NEAS LIMITED v. OJSC RUSNANO et al

Filing 82

Order Re: 71 Motion for Relief from Non-Dispositive Pretrial Order of Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 70). (rmwlc2, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/30/2016)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

SAN JOSE DIVISION

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12

NEAS LIMITED, et al.,

Case No. 5:15-cv-01612-RMW

Plaintiffs,
13
v.

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR RELIEF
FROM NON-DISPOSITIVE PRETRIAL
ORDER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
(DKT. NO. 70)

14
15

OJSC RUSNANO, et al.,
Defendants.

Re: Dkt. No. 71

16

Before the court is plaintiffs’ Motion for Relief from Non-Dispositive Pretrial Order of

17
18

Magistrate Judge. Dkt. No. 71. Plaintiffs assert six objections to the magistrate judge’s order

19

denying plaintiffs’ request to conduct jurisdictional discovery before plaintiffs are required to

20

respond to defendants’ pending motions to dismiss. Dkt. No. 70. This court ordered supplemental

21

briefing, Dkt. No. 73, which the parties provided, Dkt. Nos. 75, 78, 79. For the reasons stated

22

below, plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

23

I.

24

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Neas Limited and Andrey Tretyakov are suing defendants OJSC Rusnano;

25

Rusnano USA, Inc.; Rusnano Management Company, LLC; Rusnano Capital, A.G.; Rusnano

26

Capital, LLC; Fonds Rusnano Capital, S.A.; Anatoly Chubais; Oleg Kiselev; Irina Rapoport;

27

Sergey Polikarpov; and Valery Rostokin regarding an alleged illegal takeover of nominal

28

1
5:15-cv-01612-RMW
ORDER RE: MOT. FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE (DKT. NO. 70)
RS

1

defendant Nitol Solar Limited. Dkt. No. 43 (First Amended Complaint). Plaintiffs also allege that

2

the foreign defendants (i.e., all defendants except Rusnano USA) siphoned money from their

3

alleged unlawful takeover of Nitol into California via Rusnano USA. Based on the parties’

4

submissions, the magistrate judge found that all of the corporate defendants aside from Rusnano

5

USA are incorporated and have their principal places of business in foreign countries and that all

6

of the individual defendants reside and work in Russia. Dkt. No. 70 at 2.

7

Rusnano USA and the foreign defendants filed separate motions to dismiss the complaint.

8

Dkt. Nos. 46, 50. The foreign defendants argue that they should be dismissed from the case under

9

the forum non conveniens doctrine and due to lack of personal jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 50. The
foreign corporate defendants also argue that sovereign immunity bars the claims against them. Id.

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

at 23-24. In support of their motions to dismiss, the foreign defendants submitted declarations

12

asserting their lack of ties to California and/or the United States. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 35-1, 35-2,

13

35-3, 35-5, 35-6.
Pursuant to a stipulation, plaintiffs filed a motion before the magistrate judge for leave to

14
15

conduct jurisdictional discovery before plaintiffs had to respond to the motions to dismiss. Dkt.

16

No. 51. The magistrate judge denied plaintiffs’ motion for discovery. Dkt. No. 70. Plaintiffs then

17

filed the instant motion for relief. Dkt. No. 71.

18

II.

19

ANALYSIS
The magistrate judge’s order is reviewed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), which provides

20

that “[t]he district judge in the case must consider timely objections [to a magistrate’s order] and

21

modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.”

22

A.

23

Weeks after submitting their reply in support of their request for jurisdictional discovery,

New Evidence

24

plaintiffs filed a declaration from Ilya Ponomarev, a former member of the Russian Duma who

25

purported to have knowledge of certain defendants’ ties to the United States. Dkt. No. 67-1 (also

26

filed at Dkt. No. 72-1). The magistrate judge did not consider the Ponomarev declaration because

27

it was untimely under Civil Local Rule 7-3(d). A district court, however, has discretion, but is not

28

2
5:15-cv-01612-RMW
ORDER RE: MOT. FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE (DKT. NO. 70)
RS

1

required, to consider evidence presented for the first time in a party’s objection to a magistrate

2

judge’s order. United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2000). Because portions of

3

the Ponomarev declaration call certain statements in defendants’ declarations into question, and

4

the late submission does not appear to have been in bad faith, this court exercises its discretion and

5

considers the Ponomarev declaration in evaluating plaintiffs’ request for relief.

6

B.

7

“There are two forms that personal jurisdiction may take: general and specific.” Picot v.

Requirements for Jurisdictional Discovery

8

Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015). Plaintiffs appear to have abandoned their argument

9

that the foreign defendants are subject to general jurisdiction in this court, see Dkt. No. 74 at 1, so
this order considers only specific jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit has articulated the following

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

three-prong test for analyzing a claim of specific jurisdiction:

12

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his
activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or
resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully
avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum,
thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;

13
14
15

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the
defendant’s forum-related activities; and

16

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and
substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

17
18
19

Id.
With respect to the first prong, the “purposeful availment” analysis is generally used for

20

contract claims. Id. at 1212. For tort claims, the Ninth Circuit applies a “purposeful direction” test

21

that examines “evidence that the defendant has directed his actions at the forum state, even if those

22

actions took place elsewhere.” Id. In analyzing purposeful direction, courts apply the Supreme

23

Court’s “effects” test from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1983). Under Calder, the defendant

24

must have (1) committed an intentional act, which was (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, and

25

(3) caused harm, the brunt of which is suffered and which the defendant knows is likely to be

26

suffered in the forum state. Picot, 780 F.3d at 1213-14.

27
28

With respect to the second prong, specific jurisdiction requires that the claim against the
3
5:15-cv-01612-RMW
ORDER RE: MOT. FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE (DKT. NO. 70)
RS

1

defendant be one that arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities. The court

2

“must determine if the plaintiff . . . would not have been injured ‘but for’ the defendant’s . . .

3

conduct directed toward [plaintiff] in [the forum].” Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d

4

1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998).
With respect to the third prong, reasonableness, the court considers the following seven

5
6

factors:
(1) the extent of the defendants’ purposeful interjection into the
forum state’s affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in
the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the
defendants’ state; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the
dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy;
(6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff’s interest in
convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an
alternative forum. None of the factors is dispositive in itself; instead,
[the court] must balance all seven.

7
8
9
10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12

Core–Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries, 11 F.3d 1482, 1487–88 (9th Cir. 1993).
Jurisdictional discovery “may be appropriately granted where pertinent facts bearing on the

13
14

question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more satisfactory showing of the facts is

15

necessary.” Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Data Disc, Inc. v.

16

Systems Tech. Assoc., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1977)). Discovery may be

17

appropriate where further discovery on an issue “might well demonstrate facts sufficient to

18

constitute a basis for jurisdiction.” Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328

19

F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). On the other hand, “[a] refusal [to grant discovery] is not an

20

abuse of discretion when it is clear that further discovery would not demonstrate facts sufficient to

21

constitute a basis for jurisdiction.” Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir.

22

2014).

23

“Personal jurisdiction over each defendant must be analyzed separately.” Harris Rutsky,

24

328 F.3d at 1130.

25

C.

26
27
28

Plaintiffs’ Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Order
1.

The Foreign Defendants’ Contacts with the United States as a Whole

Plaintiffs first argue that the magistrate judge erred by only considering the foreign
4
5:15-cv-01612-RMW
ORDER RE: MOT. FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE (DKT. NO. 70)
RS

1

defendants’ contacts with California and not the United States as a whole. Under Federal Rule of

2

Civil Procedure 4(k)(2),1 a court analyzing personal jurisdiction can consider “the aggregate

3

contacts of a defendant with the United States as a whole instead of a particular state forum.”

4

Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006). To utilize Rule 4(k)(2), the

5

“federal long-arm statute,” a plaintiff must prove three factors. “First, the claim against the

6

defendant must arise under federal law. Second, the defendant must not be subject to the personal

7

jurisdiction of any state court of general jurisdiction. Third, the federal court’s exercise of personal

8

jurisdiction must comport with due process.” Id. at 1159 (internal citations omitted). The due

9

process inquiry into a defendant’s contacts with the forum “is identical to the one discussed above

10

when the forum was California, except here the relevant forum is the entire United States.” Id.

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

a.

Due Process and Minimum Contacts

The court first addresses the issue of whether plaintiffs have shown that they are entitled to

12
13

discovery regarding the foreign defendants’ contacts with the United States because for most

14

defendants, this issue is dispositive. Plaintiffs are correct that the magistrate judge generally

15

analyzed each foreign defendant’s contacts with California rather than their contacts with the

16

United States as a whole. With few exceptions, however, even considering the Ponomarev

17

declaration, and even analyzing each foreign defendant’s ties to the United States as a whole, the

18

court concludes that the magistrate judge did not err in denying jurisdictional discovery.2
With respect to the corporate defendants, based on plaintiffs’ complaint and declarations

19
20

from Rapoport and Chubais, the magistrate judge found that Rusnano Management Company,

21

LLC; Rusnano Capital, A.G.; Rusnano Capital, LLC; and Fonds Rusnano Capital, S.A. are

22

incorporated and have their principal places of business outside the United States and have no

23
24
25
26
27
28

1

“For a claim that arises under federal law, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service
establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant if: (A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction
in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction; and (B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the
United States Constitution and laws.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).
2
The court notes that plaintiffs attempt to group the foreign defendants together and argue that
defendants’ aggregate contacts with the United States are extensive. Under precedent cited by
plaintiffs, however, this approach is improper; plaintiffs are required to demonstrate that the court
has personal jurisdiction over each separate defendant. See Harris Rutsky, 328 F.3d at 1130.
5
5:15-cv-01612-RMW
ORDER RE: MOT. FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE (DKT. NO. 70)
RS

1

physical presence in California. Dkt. No. 70 at 7-8. Plaintiffs’ complaint does not offer any

2

jurisdictionally significant allegations regarding these defendants’ contacts with the United States.

3

Moreover, the Ponomarev declaration does not discuss these four defendants by name other than

4

in a brief, jurisdictionally irrelevant reference to Rusnano Capital A.G.3 Thus, plaintiffs have not

5

pointed to any clear error in the magistrate judge’s findings for these four defendants. This court

6

agrees with the magistrate judge that plaintiffs have failed to show discovery might well

7

demonstrate facts sufficient to constitute a basis for personal jurisdiction over Rusnano

8

Management Company, LLC; Rusnano Capital, A.G.; Rusnano Capital, LLC; and Fonds Rusnano

9

Capital, S.A. The court addresses plaintiffs’ arguments regarding OJSC Rusnano and plaintiffs’

10

theory of “alter ego” liability below.
Similarly, with respect to individual defendants Rapoport, Polikarpov, and Rostokin, the

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12

magistrate judge reviewed plaintiffs’ allegations and the declarations submitted by defendants and

13

concluded that jurisdictional discovery is highly unlikely to unearth facts sufficient to establish

14

personal jurisdiction over these individuals. Dkt. No. 70 at 4-6. Once again, the Ponomarev

15

declaration does not even mention these individuals by name. Thus, plaintiffs have provided no

16

basis to find error in the magistrate judge’s conclusion that jurisdictional discovery for Rapoport,

17

Polikarpov, and Rostokin should be denied.
Plaintiffs have, however, provided support for their argument that jurisdictional discovery

18
19

related to Chubais, Kiselev and OJSC Rusnano may be appropriate. The Ponomarev declaration

20

does actually discuss these three defendants’ contacts with the United States, in contrast to the

21

defendants mentioned in previous paragraphs of this order. Specifically, Mr. Ponomarev declares:

22

18. In or around January 2010, I was part of a delegation that
travelled to Boston to further address the expansion of the Russian
high technology sector in series of meetings with MIT officials,
including then-Provost Rafael Reif. The delegation included,
among others Chubais.

23
24

19. During the trip, Chubais described Rusnano’s experience with
Nitol and sought out advice as to how to properly operate in US

25
26
27
28

3

Dkt. No. 72-1 ¶¶ 23, 35.
6

5:15-cv-01612-RMW
ORDER RE: MOT. FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE (DKT. NO. 70)
RS

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

market.
20. To be sure, the structure of Nitol was discussed in significant
detail and was a major topic of conversation given Rusnano’s
relatively short track record at that point in time. I recall the
following topics being discussed in the United States in regard to
Nitol: (i) the lack of capital for technology deals in Russia; (ii) the
fact that due to time pressures Rusnano investment in Nitol was not
done the right way; (iii) Kiselev’s concerns regarding legal
restrictions under Russian law related to 50% co-investment
requirement; (iv) the need for Rusnano to “sweeten” the deal for
Alfa Bank (“Alfa”) also a lender in regard to Nitol; (v) the fact that
the original structure of Nitol did not give Rusnano sufficient
decision-making power over the plant’s affairs; (vi) an
investigation of the original deal started by local law enforcement;
and (vii) the need for Rusnano to fully control Nitol.
Dkt. No. 72-1 ¶¶ 18-20 (emphasis added). The declaration also describes a series of meetings in

10

Cambridge, Massachusetts regarding an “investment fund that Chubais and Kiselev planned on

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

9

creating” in the United States. Id. ¶ 21. These purported meetings may have been unrelated to

12

plaintiffs’ allegations of wrongdoing, as defendants claim, but the Ponomarev declaration provides

13

at least limited support for plaintiffs’ theory that some of the acts related to the alleged “takeover”

14

of Nitol occurred in the United States. Moreover, the declaration seems to contradict Chubais’s

15

and Kiselev’s assertions that they did not have regular contact with the United States. The court

16

finds it appropriate to allow plaintiffs to further explore these issues through limited discovery

17

aimed at Chubais, Kiselev, and OJSC Rusnano.

18

b.

19

Whether Plaintiffs’ Claims Arise Under Federal Law

To invoke Rule 4(k)(2), plaintiffs’ claims must arise under federal law. Plaintiffs’ only

20

federal claim is for civil RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1961. Defendants assert that the complaint fails

21

to state a claim under RICO. Dkt. No. 79 at 3-5. Because plaintiffs have not had an adequate

22

opportunity to address the merits of defendants’ RICO arguments, however, the court finds it

23

premature to rule out discovery on that basis.

24
25

c.

Whether Defendants Are Subject to Jurisdiction in Any State

Rule 4(k)(2)’s remaining requirement is that the defendants not be subject to jurisdiction in

26

any U.S. state. Defendants point out that plaintiffs argued before the magistrate judge that the

27

foreign defendants are subject to jurisdiction in California. In their motion for relief, plaintiffs

28

7
5:15-cv-01612-RMW
ORDER RE: MOT. FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE (DKT. NO. 70)
RS

1

appear to have changed their position to argue that the foreign defendants are not subject to

2

jurisdiction in any state court. While the court finds plaintiffs’ shift in advocacy somewhat

3

troubling, in this instance, the court will assume that plaintiffs have argued in the alternative to

4

conform their arguments to the proof defendants have presented. The court further notes that the

5

foreign defendants have not indicated a state in which they are subject to personal jurisdiction.

6

***

7

In sum, the court finds that plaintiffs have made a showing that discovery might well

8

demonstrate facts sufficient to constitute a basis under Rule 4(k)(2) for personal jurisdiction over

9

Chubais, Kiselev, and OJSC Rusnano.4

10

2.

Plaintiffs also argue that the magistrate judge erred in denying jurisdictional discovery

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

Alter Ego Theory

12

without considering plaintiffs’ theory that Rusnano USA is the “alter ego” of OJSC Rusnano. A

13

parent-subsidiary relationship is generally “insufficient to attribute the contacts of the subsidiary

14

to the parent for jurisdictional purposes,” but an exception exists when the subsidiary is the

15

parent’s “alter ego.” Harris Rutsky, 328 F.3d at 1134. To satisfy the alter ego test, a plaintiff must

16

show “(1) that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities [of the

17

two entities] no longer exist and (2) that failure to disregard [their separate identities] would result

18

in fraud or injustice.” Id. (citation omitted).
In this case, the magistrate judge did not fail to consider plaintiffs’ alter ego theory. To the

19
20

contrary, the magistrate judge considered plaintiffs’ theory and rejected it. Dkt. No. 70 at 6. The

21

magistrate judge found that “no Individual Defendant has ever been an officer or director of

22

Rusnano USA.” Moreover, the magistrate judge noted, “Plaintiffs do not contravene Chubais’[s]

23

sworn statement that Rusnano USA is ‘autonomous from its owners and has its own distinct

24

corporate identity.’” Id. (citing Dkt. No. 35-6 ¶ 26). These findings were not clearly erroneous

25

based on the record before the magistrate judge.

26
27
28

4

Thus, the court need not address plaintiffs’ alternative argument that the foreign defendants are
subject to personal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1965(b) and (d).
8
5:15-cv-01612-RMW
ORDER RE: MOT. FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE (DKT. NO. 70)
RS

1

If this court considers the Ponomarev declaration, however, potential disputes of fact start

2

to emerge. For example, Ponomarev declares that “[t]he final decision to rent Menlo Park offices,”

3

i.e., the offices of Rusnano USA, “was made personally by Anatoly Chubais in California.” Dkt.

4

No. 72-1 ¶ 38. Moreover, Ponomarev declares, “Chubais indicated he wished to have a personal

5

office adjacent to his investment operations in Silicon Valley.” Id. ¶ 41. Ponomarev concludes that

6

“regardless of form, the existence of a separate entity as Rusnano USA is a matter of legal

7

convenience for Rusnano and Akhanov, Rusnano USA’s president, reports directly to Chubais and

8

is regarded as a Rusnano manager.” Id. ¶ 43. While Ponomarev’s statements are insufficient in and

9

of themselves to state a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction over OJSC Rusnano under an
alter ego theory, his statements at least support the possibility that discovery might well

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

demonstrate facts sufficient to constitute a basis for personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court

12

concludes that limited discovery in support of plaintiffs’ alter ego theory is appropriate.

13
14
15

3.

Plaintiffs’ Other Objections

Because the court is allowing limited jurisdictional discovery, the court need not address
plaintiffs’ other objections to the magistrate judge’s order.
Impact of Defendants’ Other Grounds for Dismissal

16

D.

17

Defendants argue that there is no need to even address the issue of personal jurisdiction

18

because this case should be dismissed under the doctrines of forum non conveniens or foreign

19

sovereign immunity. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432

20

(2007) (“A district court . . . may dispose of an action by a forum non conveniens dismissal,

21

bypassing questions of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, when considerations of

22

convenience, fairness, and judicial economy so warrant.”). Defendants’ argument is appealing, but

23

the court finds that in this instance, there is sufficient overlap between the facts relevant to a forum

24

non conveniens inquiry and those relevant to a personal jurisdiction inquiry to allow discovery to

25

proceed. For example, if, as Mr. Ponomarev asserts, Mr. Chubais has a personal office in Menlo

26

Park, California, Dkt. No. 72-1 ¶ 41, a forum non conveniens dismissal of the claims against him

27

would seem less appropriate.

28

9
5:15-cv-01612-RMW
ORDER RE: MOT. FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE (DKT. NO. 70)
RS

1

As for foreign sovereign immunity, the court finds that this argument has not been

2

sufficiently well developed to justify denying discovery. In any event, the individual defendants

3

do not assert foreign sovereign immunity, so this argument would not apply to them.

4

E.

5

While the court concludes that some jurisdictional discovery is appropriate, the set of

6

discovery requests that plaintiffs have proposed, Dkt. Nos. 75-1 – 75-3 is overbroad, unduly

7

burdensome, and out of proportion with the needs of this case. In its discretion, the court rules that

8

plaintiffs may request the following documents from OJSC Rusnano, Chubais, and Kiselev:

9

2. All documents (including presentations) disseminated to any U.S.
Person by or on behalf of OJSC Rusnano, Chubais, or Kiselev that
mention the Nitol Plant during the Relevant Time Period.

10
11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

Scope of Permissible Discovery

3. All documents (including notes) regarding any meeting between
OJSC Rusnano, Chubais, or Kiselev and any U.S. Person in regard
to the Nitol Plant.

12
13

9. All documents (including communications as among OJSC
Rusnano, Chubais, or Kiselev) regarding the establishment of an
office or legal entity in the United States.

14
15

10. All documents sufficient to show the organizational structure of
OJSC Rusnano and Rusnano USA, including the boards of directors
and management team of each entity during the Relevant Time
Period

16
17
18

11. Any and all agreements between OJSC Rusnano and Rusnano
USA regarding the management and operation of Rusnano USA.

19

Dkt. No. 75-2 (as modified by the court). Furthermore, the court rules that plaintiffs may propound

20

any seven of their proposed interrogatories, Dkt. No. 75-3, on OJSC Rusnano, Chubais, and

21

Kiselev with the modification that “Foreign Defendants” in plaintiffs’ proposed interrogatories

22

shall be redefined to mean “defendants OJSC Rusnano, Chubais, and Kiselev.” Finally, plaintiffs

23

may depose either Chubais or Kiselev for four hours. Because Rusnano USA concedes that this

24

court has personal jurisdiction over it, plaintiffs may not seek any discovery from Rusnano USA

25

or its CEO.

26

III.

27
28

ORDER
For the reasons explained above, plaintiffs’ motion for relief from the magistrate judge’s
10

5:15-cv-01612-RMW
ORDER RE: MOT. FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE (DKT. NO. 70)
RS

1

order is GRANTED IN PART as follows. Plaintiffs may pursue limited discovery consistent with

2

this order directed toward Chubais, Kiselev, and OJSC Rusnano for 60 days. In all other respects,

3

plaintiffs’ motion for relief is DENIED.

4
5
6
7
8
9

At the expiration of the 60-day discovery window, defendants may renew their motions to
dismiss with any adjustments necessary to account for facts uncovered in discovery.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 30, 2016
______________________________________
Ronald M. Whyte
United States District Judge

10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

11
5:15-cv-01612-RMW
ORDER RE: MOT. FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE (DKT. NO. 70)
RS