Quintana v. Mountain View School District

Filing 27

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS by Judge Paul S. Grewal granting 13 (psglc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/3/2013) (Additional attachment(s) added on 10/3/2013: # 1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE) (ofr, COURT STAFF).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN JOSE DIVISION

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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GENARO QUINTANA,

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Plaintiff,
v.

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MOUNTAIN VIEW-LOS ALTOS UNION
HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT,

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Defendant.

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Case No.: 13-cv-02258-PSG
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
(Re: Docket No. 13)

In this action for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101

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(“ADA”), Defendant Mountain View-Los Altos Union High School District (the “District”) moves

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to dismiss the complaint filed by Plaintiff Genaro Quintana (“Plaintiff”), who is proceeding pro se.

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Having considered the parties’ papers and oral arguments, the court GRANTS the motion to

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dismiss with leave to amend.

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I.

BACKGROUND

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From September 2001 until August 2011, the District employed Plaintiff as a Student

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Conduct Liaison (“SCL”). 1 SCLs are charged with maintaining order and promoting a safe campus
environment. 2 Plaintiff informed the District that he suffered from memory impairment due to a

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See Docket No. 1 at 1.
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Case No.: 5:13-cv-02258-PSG
ORDER

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prior car accident. Despite the impairment, Plaintiff states that he was able to work effectively as
an SCL for a period of eight years. 3
During the 2009-2010 and 2010-2011 school years, however, Plaintiff received several sub-

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standard work evaluations, each enumerating multiple instances of inadequate performance. 4 On
June 27, 2011, the District provided Plaintiff with a Statement of Charges and the opportunity to
address the complaints. 5 Despite his efforts, on August 2, 2011, Plaintiff was informed that his
services as an SCL were no longer needed. 6 Rather than terminate his employment, however, the
District gave Plaintiff the opportunity to resign and then apply for a janitorial position with the

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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school. 7 Plaintiff did so but was let go after the six-month probationary period for his new job

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ended. 8

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On April 30, 2012, Plaintiff filed a claim in state court for wrongful termination, attempt to
defraud, and gross negligence. 9 His case was dismissed with leave to amend. 10 On

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August 9, 2012, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in state court for disability discrimination
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under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). 11 After Plaintiff failed to oppose
the District’s demurrer, however, the state court dismissed the case without leave to amend. 12 On

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See Docket No. 1-1 at 9.

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See Docket No. 1 at 2; Docket No. 1-1 at 14.

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See Docket No. 1-1 at 9-13.

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See id. at 15.

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See Docket No. 1 at 3.

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See id.

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See id. at 4.

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See Docket No. 14-1 at 10.

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See Docket No. 14-2 at 8.

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See Docket No. 14-3 at 2.

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Case No.: 5:13-cv-02258-PSG
ORDER

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May 17, 2013, Plaintiff filed this claim in federal court for disability discrimination under the
ADA.
II.

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LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitle to relief.” 13 The court must generally accept as true all “well-pleaded factual
allegations,” 14 and must construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 15 If a

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plaintiff fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” the court
may dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 16 Thus, a

United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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complaint should only be dismissed where it “appears beyond doubt the plaintiff can prove no set

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of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” 17 But even then, leave to amend

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shall be freely given when justice so requires. 18

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III.

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DISCUSSION

Plaintiff claims that the District terminated him because of his memory impairment and in
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violation of the ADA. 19 The District challenges his claim on several grounds. The District argues

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that even if Plaintiff had a disability and was a qualified individual under the ADA—both of which

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the District contests—Plaintiff was released for inadequate performance under the District’s

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standards, not because of his allegedly poor memory.

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See Docket No. 14-4 at 6.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 664 (2009).

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See Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988).

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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007).

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Clegg v. Cult of Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1994).

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See Fed R. Civ. P. 15(a).

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See Docket No. 1 at 5-6.
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Case No.: 5:13-cv-02258-PSG
ORDER

The ADA provides that no “covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual

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with a disability because of disability.” 20 To prove liability under the ADA, “the plaintiff must

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establish a prima facie case by showing that: (1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the

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statute; (2) he is a qualified individual with a disability; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment

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action because of his disability.” 21 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that he is qualified. 22

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Because, as explained below, the court finds that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged the first

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prong of the prima facie case, the court does not reach the second or third prongs.
A “disability” under the ADA is “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits

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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

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one or more major life activities” such as working. 23 Whether a person is disabled under the

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statute is an “individualized inquiry” that takes into consideration the “nature and severity of the

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impairment.” 24 Medical testimony is unnecessary at this stage to assert disability, but plaintiffs

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nevertheless must still allege facts of “sufficient detail to convey the existence of an impairment.” 25

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Plaintiff pleads that because of a car accident years earlier he has a “physical and mental
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disability” that substantially, but periodically, impairs his memory. 26 He further alleges that

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because of his memory impairment he is “unable to have an excellent memory at times.” 27

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Although Plaintiff states that his memory impairment “substantially limit[s] one or more major life

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activities,” Plaintiff’s complaint does not provide what major life activities his memory impairment

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42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).

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Hutton v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir. 2001).

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Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000).

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42 U.S.C. § 12102.

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Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 2003)

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Head v. Glacier Northwest, Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005).

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Docket No. 1 at 2.

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Id.
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Case No.: 5:13-cv-02258-PSG
ORDER