Williams v. Kalisher et al

Filing 41

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Re: Dkt. No. 36 . Signed by Judge Nathanael Cousins. (Attachments: # 1 Certificate/Proof of Service)(lmh, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/11/2017)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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LURENZO LEE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,

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Case No. 15-cv-03068 NC (PR)
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
DR. G. KALISHER, et al.,

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Defendants.

Re: Dkt. No. 36

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Plaintiff Lurenzo Lee Williams, a California state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed

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a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants were deliberately

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indifferent to his serious medical needs. Defendants have filed a motion for summary

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judgment. Plaintiff has filed an opposition, and Defendants have filed a reply. For the

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reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

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BACKGROUND

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The following facts are taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and are

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Case No. 15-cv-03068 NC (PR)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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undisputed unless otherwise indicated.
Plaintiff arrived at Correctional Training Facility (“CTF”) from Salinas Valley State
Prison on May 28, 2014. Am. Compl. ¶ 1; Bright Decl. ¶ 5. Prior to that time, Plaintiff

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had been diagnosed as a chronic care inmate with osteoporosis in both legs and feet. Am.

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Compl. ¶ 1. On July 1, 2014, Plaintiff met with Defendant Dr. G. Kalisher and informed

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Dr. Kalisher that Plaintiff had been approved to be placed back on morphine for pain. Am.

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Compl. ¶ 1; Bright Decl. ¶ 7. Despite seeing documentary evidence supporting Plaintiff’s

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assertion, Dr. Kalisher informed Plaintiff that she would not prescribe any medication until

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Plaintiff received an x-ray and obtained lab tests. Am. Compl. ¶ 1. If the x-rays came

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back “positive,” Dr. Kalisher would prescribe morphine for Plaintiff. Id. Dr. Kalisher

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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ordered x-rays of Plaintiff’s left hip, lumbosacral spine, and legs. Bright Decl. ¶ 7.

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Plaintiff claims that the x-ray results revealed multiple fractures and arthritis in his

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lower back. Am. Compl. ¶ 2. However, according to Defendants and documentary

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evidence, the left hip x-rays showed no acute fracture, and minimal left hip joint arthritis.

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Bright Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. A at A-10. The spinal x-ray showed mild degenerative disc disease.

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Bright Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. A-11.

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Plaintiff saw Dr. Kalisher on September 30, 2014 for a chronic care appointment.

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Bright Decl. ¶ 9. Dr. Kalisher reviewed the results of Plaintiff’s blood test and x-rays with

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Plaintiff, and told Plaintiff that she felt that his arthritis was in a “mild stage,” and she

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would not prescribe any narcotics until Plaintiff’s medical condition became critical. Am.

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Compl. ¶ 2. Dr. Kalisher explained to Plaintiff that he had degenerative disc disease,

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which was a term to describe the normal and gradual changes that occur in an individual’s

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spinal discs over time. Bright Decl. ¶ 9, Ex. B at B-004. Dr. Kalisher offered Plaintiff

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Elavil instead, which is a psychotropic medication. Am. Compl. ¶ 2. Plaintiff explained to

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Dr. Kalisher that he did not want a psychotropic medication for pain, and that he had taken

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Case No. 15-cv-03068 NC (PR)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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Elavil before and it had given him bad side effects and an allergic reaction. Id.

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Plaintiff requested an MRI to determine the damage to Plaintiff’s tissue and

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cartilage, but Dr. Kalisher felt that Plaintiff’s medical condition did not warrant an MRI.

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Am. Compl. ¶ 3. Defendants Dr. Bright and Deputy Director Lewis also rejected

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Plaintiff’s appeals for morphine and further testing. Am. Compl. ¶ 4.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants deliberately failed to provide adequate pain

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medication, and denied an MRI or further testing, knowing that Plaintiff faced a substantial

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risk of serious harm.

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DISCUSSION

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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A.

Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show

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there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

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as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the

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outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

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dispute as to a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

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return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id.

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A court shall grant summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing

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sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

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which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial[,] . . . since a complete failure of

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proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders

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all other facts immaterial.” See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

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The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the record that

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demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. The burden then shifts to

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the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the

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Case No. 15-cv-03068 NC (PR)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts

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showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” See id. at 324 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

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56(e)).
For purposes of summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light

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most favorable to the nonmoving party; if the evidence produced by the moving party

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conflicts with evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the court must assume the truth

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of the evidence submitted by the nonmoving party. See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d

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1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to

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make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed

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material fact. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626,

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Northern District of California

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630 (9th Cir. 1987).

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C.

Analysis
Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that the evidence is undisputed

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that the denial of morphine was not medically unacceptable, and the denial of an MRI was

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not medically unacceptable. Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that the facts

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demonstrated that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical

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needs.

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Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s

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proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

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104 (1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

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grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en

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banc). A determination of “deliberate indifference” involves an examination of two

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elements: the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s

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response to that need. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059.

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Here, even assuming that plaintiff suffered from a “serious” medical need, there is
Case No. 15-cv-03068 NC (PR)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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an absence of evidence that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to that need.
With respect to the denial of morphine or other narcotic pain medication, Plaintiff

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asserts that Dr. Kalisher should have offered another option aside from Elavil, and that

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Defendants’ failure to do so was “cruel and unusual.” Here, the undisputed evidence

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shows that just before Plaintiff saw Dr. Kalisher on July 1, 2014, Plaintiff was able to walk

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with a slow and steady gait. Bright Decl. ¶ 6. Dr. Kalisher did offer Elavil, but Plaintiff

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declined it. Plaintiff was instead prescribed the nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug

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(“NSAID”), naproxen, for the pain. Id. ¶ 7. In September 2014, Plaintiff again requested

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morphine, but was denied.
According to the California Correctional Health Care Services (“CCHCS”)

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Guidelines, morphine is contraindicated in patients with no “objective evidence of severe

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disease or pathology;” that is, it is restricted to patients with objective evidence of severe

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disease. Bright Decl. ¶¶ 10-11; Pl. Opp. Ex. A at 4, 6. Plaintiff’s medical records showed

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that Plaintiff was able to rise from a seated position, and could walk briskly. Bright Decl.

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¶ 11. Plaintiff was offered non-narcotic pain medication, but refused NSAIDs. Bright

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Decl. ¶ 13. After Plaintiff fell off his top bunk in February 2015, Plaintiff was prescribed

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acetaminophen with codeine for pain management up until he was transferred from CTF in

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December 2015. Id.

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Here, there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s medical needs were treated with deliberate

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indifference by Dr. Kalisher. The record indicates that although Plaintiff did not receive

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morphine upon his request, Dr. Kalisher was responsive to Plaintiff’s complaint of pain by

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ordering x-rays, scheduling a chronic care appointment, and offering alternative non-

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narcotic pain medication. Defendants refused Plaintiff’s request for morphine because the

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CCHCS guidelines did not call for narcotic relief, and Defendants did not believe that

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morphine was medically necessary. It is well-established that “[a] difference of opinion

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Case No. 15-cv-03068 NC (PR)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not

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give rise to a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).

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Plaintiff’s claim that he should have received prescription narcotics for pain is the type of

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difference in medical opinion between a lay prisoner and medical personnel that is

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insufficient to establish a constitutional violation. See Alford v. Gyaami, No. 2:13-CV-

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2143 DAD P, 2015 WL 3488301, at *10 n.3 (E.D. Cal. June 2, 2015) (noting that “in other

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contexts, courts within this circuit have consistently rejected a prisoner’s attempt to dictate

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the terms of their pain medication”) (citing cases).
Regarding Plaintiff claim that Defendants should have ordered an MRI or further

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testing, Plaintiff provides no evidence to suggest that the denial of an MRI amounted to

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The evidence is undisputed that the

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MRI was denied because it was not medically necessary. Plaintiff’s x-rays in 2014

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showed no fractures in his hip, minimal left hip join arthritis, and mild degenerative disc

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disease. There is an absence of evidence that Defendants failed to order an MRI or other

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additional testing, knowing that without such testing, Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of

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serious harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. No evidence has been presented to show that

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Defendants’ failure to order further testing resulted in further harm to Plaintiff. See

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McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (requiring a showing of a purposeful act and resulting harm in

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order to establish deliberate indifference).

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In addition, there is nothing in the record to suggest that additional testing would

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have altered Defendants’ medical treatment of Plaintiff’s pain. Such decisions are

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squarely matters of medical judgment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976)

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(“[T]he question whether an X-ray or additional diagnostic techniques or forms of

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treatment is indicated is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment. A medical

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decision not to order an X-ray, or like measures, does not represent cruel and unusual

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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punishment. At most it is medical malpractice, and as such the proper forum is the state

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court.”). Nor has Plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact that Defendants’ course of

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treatment was medically unacceptable under the circumstances or that they chose this

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course in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health. See Toguchi v.

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Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058-60 (9th Cir. 2004).

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Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he has failed, as a matter

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of law, to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether Defendants were deliberately

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indifferent to his serious medical needs. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

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GRANTED.

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CONCLUSION

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk shall
terminate all pending motions, enter judgment, and close the file.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

August 11, 2017

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS
United States Magistrate Judge

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Case No. 15-cv-03068 NC (PR)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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