Williams v. County of Santa Clara et al

Filing 23

ORDER GRANTING 11 MOTION TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Signed by Judge Beth Labson Freeman.(blflc2S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 3/8/2016)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN JOSE DIVISION

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EVANGELINE E. WILLIAMS,

Case No. 15-cv-04859-BLF

Plaintiff,
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v.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

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COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, et al.,

[Re: ECF 11]

Defendants.

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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On March 3, 2016, the Court heard oral argument on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. ECF

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11. For the reasons stated on the record and below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s first,

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second, fourth, and fifth claims—each brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983—is GRANTED with

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leave to amend as requested by Plaintiff.

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While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, it “must contain sufficient

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factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

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Plaintiff has failed to meet this standard for the four claims discussed below.

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Plaintiff essentially concedes that Defendants are correct to challenge her first and second

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claims on the grounds that the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996

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(HIPAA) does not provide a private right of action. See Mot. at 3, ECF 11. Rather than oppose this

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argument, Plaintiff seeks to amend her first claim to allege a violation of the Due Process Clause

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of the Fourteenth Amendment and her second claim to allege a mandatory duty that the County

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violated. See Opp. at 6-8, ECF 12. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to

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dismiss Plaintiff’s first and second claims with leave to amend.

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Defendants next challenge Plaintiff’s fourth claim, against the County and Santa Clara

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Valley Health & Hospital System (SCVHHS)1 for constructive termination. To state a constructive

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termination claim, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that “a reasonable person in his

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position would have felt that he was forced to quit because of intolerable and discriminatory

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working conditions.” Huskey v. City of San Jose, 204 F. 3d 893, 900 (9th Cir. 2000).
Defendants correctly point out that, though Plaintiff contends that the privacy breach

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“created working conditions that are so intolerable that a reasonable person in [her] position would

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feel compelled to resign,” she has not, in fact, resigned. Mot. at 5; Compl. ¶¶ 9, 64. Defendants

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also argue that, far from showing a continuing pattern of discriminatory treatment, Plaintiff’s

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allegations demonstrate that Defendants took immediate action to support Plaintiff following the

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breach. Reply at 3 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 16, 25). Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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offer any allegations regarding who read the email or how they reacted. Id. at 3-4.
Plaintiff responds that “[s]ubjection to judgments and unexpressed ridicule on a daily basis

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clearly constitute[s] a ‘continuing pattern of discriminatory treatment.’” Id. at 8-9 (quoting

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Schnidrig v. Columbia Mach., Inc., 80 F. 3d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1996)). At oral argument,

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Plaintiff explained that she should not have to endure the indignity and pain of returning to work

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simply to prove her claim.

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While recognizing the gravity of Plaintiff’s discomfort, the Court must agree with

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Defendants. Plaintiff’s allegation that the disclosure has “created working conditions that are so

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intolerable that a reasonable person in [her] position would feel compelled to resign” is too

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conclusory to support a claim—particularly in light of the fact that Plaintiff has not resigned. See

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In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff’s remaining

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allegations are similarly insufficient. Plaintiff has neither revealed the private information exposed

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nor has she alleged any negative treatment by her coworkers or in the workplace as a result of the

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Defendants correctly argue that “[n]aming a municipal department as a defendant is not an
appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action against a municipality.” Mot. at 1 n.1 (quoting
Vance v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996)). Accordingly, Defendant
SCVHHS is DISMISSED with prejudice from the second through fifth claims.
The Court additionally notes that Plaintiff names “Defendant Vanessa Ridley” for the first time in
¶ 54. Ms. Ridley is not listed in the caption. The Court DIRECTS Plaintiff to clarify whether or
not Ms. Ridley is a defendant in this case in any amended pleading.
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exposure. While understandable, this lack of information prevents Plaintiff from stating a claim;

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without additional details, it is impossible to determine that a reasonable person could feel

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compelled to resign in Plaintiff’s position. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion

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to dismiss with leave to amend.

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Finally, Defendants challenge Plaintiff’s fifth claim, a Monell claim against the County

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and SCVHHS for negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention. To succeed on a Monell

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claim, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a municipal custom or policy, such as a

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“longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local

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government entity.” Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass'n, 541 F.3d 950, 964 (9th Cir. 2008);

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-691 (1978).
Defendants argue that a single, isolated incident cannot support a Monell claim. Mot. at 6.

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Plaintiff responds that the egregiousness of the disclosure demonstrates that Defendants’ lack of

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oversight amounts to an official policy. Opp. at 10. The Court agrees with Defendants: a single

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incident is not sufficient to state a Monell claim. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’

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motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth claim with leave to amend. As requested at the hearing, Plaintiff

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shall file any amended pleading by no later than April 7, 2016.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 8, 2016
______________________________________
BETH LABSON FREEMAN
United States District Judge

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