Stelmachers v. VeriFone Systems, Inc.
Filing
34
ORDER granting 19 Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs' entire complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Any amended complaint addressing the deficiencies identified herein must be filed on or before 12/30/2015. The court schedules this case for a Case Management Conference at 10:00 a.m. on 2/18/2016. The parties shall file a Joint Case Management Conference Statement on or before 2/11/2016. Signed by Judge Edward J. Davila on 12/7/2015. (ejdlc4S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 12/7/2015)
1
2
3
4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
SAN JOSE DIVISION
7
8
PAUL M. STELMACHERS, individually
and on behalf of similarly situated persons,
Case No. 5:14-cv-04912-EJD
Plaintiff,
9
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS
v.
10
Re: Dkt. No. 19
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
VERIFONE SYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendant.
12
13
Plaintiff Paul M. Stelmachers filed the instant class action suit against Defendant VeriFone
14
Systems, Inc. (“VeriFone”), alleging violations of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act
15
of 2003 (“FACTA”) amendment to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). Presently before the
16
court is VeriFone’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See
17
Mot., Dkt. No. 19.
18
Federal jurisdiction arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 1681p. The court
19
found this matter suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7–1(b)
20
and previously vacated the associated hearing. Having carefully considered the parties’ pleadings,
21
the court grants VeriFone’s motion for the reasons explained below.
22
23
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that on June 3, 2014, he took a taxi cab ride in Las Vegas, Nevada, and
24
used his credit card for payment. Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 20-21. To receive the payment,
25
VeriFone’s product was used in the taxi cab. Id. at ¶ 23. Plaintiff then allegedly received a
26
computer-generated receipt displaying more than the last five digits of Plaintiff’s credit card
27
number. Id.
28
1
Case No.: 5:14-cv-04912-EJD
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
1
Plaintiff commenced the instant class action suit in November 2014, asserting the violation
2
of FACTA. See Dkt. No. 1. VeriFone filed its Motion to Dismiss in January 2015. Plaintiff filed
3
his opposition brief in March 2015, and VeriFone subsequently filed its reply brief. See Opp’n,
4
Dkt. No. 22; Reply, Dkt. No. 27.
5
6
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with sufficient
7
specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
8
it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). A
9
complaint which falls short of the Rule 8(a) standard may be dismissed if it fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support
12
a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th
13
Cir. 2008). Moreover, the factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
14
speculative level” such that the claim “is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.
15
When deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court generally “may not consider
16
any material beyond the pleadings.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d
17
1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). However, the court may consider material submitted as part of
18
the complaint or relied upon in the complaint, and may also consider material subject to judicial
19
notice. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001).
20
In addition, the court must generally accept as true all “well-pleaded factual allegations.”
21
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The court must also construe the alleged facts in the
22
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988).
23
However, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
24
allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Nor must the court accept as true “allegations that contradict
25
matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit” or “allegations that are merely
26
conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec.
27
Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).
28
2
Case No.: 5:14-cv-04912-EJD
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
1
2
III.
DISCUSSION
In its motion, VeriFone sets forth three arguments: (1) FACTA does not prohibit
3
merchants from printing the first digit of a credit card number; (2) Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege
4
that VeriFone willfully violated FACTA, and thus cannot seek statutory damages; and (3) Plaintiff
5
sued the wrong party because FACTA does not apply to point-of-sale system providers like
6
VeriFone. The court will only address VeriFone’s third argument because it is dispositive of the
7
entire motion.
8
Congress passed FACTA in 2003 as an amendment to the FCRA, in part to combat
9
identity theft. Simonoff v. Expedia, Inc., 643 F.3d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 2011). FACTA provides
10
in relevant part:
United States District Court
Northern District of California
11
12
13
14
Truncation of credit card and debit card numbers:
[N]o person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the
transaction of business shall print more than the last 5 digits of the
card number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the
cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction.
15
15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1). Here, the parties dispute whether VeriFone is considered a “person that
16
accepts credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of business.” VeriFone contends that while
17
its product was used to process the taxi cab payment, the statute does not apply to VeriFone as the
18
point-of-sale manufacturer; instead, it applies to the taxi company that transacted the business.
19
Mot. at 8. In response, Plaintiff argues the statute applies to VeriFone because through its
20
product, VeriFone is a “person that accepts credit cards.” Opp’n at 15. He contends that FACTA
21
does not explicitly apply only to merchants, but to a broad definition of “persons.” Id.
22
When engaging in statutory interpretation, the court begins “by looking at the language of
23
the statute to determine whether it has a plain meaning.” U.S. ex rel. Hartpence v. Kinetic
24
Concepts, Inc., 792 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015). In examining the language of FACTA, it is
25
unclear whether the term “person” applies only to merchants or to manufacturers of point-of-sale
26
systems. Both interpretations are possible since a merchant physically accepts a credit card for
27
payment, and a manufacturer electronically accepts the credit card to process payment. Therefore,
28
3
Case No.: 5:14-cv-04912-EJD
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
1
2
the statute on its face provides no clear guidance.
Since FACTA’s reference to “person” is ambiguous, the court will now consider the
legislative history and other extrinsic material. See id. Congress enacted § 1681c(g)(1) on
4
December 4, 2003, as part of the FACTA amendment. See FACTA, Pub. L. No. 108-159, § 113,
5
117 Stat. 1952 (2003). A congressional report dated September 4, 2003, states that FACTA
6
“provides consumers with the tools they need to fight identity theft and to ensure the accuracy of
7
their credit reports while establishing permanent national credit reporting standards by removing
8
the sunset from the expiring national consumer protection standards.” H.R. Rep. No. 108-263, at
9
22 (2003). The report sets forth the purpose of FACTA and provides that “merchants will be
10
required to truncate credit and debit card information.” Id. Moreover, at least two documents
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
3
refer specifically to merchants. First, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) issued a press
12
release on December 15, 2003, stating that FACTA “requires merchants to truncate account
13
numbers on credit or debit card receipts to prevent identity thieves from accessing account
14
information from discarded or stolen receipts.” Press Release, FTC, FTC Committed to Fighting
15
Identity Theft (Dec. 15, 2003), 2003 WL 22943394. Second, the FTC issued a report on July 1,
16
2011, stating that FACTA “required merchants to truncate account numbers on electronic
17
credit/debit card receipts.” FTC, 40 Years of Experience with the Fair Credit Reporting Act, at 2
18
(July 1, 2011), 2011 WL 3020575. In sum, FACTA’s legislative history and extrinsic material
19
show that Congress intended § 1681c(g)(1) to apply to merchants.
20
Having determined that the FACTA statute applies to merchants, Plaintiff must adequately
21
plead that VeriFone is a merchant. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, a “merchant”
22
is “a buyer and seller of commodities for profit.” Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant is a ‘person that
23
accepts credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of business’ within the meaning of FACTA.”
24
Compl. at ¶ 18. Plaintiff alleges he “used his credit card to pay for the cab,” “[t]he credit card
25
used by [him] in the taxi cab ride was a VISA credit card,” and “Defendant’s product was used to
26
receive payment by Plaintiff in the taxi cab.” Id. at ¶¶ 21-23. He further alleges that he “received
27
from the Defendant a computer-generated receipt displaying more than the last five (5) digits of
28
4
Case No.: 5:14-cv-04912-EJD
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
1
Plaintiff’s credit card number.” Id. at ¶ 24. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant produces
2
and manages machines that accept credit cards or debit cards in the course of transacting business
3
with persons such as Plaintiff and the other class members,” and alleges that “[i]n transacting such
4
business, Defendant’s machines electronically print receipts for credit and debit card transactions.”
5
Id. at ¶ 36.
While the court must construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
6
7
courts are not bound to accept a legal conclusion. In this instance, Plaintiff merely concludes that
8
VeriFone is a “person” under the FACTA statute, but does not provide factual allegations as to
9
how VeriFone served as a merchant during the transaction at issue. See Blantz v. Cal. Dep’t of
Corr. & Rehab., 727 F.3d 917, 927 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that “conclusory allegations are
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California
10
insufficient on their own to defeat a motion to dismiss”). Instead, it appears VeriFone only
12
manufactured the machine that processed Plaintiff’s credit card payment.
Therefore, as currently pled, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to proceed with his
13
14
claim. As such, VeriFone’s motion is granted.
15
IV.
16
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, VeriFone’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ entire
17
complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Any amended complaint addressing the
18
deficiencies identified herein must be filed on or before December 30, 2015.
19
The court schedules this case for a Case Management Conference at 10:00 a.m. on
20
February 18, 2016. The parties shall file a Joint Case Management Conference Statement on or
21
before February 11, 2016.
22
23
24
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 7, 2015
______________________________________
EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge
25
26
27
28
5
Case No.: 5:14-cv-04912-EJD
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?