Olga C. v. County of Santa Clara et al
Filing
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ORDER denying 46 Motion to Dismiss and/or strike. Signed by Judge Edward J. Davila on 10/17/2017. (ejdlc3S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/17/2017)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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SAN JOSE DIVISION
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OLGA C.,
Case No. 5:15-cv-01691-EJD
Plaintiff,
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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
DISMISS AND/OR STRIKE
v.
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COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, et al.,
Re: Dkt. No. 46
United States District Court
Northern District of California
Defendants.
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I. INTRODUCTION
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This action arises out of the removal of minor children, including Jane Doe, from their
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mother Plaintiff Olga C.’s custody. Olga C. (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants
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County of Santa Clara (“County”), Santa Clara County Social Services Agency, Department of
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Family and Children Services, and social workers Janet Caudillo (“Caudillo”) (erroneously sued
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as Janet Trujillo) and Darlene Sandoval (“Sandoval”) (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging
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constitutional rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state claims. Presently before
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the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the §1983 claim on the grounds that it is barred by
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collateral estoppel. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f), Defendants also move to strike allegations
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regarding the injuries Jane Doe suffered while in foster care on the grounds that the allegations are
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irrelevant to Plaintiff’s claims. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss and
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motion to strike are denied.
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II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is the mother of five children, including Jane Doe. Jerry Paredes, Sr. (“Jerry Sr.”)
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is the father of Jane Doe. Jerry Sr. allegedly has a history of domestic violence and has been
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convicted of child endangerment. Jerry Sr. is married to Deanne Paredes (“Deanne”) and is the
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father of their two adult children, Krystal Paredes (“Krystal”) and Jerry Paredes, Jr. (“Jerry Jr.”).
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While Deanne, Krystal, and Jerry Jr. all live in the same home in San Jose, California (the
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“Paredes home”), it is unknown where Jerry Sr. lives. Nonetheless, Jerry Sr. is alleged to have
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frequented the Paredes home.
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As of 2013, Plaintiff allegedly had sole legal and physical custody of Jane Doe while Jerry
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Sr. had unsupervised visitation. Plaintiff alleges that in April 2013, during an over-night visit,
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Jerry Sr. hit Jane Doe and gave her a blackened eye. Plaintiff photographed Jane Doe and
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contacted CPS. Plaintiff alleges that she met with Defendant Caudillo, told her about Jane Doe’s
blackened eye, and asked her to investigate. Caudillo, however, allegedly focused her
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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investigation on Plaintiff, visited the children’s school, and questioned the children about
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Plaintiff’s conduct. Plaintiff alleges that Caudillo then presented her with papers to sign, and
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when Plaintiff refused to immediately sign the papers due to her limited English proficiency, the
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County removed Plaintiff’s children from her home and placed them in foster care.
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Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated her constitutionally protected right to familial
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association by giving false and fabricated evidence and/or withholding exculpatory evidence
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during dependency proceedings to secure the removal of Jane Doe from her custody. More
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specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Caudillo (1) failed to note in investigative reports and
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reports to the court that it was Plaintiff who first called Child Protective Services to report
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suspected abuse by Jerry Sr.; (2) tried to coerce Plaintiff’s children into saying that Plaintiff was
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not a good mother; (3) withheld evidence showing that Plaintiff was caring for her children; (4)
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failed to inform the court that Plaintiff suspected Jane Doe had been abused in the Paredes home;
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(5) failed to conduct an adequate investigation into the alleged abuse in the Paredes home; (6)
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falsely reported to the dependency court that Plaintiff had failed to protect her children from Jerry
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Jr.; and (7) failed to inform the court that there was no emergency warranting the removal of
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Plaintiff’s children from her custody and care.
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With respect to Defendant Sandoval, Plaintiff alleges that she regularly met with Sandoval
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to determine the conditions under which she might regain custody of her children. Plaintiff
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alleges that Sandoval frustrated Plaintiff’s repeated attempts to comply with the conditions,
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especially the requirement to attend parenting classes. Plaintiff further alleges that Sandoval
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falsely advised the dependency court that Plaintiff had missed visits with her children; withheld
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evidence from the court regarding Jane Doe’s deteriorating condition; and conducted superficial
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investigations of Jane Doe’s physical abuse.
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Plaintiff alleges that consistent with County policy, Jane Doe was placed in the Paredes
home without the County conducting a background check of the members of that household.
Plaintiff further alleges that 21-year-old Krystal was named Jane Doe’s foster parent even though
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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she was unfit for such a role.
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In early 2014, during one of Plaintiff’s supervised visitations, Plaintiff noticed that Jane
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Doe’s body had cuts and bruises. Plaintiff allegedly reported this to Defendant Sandoval, but
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Sandoval dismissed Plaintiff’s concerns. In March 2014, during a visitation with Plaintiff and her
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five children, the other foster parents in the room also noticed the cuts, bruises, swelling, and
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blackened eyes and marks on Jane Doe’s body.
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Plaintiff alleges that the limited investigation conducted by Defendants thereafter was
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negligent and incomplete because, among other things, Defendants simply accepted the
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explanations of Deanne and Krystal that Jane Doe’s injuries were self-inflicted or the result of a
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cold and/or allergies.
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Between March and June 2014, Plaintiff allegedly met with Sandoval numerous times to
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discuss her concerns of child abuse, but Sandoval allegedly took no action. In May 2014, Plaintiff
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was unable to see Jane Doe because Krystal failed to bring Jane Doe to the visits. On June 6,
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2014, Plaintiff met with another social worker and pleaded for help. The social worker scheduled
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visitations, but Krystal again failed to bring Jane Doe. On June 10, 2014, the social worker visited
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the Paredes home. Upon observing suspicious circumstances, the social worker told Krystal to
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take Jane Doe to a doctor immediately. Hours later, Jane Doe was admitted to Valley Medical
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Center where she was hospitalized for days. Plaintiff alleges that Jane Doe had severe brain
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hemorrhaging and was beaten beyond recognition. Plaintiff also alleges that Jane Doe’s eyes were
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swollen shut, she had bite marks where chunks of flesh were missing, spike marks around her
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neck, missing teeth, and cuts and bruises all over her body. Jane Doe was subsequently removed
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from the Paredes home and the Paredes family was criminally charged. Plaintiff’s First Amended
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Complaint (“FAC”) lists the following claims: (1) violation of civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
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1983; (2) Monell-related claims; (3) violation of state civil rights; and (4) intentional infliction of
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emotional distress.
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Defendants contend that the Section 1983 claim is barred by collateral estoppel based on
dependency court proceedings and should be dismissed. Defendants also contend that Plaintiff
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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lacks standing to assert any claims premised on Jane Doe’s injuries, and therefore move to strike
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allegations in the complaint relating to the abuse Jane Doe suffered. See FAC at ¶¶17, 18, 20, 26,
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27, 35. Plaintiff argues that collateral estoppel does not apply because (1) the issues in this case
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are not identical to any issues determined in the dependency court proceedings, and (2) the basis
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of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim was not actually litigated or decided in the dependency court
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proceedings. With respect to the motion to strike, Plaintiff clarifies that she is not seeking to
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recover damages for Jane Doe’s injuries. Instead, Plaintiff seeks damages for the injuries she
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suffered as a result of being separated from her children, including emotional distress caused by
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witnessing the abuse to Jane Doe.
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III. STANDARDS
A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of claims
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alleged in the complaint. Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir.
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1995). When deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court must generally accept as
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true all “well-pleaded factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664 (2009). The court
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must also construe the alleged facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Retail Prop.
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Trust v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014)
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(providing the court must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party” for
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a Rule 12(b)(6) motion). Dismissal “is proper only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an
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absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250
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F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f), a court may strike from the complaint any “redundant,
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immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” The function of a Rule 12(f) motion to strike is
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“to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by
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dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970,
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973 (9th Cir. 2010). A motion to strike will only be granted if “it is clear that the matter to be
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stricken could have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the litigation.” Illinois Nat’l Ins.
Co. v. Nordic PCL Const., Inc., 870 F.Supp.2d 1015 (D. Hi 2012); see also Oracle v. Micron
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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Tech., Inc., 817 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“A court must deny the motion to strike
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if there is any doubt whether the allegations in the pleadings might be relevant in the action.”).
IV. DISCUSSION
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The Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. §1738, requires a federal court to give a state
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court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment under the law of the
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state in which the judgment was entered. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S.
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75, 81 (1984). Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of issues that were actually tried and
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decided in prior proceedings. Lucido v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.3d 335, 341, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767
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(1990). “Collateral estoppel applies when the issue sought to be precluded is identical to the issue
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decided in the former proceeding, the issue was actually litigated in the former proceeding, the
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issue was necessarily decided in the former proceeding, the decision in the former proceeding is
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final and on the merits, and the party against whom preclusion is sought is the same as or in
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privity with the party to the former proceeding.” Id.; see also Hardwick v. County of Orange, No.
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SACV-13-1390-JLS, 2015 WL 13298081 (C.D. Cal. April 10, 2015); Kasdan v. County of Los
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Angeles, No. CV-12-06793 GAF, 2014 WL 6669354(C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2014); Anderson-
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Francois v. County of Sonoma, No. C-08-00724 WHA, 20009 WL 1458240 (N.D. Cal. May 22,
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2009).
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Plaintiff argues that collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, does not apply
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because at no point in the dependency proceedings was the malfeasance or misfeasance of the
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social workers determined or actually litigated. The case of Watson v. County of Santa Clara, No.
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C-06-4029 RMW, 2010 WL 2077171 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2010), which is factually similar to the
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present action, is instructive. In Watson, plaintiffs filed an action asserting various constitutional
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violations and state law torts against defendants arising out of the removal of three minor children
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from their parents’ custody, the conduct of the dependency proceedings, and the length and
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circumstances of supervised visitation prior to the reunification of the children with their parents.
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On summary judgment, plaintiffs argued that collateral estoppel did not apply because they did not
have a full and fair opportunity to litigate issues in the state court. The basis for plaintiffs’
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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argument was that defendants committed perjury, submitted false documents, and concealed
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material facts and evidence in the dependency proceedings. The court rejected plaintiffs’
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argument as unsupported by the evidentiary record, which showed that the state court trial
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“conducted a lengthy, contested, jurisdictional hearing consuming 19 trial days, involving 27
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witnesses and 85 trial exhibits.” Watson, 2010 WL 2077171, at *4. Notably, the court also stated
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that collateral estoppel prohibits attack on a judgment on grounds that evidence was falsified,
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destroyed or suppressed. Watson, 2010 WL 2077171, at *3 (citing Cedars-Sinai Medical Center
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v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.4th 1, 10 (1998) (discussing caselaw forbidding collateral attack on a
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judgment on the ground that the evidence was falsified, concealed or suppressed)).
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Although Defendants make a compelling argument for the applicability of collateral
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estoppel to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim based upon Watson, supra, and Cedars-Sinai, supra,
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the Court is mindful of the Ninth Circuit’s order reversing dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims
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because Plaintiff’s “federal claims may be saved by amendment,” and remanding the case with
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instructions to grant Plaintiff leave to amend to assert a claim for extrinsic fraud in connection
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with the dependency proceedings. See Memorandum Decision attached as Ex. C to Defendants’
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Request for Judicial Notice. Plaintiff has now pled extrinsic fraud in connection with the
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dependency proceedings. Further development of the evidentiary record is necessary to determine
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whether the elements of collateral estoppel are satisfied. At the pleading stage, it cannot be
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determined whether the issues Defendants seek to preclude are identical to the issues decided in
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the dependency proceedings, whether the issues were actually litigated in the dependency
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proceedings, and whether the issues were necessarily decided in the dependency proceedings.
V. CONCLUSION
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For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED. Defendant’s
motion to strike is DENIED because Defendants have not established that the matters they seek to
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strike regarding Jane Doe’s injuries “have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the
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litigation.” Illinois Nat’l Ins. Co., 817 F.Supp.2d at 1132. Whether evidence of Jane Doe’s
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injuries will ultimately be admissible at trial, however, is a separate issue that will have to be
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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decided later in the proceedings.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 17, 2017
______________________________________
EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge
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