William Philips et al v. Ford Motor Company

Filing 242

Order by Judge Lucy H. Koh Denying #237 Administrative Motion to File Under Seal as Moot; Denying #238 Administrative Motion to File Under Seal Without Prejudice. (lhklc2S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/16/2017)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN JOSE DIVISION

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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WILLIAM PHILIPS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SEAL
WITHOUT PREJUDICE

v.

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Case No. 14-CV-02989-LHK

Re: Dkt. No. 238
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant.

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Before the Court is the parties’ Joint Administrative Motion to Seal Plaintiffs’ Opposition

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to Defendant Ford Motor Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment and to Correct Redactions

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Contained in the Opposition and Certain Exhibits to that Opposition (“Motion”). ECF No. 238.

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For the reasons below, the parties’ motion to file under seal is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

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Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) filed a motion for summary judgment on

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January 9, 2017. ECF No. 228. On January 31, 2017, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion

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for summary judgment. ECF No. 236. The same day, the parties filed a joint administrative motion

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to file portions of the opposition brief, as well as portions of exhibits to the brief, under seal. ECF

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No. 237.

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On February 3, 2017, the parties filed the instant motion. ECF No. 238. In the instant
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Case No. 14-CV-02989-LHK
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SEAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

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motion, the parties have modified their earlier request for sealing. Id. at 2. Thus, the instant motion

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supersedes the January 31, 2017 motion to seal. The Court therefore DENIES the January 31,

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2017 motion to seal as moot.

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As to the instant motion, “[h]istorically, courts have recognized a ‘general right to inspect
and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.’” Kamakana v.

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City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nixon v. Warner

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Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978)). Thus, when considering a sealing request, “a

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strong presumption in favor of access is the starting point.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Parties seeking to seal judicial records relating to dispositive motions and motions that are

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“more than tangentially related to the underlying cause of action,” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Grp., 809 F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016), bear the burden of overcoming the presumption with

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“compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings” that outweigh the general history of

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access and the public policies favoring disclosure. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178–79 (9th Cir.

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2006). Compelling reasons justifying the sealing of court records generally exist “when such

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‘court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to

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gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade

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secrets.” Id. at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). However, “[t]he mere fact that the

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production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further

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litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id.

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Records attached to non-dispositive motions that are “not related, or only tangentially

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related, to the merits of a case,” are not subject to the strong presumption of access. Ctr. for Auto

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Safety, 809 F.3d at 1099; see also Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (“[T]he public has less of a need

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for access to court records attached only to non-dispositive motions because those documents are

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often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action.” (internal quotation

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marks omitted)). Parties moving to seal records attached to such motions must meet the lower

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“good cause” standard of Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ctr. for Auto Safety,

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809 F.3d at 1098-99; Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179–80. The “good cause” standard requires a

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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SEAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

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“particularized showing” that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the information is

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disclosed. Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002); see Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated

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reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir.

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1992).

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Pursuant to Rule 26(c), a trial court has broad discretion to permit sealing of court
documents for, inter alia, the protection of “a trade secret or other confidential research,

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development, or commercial information.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G). The Ninth Circuit has

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adopted the definition of “trade secrets” set forth in the Restatement of Torts, holding that “[a]

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trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over

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competitors who do not know or use it.” Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1972)

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(quoting Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 cmt. b). “Generally [a trade secret] relates to the

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production of goods. . . . It may, however, relate to the sale of goods or to other operations in the

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business. . . .” Id. (ellipses in original). In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that

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sealing may be justified to prevent judicial documents from being used “as sources of business

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information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598.

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In addition, parties moving to seal documents must comply with the procedures established

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by Civil Local Rule 79-5. Pursuant to that rule, a sealing order is appropriate only upon a request

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that establishes the document is “sealable,” or “privileged, protectable as a trade secret or

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otherwise entitled to protection under the law.” Civ. L. R. 79-5(b). “The request must be narrowly

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tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material, and must conform with Civil L.R. 79-5(d).” Id.

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Moreover, Civil Local Rule 79-5(d) requires the submitting party to attach a “proposed order that

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is narrowly tailored to seal only the sealable material” and that “lists in table format each

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document or portion thereof that is sought to be sealed,” as well as an “unredacted version of the

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document” that “indicate[s], by highlighting or other clear method, the portions of the document

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that have been omitted from the redacted version.” Id. R. 79-5(d)(1).

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Case No. 14-CV-02989-LHK
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SEAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

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In the instant motion, the parties state that they seek to seal only material that the Court

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previously found sealable in its December 20, 2016 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part

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Administrative Motions to File Under Seal. ECF No. 223; see also ECF No. 238 (“[T]he portions

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that they redacted from their Opposition and those exhibits to their Opposition reflect only those

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portions that the Court had already approved for sealing in its December 20, 2016 Order.”).

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However, the Court’s December 20, 2016 order found the information sealable in the context of a

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motion for class certification. As discussed in the December 20, 2016 order, a motion for class

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certification is generally considered to be a non-dispositive motion. Therefore, the Court applied a

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“good cause” standard to the parties’ motion to seal. Id. at 4; see also In re High-Tech Emp.
Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 5486230, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2013) (“As Plaintiffs’ Motion for

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Class Certification is a non-dispositive motion, the Court finds that the parties need only

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demonstrate ‘good cause’ in order to support their requests to seal.”).

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In contrast, the instant motion to seal was filed in connection with a motion for summary

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judgment, which is a dispositive motion and is “more than tangentially related to the underlying

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cause of action.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1099. Therefore, the standard for granting a

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motion to seal in the context of a motion for summary judgment is higher than “good cause.” In re

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Incretin-Based Therapies Prod. Liab. Litig., 2015 WL 11658712, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2015)

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(“The strong presumption of access to judicial records applies fully to dispositive pleadings,

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including motions for summary judgment and related attachments.”). Instead, a party seeking to

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seal material in connection with a motion for summary judgment bears the burden of

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demonstrating “compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings” that outweigh the

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general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure. Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of

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Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2006).

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However, the instant motion does not offer any “specific factual findings” demonstrating

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that there are “compelling reasons” to seal the requested material that outweigh the presumption of

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public access to court documents. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178–79. Indeed, the motion does not

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even acknowledge that the applicable standard is the “compelling reasons” standard. Therefore,

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Case No. 14-CV-02989-LHK
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SEAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

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the parties’ have not met their burden to establish that sealing is warranted.

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For the foregoing reasons, the parties’ joint administrative motion to file under seal certain

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portions of Plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion for summary judgment and exhibits to that motion

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is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The parties shall file any renewed motions to seal within

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fourteen days of this order.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: February 16, 2017
______________________________________
LUCY H. KOH
United States District Judge

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case No. 14-CV-02989-LHK
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SEAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE