issue

16

provided for an award of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party “[i]f any Party or Broker brings an

17

action or proceeding to enforce the terms hereof or declare rights hereunder.” Exxess Electronixx,

18

64 Cal. App. 4th at 708-09. Interpreting that clause, the court held that the plaintiff’s claims for

19

constructive fraud and breach of fiduciary duty were not brought either to “enforce the terms” of

20

the lease or to “declare rights []under” the lease and, therefore, plaintiff was not entitled to

21

attorneys’ fees under the contract. Id. at 713.

22

In comparison, in Thompson v. Miller, the court considered whether attorneys’ fees were

23

proper pursuant to a contract that stated: “The prevailing party in any dispute under this

24

Agreement shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys fees incurred in such dispute.” Thompson v.

25

Miller, 112 Cal. App. 4th 327, 333, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 905, 910 (2003). In that case, the plaintiff

26

brought various tort claims against the defendant, who raised certain statements in the relevant

27

contract as a defense. Like the Exxess Electronixx court, the Thompson court noted that whether

28

Case No.: 5:12-cv-04382-EJD
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
6

1

the defendant was entitled to attorneys’ fees hinged on whether or not the provision at issue was

2

broad enough to account for attorneys’ fees for tort claims. Id. at 334. The Thompson court

3

distinguished the provision at issue from the provision in Exxess Electronixx, stating that “the

4

specific language of the attorney fees provision is broader than the language of the provision

5

in Exxess Electronixx.” Id. at 336. In particular, the provision at issue was not limited to

6

“actions” to “enforce the terms” of or “declare right under” the contract, but rather, covered “any

7

dispute under [the] Agreement.” Id. at 336-37. For this reason, the court held that the provision

8

encompassed the action for fraud, concealment, and breach of fiduciary duty because defendant

9

had raised a defense related to the contract.

10

Exxess Electronixx and Thompson both indicate that the Court must consider the actual

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

language of the relevant attorneys’ fees provision. Here, like in Exxess Electronixx, the attorneys’

12

fee provision allows for attorneys’ fees when a party “seeks to enforce its rights . . . or seeks a

13

declaration of any rights or obligations under this Agreement.” However, unlike Exxess

14

Electronixx, the provision also expressly states that it applies to efforts to enforce rights “whether

15

in contract, tort or both.” The Court finds that the plain meaning of this language is to ensure that

16

the attorneys’ fees provision covers tort claims related to the contract. Exxess Electronixx, 64 Cal.

17

App. 4th at 709 (applying “the ordinary rules of contract interpretation” and considering the “clear

18

and explicit” meaning of the language, interpreted in an “ordinary and popular sense,”).

19

Defendant argues that the parenthetical language in the provision simply references

20

possible rights that could be enforced, rather than expanding the scope of the provision to cover

21

torts related to the contract. Opposition, p. 3. While it is true that the reference to tort claims is

22

parenthetical, the Court still finds that the Parties intended for the provision to cover tort claims

23

related to the contract, especially given the broad construction that courts in this circuit give

24

attorneys’ fees provisions. See Lafarge Conseils Et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum

25

Corp., 791 F.2d 1334, 1339-41 (9th Cir. 1986) (“This court has given the requirement that an

26

action be ‘on the contract’ a liberal scope”); In re Baroff, 105 F.3d 439, 442-43 (9th Cir. 1997)

27

(“California courts liberally construe ‘on a contract’ to extend to any action as long as an action

28

Case No.: 5:12-cv-04382-EJD
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
7

1

involves a contract and one of the parties would be entitled to recover attorney fees under the

2

contract if that party prevails in its lawsuit”) (quoting Milman v. Shukhat, 22 Cal. App. 4th 538,

3

544–45 (1994)) (additional internal quotations omitted).

4

The fraud claim in this case was certainly related enough to the contract to fall under the

5

Court’s reading of the provision. See, e.g., Javaheri, 2020 WL 104995, at *2 (Court considered

6

the claims “on the contract” because they “challenged the validity” of plaintiff’s obligations and

7

defendant’s rights under the contract.”); Ng v. U.S. Bank, NA, No. 15-cv-04998-KAW, 2016 WL

8

6995884, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2016) (prevailing defendant entitled to attorneys’ fees where

9

“Plaintiff's claims directly challenged Defendants’ ability to enforce the [contract], both by
claiming that Defendants did not have the authority to enforce the documents and by seeking to

11

United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

rescind the documents entirely.”); Rivera v. Wachovia Bank, 2009 WL 3423743, at *2 (S.D. Cal.

12

2009) (mortgage case awarding fees on claims for fraud and other torts in addition to breach of

13

contract because the claims were all “either based directly on the contract, require predicate acts

14

based on the contract, or relate to the formation of the contract”); Bonner, 2010 WL 2528962, at

15

*3 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 2010) (awarding fees on fraudulent misrepresentation, and numerous other

16

torts, “[g]iven their significant relation to the parties’ mortgage contract.”).
b. Reasonableness of Plaintiff’s Fees

17

Because Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees, the Court must now determine whether the

18
19

fees requested are reasonable. Under California law, courts use the lodestar calculation, which

20

“begins with a touchstone or lodestar, based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and

21

reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney.’” Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1131-32

22

(2001) (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 48 (1977)). Under the lodestar method of

23

evaluating a request for attorneys’ fees, the lodestar is the number of hours spent on the case

24

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir.

25

1998).

26

Courts also consider the following factors to the extent they are relevant to a particular

27

case: “(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3)

28

Case No.: 5:12-cv-04382-EJD
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
8

1

the skill necessary to perform the legal services properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment

2

by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or

3

contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances, (8) the amount involved

4

and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys, (10) the

5

‘undesirability’ of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relations with the client,

6

and (12) awards in similar cases.” Sato v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, No. 5:11-CV-00810-EJD, 2013

7

WL 61103, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2013) (quoting LaFarge Conseils et Etudes, 791 F.2d at 1341-

8

42 (9th Cir. 1986)). The reasonableness of hourly rates should be examined “according to the

9

prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895
(1984); Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The prevailing

11

United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

market rate in the community is indicative of a reasonable hourly rate.”).

12

Here, Plaintiff submitted an affidavit detailing the hourly rate and hours billed on relevant

13

post-appeal matters. See Declaration of Joseph L. Lanza, Dkt. No. 219-1 (“Lanza Decl.”). Mr.

14

Lanza, a senior associate managing attorney at The Vethan Law Firm and lead post-appellate

15

counsel for Plaintiff, has approximately 27 years of experience in commercial litigation. Id. at ¶ 2.

16

Mr. Lanza indicated that his typical hourly rate it $400, though he charged the Plaintiff $350 per

17

hour on account of their longstanding relationship. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 21. The three associates on the

18

case charge a typical hourly rate of $350 but in this case were billed to Plaintiff at an hourly rate of

19

$275. Ibid. These rates are reasonable and in line with rates that have been approved in other

20

cases in the Northern District. See, e.g., Shaw v. Gera, No. 5:18-CV-06765-EJD, 2019 WL

21

4933636, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2019) (“This district has awarded hourly rates of $305

22

per hour for lawyers with at least five years of experience and $425 for lawyers with at least

23

twenty years of experience.”); Arroyo v. Aldabashi, 2018 WL 4961637, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15,

24

2018) (awarding rate of $305/hour for lawyers with at least five years of experience when case

25

was filed); In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litig., 309 F.R.D. 573, 591 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“In the Bay

26

Area, “reasonable hourly rates for partners range from $560 to $800, for associates from $285 to

27

$510, and for paralegals and litigation support staff from $150 to $240.”).

28

Case No.: 5:12-cv-04382-EJD
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
9

The Court further finds that the number of hours expended was reasonable. According to

1
2

Mr. Lanza, the total number of hours worked on post-appeal matters was 106, however, Mr. Lanza

3

wrote off nearly 50% of the hours worked as duplicative or unnecessary and the amount charged

4

to the client was only 56.05 hours. Lanza Decl. ¶ 11. The post-appeal work consisted of

5

significant legal research into complex questions of California law regarding the economic loss

6

rule and the application of the prohibition against a double recovery, as well as an analysis of the

7

application of the contract’s limitation of liability. Id. at ¶ 18.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s fees are not reasonable because they were substantially

8

more than Defense counsel’s fees for work on the same post-appeal issues. Defendant argues that

10

Plaintiff’s request for fees for 76.8 hours of work is unreasonable because Defendant only worked

11

United States District Court
Northern District of California

9

44.3 hours over the same period. While the Court commends Defense counsel on its efficient

12

work, the number of hours Defense counsel charged is irrelevant to the analysis here. Defense

13

counsel further argues that it authored more pages of briefing than Plaintiff’s counsel did. While

14

that may be true, it has no bearing on whether Plaintiff’s rates and expenditures were reasonable.
Because the Court finds that the hourly rates and number of hours billed by Plaintiff’s

15
16

counsel are reasonable, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion in full.

17

IV.

18

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion for attorneys’ fees is GRANTED in

19

full. The Court awards $21,145.50 in attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff for work done post-appeal. To

20

the extent the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the JMOL Order vacated the prior award of attorneys’

21

fees, the Court awards $183,556.91 in fees for work done pre-appeal.

22
23
24
25

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 4, 2020
______________________________________
EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge

26
27
28

Case No.: 5:12-cv-04382-EJD
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
10