Sarah Doty v. City of Santa Clara
Filing
53
Order by Judge Lucy Koh granting 32 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 45 Motion to Withdraw Admissions; and denying Request for Leave to Amend (lhklc2S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/16/2015) **THE CLERK SHALL CLOSE THE CASE FILE** (A one-time courtesy copy of the order was emailed to Sarah Doty by the Courtroom Deputy) Modified on 12/16/2015 (sms, COURT STAFF).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE DIVISION
9
10
SARAH DOTY,
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
13
14
15
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST
FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
v.
CITY OF SANTA CLARA and
DEFENDANT OFFICERS DOES 1
THROUGH 50,
Re: Dkt. Nos. 32, 45
Defendants.
16
17
Plaintiff Sarah Doty (“Plaintiff” or “Doty”) brings this action against Defendant City of
18
Santa Clara (“Defendant” or “City”) and Defendant Officers Does 1 through 50. Before the Court
19
are Defendant City of Santa Clara’s motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff’s motion to
20
withdraw admissions. ECF No. 32 (“MSJ”); ECF No. 45 (“Mot. to Withdraw Admissions”).
21
Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment included a request for leave to
22
amend Plaintiff’s complaint. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds these motions
23
appropriate for resolution without oral argument and VACATES the hearing and case
24
management conference set for December 17, 2015. Having considered the parties’ submissions,
25
the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary
26
judgment, DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to withdraw admissions, and DENIES Plaintiff’s request for
27
28
1
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
1
leave to amend the complaint.
2
I.
3
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
4
1. June 18, 2013 Incident
5
The instant action arises out of two incidents involving Doty and police officers employed
6
by the City. The first incident occurred on June 18, 2013, when Doty went to City Hall in order to
7
speak to the City Manager. See ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 6. Prior to this incident, Doty had filed
8
several complaints with the Santa Clara City Police Department regarding construction noise from
9
a neighbor’s residence. ECF No. 32-14 (“Green Police Report”) at 3. On June 17, 2013, the
neighbor in question met with City officials and “drew attention to a matter of what he felt to be
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
unfair and unequal treatment.” Id. Specifically, the neighbor “identified a number of [property]
12
violations that existed in Doty’s yard and to her residence,” which “included an overgrowth of dry
13
weeds in her yard.” Id.
14
Following this meeting, City police officers issued a citation to Doty for having weeds in
15
her yard. Id. This citation required Doty to address the problem within the next 48 hours or face a
16
$250 fine. Id. After receiving the citation, Doty called the City Police Department to express her
17
view that “the action was retalitory [sic] by the City” and to demand that “the warning/citation be
18
lifted.” Id. According to Santa Clara City Police Officer Tyson Green, Doty grew angrier over
19
the course of the call, which culminated with Doty stating that she would be confronting the City
20
Manager and that “[y]ou might want to drive to the City Manager’s Office or call the cops.
21
You’re going to have to peel me off of Julio (City Manager). I’m bringing five of my neighbor’s
22
with me.” Id. After the call ended, Officer Green alerted the City Manager’s Office that Doty
23
would be on her way.
24
Doty eventually arrived at City Hall, entered the City Manager’s Office, and demanded to
25
see the City Manager. ECF No. 35 (“Kadam Decl.”) at 1. Doty was visibly angry and “proceeded
26
to an area restricted from public access and began banging on the City Manager’s locked office
27
28
2
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
1
door and yelling.” Id. at 2. After learning that the City Manager would not be able to meet with
2
her, Doty attempted to find Kevin Riley, the Director of Planning and Inspection for the City.
Santa Clara City Police Officer Mike Serna encountered Doty at this time, and observed
3
4
that Doty was “pale, visibly shaking, clenching her fists, and grinding her teeth.” ECF No. 32-14
5
(“Serna Police Report”) at 2. Although Officer Serna attempted to calm Doty down, Doty
6
continued to appear threatening and continued to insist that she be allowed to see Director Riley.
7
Id. At some point, another City police officer arrived on the scene, and informed Officer Serna
8
that Doty “had no scheduled business” at City Hall and that she should be removed from the
9
building. Id. After Doty refused to leave voluntarily, Officer Serna placed his left hand on Doty’s
right shoulder and placed two fingers from his right hand on Doty’s wrist. At this point, Doty
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
began to “swing a set of exposed keys with her left arm/hand.” ECF No. 32-14 (“Lee Police
12
Report”) at 2. Santa Clara City Police Officer Brian Lee, out of concern that Doty would use the
13
keys as “an impact or stabbing weapon,” proceeded to “guide[] Doty’s left arm behind her back to
14
remove the keys.” Id. Officer Lee “then pulled the keys from [Doty’s] grasp.” Id. In response to
15
these actions, Doty screamed, and stated that Officers Serna and Lee were “twisting her arm and
16
hurting her.” Id. After Officer Serna released his fingers from Doty, Doty fell to the ground and
17
“yelled that [the police] had beaten her.” Id. Doty insisted that paramedics arrive to treat her
18
injuries. Officer Green placed Doty on a temporary hold pursuant to Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §
19
5150.1 Doty was eventually transported to Santa Clara Valley Medical Center, where she was
20
medically cleared, and then transferred to the Santa Clara County Mental Health Department,
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
1
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5150(a) provides that “[w]hen a person, as a result of a mental health
disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled, a peace officer,
professional person in charge of a facility designated by the county for evaluation and treatment,
member of the attending staff, as defined by regulation, of a facility designated by the county for
evaluation and treatment, designated members of a mobile crisis team, or professional person
designated by the county may, upon probable cause, take, or cause to be taken, the person into
custody for a period of up to 72 hours for assessment, evaluation, and crisis intervention, or
placement for evaluation and treatment in a facility designated by the county for evaluation and
treatment and approved by the State Department of Health Care Services.” Cal. Welf. & Inst.
Code § 5150(a).
3
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
1
which released her after a psychiatric evaluation. Compl. ¶ 16.
2. December 31, 2013 Incident
3
The second incident at issue occurred on December 31, 2013. Id. ¶ 18. Doty alleges that
4
she “heard her neighbor engaging in a [sic] construction activities after the allowed constructions
5
[sic] hours.” Id. Doty proceeded to call the Santa Clara City Police Department to request that
6
officers investigate a noise complaint. Id. ¶ 19. Unbeknownst to Doty, Santa Clara City Police
7
Officer Richard Fitting was standing outside of Doty’s residence during the call and observed that
8
no construction was taking place. ECF No. 32-14 (“Fitting Police Report”) at 6. Officer Fitting
9
and two other City police officers thereafter went to Doty’s residence, and informed Doty that she
10
would receive a misdemeanor citation for making false statements to a police officer. The officers
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
2
“attempted to explain that [Doty] needed to sign the promise to appear” on the citation. Id. at 7.
12
Doty initially refused to sign the citation, and requested that she be allowed to contact her attorney
13
and that the officers leave her home. Id. With Doty’s consent, the officers attempted to contact
14
Doty’s attorney using Doty’s cell phone. These attempts were unfruitful. Doty ultimately agreed
15
to sign the citation, and the officers left Doty’s residence.
16
17
B. Procedural History
Doty was represented by counsel from the beginning of this action until December 13,
18
2015. On December 13, 2015, Doty’s counsel filed a notice of withdrawal and informed the Court
19
that Doty would now be proceeding pro se. ECF No. 50. Doty has not yet filed any documents
20
pro se. All of Doty’s filings discussed in this Order were filed by counsel.
21
On August 18, 2014, Doty filed suit against the City and Defendant Officers Does 1
22
through 50. Doty’s complaint contained four federal law claims, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
23
1983: excessive force, unlawful detainment, illegal search, and false arrest. Compl. ¶¶ 23–32.
24
Doty’s complaint also asserted state law claims for battery, negligence, unlawful search and
25
seizure, and false imprisonment. Id. ¶¶ 33–44.
26
27
28
On April 3, 2015, the City served on Doty a Request for Admissions, a Request for
4
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
1
Production of Documents, and a set of Interrogatories. Doty did not respond to these requests. At
2
the June 10, 2015 case management conference, the Court “ordered that Defendant’s requests for
3
admission [be] deemed admitted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(3).” ECF No.
4
22 at 1. In addition, the Court “issued an Order to Show Cause why this case should not be
5
dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute.” Id. Pursuant to this Order, Doty provided
6
written responses to the City’s Interrogatories and Requests for Production. Doty, however, did
7
not produce any actual documents. On June 22, 2015, the Court issued another Order, where the
8
Court noted its “disappoint[ment] that Plaintiff [had] failed to produce [any] documents.” ECF
9
No. 24 at 2. Nonetheless, because Doty stated that she had been “unable to locate [the] responsive
documents” after a “diligent search,” the Court determined that it could not order “Plaintiff to
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
produce documents that [] Plaintiff does not possess.” Id. Accordingly, the Court advised Doty to
12
take further “prompt and reasonable steps to obtain [any] requested documents” and noted that
13
Doty would be “precluded from relying on any evidence responsive to Defendant’s discovery
14
requests that [Doty did] not timely produce during discovery.” Id.
In the parties’ September 9, 2015 joint case management statement, Doty’s counsel stated
15
16
that he intended to file a “motion to withdraw all admissions made due to Plaintiff’s untimely
17
response to defendants requests for admission pursuant to Rule 36(b) within the next two weeks.”
18
ECF No. 29 at 5. However, at the September 16, 2015 case management conference, Doty’s
19
counsel informed the Court that a motion to withdraw would not be filed. ECF No. 30.
On November 5, 2015, the City moved for summary judgment. On November 19, 2015,
20
21
Doty filed an opposition, which included a request that Doty be given leave to amend her
22
complaint and a supporting declaration from Doty. ECF No. 42 (“MSJ Opp’n”); ECF No. 44
23
(“Doty Decl.”). The City filed a reply on November 25, 2015. ECF No. 46 (“MSJ Reply”).
On November 19, 2015, Doty filed a motion to withdraw admissions. The City filed an
24
25
opposition on December 3, 2015. ECF No. 47. Doty did not file a reply.
26
II.
27
28
LEGAL STANDARD
5
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
A. Request for Admissions
Under Rule 36(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] party may serve on any
other party a written request to admit [in an action] . . . facts, the application of law to fact, or
opinions about either.” Fed R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1). “A matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after
being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written
answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or its attorney.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 36(a)(3). Under Rule 36(b), “[a] matter admitted [under Rule 36(a)]. . . is conclusively
established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 36(b). “[T]he court may permit withdrawal or amendment if it would promote the
presentation of the merits of the action and if the court is not persuaded that it would prejudice the
requesting party in maintaining or defending the action on the merits.” Id. “Rule 36(b) is
permissive, not mandatory, with respect to the withdrawal of admissions.” Conlon v. United
States, 474 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 2007).
B. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of
material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, the Court
“does not assess credibility or weigh the evidence, but simply determines whether there is a
genuine factual issue for trial.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 559–60 (2006). A fact is “material”
if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a dispute as to a material
fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to decide in favor of
the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “If the
evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be
granted.” Id. (citations omitted).
The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings,
6
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
1
discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex
2
Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Where the party opposing summary judgment will have the burden of
3
proof at trial, the party moving for summary judgment need only point out “that there is an
4
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325; accord Soremekun v.
5
Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). If the moving party meets its initial
6
burden, the nonmoving party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56,
7
“specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
8
C. Leave to Amend
Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend “shall be freely
9
granted when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule 15 to facilitate
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
12
1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
13
Generally, leave to amend shall be denied if allowing amendment would unduly prejudice the
14
opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, or if the moving party has acted in bad faith.
15
Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008).
16
III.
17
18
DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Withdraw
On April 3, 2015, Defendant served on Doty twenty six requests for admission. See ECF
19
No. 32-15 (“Doty Admissions”) at 2–4. These requests included asking Doty to “[a]dmit that City
20
of Santa Clara Police officers did not injure you during the City Hall incident,” “[a]dmit that you
21
exhibited hostile behavior toward employees of the City of Santa Clara at the time of the City Hall
22
incident,” “[a]dmit that you did not hear your neighbor perform any construction activity around
23
7:00 p.m. on December 31, 2013,” and “[a]dmit that you gave police officers consent to review
24
your phone on December 31, 2013.” Id. Doty did not respond to these requests for admission.
25
On June 10, 2015, the Court ordered that all requests for admission be deemed admitted. At the
26
September 16, 2015 case management conference, Doty’s counsel stated that Doty would not file
27
28
7
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
1
a motion to withdraw Doty’s admissions. Doty’s counsel nonetheless proceeded to file a motion
2
to withdraw on November 19, 2015.
3
In this motion, Doty contends that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(b),
4
“withdrawal of the admissions would . . . facilitate a presentation of the merits of Plaintiff’s case,”
5
and that withdrawal would not prejudice Defendant’s case. Mot. to Withdraw Admissions at 3, 5;
6
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b) (“[T]he court may permit withdrawal or amendment [of an
7
admission] if it would promote the presentation of the merits of the action and if the court is not
8
persuaded that it would prejudice the requesting party in maintaining or defending the action on
9
the merits.”).
10
These arguments are not well taken. First, Doty has not shown how withdrawal would
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
promote presentation of the merits of this action. Nearly all of Doty’s admissions are corroborated
12
by various declarations, statements, and exhibits that Defendant filed in support of Defendant’s
13
motion for summary judgment. In contrast, Doty has produced no documents in response to
14
Defendant’s requests for production and has “issued no subpoenas, propounded no written
15
discovery, and taken no depositions in her prosecution of this case.” ECF No. 32-15 at 2. Indeed,
16
in opposing Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Doty relies exclusively upon a self-
17
serving declaration. Much of Doty’s declaration simply reiterates allegations asserted in the
18
complaint. Compare Doty Decl. ¶¶ 3–5 (“[W]hile I was waiting, I was approached by thee [sic]
19
Santa Clara police officers (DOE Officers) . . . one officer came up to me from the front to grab
20
me . . . I requested for this officer not to grab my arm because I was suffering from a serious neck
21
injury.”), with Compl. ¶ 7 (“While the Plaintiff was waiting, she was approached by thee [sic]
22
Santa Clara police officers (DOE Officers). One officer came up to the Plaintiff from the side to
23
grab her. The Plaintiff requested for this officer not to grab her arm because she was suffering
24
from a neck injury.”). Because Doty’s admissions are consistent with the other evidence that
25
Defendant has produced and because Doty has apparently conducted no discovery, Doty has not
26
demonstrated how withdrawal of her admissions would promote presentation of the merits of this
27
28
8
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
1
2
action.
Second, allowing withdrawal would result in significant prejudice to Defendant. Doty did
3
not file a motion to withdraw until November 19, 2015—more than five months after her
4
admissions were deemed admitted, more than two months after her counsel stated that a motion to
5
withdraw would not be filed, and more than a month after the close of discovery. Doty has
6
provided the Court with no explanation as to why it took her so long to file a motion to withdraw.
7
As Defendant points out, Defendant has relied upon Doty’s admissions to structure Defendant’s
8
discovery plan, to plan for a settlement conference, and to prepare this case for trial. See, e.g.,
9
ECF No. 47 at 6–7. Defendant, for instance, “forwent retaining a medical expert and demanding
an independent medical exam of Plaintiff” because Doty admitted that she had suffered no injuries
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
from either the June 18, 2013 incident or the December 31, 2013 incident. Id. at 7. Under these
12
circumstances, Defendant would be significantly prejudiced if Doty’s motion to withdraw were
13
granted. See, e.g., Conlon, 474 F.3d at 624 (finding prejudice because “government relied on the
14
admissions for a total of two and a half months, through the discovery and dispositive motion cut-
15
off dates, with no indication that Conlon intended to file a motion to withdraw his admissions.”).
16
As a final point, Doty has objected to Defendant’s reliance on Admission 5 and 6 from
17
Defendant’s request for admissions. ECF No. 43. Admission 5 states “[a]dmit that you were not
18
physically injured during the City Hall incident,” and Admission 6 states, “[a]dmit that City of
19
Santa Clara Police officers did not use excessive force against you during the City Hall incident.”
20
Doty Admissions at 3. Doty contends that these admissions are legal conclusions that are
21
inadmissible under Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. This objection lacks merit.
22
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(1)(A) provides that a party may “admit . . . the truth of any
23
matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) relating to . . . facts, the application of law to fact, or
24
opinions about either.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Federal Rule of Civil
25
Procedure 26(b)(1) allows parties to “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is
26
relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Read together, nothing in Rule
27
28
9
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
1
36(a)(1)(A) or Rule 26(b)(1) prevents the Court from considering Admissions 5 and 6 in deciding
2
the instant motion for summary judgment, and Doty has cited no authority in support of her
3
argument. The Court thus finds that Doty’s objections are not well taken.
4
To summarize, because Doty has not shown how withdrawal would promote presentation
5
of the merits in this action and because withdrawal would result in significant prejudice to
6
Defendant, the Court DENIES Doty’s motion to withdraw. Moreover, “[a] matter admitted under
7
Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is ‘conclusively established’ unless the court
8
permits it to be withdrawn by motion.” Hologic, Inc. v. SenoRx, Inc., 2009 WL 8760730, *6
9
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2009). “Such a matter ‘cannot be overcome at the summary judgment stage by
contradictory affidavit testimony or other evidence in the summary judgment record.’” Id.
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
(quoting In re Carney, 258 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 2001)). Thus, to the extent that Doty’s
12
admissions conflict with statements from Doty’s declaration or with allegations in Doty’s
13
complaint, Doty’s admissions govern.
14
15
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
Doty’s claims arise from two incidents. One occurred on June 18, 2013. The other
16
occurred on December 31, 2013. The Court will first address all of Doty’s claims as to the June
17
18, 2013 incident. The Court will then address all of Doty’s claims as to the December 31, 2013
18
incident.
19
1. June 18, 2013 Incident
20
With respect to the June 18, 2013 incident, Doty alleges that Santa Clara City police
21
officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force against her and by
22
unlawfully detaining her without probable cause. Compl. ¶ 23. Doty also asserts corresponding
23
claims for Monell liability against the City. Id. ¶¶ 25–32. Finally, Doty asserts state law causes of
24
action for battery, negligence, and false imprisonment. Id. ¶¶ 33–42. The Court addresses these
25
claims in turn.
26
27
28
a. Excessive Force (§ 1983)
10
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
1
In order to determine whether Santa Clara City police officers used excessive force against
2
Doty, the Court must “first consider[] the nature and quality of the alleged intrusion.” Mattos v.
3
Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court must “then consider the governmental
4
interests at stake by looking at (1) how severe the crime at issue is, (2) whether the suspect posed
5
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively
6
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. These factors are not exclusive; the
7
Court must “examine the totality of the circumstances and consider whatever specific factors may
8
be appropriate in a particular case.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the instant case, the nature and quality of the alleged intrusion weigh against a finding of
10
excessive force. Santa Clara City Police Officer Mike Serna, who attempted to remove Doty from
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
9
City Hall, reported that he placed his “left hand on [Doty’s] right shoulder” and placed his “right
12
thumb and right middle finger around [Doty’s] right wrist with little to no pressure.” Serna Police
13
Report at 2. Serna’s report is corroborated by declarations from several witnesses. Jim Hersom,
14
an individual who was at City Hall on June 18, 2013 for other business, witnessed the incident at
15
issue. Hersom stated that “Officer Serna place[d] his right thumb and middle finger lightly around
16
Doty’s right wrist. He placed his left hand on her upper right arm. . . . [T]here was no force
17
used.” ECF No. 32-13 at 4 (statement of Hersom from June 18, 2013 police report); ECF No. 32-
18
13 at 1 (October 12, 2015 declaration from Hersom reviewing police report and affirming that
19
report “is a true and correct account of what I personally witnessed during the incident”).
20
Likewise, Santa Clara City Police Officer Brian Lee removed Doty’s keys from her hand out of
21
concern that Doty, who was swinging the keys around, might use these keys as a weapon. Finally,
22
Doty has admitted that Santa Clara City police officers did not injure her during the June 18, 2013
23
incident. Doty Admissions at 3. Although Doty was treated at Santa Clara Valley Medical Center
24
“due to her subjective complaints of pain,” she was medically cleared to leave after a series of
25
medical examinations, including x-rays and an MRI. MSJ at 5.
26
27
28
The remaining factors—the severity of the crime at issue, the threat of the suspect to the
11
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
1
safety of others, and whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest—likewise weigh against a
2
finding of excessive force. As noted above, Doty stated that she would “peel off” the City
3
Manager, “exhibited hostile behavior toward employees of the City,” and refused to leave City
4
Hall voluntarily. Id. at 3–4. These facts demonstrate that Doty’s behavior could have been
5
perceived as a threat to the safety of others. Doty’s refusal to comply with repeated verbal
6
requests also lends support to Officer Serna’s decision to place his fingers on Doty’s wrist. Under
7
these circumstances, the Court finds that the City police officers acted reasonably in their attempts
8
to remove Doty from City Hall. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Doty’s excessive
9
force claim is granted.
10
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
b. Unlawful Detention (§ 1983)
After Doty was removed from City Hall, Santa Clara City police officers placed Doty on a
12
psychiatric hold pursuant to Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5150 (“Section 5150” or “§ 5150”). Doty
13
alleges that the decision to place her on such a hold violated her Fourth Amendment right “to be
14
free from unlawful detainment without probable cause.” Compl. ¶ 23.
15
“Under section 5150, an officer may detain any person the officer determines, ‘as a result
16
of mental disorder, is a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or [is] gravely disabled.’” Bias v.
17
Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1220 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5150). “If
18
such a determination is . . . made, the officer may place the person at a county-designated facility
19
for” up to 72 hours for treatment and evaluation. Id. Critically, “[t]he officer’s determination
20
must be based on probable cause.” Id. Doty’s claim thus rises and falls based on whether City
21
police officers had probable cause to place her on a § 5150 hold. If the City police officers acted
22
with probable cause, then Doty was properly held pursuant to § 5150, and Doty’s claim that she
23
was unlawfully detained without probable cause must necessarily fail.
24
In order to establish probable cause under § 5150, “a state of facts must be known to the
25
peace officer (or other authorized person) that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence
26
to believe, or to entertain a strong suspicion, that the person detained is mentally disordered and is
27
28
12
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
1
a danger to himself or herself or is gravely disabled.” People v. Triplett, 192 Cal. Rptr. 537, 540–
2
41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). “In justifying the particular intrusion, the officer must be able to point to
3
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
4
reasonably warrant his or her belief or suspicion.” Id. Here, Santa Clara City Police Officer
5
Tyson Green decided to “place[] Ms. Doty on a temporary hold pursuant to California Welfare &
6
Institutions Code section 5150 based on her statement on the phone that [an officer] would have to
7
‘peel [her] off’ the City Manager, her apparent uncontrolled anger, her persistence in locating the
8
City Manager, and interviews with witnesses that saw her aggressive, threatening and bizarre
9
behavior.” ECF No. 34 (“Green Decl.”) at 1–2. Taken together, the Court finds that these
circumstances constitute “specific and articulable facts” that would lead a reasonable person “to
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
believe, or to entertain a strong suspicion, that the person detained is mentally disordered and is a
12
danger to himself or herself or is gravely disabled.” Triplett, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 540–41.
13
Case law supports the Court’s finding. In Bias v. Moynihan, the plaintiff also asserted that
14
she had been placed on a § 5150 hold without probable cause. 508 F.3d at 1221. The Ninth
15
Circuit disagreed, and pointed to the fact that the plaintiff had exhibited paranoia about her
16
neighbors on the date of the incident and had become combative during an interaction with police.
17
Id. In addition, police observed that “Bias’s thoughts were disconnected and [that] she was visibly
18
angry and appeared agitated.” Id. “Based on these observations and circumstances, it was not
19
unreasonable for [officers] to conclude on May 14, 2003, that Ms. Bias might be a threat to herself
20
or to others due to a mental disorder.” Id. Likewise, in the instant case, Doty informed Santa
21
Clara City police that someone would have to “peel [her] off” the City Manager. Green Decl. at 1.
22
Doty also displayed increasingly “aggressive, threatening and bizarre behavior” while at City Hall.
23
Id. at 1–2. Doty repeatedly ignored requests that she leave voluntarily. Thus, as in Bias, Doty’s
24
behavior was sufficient to warrant a finding of probable cause under § 5150. The Court therefore
25
grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Doty’s unlawful detention claim.
26
27
28
c. Monell Liability (§ 1983)
13
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
1
The Court also finds unavailing Doty’s corresponding claims for Monell liability against
2
the City. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 29 (“Plaintiff alleges that the City of Santa Clara has an inadequate
3
policy in place directing its law enforcement officers to know what probable cause is necessary to
4
warrant detaining a citizen and or committing a citizen for psychiatric evaluation.”). As the U.S.
5
Supreme Court explained in City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986), “[i]f a person
6
has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the
7
departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite
8
beside the point.” See also Yousefian v. City of Glendale, 779 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 2015)
9
(“[M]unicipalities cannot be held liable when the individual police officer has inflicted no
constitutional injury.”). Because the individual City police officers did not violate Doty’s Fourth
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
Amendment rights during the June 18, 2013 incident, Doty’s Monell claims cannot survive
12
summary judgment.
d. Battery (State Law)2
13
14
Next, Doty alleges that the Santa Clara City police officers who handled the June 18, 2013
15
incident are liable for battery. Compl. ¶ 33. Under California law, “[a] state law battery claim is a
16
counterpart to a federal claim of excessive use of force. In both, a plaintiff must prove that the
17
peace officer’s use of force was unreasonable.” Brown v. Ransweiler, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 801, 811
18
(Cal. Ct. App. 2009); see also Avina v. United States, 681 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (“In
19
California, claims that police officers used excessive force in the course of an arrest, investigatory
20
stop or other seizure of a free citizen are analyzed under the reasonableness standard of the Fourth
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
Under Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2(a), the City may be held liable for the actions of individual City
police officers so long as those actions occurred within the scope of the officers’ employment.
Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2(a). Thus, in Doty’s complaint, Doty asserts all of her state law claims
against both individual City police officers and against the City. However, under Cal. Gov’t Code
§ 815.2(b), “a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an
employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability.” Cal. Gov’t Code §
815.2(b). Thus, if the individual officers are not liable, then the City cannot be liable. For
purposes of simplicity, the Court shall analyze only Doty’s claims against the individual City
police officers. As the Court shall explain, all of these claims are unavailing. By extension,
Doty’s corresponding claims against the City must also be unavailing.
14
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
1
Amendment to the United States Constitution.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
2
As the Court has already determined, City police officers did not use unreasonable force against
3
Doty on June 18, 2013. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Doty’s
4
battery claim is granted.
5
6
e. False Imprisonment (State Law)
Doty’s false imprisonment claim is similarly unavailing. According to Doty, “Defendants
illegally caused the Plaintiff to be restrained and confined within a bounded area without her
8
consent by having her involuntarily committed to a mental hospital without . . . probable cause.”
9
Compl. ¶ 39. However, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5278 expressly provides that “[i]ndividuals
10
authorized . . . to detain a person for 72-hour treatment and evaluation pursuant to . . . Section
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
7
5150 . . . shall not be held either criminally or civilly liable for exercising this authority in
12
accordance with the law.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5278. As the California Court of Appeal has
13
explained, “section 5278 means precisely what it says it means”: civil liability “for false
14
imprisonment . . . is precluded insofar as the detention is ‘in accordance with the law.’” Heater v.
15
Southwood Psychiatric Ctr., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 880, 889 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). In the instant case,
16
Santa Clara City police officers properly exercised their authority to place Doty under a temporary
17
hold pursuant to § 5150. Consonant with Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5278 and the case law
18
interpreting this provision, these City police officers cannot be held liable for false imprisonment
19
under state law.
20
21
e. Negligence (State Law)
Finally, with respect to the June 18, 2013 incident, Doty asserts that “Defendants owed
22
[her] a duty of care not to cause the Plaintiff physical harm, or to cause her to be confined without
23
her consent to a psychiatric center for evaluation without probable cause.” Compl. ¶ 36. This
24
claim lacks merit. On the issue of physical harm, Doty has admitted that she was not physically
25
harmed by City police officers during the June 18, 2013 incident. Doty Admissions at 3.
26
Moreover, Doty has produced no evidence of physical injury. On the issue of Doty’s
27
28
15
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
1
confinement, the Court has explained that City police officers acted within their authority under
2
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 5150 and 5278. Thus, because the undisputed facts demonstrate that
3
Doty was not physically injured and that City police officers acted with probable cause, Doty’s
4
negligence claim fails.
2. December 31, 2013 Incident
6
With respect to the December 31, 2013 incident, where Doty was given a citation for
7
making false statements to City police officers, Doty alleges that her Fourth Amendment rights “to
8
be free from false arrest” and “to be free from illegal searches and seizures of her property” were
9
violated. Compl. ¶ 24. Doty asserts corresponding claims for Monell liability against the City.
10
Id. ¶¶ 25–32. Third, Duty asserts state law causes of action for false imprisonment and illegal
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
5
search and seizure. The Court addresses these claims in turn.
12
13
a. False Arrest (§ 1983)
“A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth
14
Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.” Lacey v.
15
Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 918 (9th Cir. 2012). “Probable cause exists when there is a fair
16
probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.” Id. “It is well-settled that the
17
determination of probable cause is based upon the totality of the circumstances known to the
18
officers at the time of the search.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The existence of
19
probable cause is a defense to a false arrest claim under § 1983. Id.
20
In the instant action, City police officers issued a misdemeanor citation to Doty for
21
violating Cal. Penal Code § 148.5, which provides that “[e]very person who reports to any peace
22
officer . . . that a felony or misdemeanor has been committed, knowing the report to be false, is
23
guilty of a misdemeanor.” Several facts support the City police officers’ decision to issue this
24
citation. First, a City police officer in Doty’s neighborhood had observed that no illicit
25
construction had occurred prior to, during, and after Doty’s call to police. Second, prior to the
26
incident in question, City police officers interviewed Doty’s neighbor and learned that “no matter
27
28
16
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
1
what [the neighbor] did on the property, however silent, Doty would call police if [the neighbor]
2
was physically present beyond typical construction hours.” Fitting Police Report at 5. Third,
3
Doty has admitted that she provided false statements to police during the December 31, 2013
4
incident. Doty Admissions at 4. Considered together, these facts cross the threshold necessary to
5
satisfy a showing of probable cause. Thus, because the City police officers acted with probable
6
cause, Doty cannot prevail on her false arrest claim under § 1983.
b. Illegal Search and Seizure (§ 1983)
7
8
9
According to Doty, after City police officers informed Doty that she would receive a
misdemeanor citation, the officers proceeded to “conduct[] a search of the contents of her cell
phone without her consent and without a search warrant,” in violation of Doty’s Fourth
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
Amendment rights. Compl. ¶ 24. In response, the City contends that no search occurred and that,
12
if a search did occur, Doty provided her consent to the search. See MSJ at 19; see also United
13
States v. Russell, 664 F.3d 1279, 1281 (9th Cir. 2012) (“It is well-established that consent is a
14
recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and
15
seizures.”).
16
Several facts support the City’s position. First, police reports from the incident indicate
17
that Doty requested City police officers to use Doty’s cell phone to contact Doty’s attorney.
18
Fitting Police Report at 7–8. Second, contemporaneous audio and video recordings taken from the
19
incident reveal that Doty consented to the City police officers’ use of her cell phone. ECF No. 32-
20
14 (Exhs. K & L). There is no indication, based on these audio and video recordings, that Doty
21
withheld her consent. Id. Third, Doty has admitted that she gave City police officers “consent to
22
review [her] phone on December 31, 2013.” Doty Admissions at 3. Although these admissions
23
conflict with some of the statements in Doty’s own declaration, see, e.g. Doty Decl. ¶ 23, the
24
admissions govern. Hologic, 2009 WL 8760730, *6 (“[A] matter [deemed admitted] ‘cannot be
25
overcome at the summary judgment stage by contradictory affidavit testimony or other evidence in
26
the summary judgment record.’”). Accordingly, the Court finds that Doty consented to the City
27
28
17
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
1
police officers’ use of her cell phone, and that Doty was not subject to an unreasonable search and
2
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
c. Monell (§ 1983)
3
4
As above, because the individual City police officers did not violate Doty’s Fourth
5
Amendment rights during the December 31, 2013 incident, Doty’s Monell claims cannot survive
6
summary judgment.
d. False Imprisonment (State Law)
7
Doty’s false imprisonment claim, asserted under state law, is also unavailing. Under
8
9
California law, a law enforcement officer is not liable for false arrest “where the officer, acting
within the scope of his or her authority, either (1) effects a lawful arrest or (2) has reasonable
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
cause to believe the arrest is lawful.” Galvin v. Hay, 374 F.3d 739, 758 (9th Cir. 2004). City
12
police officers here effectuated a lawful arrest: these officers acted with probable cause in issuing
13
a misdemeanor citation to Doty for making false statements, and Doty has admitted that she
14
provided false statements to police. Doty cannot, therefore, prevail on her false imprisonment
15
claim.
16
17
e. Illegal Search and Seizure (State Law)
Finally, Doty contends that City police officers violated her “right under the California
18
Constitution Article I Section 13, to be free from illegal searches and seizures of her property
19
when they conducted a search of the contents of her cell phone without her consent.” Compl. ¶
20
43. Because “Article I, Section 13 of the California Constitution . . . contains language virtually
21
identical to that of the Fourth Amendment,” the Ninth Circuit has held that Article I, Section 13
22
provides the same protection against searches and seizures as that provided under the Fourth
23
Amendment. Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 2015 WL 7873413, *5 n.7 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2015)
24
(quoting Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 928–29 (9th Cir. 2006)). Accordingly,
25
consonant with the Court’s finding with respect to Doty’s Fourth Amendment search and seizure
26
claim, the Court finds that Doty cannot, as a matter of law, prevail on Doty’s Article I, Section 13
27
28
18
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
1
2
claim.
To conclude, Doty has failed to demonstrate that Defendant or police officers employed by
3
Defendant violated federal or state law during either the June 18, 2013 incident or the December
4
31, 2013 incident. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in
5
its entirety.
6
7
C. Leave to Amend
As a final matter, in Doty’s opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Doty
8
requests leave to amend the complaint in order to substitute the true names of the Doe Officers.
9
MSJ Opp’n at 14. Although Doty concedes that “it is obvious that Plaintiff’s counsel mistakenly
failed to amend the complaint to substitute the three officers’ names for the DOE defendants
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
relating to the City Hall incident, this mistake does not amount to bad faith, prejudice to the
12
opposing party, or unjust delay.” Id. at 15–16.
13
The Court denies Doty’s request for leave to amend for two reasons. First, Doty’s request
14
is procedurally improper. Under Civil Local Rules 7-1(a) and 7-2(a), Doty’s request should have
15
been filed as a separate motion before the Court, not included in a brief in opposition to
16
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. See Civil L.R. 7-1(a)(1) (“Any written request to the
17
Court for an order must be presented by . . . [a] [d]uly noticed motion [filed] pursuant to Civil L.R.
18
7-2.”); Civil L.R. 7-2(a) (“[A]ll motions must be filed, served and noticed in writing on the motion
19
calendar of the assigned Judge for hearing not less than 35 days after filing of the motion.”).
20
Second, even if the Court were to address Doty’s request on the merits, the Court would
21
deny Doty’s request. Generally, leave to amend shall be denied if allowing amendment would
22
unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, or if the moving party has
23
acted in bad faith. At the February 25, 2015 case management conference, the Court set May 15,
24
2015 as the deadline to file a motion to amend or add parties. ECF No. 14 at 1. Doty’s request for
25
leave to amend was made on November 19, 2015, more than six months after this deadline.
26
Allowing Doty to amend the complaint now would therefore cause undue delay to the resolution
27
28
19
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
1
of this case.
In addition, providing Doty leave to amend would result in undue prejudice to Defendant.
2
3
At this point, fact and expert discovery have closed and the deadline to file a dispositive motion
4
has passed. The final pretrial conference, set for February 18, 2016, is only two months away.
5
Trial is set to begin on March 4, 2016. In light of these circumstances, Defendant would be
6
unduly prejudiced if Doty were granted leave to amend the complaint now.
Finally, granting leave to amend would be futile. As the Court has determined, the City
7
8
police officers involved in the June 18, 2013 and December 13, 2013 incidents did not violate
9
federal or state law in their handling of these incidents. Granting Doty leave to amend the
complaint “to substitute three officers’ names for the DOE defendants,” MSJ Opp’n at 15, would
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
not change the fact that these officers did not violate federal or state law. Thus, amendment would
12
be futile.
Accordingly, because Doty’s request for leave to amend is procedurally improper and
13
14
because granting leave to amend would result in undue prejudice to Defendant, would cause undue
15
delay to the resolution of this action, and would be futile, the Court DENIES Doty’s request for
16
leave to amend.
17
IV.
CONCLUSION
18
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to withdraw Plaintiff’s admissions is
19
DENIED. Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend the complaint is likewise DENIED. Defendant’s
20
motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk shall close the file.
21
IT IS SO ORDERED.
22
Dated: December 16, 2015
23
24
______________________________________
LUCY H. KOH
United States District Judge
25
26
27
28
20
Case No. 14-CV-03739-LHK
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?