Montero-Zarate v. USA
Filing
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ORDER Denying 1 Section 2255 Motion to Vacate. Judgment is Entered in Favor of Government United States and Against Defendant. THE CLERK SHALL CLOSE THIS FILE. Signed by Judge Edward J. Davila on 5/24/2019. (ejdlc2S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/24/2019)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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SAN JOSE DIVISION
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Case No. 5:15-cr-00207-EJD-1
Plaintiff,
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v.
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ABEL MONTERO-ZARATE,
Defendant.
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
AND MOTION PURSUANT TO
28 § U.S.C. 2255
Re: Dkt. Nos. 24, 27
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Presently before the Court is pro se Defendant Abel Montero-Zarate’s (“Defendant”) (1)
United States District Court
Northern District of California
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Motion to Appoint Counsel (Dkt. No. 24) and (2) Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct
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Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Dkt. No. 27, “Mot.”). The Court has carefully reviewed
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the relevant documents and pertinent law and finds that, on this record, Defendant is not entitled to
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relief. For the reasons set forth below, both motions are DENIED.
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I.
BACKGROUND
In May of 2013, a confidential source for the Unified Narcotics Enforcement Team
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(“UNET”) purchased methamphetamine from Defendant. Dkt. No. 16, ¶ 8. Over the course of
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2013, undercover officers purchased methamphetamine on four more occasions. In total,
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Defendant sold 234.7 grams of methamphetamine. Id. ¶ 19. In addition to these drug transactions,
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Defendant also sold to undercover officers a total of three weapons: (1) a stolen Springfield
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Armory XD9611 .45 caliber semi-automatic handgun, (2) a Hi-Point 9mm caliber semi-automatic
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handgun, and (3) a Smith & Wesson .38 caliber six shot revolver. Id.
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On April 8, 2015, Defendant was indicted on five counts for violations of 21 U.S.C.
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§ 841(a)(1) – Possession with Intent to Distribute, and Distribution, of Methamphetamine (Counts
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I-V). Dkt. No. 1. Defendant pled guilty to count two of the indictment for a violation of 21
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Case No.: 5:15-cr-00207-EJD-1
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL AND MOTION
PURSUANT TO 28 § U.S.C. 2255
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U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) – Possession with Intent to Distribute, and Distribution of 5 Grams or more of
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actual Methamphetamine. Dkt. No. 14. The remaining counts were dismissed. Dkt. No. 22.
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Defendant’s sentencing calculation resulted in a total offense level of 31. Dkt. No. 36.
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U.S.S.G. Section
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Base Offense Level
Defendant’s offense involved
approximately 234.7 grams of
methamphetamine, which is at least
150 Grams, but less than 500 Grams
of Methamphetamine (actual).
Specific Offense Characteristics
Defendant possessed and sold
firearms during three of his drug
sales to undercover officers.
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Acceptance of responsibility
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Total offense level
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Criminal History Category1
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RANGE
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Actual sentence
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
2D1.1
32
2D1.1(b)(1)
+2
Adjusted offense level
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Level/Points
34
3E1.1
-3
31
I
108–135 months
87 months
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See Dkt. No. 16, ¶¶ 24-33, 40-41; Dkt. No. 14. The Court sentenced Defendant to 87 months
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imprisonment. Dkt. No. 22. Judgment was entered on November 16, 2015. Dkt. No. 22.
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On September 8, 2016, pro se Defendant filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct
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Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Mot. Defendant did not state any supporting facts in his
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motion but requested the Court to examine his case in light of two Supreme Court cases: Johnson
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Defendant’s plea agreement states parties did not agree on his Criminal History Category.
Dkt. No. 14 at 4.
Case No.: 5:15-cr-00207-EJD-1
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL AND MOTION
PURSUANT TO 28 § U.S.C. 2255
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v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016).
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Generally, Defendant argues in his motion that in light of these two cases, his “offense does not
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qualify as a ‘violent felony’ according to the Armed Career Criminal Act . . . .” Mot. at 5.
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Defendant also states “Amendment 2K2.1(b)(2) mentions that a deduction of points should be
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considered in an offense, if the user ‘did not unlawfully discharge or otherwise unlawfully use
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such firearm or ammunition.’” Id. In construing Defendant’s claim liberally, the Court draws an
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inference that Defendant argues that because of the new Supreme Court cases and the
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Amendment, Defendant’s sentence should be vacated, set aside, or corrected.
On January 16, 2018, the Court requested a response from the Government as to
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Defendant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. Dkt. No. 34. On February 5, 2018, Defendant filed an
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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Answer in Support of his Motion to Vacate asserting multiple new claims for his § 2255 motion.
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Dkt. No. 35. On March 16, 2018, the Government filed a Response in opposition to Defendant’s
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motion responding only to the initial § 2255 (Mot.). Dkt. No. 36. The Government argues that
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neither case Defendant references applies to his offense and therefore his motion should be denied.
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The Court agrees.
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II.
LEGAL STANDARD
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A.
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Section 2255 authorizes a “prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by
28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion
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Act of Congress” to “move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
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sentence” based on a violation of federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Relief under § 2255(a) is
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limited to the particular grounds listed in the statute—namely, “that the sentence was imposed in
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violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction
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to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or
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is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” See United States v. Berry, 624 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th
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Cir. 2010). If a court finds error on one of these enumerated grounds, then “the court shall vacate
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and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial
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Case No.: 5:15-cr-00207-EJD-1
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL AND MOTION
PURSUANT TO 28 § U.S.C. 2255
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or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).
Following the submission of a § 2255 motion, the court must grant an evidentiary hearing
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“[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is
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entitled to no relief.” Id.; see also United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994).
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In other words, a court need not hold an evidentiary hearing where the prisoner’s allegations,
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when viewed against the record, either do not state a claim for relief or are so palpably incredible
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as to warrant summary dismissal. United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2004).
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“[C]onclusory statements in a § 2255 motion are not enough to require a hearing.” United States
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v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190,
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1194 (9th Cir. 1980)).
United States District Court
Northern District of California
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B.
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Where, as here, the pleading at issue is filed by a plaintiff proceeding pro se, it must be
Pro Se Pleadings
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construed liberally. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). In doing so, the court
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“need not give a plaintiff the benefit of every conceivable doubt” but “is required only to draw
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every reasonable or warranted factual inference in the plaintiff’s favor.” McKinney v. De Bord,
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507 F.2d 501, 504 (9th Cir. 1974). The court “should use common sense in interpreting the
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frequently diffuse pleadings of pro se complainants.” Id. But pro se parties must still abide by the
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rules of the court in which they litigate. Carter v. Commissioner, 784 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir.
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1986). A pro se complaint should not be dismissed unless the court finds it “beyond doubt that the
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plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
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Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972).
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III.
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DISCUSSION
A.
Defendant’s Second § 2255 Pleading is Time-Barred
Section 2255 motions limit defendants to one-year to file a motion. Section 2255(f)
provides:
A 1–year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this
section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—(1) the date
on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) the date on
Case No.: 5:15-cr-00207-EJD-1
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL AND MOTION
PURSUANT TO 28 § U.S.C. 2255
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which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental
action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is
removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such
governmental action; (3) the date on which the right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable
to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the facts
supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered
through the exercise of due diligence.
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Here, judgment was entered on November 16, 2015. Defendant timely filed his § 2255
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motion to vacate on September 8, 2016 (Dkt. No. 27). Defendant filed a pleading titled Answer in
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Support of Motion to Vacate on February 5, 2018 (Dkt. No. 35). The document is a four-page
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written letter stating approximately five additional claims in seeking a reduced sentence, which
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includes but is not limited to, a Sixth Amendment Claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
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Because the one-year limitation period for Defendant’s motion resulted in a final filing date of
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
November 16, 2015, and Defendant filed his first § 2255 motion before that date but filed what
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appears as another § 2255 motion on February 5, 2018—far past the one-year limitation—the
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Court views the first pleading (Dkt. No. 27) as the operative § 2255 motion and finds the second
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(Dkt. No. 35) time-barred.
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B.
Johnson and Welsh Do Not Provide Defendant Relief
Neither Johnson nor Welsh apply to Defendant’s case and therefore cannot provide him
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relief. In Johnson, the Court held that the “residual clause,” which partially defines what
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constitutes a violent felony/crime, of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) violated the Due
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Process Clause as it is void for vagueness. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2562.
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Here, the Government never alleged, and the Court never found, that Defendant should be
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sentenced under the ACCA. The Court applied the United States Sentencing Guidelines
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(“USSG”) in calculating his sentence. Defendant acknowledged and agreed to the Sentencing
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Guidelines calculation as outlined in his plea agreement. Dkt. No. 14, ¶ 7. In construing
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Defendant’s motion liberally, Defendant appears to reason that because the language surrounding
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the term “crime of violence” under the residual clause of the ACCA reads similarly as the USSG
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when defining crimes of violence, that his sentencing structure must also violate his due process
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Case No.: 5:15-cr-00207-EJD-1
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL AND MOTION
PURSUANT TO 28 § U.S.C. 2255
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rights. However, this is not the case for two reasons. First, the Court applied the USSG in
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calculating Defendant’s sentence and did not apply the ACCA. Second, Defendant was convicted
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of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) – Possession with Intent to Distribute, and Distribution, of
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Methamphetamine and that statute does not contain a residual clause effected by Johnson.
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Furthermore, Defendant was sentenced pursuant to the drug quantity table at USSG § 2D.1(c),
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which is unrelated to crimes of violence. For these reasons, Johnson is inapplicable to
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Defendant’s case and therefore there is nothing to apply retroactively to in order to reduce or
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vacate his sentence.
Defendant also states in his motion in the section asking for supporting facts that
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“Amendment 2K2.1(b)(2) mentions that a deduction of points should be considered in an offense,
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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if the user ‘did not unlawfully discharge or otherwise unlawfully use such firearm or
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ammunition.’” Mot. at 5. This reference is irrelevant because it does not apply to Defendant’s
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offense of conviction. Section 2K2.1 applies to convictions under firearm statutes, such as 18
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U.S.C. § 922(g). Defendant was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841. Thus, “Amendment
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2K2.1(b)(2)” does not apply to Defendant’s case.
On a separate note, in his plea agreement, Defendant agreed not to file any collateral attack
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on his conviction or sentence, to include a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Dkt. No. 14 at 3.
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Additionally, Defendant stated in his plea agreement that he would not ask to adjust or reduce the
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offense level or for any downward departure from the Guidelines range as determined by the
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Court. Id. at 4. Nonetheless, even when considering Defendant’s request, he is not entitled to
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relief.
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C.
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Prior to filing his § 2255 motion, pro se Defendant filed a motion requesting appointment
Motion to Appoint Counsel
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of counsel to enable him to apply for a modification of term of imprisonment as a result of
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Amendment 782 to the USSG, which is related to drug offense sentencing and applies
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retroactively. Dkt. No. 24. This amendment revised the Drug Quantity Table across drug and
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Case No.: 5:15-cr-00207-EJD-1
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL AND MOTION
PURSUANT TO 28 § U.S.C. 2255
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chemical types, which lowers the base level offense for certain drug offenses by two levels. Dkt.
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No. 29 at 2; Dkt. No. 31 at 4. The office of the federal public defender filed a Notice of Non-
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Intervention. Dkt. No. 25. The Government filed a response arguing that Defendant had already
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received the benefit of this amendment and therefore his motion should be denied. Dkt. No. 31.
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The probation office filed a report stating the same. Dkt. No. 29.
Here, as shown in the table above, Defendant’s base level offense for the possession and
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distribution of at least 150 grams, but less than 500 grams, of methamphetamine was 32.
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Amendment 782 went into effect on November 1, 2014. Defendant was sentenced on November
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16, 2015. Had Defendant been sentenced before the amendment went into effect, his base level
offense would have been 34. Defendant’s actual base level offense of 32 was calculated after the
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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amendment went into effect. Because Defendant has already benefited from Amendment 782, his
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motion is denied.
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IV.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
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Defendant’s motion to vacate or correct his sentence is DENIED with prejudice.
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Defendant’s motion to appoint counsel is also DENIED with prejudice. The record shows that
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Defendant is not entitled to relief. Thus, Defendant is not entitled to a hearing.
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JUDGMENT
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Pursuant to this order denying Defendant’s request to vacate or correct his sentence
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 with prejudice and denying Defendant’s request to appoint counsel,
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judgment is hereby entered in favor of Government United States of America and against
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Defendant Abel Montero-Zarate.
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The Clerk shall close the companion case 5:16-cv-05267-EJD pursuant to this Judgment.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: May 24, 2019
______________________________________
EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge
Case No.: 5:15-cr-00207-EJD-1
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL AND MOTION
PURSUANT TO 28 § U.S.C. 2255
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