Peasley v. Spearman, et al

Filing 308

Order by Judge Lucy H. Koh denying 264 Administrative Motion to File Under Seal.(lhklc4, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/14/2018)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN JOSE DIVISION

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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DAVID SCOTT PEASLEY,
Plaintiff,

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Case No. 15-CV-01769-LHK
ORDER DENYING ADMINISTRATIVE
MOTION TO SEAL

v.

Re: Dkt. No. 264

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ZAHED AHMED and MARIA LOPEZ,

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Defendants.

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Before the Court is Plaintiff David Scott Peasley’s (“Plaintiff”) administrative motion to

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file under seal (1) portions of Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants Zahed Ahmed and Maria

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Lopez’s (“Defendants”) second motion in limine; and (2) Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s opposition to

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Defendants’ second motion in limine. ECF No. 264. On October 26, 2018, Defendants filed a

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declaration in support of Plaintiff’s administrative motion to seal. ECF No. 272.

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“Historically, courts have recognized a ‘general right to inspect and copy public records

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and documents, including judicial records and documents.’” Kamakana v. City & Cty. of

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Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435

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U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978)). Accordingly, when considering a sealing request, “a strong

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presumption in favor of access is the starting point.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Case No. 15-CV-01769-LHK
ORDER DENYING ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO SEAL

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Parties seeking to seal judicial records relating to motions that are “more than tangentially

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related to the underlying cause of action,” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., 809 F.3d 1092,

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1099 (9th Cir. 2016), bear the burden of overcoming the presumption with “compelling reasons

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supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public

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policies favoring disclosure,” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178–79 (internal quotation marks and

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citation omitted). Compelling reasons justifying the sealing of court records generally exist “when

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such ‘court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as the use of records to

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gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous statements, or release trade

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secrets.” Id. at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598). However, “[t]he mere fact that the
production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id.

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Records attached to motions that are “not related, or only tangentially related, to the merits

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of a case” are not subject to the strong presumption of access. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at

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1099; see also Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (“[T]he public has less of a need for access to court

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records attached only to non-dispositive motions because those documents are often unrelated, or

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only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action.” (internal quotation marks and citation

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omitted)). Parties moving to seal records attached to motions unrelated or only tangentially

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related to the merits of a case must meet the lower “good cause” standard of Rule 26(c) of the

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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1098–99; Kamakana, 447 F.3d

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at 1179–80. The “good cause” standard requires a “particularized showing” that “specific

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prejudice or harm will result” if the information is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v.

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Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P.

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26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning”

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will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation

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omitted).

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In addition, parties moving to seal documents must comply with the procedures established
by Civil Local Rule 79-5. Pursuant to that rule, a sealing order is appropriate only upon a request
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Case No. 15-CV-01769-LHK
ORDER DENYING ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO SEAL

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that establishes the document is “sealable,” or “privileged, protectable as a trade secret or

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otherwise entitled to protection under the law.” Civ. L. R. 79-5(b). “The request must be

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narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material, and must conform with Civil [Local

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Rule] 79-5(d).” Id. Civil Local Rule 79-5(d), moreover, requires the submitting party to attach a

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“proposed order that is narrowly tailored to seal only the sealable material” and that “lists in table

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format each document or portion thereof that is sought to be sealed,” as well as an “unredacted

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version of the document” that “indicate[s], by highlighting or other clear method, the portions of

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the document that have been omitted from the redacted version.” Civ. L. R. 79-5(d)(1). Where

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the moving party seeks to file under seal a document containing information designated
confidential by another party or a non-party, “the [designating party] must file a declaration as

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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required by subsection 79-5(d)(1)(A) establishing that all of the designated material is sealable.”

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Civ. L. R. 79-5(e)(1).

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Here, the information sought to be sealed consists of a California Department of

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Correction and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) disciplinary report on Defendant Lopez’s termination, as

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well as Plaintiff’s references in a brief to that report and the report’s contents. The disciplinary

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report was the subject of Defendants’ second motion in limine. ECF No. 253. Plaintiff referenced

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the disciplinary report in his brief in opposition to Defendants’ second motion in limine and

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attached the disciplinary report to that opposition. See ECF No. 265.

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The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “routine motions in limine [] are strongly correlative

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to the merits of a case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1099. Similarly, this Court has

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previously explained that the exclusion of material at issue in a motion in limine may “critically

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affect[] the outcome of the case,” such that the material is subject to the compelling reasons

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standard. Fujitsu Ltd. v. Belkin Int’l, Inc., No. 10-CV-03972-LHK, 2012 WL 6019754, at *5

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(N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012) (citing In re Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co. Annuity Sales Practices Litig.,

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686 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2012)). The disciplinary report at issue in Defendants’ second

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motion in limine is no different. The Court concluded that the disciplinary report is admissible

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evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(2) and that the report has “significant probative

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Case No. 15-CV-01769-LHK
ORDER DENYING ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO SEAL

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value” for Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Lopez. ECF No. 279 at 3–4. Thus, because

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Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ motion in limine is “more than tangentially related to the

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underlying cause of action,” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1099, the Court concludes that the

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higher “compelling reasons” standard is the applicable standard.
The Court now turns to the substance of the sealing motion. Defendants have designated

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the disciplinary report as confidential pursuant to the parties’ stipulated protective order. See ECF

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No. 264-2. However, that designation alone does not justify sealing even under the good cause

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standard. See Beckman, 966 F.2d at 476 (explaining that entry of a stipulated protective order is

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not equivalent to a showing of good cause). Defendants assert that keeping CDCR’s personnel
records confidential “encourages witnesses to cooperate with investigations concerning personnel

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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and promotes honest responses to investigators’ questions,” which “assists CDCR in correcting

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personnel problems and maintaining the safety and security of its institutions.” ECF No. 272,

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Declaration of Michael Quinn (“Quinn Decl.”), ¶ 4. However, Defendants do not explain how

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public disclosure of the disciplinary report discourages honest responses to investigators’

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questions.
Defendants also attach a declaration from E. Galvan, the litigation coordinator at California

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Training Facility (“CTF”), which Galvan signed when Plaintiff first sought discovery of the

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disciplinary report and of other CTF records. Id. ¶ 2; see ECF No. 272, Ex. A, Declaration of E.

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Galvan (“Galvan Decl.”). Galvan attests that “disclosure to inmates and former inmates of

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confidential information would seriously threaten and undermine the safety and security of

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CDCR’s prisons, staff, and inmates.” Galvan Decl. ¶ 1.1 However, Galvan’s declaration relates to

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documents sought in discovery, including “third-party inmates’ grievances against prison staff

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concerning medical treatment,” id. ¶ 6, and was not even signed in support of the instant sealing

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motion. The disciplinary report sought to be sealed concerns Defendant Lopez’s termination by

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CDCR and does not reveal the confidential medical information of any inmate or CDCR

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Defendants appear to have omitted portions of Paragraphs 1 and 5 and all of Paragraphs 2–4 of
Galvan’s declaration from the instant request. See id.
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Case No. 15-CV-01769-LHK
ORDER DENYING ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO SEAL

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employee. Galvan articulates no specific risks that would result from disclosure of this report or

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references to its contents. Thus, Defendants have not offered “compelling reasons supported by

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specific factual findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies

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favoring disclosure.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178–79.

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With the Ninth Circuit’s sealing case law in mind, the Court rules on the instant motion to
seal as follows:

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Document

Page/Line

Ruling

Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s
Opposition to Defendants’
Second Motion in Limine

Entire Document

DENIED. The report contains no
material for which sealing is warranted.

Plaintiff’s Opposition to
Defendants’ Second
Motion in Limine

All redacted portions

DENIED. The brief contains no
material for which sealing is warranted.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: November 14, 2018
______________________________________
LUCY H. KOH
United States District Judge

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Case No. 15-CV-01769-LHK
ORDER DENYING ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO SEAL