Matthew Enterprise, Inc. v. Chrysler Group LLC

Filing 302

ORDER RE 288 ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO SEAL. Signed by Judge Beth Labson Freeman on 9/21/2016. (blflc2S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/21/2016)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN JOSE DIVISION

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MATHEW ENTERPRISE, INC.,

Case No. 13-cv-04236-BLF

Plaintiff,
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v.

ORDER RE ADMINISTRATIVE
MOTION TO SEAL

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CHRYSLER GROUP LLC,
Defendant.

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[Re: ECF 288]

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Before the Court is an administrative motion to file under seal from defendant Chrysler

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Group LLC (“Chrysler”). See ECF 288. The motion relates to the parties’ motions in limine. For

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the reasons discussed below, the motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

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I.

LEGAL STANDARD
“Historically, courts have recognized a ‘general right to inspect and copy public records

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and documents, including judicial records and documents.’” Kamakana v. City & Cty. of

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Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435

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U.S. 589, 597 & n. 7 (1978)). Accordingly, when considering a sealing request, “a ‘strong

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presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.” Id. (quoting Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

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Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). Parties seeking to seal judicial records relating to

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motions that are “more than tangentially related to the underlying cause of action” bear the burden

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of overcoming the presumption with “compelling reasons” that outweigh the general history of

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access and the public policies favoring disclosure. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., 809 F.3d

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1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016); Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178–79.

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However, “while protecting the public’s interest in access to the courts, we must remain

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mindful of the parties’ right to access those same courts upon terms which will not unduly harm

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their competitive interest.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 727 F.3d 1214, 1228–29 (Fed.

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Cir. 2013). Records attached to motions that are “not related, or only tangentially related, to the

merits of a case” therefore are not subject to the strong presumption of access. Ctr. for Auto

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Safety, 809 F.3d at 1099; see also Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (“[T]he public has less of a need

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for access to court records attached only to non-dispositive motions because those documents are

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often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action.”). Parties moving

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to seal the documents attached to such motions must meet the lower “good cause” standard of

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Rule 26(c). Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (internal quotations and citations omitted). This

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standard requires a “particularized showing,” id., that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the

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information is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206,

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1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated

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by specific examples of articulated reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992). A protective order sealing the documents during

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discovery may reflect the court’s previous determination that good cause exists to keep the

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documents sealed, see Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179–80, but a blanket protective order that allows

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the parties to designate confidential documents does not provide sufficient judicial scrutiny to

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determine whether each particular document should remain sealed. See Civ. L.R. 79-5(d)(1)(A)

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(“Reference to a stipulation or protective order that allows a party to designate certain documents

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as confidential is not sufficient to establish that a document, or portions thereof, are sealable.”).

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In addition to making particularized showings of good cause, parties moving to seal

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documents must comply with the procedures established by Civ. L.R. 79-5. Pursuant to Civ. L.R.

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79-5(b), a sealing order is appropriate only upon a request that establishes the document is

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“sealable,” or “privileged or protectable as a trade secret or otherwise entitled to protection under

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the law.” “The request must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material, and

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must conform with Civil L.R. 79-5(d).” Civ. L.R. 79-5(b). In part, Civ. L.R. 79-5(d) requires the

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submitting party to attach a “proposed order that is narrowly tailored to seal only the sealable

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material” which “lists in table format each document or portion thereof that is sought to be

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sealed,” Civ. L.R. 79-5(d)(1)(b), and an “unredacted version of the document” that indicates “by

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highlighting or other clear method, the portions of the document that have been omitted from the

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redacted version.” Civ. L.R. 79-5(d)(1)(d). “Within 4 days of the filing of the Administrative
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Motion to File Under Seal, the Designating Party must file a declaration as required by subsection

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79-5(d)(1)(A) establishing that all of the designated material is sealable.” Civ. L.R. 79-5(e)(1).

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II.

DISCUSSION
The sealing motion at issue is resolved under the good cause standard because motions in

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limine are only tangentially related to the merits of this case. With this standard in mind, the

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Court rules on the instant motion as follows:
ECF
Document to
Result
No.
be Sealed
288-4
Ex. B to
GRANTED.
Munkittrick
Declr. ISO
Opp. to Plf.’s
MILs
288-6
Ex. E to
DENIED.
Munkittrick
Declr. ISO
Opp. to Plf.’s
MILs

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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288-8

Ex. G to
Munkittrick
Declr. ISO
Opp. to Plf.’s
MILs
Ex. H to
Munkittrick
Declr. ISO
Opp. to Plf.’s
MILs
Ex. N to
Munkittrick
Declr. ISO
Opp. to Plf.’s
MILs

Contains information designated by
Stevens Creek as confidential. Denied
because the designating party did not
provide a supporting declaration and
confirmed that it did not intend to do so
on the record on September 20, 2016.
Contains information designated by
Stevens Creek as confidential. Denied
because the designating party did not
provide a supporting declaration and
confirmed that it did not intend to do so
on the record on September 20, 2016.
Contains information designated by
Stevens Creek as confidential. Denied
because the designating party did not
provide a supporting declaration and
confirmed that it did not intend to do so
on the record on September 20, 2016.
Contains information designated by
Stevens Creek as confidential. Denied
because the designating party did not
provide a supporting declaration and
confirmed that it did not intend to do so
on the record on September 20, 2016.

DENIED.

288-12

Contains sensitive and detailed financial
and sales information, including
customer and pricing data of Chrysler
dealerships in the Bay Area.

DENIED.

288-10

Reasoning

DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 21, 2016
______________________________________
BETH LABSON FREEMAN
United States District Judge
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