Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. et al

Filing 184

ORDER GRANTING 164 DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES. Signed by Judge Edward J. Davila on 10/30/2017. The 11/2/2017 hearing is VACATED. No appearance necessary. (ejdlc2S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/30/2017)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 12 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 13 SAN JOSE DIVISION 14 15 ELIZABETH ANN WILLIAMS, Case No. 5:13-cv-03387-EJD Plaintiff, 16 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES v. 17 18 WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Re: Dkt. No. 164 Defendant. 19 20 21 Following a jury trial, Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. moves for an award of 22 attorneys’ fees against Plaintiff Elizabeth Ann Williams. Wells Fargo’s motion will be granted. 23 24 I. BACKGROUND Williams obtained a $492,800 home loan from Wells Fargo’s predecessor in 2000. Second 25 Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ¶ 10, Dkt. No. 29. The loan terms were stated in a promissory note and the 26 loan was secured by a deed of trust. Id. ¶ 1. In 2006, Williams obtained a $200,000 home equity 27 line of credit from the same bank. Id. ¶ 11. This loan was also secured by a deed of trust. Id. 28 Case No.: 5:13-cv-03387-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 1 1 Williams alleges that Wells Fargo failed to properly withdraw her monthly payments from 2 her checking account, leading to an “artificial default” and foreclosure on the second mortgage in 3 2008. Id. ¶¶ 17–29. Williams filed this action in 2013, in which she alleges a range of injuries, 4 including up to $2.2 million in credit damages. A jury trial commenced on August 8, 2017. The jury returned a verdict in Wells Fargo’s 5 6 favor (Dkt. No. 161) and judgment was entered accordingly (Dkt. No. 162). Wells Fargo now 7 seeks to recover attorneys’ fees under the fee clauses in the promissory note and deed of trust. 8 Def.’s Mot. for Att’ys’ Fees (“Mot.”) 5, Dkt. No. 164. 9 10 II. LEGAL STANDARD “Under the American Rule, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect United States District Court Northern District of California 11 reasonable attorney’s fees from the losing party.” Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas 12 & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 448 (2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). However, 13 attorneys’ fees can be recovered under statutory provisions or the terms of a contract. Id. “In a 14 diversity case, the law of the state in which the district court sits determines whether a party is 15 entitled to attorney fees, and the procedure for requesting an award of attorney fees is governed by 16 federal law.” Carnes v. Zamani, 488 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, state law governs the 17 enforceability of a contract’s attorneys’ fees provision. 18 19 20 21 22 23 In California, Civil Code § 1717(a) governs fee applications stemming from contract actions: In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs. 24 The court determines whether a party has prevailed on the contract for the purposes of awarding 25 fees. Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(b)(1). The prevailing party on a contract is the party that recovered a 26 greater relief in the action on the contract. Id. § 1717(b)(2). 27 28 “Under California law, when a party to a contract dispute obtains a simple unqualified win Case No.: 5:13-cv-03387-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 2 1 in litigation, a court has no discretion to deny attorneys’ fees pursuant to a valid contractual 2 attorneys’ fees clause under section 1717.” Albizo v. Wachovia Mortg., No. 2:11-CV-2991 AC, 3 2013 WL 5425129, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013). 4 III. 5 DISCUSSION Under the lodestar method of evaluating a request for attorneys’ fees, the lodestar is the 6 number of hours spent on the case multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Hanlon v. Chrysler 7 Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998). The lodestar “may be adjusted upward or downward 8 to account for several factors including the quality of the representation, the benefit obtained for 9 the class, the complexity and novelty of the issues presented, and the risk of nonpayment.” Id. Here, Wells Fargo requests an award of $262,260.47 under the attorneys’ fees provisions 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 at paragraph 7(E) of the promissory note and covenant 7 of the deed of trust. Mot. 5–6, 16. That 12 request is based on billing rates of $365/hour for attorney Mark Flewelling (20.2 hours), 13 $340/hour for attorney Robert Bailey (116.9 hours), $275/hour for attorney Michael Rapkine 14 (917.4 hours), and $160/hour for paralegal Helene Saller (45.5 hours), as well as ancillary work 15 performed by other attorneys and paralegals. Mot. 13; Flewelling Decl. ¶ 3, Dkt. No. 164-1. This 16 case involved two amended complaints, fully briefed motions to dismiss and for a preliminary 17 injunction, extensive discovery, pretrial motions, and a full jury trial. 18 Based on counsel’s declarations and the circumstances of this case, the Court finds the 19 requested fees to be reasonable under the lodestar method. See Sato v. Wachovia Mortg., FSB, 20 No. 5:11-CV-00810 EJD, 2013 WL 61103, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2013) (finding that similar 21 billing rates from the same law firm involved in this case were “commensurate with those charged 22 in the local legal community”). 23 Williams does not dispute the reasonableness of the amount of Wells Fargo’s fees request. 24 Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Att’ys’ Fees (“Opp’n”), Dkt. No. 171. Nor does Williams dispute 25 that the relevant loan agreements contain valid fees provisions that apply to this case. Id. Instead, 26 Williams argues that this Court has “discretion to refuse to enforce a contractual attorney’s fees 27 provision where it would be inequitable and unreasonable.” Id. at 1–2. Williams argues that an 28 Case No.: 5:13-cv-03387-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 3 1 attorneys’ fees award would be inequitable because, when she filed this case, “she was in a rush to 2 prevent a foreclosure and was not paying attention to the risks of the fees provision in her contract 3 of adhesion.” Id. at 3. She further argues that a fees award would be unjust because she now owes 4 $365,000 in arrears. Id. 5 Wells Fargo responds that the Court may not deny a fees award here because an award 6 under § 1717 is mandatory, not discretionary. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1717(a) (“the party who is 7 determined to be the party prevailing on the contract . . . shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s 8 fees in addition to other costs”) (emphasis added); see also Def.’s Reply in Support of Mot. for 9 Att’ys’ Fees (“Reply”) 2–4, Dkt. No. 172. The Court finds that, even if § 1717(a) is discretionary, a fees award is equitable under the 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 circumstances of this case. Williams is a sophisticated real estate investor who owns 12 approximately twenty buildings consisting of approximately 100 rental units. Id. at 7. She testified 13 that she has $11 million in equity in her rental holdings, and she testified further that she has 14 approximately $900,000 in liquid assets at her disposal. Id. In addition, Williams was aware of the 15 attorneys’ fees provisions in her loan agreements when she brought this action. SAC ¶¶ 80, 89. 16 Accordingly, the Court finds that a fees award is warranted. 17 IV. 18 CONCLUSION Wells Fargo’s motion for attorneys’ fees is GRANTED. 19 20 21 22 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: October 30, 2017 ______________________________________ EDWARD J. DAVILA United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28 Case No.: 5:13-cv-03387-EJD ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 4

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