Vaccaro v. Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston

Filing 28

ORDER DENYING #24 DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA DIRECTED AT NETAPP INC. AND VACATING HEARING DATE. Signed by Judge Beth Labson Freeman on 6/5/2017. (blflc1S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 6/5/2017)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN JOSE DIVISION

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MELISSA VACARRO,

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Plaintiff,

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v.
LIBERTY LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY
OF BOSTON,

Case No. 16-cv-03220-BLF
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA
DIRECTED AT NETAPP INC. AND
VACATING HEARING DATE
[Re: ECF 24]

Defendant.
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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Defendant Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston moves to quash a subpoena issued

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by Plaintiff Melissa Vacarro on third party NetApp, Inc. The Court finds the motion to be

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appropriate for determination without oral argument and therefore VACATES the noticed hearing

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date of September 28, 2017. See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). The motion is DENIED for the reasons

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discussed below.

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Vacarro sues Liberty to recover long-term disability benefits (“LTD benefits”) that she

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claims are due to her under a plan (“the Plan”) governed by the Employee Retirement Income

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Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. Compl., ECF 1. Vacarro alleges that

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Liberty administered the Plan and funded benefits due under the Plan through a group insurance

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policy (“the Policy”) issued to Vacarro’s former employer, NetApp. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. The Policy

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defines two classes of participants: Class 1 participants include “CEO, President, Vice President,

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Corporate Officers, Directors, Managers and Engineers,” while Class 2 participants include “All

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other Employees.” Id. ¶ 8. Both classes of participants are entitled to LTD benefits if they are

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unable to perform their own occupation, but after twenty-four months Class 2 participants must

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show that they are unable to perform any occupation to continue receiving benefits.

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Vacarro claims disability due to a brain impairment that prevents her from performing her

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prior occupation as NetApp’s Global Leadership and Talent Development Program Manager.

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Compl. ¶¶ 11-14. Following her last day of work on April 29, 2015, she submitted a claim which

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initially was approved. Id. ¶ 15. However, Vacarro filed this action in June 2016 after Liberty

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terminated her benefits and failed to respond to her administrative appeal. Id. ¶¶ 16-20. She

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claims that she is entitled to benefits as a Class 1 participant because she was a manager for

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NetApp. Id. ¶ 9. Liberty has reinstated Vacarro’s LTD benefits, but it takes the position that she

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is a Class 2 participant. This lawsuit therefore has been narrowed to the issue of whether Vacarro

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is a Class 1 participant or a Class 2 participant. If the former, Vacarro need show only that she

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cannot perform her own occupation. If the latter, she must show that she cannot perform any

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occupation in order to continue receiving LTD benefits after the initial twenty-four month period.
In January 2017, Liberty and NetApp “provided an updated Policy” (“2017 Policy”) which

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excludes Vacarro’s prior occupation from the definition of Class 1 participants. Madrigal Decl. ¶¶

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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7-10, ECF 24-1. Liberty takes the position that the 2017 Policy governs and forecloses Vacarro’s

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claim that she is entitled to benefits as a Class 1 participant. Vacarro questions whether the

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change to the Policy complied with the Plan’s amendment procedures. She also challenges

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application of the amendment to a claim submitted while the earlier Policy was in effect. She has

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issued a subpoena to NetApp seeking deposition testimony and documents relating to the changes

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made to the schedule of benefits in the Policy. Subpoena, Exh. 1 to Tucker Decl., ECF 24-10.

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Liberty moves to quash the subpoena.

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“On timely motion, the court for the district where compliance is required must quash or

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modify a subpoena that: (i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply; (ii) requires a person to

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comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c); (iii) requires disclosure of

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privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or (iv) subjects a person to

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undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A). “The movant seeking to quash a subpoena bears the

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burden of persuasion.” Walker v. North Las Vegas Police Dep’t, No. 2:14-cv-01475-JAD-NJK,

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2017 WL 1536212, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 27, 2017).

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Neither party addresses the threshold question of Liberty’s standing to move to quash a

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subpoena issued to a third party. The Ninth Circuit has not addressed the issue, but numerous

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district courts within the Ninth Circuit have held that “[a] party has standing to quash a subpoena

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issued to a third party only where the party asserts a legitimate privacy interest in the material
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sought.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lighthouse Law P.S. Inc., No. C15-1976RSL, 2017 WL 497610, at

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*3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 7, 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Garcia v.

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Strayhorn, No. 3:13-cv-0807 BEN (KSC), 2015 WL 5535733, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2015)

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(“Ordinarily a party lacks standing to quash a subpoena issued to a third party, unless the party

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objecting claims a personal right or privilege with regard to the documents sought.”); Paws Up

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Ranch, LLC v. Green, No. 2:12-cv-01547-GMN-NJK, 2013 WL 6184940, at *2 (D. Nev. Nov. 22,

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2013) (“As a general rule, a party has no standing to seek to quash a subpoena issued to a non-

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party to the action. . . . Nonetheless, some courts have found that a party has standing to move to

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quash subpoenas where the party has some personal right or privilege in the documents sought.”)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Liberty has not identified a privacy interest,

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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personal right, or privilege in the information sought. Instead, Liberty argues that the subpoena

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seeks irrelevant information that cannot lead to admissible evidence. The motion to quash

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therefore is subject to denial for lack of standing.

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Even if it were to consider Liberty’s relevance argument, the Court would deny the motion

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to quash on the merits. “It is well established that the scope of discovery under a subpoena issued

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pursuant to Rule 45 is the same as the scope of discovery allowed under Rule 26(b)(1).” Paws

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Up, 2013 WL 6184940, at *4 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Generally

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speaking, the Federal Rules allow parties to obtain discovery that is relevant to a claim or defense

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of any party.” Id. at *2. The subpoena seeks information relevant to Liberty’s defense based upon

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the amendment to the Policy. Whether the information obtained by means of the subpoena

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ultimately is admissible presents a question for another day. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)

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(“Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be

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discoverable.”).

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Accordingly, Liberty’s motion to quash the subpoena issued to NetApp is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: June 5, 2017
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BETH LABSON FREEMAN
United States District Judge
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