Chavez v. Converse, Inc. et al

Filing 80

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Re: Dkt. No. #55 . Signed by Judge Nathanael Cousins. (lmh, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/18/2016)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 ERIC CHAVEZ, Plaintiff, United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 v. CONVERSE, INC., Defendant. Case No. 15-cv-03746 NC ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Re: Dkt. No. 55 15 16 In this state law wage and hour case, Chavez alleges that Converse inadequately 17 compensated its store employees by failing to appropriately pay overtime and by failing to 18 pay employees for mandatory bag checks at the end of each shift. At issue in this 19 summary judgment motion is whether Converse violates the California Labor Code by 20 paying employees a quarterly bonus without increasing their overtime pay. Certain 21 categories of bonuses require an employer to recalculate the “regular rate” of pay, and as a 22 result, recalculate the time-and-a-half overtime pay. The Court concludes that Converse 23 does not need to recalculate its overtime pay for bonuses paid as a percentage of total 24 earnings or for fully discretionary bonuses. In addition, the Court finds that Chavez did 25 not present material facts that Converse provided a bonus that requires a recalculation of 26 the overtime pay. Thus, the Court GRANTS defendant’s motion for summary judgment 27 on claim 2, and GRANTS defendant’s motion as to claims 5, 6, and 7 based on the theory 28 that Converse failed to include bonuses in the regular rate of pay. Case No. 15-cv-03746 NC 1 I. 2 LEGAL STANDARD Partial summary judgment may be granted only when, drawing all inferences and 3 resolving all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any 4 material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1863 (2014); 5 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, under 6 governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty 7 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the 8 evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. 9 Bald assertions that genuine issues of material fact exist are insufficient. Galen v. Cnty. of 10 L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007). United States District Court Northern District of California 11 The moving party bears the burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, 12 discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 13 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving 14 party must go beyond the pleadings, and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth 15 specific facts showing that a genuine issue of fact exists for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 16 Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass’n, 897 F.2d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Steckl v. 17 Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983)). All justifiable inferences, however, 18 must be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 19 1863 (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255). 20 II. 21 DISCUSSION Chavez’s second cause of action alleges that Converse has a pattern and practice of 22 violating California Labor Code §§ 510 and 1194. Dkt. No. 1 at 26. Those Labor Code 23 sections require an employer to pay overtime at a rate of one and one-half the employee’s 24 regular rate of pay for any work in excess of eight hours in a workday or 40 hours in a 25 workweek. Dkt. No. 1 at 26. Chavez alleges that Converse has a pattern and practice of 26 failing to properly pay overtime because of the way it pays out bonuses. 27 28 No party disputes that Converse pays overtime on regular paychecks, then gives employees quarterly bonuses. However, the parties dispute whether Converse’s quarterly Case No. 15-cv-03746 NC 2 1 bonuses should be included in the calculation of “regular rate of pay” to increase the 2 employee’s rate of pay, and thus increase the employee’s overtime rate. The parties agree 3 that Converse does not currently make such adjustments. 4 Converse argues that Chavez received quarterly bonuses as a percentage of an employee’s total earnings for the quarter, so the regular rate of pay does not need to be 6 recalculated to include bonus pay. Dkt. No. 55 at 11. In support of its position, Converse 7 states that California courts adopt the definition of “regular rate” set forth in the federal 8 Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 207(e). See Prachasaisoradej v. Ralphs 9 Grocery Co., Inc., 42 Cal. 4th 217, 242 n.14 (2007) (noting that “California follows the 10 federal standard for purposes of determining, under the Labor Code, what constitutes an 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 5 employee’s regular pay subject to an overtime rate.”). Chavez argues that the California 12 Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (“DLSE”) Enforcement Policies and 13 Interpretation Manual §§ 49.1, 49.2.4 provides that employers must include all non- 14 discretionary items of pay, including annual merit bonuses, into the regular rate of pay to 15 calculate overtime. 16 In reviewing the authorities cited by the parties, the Court concludes that California 17 law encourages the Court to be guided by the FLSA where California labor laws are 18 unclear. See Nordquist v. McGraw-Hill Broad. Co., 32 Cal. App. 4th 555, 562 (1995) 19 (“Because the California wage and hour laws are modeled to some extent on federal law, 20 federal cases may provide persuasive guidance.”). “In sum, no California court decision, 21 statute, or regulation governs bonus overtime . . . Thus, there is no controlling California 22 authority apart from the directive that overtime hours be compensated at a rate of no less 23 than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay.” Marin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 24 169 Cal. App. 4th 804, 815 (2008), as modified on denial of reh’g (Jan. 21, 2009). 25 In the context of the “regular rate of pay,” the DLSE guidance provides, “In not 26 defining the term ‘regular rate of pay,’ the Industrial Welfare Commission has manifested 27 its intent to adopt the definition of ‘regular rate of pay’ set out in the Fair Labor Standards 28 Act . . . In determining what payments are to be included or excluded from the calculation Case No. 15-cv-03746 NC 3 1 of the regular rate of pay, California law adheres to the standards adopted by the U.S. 2 Department of Labor to the extent that those standards are consistent with California law.” 3 DLSE Enforcement Policies and Interpretations Manual § 49.1.2 (2002). The FLSA provides that the “regular rate” of pay includes “all renumeration for 4 5 employment paid to, or on behalf of the employee” with various exceptions. 29 U.S.C. § 6 207. One of these exemptions are bonuses for a “percentage of total earnings.” 29 C.F.R. 7 § 778.210. Logically, this makes sense. If an employer grants a bonus to employee as a 8 percentage of total pay, the employer increased both the regular rate of pay and the bonus 9 pay by the same percentage. However, if the bonus is based on factors to act as an incentive to the employee, the 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 regular rate of pay must be recalculated to include the additional bonus pay under both 12 federal regulations and California DLSE guidance. 29 C.F.R. § 778.211(c); DLSE Manual 13 § 49.2.4. These incentive factors include bonuses for production, efficiency, quality, and 14 duration of service. Id. Merit awards where “both the fact that payment is to be made and 15 the amount of the payment are determined at the sole discretion of the employer” do not 16 have to be included in the regular rate of pay. DLSE Manual § 49.1.3.4(3). Here, Converse has provided evidence that the bonus plans for store associates use 17 18 the following formula: “quarterly earnings x target percentage (5%) x 100% x the store 19 revenue achievement percentage.” Arevalo Decl. ¶¶ 3,5, Exh. A-C. Quarterly earnings 20 include all base pay, paid time off, overtime, and merit developmental lump sum awards. 21 Id. 22 Converse argues that because the bonus structure is based on quarterly earnings, the 23 entire bonus should be considered a “percentage of total earnings” bonus. In contrast, 24 Chavez argues that Converse’s bonus formula includes more than just quarterly earnings, 25 so it should be broken down into the component elements. Dkt. No. 58 at 13. Chavez 26 argues that the merit developmental lump sum awards must be included in the regular rate 27 of pay. Id. Converse replies that its merit awards are given at the sole discretion of the 28 employer. Stuckey Decl. ¶ 3. In addition, Converse argues that Chavez never actually Case No. 15-cv-03746 NC 4 1 2 received a merit award. Stuckey Decl. ¶ 4. Chavez did not depose Jessica Stuckey, Converse’s declarant establishing that the 3 merit awards are discretionary and that Chavez did not receive a merit award. Chavez 4 states that he has not had adequate opportunity to receive discovery on the question of 5 whether he received a merit award. In support of his argument that further fact finding is 6 necessary, Chavez includes personal wage statements and pay stubs which establish that he 7 earned a quarterly bonus. Dkt. No. 63 at Exhs. A, B. These wage statements and pay 8 stubs demonstrate that Chavez received a bonus but that it is not possible to determine 9 what type of bonus he received. Id. Additionally, Chavez argues for the first time in his supplemental brief that a 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 quarterly bonus based on paid-time off benefits must be included in the regular rate of pay. 12 Dkt. No. 63 at 4. The Court disregards this argument because it was not raised in the 13 initial briefing and Converse’s formula does not appear to include paid-time off benefits. 14 Arevalo Decl. ¶¶ 3,5, Exh. A-C. 15 As to the parties’ initial request that the Court resolve as a matter of law whether 16 Converse’s bonus plan is lawful, the Court finds that Converse may provide bonuses based 17 on a percentage of total earnings and fully discretionary merit awards without recalculating 18 the regular rate of pay. 19 Furthermore, the Court finds that Jessica Stuckey’s declaration establishes under 20 penalty of perjury that Chavez did not receive any other type of bonus. The Court 21 permitted Chavez to request a deposition of Stuckey and to explain why it had not sought 22 to depose her earlier. Dkt. No. 62. In response, Chavez did not provide any justification 23 for failing to seek these facts earlier. As such, Chavez has not established material facts to 24 rebut Converse’s evidence and arguments that Chavez did not receive a bonus other than 25 the lawful percentage of total earnings and fully discretionary merit award bonus. Chavez 26 has also not established facts to suggest that Converse’s merit award bonus is not 27 discretionary. The motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED. 28 Additionally, Converse moves for partial summary judgment on claim 5 (California Case No. 15-cv-03746 NC 5 1 Labor Code § 266(a)), claim 6 (penalties pursuant to the Private Attorneys General Act of 2 2004), and claim 7 (violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200). 3 Converse seeks partial summary judgment on these claims, in as much as they are 4 premised on Chavez’s theory that Converse failed to pay adequate overtime wages. The 5 Court GRANTS the motion. 6 III. CONCLUSION 7 The Court GRANTS Converse’s motion for partial summary judgment as to claim 2 8 in its entirety. The Court also GRANTS Converse’s motion for partial summary judgment 9 as to claims 5, 6, and 7 to the extent the claims arise from the failure to pay overtime 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 wages as a result of the miscalculation of Chavez’s regular rate of pay. IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 13 Dated: August 18, 2016 14 _____________________________________ NATHANAEL M. COUSINS United States Magistrate Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case No. 15-cv-03746 NC 6

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