In Re: Anton Andrew Rivera; Denise Ann Rivera

Filing 7

ORDER denying 3 Motion to Stay Pending Appeal. Signed by Judge Edward J. Davila on 11/9/2015. (ejdlc1S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 11/9/2015)

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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 9 IN RE Case No. 5:15-cv-04402-EJD ANTON A. RIVERA AND DENISE A. RIVERA, Debtors/Appellants. 10 ORDER DENYING APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL Re: Dkt. No. 3 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 Appellants Anton A. Rivera and Denise A. Rivera (“Appellants”) appeal from a 15 bankruptcy court order dismissing their Chapter 13 case. They now move for a stay of the 16 dismissal and a reinstatement of the automatic bankruptcy stay during the pendency of this 17 proceeding. See Docket Item No. 3. Claimant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as trustee 18 of certificate-holders of the WaMu Mortgage Pass Through Certificate Series 2005-AR6 19 (“Deutsche Bank”), the current holder of Appellant’s mortgage note and deed of trust, opposes the 20 motion. Deutsche Bank has scheduled a trustee sale for November 12, 2015. 21 Jurisdiction in this court arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158. Having carefully considered 22 this matter, the court concludes this motion is procedurally and substantively insufficient. It will 23 therefore be denied for the reasons explained below. 24 25 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Appellants filed for protection under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on December 7, 26 2013. Deutsche Bank filed a Proof of Claim in Appellants’ bankruptcy on January 22, 2013, as 27 the current noteholder of Appellants’ mortgage. In the Proof of Claim, Deutsche Bank asserted a 28 1 Case No.: 5:15-cv-04402-EJD ORDER DENYING APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL 1 secured claim in the amount of $532,272.10 and arrearages in the amount of $106,389.03. 2 Appellants, for their part, initiated an adversary proceeding against Deutsche Bank 3 challenging its standing to file a Proof of Claim and to enforce the note and deed of trust. 4 Appellants also filed an objection to Deutsche Bank’s Proof of Claim. The bankruptcy court 5 eventually dismissed Appellants’ adversary proceeding with prejudice. The Bankruptcy Appellate 6 Panel (“BAP”) reversed the dismissal in part on November 24, 2014, and remanded the case to the 7 bankruptcy court for further proceedings.1 Importantly, however, the BAP affirmed the dismissal 8 of claims challenging Deutsche Bank’s right to proceed with a non-judicial foreclosure sale 9 against Appellants’ property based on the note and deed of trust, returning to the bankruptcy court 10 only those claims related to Deutsche Bank’s standing to file a claim in Appellants’ bankruptcy. On February 25, 2015, the bankruptcy court held an evidentiary hearing on Appellants’ United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 objection to Deutsche Bank’s claim. Thereafter, the court filed an order on March 30, 2015, 13 allowing the claim and establishing the amount owed. Appellants appealed from that order to the 14 BAP. That appeal remains pending. 15 On August 13, 2015, the bankruptcy court held a hearing on the Trustee’s motion to 16 dismiss the Appellants’ Chapter 13 case and filed a written order granting the motion the next day. 17 Appellants appealed from that order, which was transferred to this court by the BAP on September 18 24, 2015. This motion followed on October 29, 2015. 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007(b), a motion for stay pending 21 appeal may be made to the district court sitting in review. The district court applies the same 22 standard as would the court of appeals. See In re Crystal Props. Ltd., L.P., 268 F.3d 743, 755 (9th 23 Cir. 2001) (noting that the district court functions as an appellate court in reviewing a bankruptcy 24 court’s decision). The legal principles relevant to a stay motion “have been distilled into consideration of 25 26 27 28 1 See In re Rivera, No. NC-13-1615-KuPaJu, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 4842, 2014 WL 6675693 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Nov. 24, 2014). 2 Case No.: 5:15-cv-04402-EJD ORDER DENYING APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL 1 four factors: ‘(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed 2 on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether 3 issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) 4 where the public interest lies.’” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (quoting Hilton v. 5 Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)). “The first two factors . . . are the most critical.” Id. However, a failure on any one factor 6 “dooms the motion.” In re Irwin, 338 B.R. 839, 843 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (quoting In re Deep, 288 8 B.R. 27, 30 (N.D.N.Y. 2003)). Moreover, because a stay pending appeal is an extraordinary 9 remedy, the court must examine the factors with obligatory restraint. See In re Smith, 397 B.R. 10 134, 136 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2008) (citing In re Fullmer, 323 B.R. 287, 293 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005)). 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 7 III. DISCUSSION 12 A. 13 As a threshold matter, Deutsche Bank argues this motion is procedurally defective because Failure to Comply with Presentation Requirement 14 Plaintiffs did not present it first to the bankruptcy court before moving for relief in the district 15 court. In response, Plaintiffs contend the motion to stay filed on August 13, 2015, satisfies their 16 obligation under Rule 8007(a). Under these circumstances, the court must agree with Deutsche 17 Bank that Plaintiffs have not actually complied with Rule 8007(a). 18 Rule 8007 contains a presentation requirement. “Ordinarily, a party must move first in the 19 bankruptcy court for the following relief . . . a stay of a judgment, order, or decree of the 20 bankruptcy court pending appeal.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007(a)(1)(A). If the request is instead made 21 directly to the court where the appeal is pending, the moving party must show “that moving first in 22 the bankruptcy court would be impracticable,” or “if a motion was made in the bankruptcy court” 23 must “state the court has not yet ruled on the motion, or state that the court has ruled and set out 24 any reasons given for the ruling.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007(b)(2). 25 A failure to seek emergency relief in the bankruptcy court is a critical defect and not often 26 overlooked. “The reason for requiring that the initial application be made to the Bankruptcy Court 27 is obvious. . . . [t]he reviewing court should have the benefit of the learning of the lower court,” 28 3 Case No.: 5:15-cv-04402-EJD ORDER DENYING APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL 1 which is more familiar with the parties, facts and legal issues. In re MSR Resort Golf Course, 2 LLC, No. 11-10371 (SHL), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29065, at *4-5, 2013 WL 766166 (S.D.N.Y 3 Feb. 26, 2013); In re Zahn Farms, 206 B.R. 643, 645 (B.A.P. 2nd Cir. 1997) (“Having elected not 4 to present this Motion to the trial court, the Debtors have denied this Panel the benefit of the views 5 of the Judge who is familiar with the issues pertaining to any purported emergency.”). “If the 6 party improperly bypasses the bankruptcy court and seeks a stay first from the district court, the 7 district court lacks the jurisdiction to hear the matter.” In re Taub, 470 B.R. 273, 276 (E.D.N.Y. 8 2012). “Thus, district courts routinely dismiss motions for a stay pending appeal when stay relief 9 is not first sought from the bankruptcy judge and the failure to do so is not adequately explained.” 10 In re BGI, Inc., 504 B.R. 754, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). United States District Court Northern District of California 11 In light of Rule 8007(a)’s purpose, Appellants’ stay application filed on August 13, 2015, 12 does not satisfy the presentation requirement. As the bankruptcy docket reveals, Appellants filed 13 the motion on the same day of the hearing on the Trustee’s motion to dismiss, which the 14 bankruptcy court ultimately granted. But apparently aware that they would seek a stay of the 15 dismissal order pending appeal, Appellant’s never actually obtained a ruling from the bankruptcy 16 court on their stay motion either after the dismissal order issued, before they filed the notice of 17 appeal, or before they brought the instant motion. This court is therefore left without the benefit 18 of the bankruptcy court’s opinion on the issue. To be sure, it is that opinion containing the lower 19 court’s exercise of discretion which matters to a court of review. The fact that Appellant’s made a 20 motion that was not ruled upon in unhelpful and cannot satisfy Rule 8007(a)’s requirement. 21 It is further apparent that Appellants have not provided a reason sufficient to excuse the 22 presentation requirement. In this motion, they do not explain what action, if any, they took to 23 have the bankruptcy court rule on the stay motion. Such an explanation is particularly necessary 24 here because this motion was not filed until two months after the one filed on August 13th. Thus, 25 it appears that Appellants had time to undertake some effort at resolution of the stay issue before 26 the bankruptcy court before moving directly in this court. 27 28 In addition, Appellants have not persuasively stated why seeking a ruling from the 4 Case No.: 5:15-cv-04402-EJD ORDER DENYING APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL 1 bankruptcy court would have been impracticable. It is not enough to simply observe that the 2 bankruptcy court granted the dismissal without addressing the motion to stay, because it is not 3 clear without citation to the record whether or not the bankruptcy court was made aware that the 4 stay motion had been made. Moreover, the dismissal order itself cannot be considered a reasoned 5 resolution of their motion. Notably, the motion to stay is not referenced in the bankruptcy court’s 6 written order. It is evident on this record that the bankruptcy court was not permitted to determine 7 8 whether a stay is appropriate in the first instance. Rule 8007(a) requires the bankruptcy court be 9 given that opportunity when doing so is not impracticable. It was not impracticable here. For that 10 reason, this motion must be denied for failure to comply with the presentation requirement. United States District Court Northern District of California 11 B. 12 The procedural shortcoming aside, this motion also fails on the merits because Appellants 13 Failure to Demonstrate Likelihood of Success on the Merits have not demonstrated they will likely succeed in this proceeding. For a stay pending appeal, the “likelihood of success” element requires a bankruptcy 14 15 debtor to establish “at a minimum, that she has a substantial case for relief on the merits.” Leiva- 16 Perez v. Holder, 640 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 2011). “[I]t is not enough that the likelihood of 17 success on the merits is ‘better than negligible’ or that there is a ‘mere possibility of relief.’” Lair 18 v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Nken, 556 U.S. at 434). In order to prevail on this motion, the applicable legal standard requires Appellants to 19 20 successfully show a “substantial case” for reversal of the dismissal order.2 Such a showing is not 21 a simple exercise because the dismissal of a Chapter 13 case is reviewed for an abuse of 22 discretion. In re Nelson, 343 B.R. 671, 674 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006). “A court abuses its discretion 23 if it does not apply the correct law or if it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of 24 material fact.” In re Ho, 274 B.R. 867, 871 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002). 25 26 27 28 2 Appellants also argue they will succeed in the separate appeal taken from the determination on Deutsche Bank’s Proof of Claim. That appeal, however, is not before this court and is not suitable for consideration for this motion. Appellants may instead make their arguments to the BAP, which is the proper court to consider them. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8007(b)(1). 5 Case No.: 5:15-cv-04402-EJD ORDER DENYING APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL 1 Here, the bankruptcy court dismissed Appellants’ Chapter 13 case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 2 1307(c) for failure to propose a confirmable plan and failure to make plan payments, all of which 3 prejudiced creditors, and for failure to make post-petition mortgage payments. Section 1307(c) 4 establishes “a two-step analysis for dealing with questions of conversion and dismissal.” Nelson, 5 343 B.R. at 675. “First, it must be determined that there is ‘cause’ to act.” Id. “Second, once a 6 determination of ‘cause’ has been made, a choice must be made between conversion and dismissal 7 based on the ‘best interests of the creditors and the estate.’” Id. (quoting Ho, 274 B.R. at 877). In the dismissal order, the bankruptcy court observed that Appellants were unable to 8 9 propose a viable plan - having “filed a document that was an amended plan in title alone” - even after a continuance of the Trustee’s motion to allow Appellants time to arrange one. The 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 bankruptcy court also noted that Appellants failed to comply with an order to make payments to 12 the Trustee and to make mortgage payments to Deutsche Bank. These reasons provide sufficient 13 cause to dismiss a Chapter 13 case. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) (permitting the bankruptcy court to 14 dismiss or convert a Chapter 13 case due to “unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to 15 creditors,” “failure to file a plan timely,” or “failure to commence making timely payments.”). Despite a claim of error, Appellants have not demonstrated that the bankruptcy court 16 17 abused its discretion. Appellants’ contention that the bankruptcy court relied on incorrect facts is 18 unsupported by citations to the record showing something other than what the bankruptcy court 19 found. Similarly, Appellants have not shown that the bankruptcy court misapprehended the law. 20 Instead, Appellants submit that the bankruptcy court should have resolved other pending issues, 21 such as its adversary proceeding against Deutsche Bank, or should not have required post-petition 22 mortgage payments or allowed them time to obtain a loan modification before dismissing the 23 Chapter 13 case. But this argument is incomplete and fails in light of the deferential standard or 24 review. Appellants cite no authority which required the bankruptcy court to either withhold 25 mortgage payments while Appellants challenged Deutsche Bank’s Proof of Claim3 or to hold the 26 27 28 3 As noted, the BAP has already held that Appellants could not challenge Deutsche Bank’s standing to enforce the note and deed of trust. The court disagrees with Appellants’ interpretation 6 Case No.: 5:15-cv-04402-EJD ORDER DENYING APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL 1 dismissal in abeyance while other issues were litigated or while they pursued a loan modification. 2 Appellants’ preference for how their case should have been resolved does not translate into error 3 on the part of the court, and certainly does not meet their burden on a motion extraordinary relief. 4 Even if this court was inclined to resolve the issue differently, it cannot substitute its judgment for 5 that of bankruptcy court. United States v. Roston, 986 F.2d 1287, 1291 (9th Cir. 1993). 6 In sum, the court concludes that Appellants have failed to demonstrate they will succeed 7 on the merits of this appeal. As such, they are not entitled to a stay of the dismissal order during 8 the pendency of this proceeding. 9 IV. 10 ORDER Appellants’ motion for a stay pending appeal (Docket Item No. 3) is DENIED. United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: November 9, 2015 ______________________________________ EDWARD J. DAVILA United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 of the BAP’s opinion to the extent they believe otherwise. 7 Case No.: 5:15-cv-04402-EJD ORDER DENYING APPELLANTS’ MOTION TO STAY PENDING APPEAL

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