Douglas T Riggin v. Aims Operating Corp., Inc. et al
Filing
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ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART MOTION TO DISMISS by Magistrate Judge Paul Singh Grewal granting-in-part and denying-in-part 23 . (psglc1S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/3/2015)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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SAN JOSE DIVISION
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DOUGLAS T. RIGGIN,
Plaintiff,
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v.
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AIMS OPERATING CORP., INC., et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 5:15-cv-02773-PSG
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART
MOTION TO DISMISS
(Re: Docket No. 23)
Motor homes are as much about dreams as transportation and housing. After Plaintiff
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Douglas T. Riggin purchased his motor home, however, his dreams were left unfulfilled.
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Disappointed with what he says is a defective product, Riggin sued Defendants Roadtrek Motor
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Homes Inc. and AIMS Operating Corp., Inc. for breach of express and implied warranties under
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state and federal law.1 Because Riggin’s complaint does not state any cognizable claim against
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AIMS, AIMS’ motion to dismiss with prejudice is GRANTED-IN-PART with leave to amend.
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See Docket No. 16.
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Case No. 5:15-cv-02773-PSG
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART MOTION TO DISMISS
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I.
Riggin alleges that after he bought his Roadtrek motor home, “the vehicle and components
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exhibited numerous defects in material and workmanship that substantially impair the vehicle’s
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use, value and safety.”2 He “delivered the vehicle to defendants’ authorized repair facilities to have
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defects remedied,” but Defendants did not cure the defects, replace the motor home with a non-
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defective product, or refund Riggin’s money.3 Riggin then sued Defendants, and as to AIMS,
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Riggin asserts claims for breach of AIMS’ express warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
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Act4 and the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act,5 breach of AIMS’ implied warranty under
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Magnuson-Moss,6 breach of AIMS’ implied warranty of merchantability under Song-Beverly,7 and
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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breach of AIMS’ express warranty generally.8
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AIMS, which supplies inverters to Roadtrek, moves to dismiss Claims One through Five
with prejudice.9
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II.
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The court has subject matter jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28
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U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate
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judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a).10
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See id. at ¶ 6.
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See id. at ¶¶ 6-8.
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See 15 U.S.C. § 2301.
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See Cal. Civ. Code § 1791.
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See 15 U.S.C. § 2301(7).
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See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1791.1, 1792.
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See Docket No. 16 at ¶¶ 46-49.
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See Docket No. 23.
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See Docket Nos. 11, 20, 22.
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Case No. 5:15-cv-02773-PSG
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART MOTION TO DISMISS
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) permits challenges to the legal sufficiency of the opposing party’s
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pleadings.11 The court must accept all material allegations in the complaint as true and construe
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them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.12 The court’s review is limited to the
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face of the complaint, materials incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which
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the court may take judicial notice.13 However, the court need not accept as true allegations that are
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conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.14 If a plaintiff fails to
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proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” the complaint may be
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dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.15 A claim is facially
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plausible “when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”16 “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a
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cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”17
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III.
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Applying the standards as set forth above, Riggin’s FAC fails as follows.
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First, Riggin’s allegation that “the vehicle and components exhibited numerous defects in
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material and workmanship”18 fails to allege sufficient facts to state a claim of relief against AIMS.
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For example, the FAC does not allege facts that would allow the court to draw the reasonable
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inference that the inverter was defective, or that Riggin’s motor home even included an AIMS
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See Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 208 F.R.D. 288, 291 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
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See Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008).
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See id.
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See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561 (2007) (“a wholly conclusory statement of [a] claim” will not
survive a motion to dismiss).
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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009).
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Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
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See Docket No. 16 at ¶ 6.
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Case No. 5:15-cv-02773-PSG
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART MOTION TO DISMISS
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inverter rather than an inverter from another supplier. It also fails to allege facts that would allow
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the court to infer that the defects in the inverter, if any, arose during AIMS’ warranty period, or
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that Riggin gave AIMS the opportunity to repair or replace the inverter and that AIMS refused to
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honor its obligations under its warranty. Riggin also alleges that he delivered his vehicle to
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“defendants’ authorized repair facilities.”19 However, the AIMS and Roadtrek warranties establish
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that Roadtrek and AIMS have separate facilities and procedures for requesting repairs under their
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respective warranties20 and AIMS states that Riggin never contacted it regarding the inverter.21
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Riggin’s general allegation against “defendants” thus fails to proffer sufficient facts to state a
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facially plausible claim against AIMS specifically.
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California
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IV.
AIMS’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED-IN-PART. Dismissal without leave to amend is
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only appropriate if it is clear that the complaint cannot be saved by amendment.22 Because it is not
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yet clear that amendment would be futile, leave to amend is GRANTED.23
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SO ORDERED.
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Dated: November 3, 2015
_________________________________
PAUL S. GREWAL
United States Magistrate Judge
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See id.
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See Docket No. 16 at Ex. A, Ex. B.
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See Docket No. 23 at 9.
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See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
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See Docket No. 28 at 2-3 (stating that Riggin has additional facts to add to an amended
complaint).
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Case No. 5:15-cv-02773-PSG
ORDER GRANTING-IN-PART MOTION TO DISMISS
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