Razavi v. Valley Medical Center, et al

Filing 11

ORDER DISMISSING 10 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT. Any amended complaint must be filed on or before 1/27/2017. Signed by Judge Edward J. Davila on 1/6/2017. (ejdlc1S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 1/6/2017)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN JOSE DIVISION

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MELINA RAZAVI,

Case No. 5:16-cv-07000-EJD

Plaintiff,
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ORDER DISMISSING FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT

v.
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VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, et al.,

United States District Court
Northern District of California

Defendants.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
On December 20, 2016, Magistrate Judge Nathanael Cousins granted Plaintiff Melina

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Razavi’s (“Plaintiff”) application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) but dismissed her letter

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complaint with leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff subsequently filed a

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First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in response to Judge Cousins’ order on January 3, 2017,

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against Defendant Valley Medical Center (“Defendant”), which pleading is now before the

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undersigned. Dkt. Nos. 9, 10.
Given Plaintiff’s IFP status, the court again reviews the FAC pursuant § 1915(e)(2) and

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dismisses it with leave to amend in part for the reasons explained below.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), federal courts are authorized to pre-screen claims filed by IFP

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plaintiffs prior to service and may dismiss a case at any time the court determines that: (1) the

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allegation of poverty is untrue; (2) the action is frivolous or malicious; (3) the action fails to state a

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claim; or (4) the action seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

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Dismissals under this section are not dismissals on the merits. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.

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Case No.: 5:16-cv-07000-EJD
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

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25, 34 (1992).
“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

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allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

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plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d

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1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)

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(noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). At

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the same time, however, dismissal is proper where there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal

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theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v.

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Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Indeed, “for a complaint to survive a
motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S.

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Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Legal conclusions without facts to support them

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will not do; the allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

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speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Furthermore, where, as here, the pleading at issue is filed by a plaintiff proceeding pro se,

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it must be construed liberally. Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447. But while the standard for review is

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liberal, the court may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey

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v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

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III.

DISCUSSION
Because Plaintiff alleges that subject matter jurisdiction arises on the basis of a federal

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question, the court begins with an examination of the two federal causes of action asserted in the

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FAC.
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)

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A.

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In the first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated the ADA by refusing to

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treat her for injuries she sustained during a car accident, refusing to provide her with a wheelchair,

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discharging her before she was stabilized, and refusing to transport her to the curbside after she

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was discharged. Although the exact legal authority supporting this cause of action is unspecified

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Case No.: 5:16-cv-07000-EJD
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in the FAC, the fact that Defendant is a public entity1 means that only Title II of the ADA - not

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Title III - can apply. See Sharkey v. O’Neal, 778 F.3d 767, 770 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The ADA is

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structured as separate titles governing different conduct: Title I, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117,

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covers discrimination in employment; Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165, covers discrimination

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in public services; and Title III, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189, covers discrimination in public

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accommodations and services operated by private entities.”); see also Disabled Rights Action

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Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 872 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§

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12181(6), 12131(1)).
To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) [she] is an

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individual with a disability; (2) [she] is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) [she] was either excluded from

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participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services . . . or was otherwise

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discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial . . . or discrimination was

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by reason of [her] disability.” McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004).

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For compensatory damages under Title II, a plaintiff must establish the defendant acted with

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discriminatory intent or deliberate indifference. Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138-

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39 (9th Cir. 2001). For injunctive relief, a plaintiff “must present facts showing a threat of

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immediate, irreparable harm before a federal court will intervene.” Midgett v. Tri-County Metro.

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Transp. Dist. of Oregon, 254 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2001).
Here, the FAC does not contain sufficient factual content to satisfy the elements of a Title

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II claim, even if liberally construed. Assuming Plaintiff is an individual with a disability under the

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statute because of complications from a stroke, she has not alleged why she was qualified to

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receive any benefit from Defendant. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (defining “qualified individual

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with a disability” as “an individual with a disability who . . . meets the essential eligibility

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requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a

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The court takes judicial notice of Chapter 1, Article 3, of the Santa Clara County Code which
applies to the administration of Defendant.
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public entity”). Furthermore, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendant failed to

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accommodate her because of her disability, as opposed to other reasons. Indeed, Plaintiff’s

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original letter complaint contains a series of alleged explanations for the treatment she received by

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Defendant, none of which are based on any disability stemming from a stroke.

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Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to qualify for compensatory damages.

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Because the FAC does not establish that Plaintiff was mistreated because of her disability, it

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likewise does not establish intentional discrimination. Nor do the allegations establish that

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Defendant acted with deliberate indifference; nothing suggests Defendant was even aware that

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Plaintiff was disabled as opposed to injured in a car accident. Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139
(“Deliberate indifference requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is

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Northern District of California

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substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that the likelihood.”).

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Similarly, the FAC does not provide a basis for injunctive relief. The allegations do not

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establish a “real or immediate threat of substantial or irreparable injury” to Plaintiff. Midgett, 254

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F.3d at 850. The superficial allegation that Plaintiff is dissuaded from returning to Defendant is

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not enough under these circumstances, since this is a Title II claim and Defendant is a government

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agency. Id.

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For these reasons, the court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the
ADA in the FAC. The first cause of action will be dismissed.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”)

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B.

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In the third cause of action, Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated HIPAA by falsely stating

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in her medical records that she was suffering from a “fall,” and was insured as a “juvenile

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prisoner.” But no matter the allegations, Plaintiff cannot bring a claim under HIPAA as a matter

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of law. Garmon v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Webb v. Smart

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Document Sols., LLC, 499 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007)). This cause of action must therefore

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be dismissed.

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C.

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What remains are three causes of action based in California state law.

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State-Law Claims

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Case No.: 5:16-cv-07000-EJD
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The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited, and is only properly exercised over those cases

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raising federal questions or involving parties with diverse citizenship. Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

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Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005). “[O]nce a court has original jurisdiction over

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some claims in the action, it may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims that are

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part of the same case or controversy.” Id. However, a district court may properly decline to

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exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims if such claims “substantially

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predominate[] over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction” or if

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the court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
Since the court has determined that all of Plaintiff’s federal causes of action will be

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dismissed, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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claims. These claims will also be dismissed without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see

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also Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

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IV.

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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the FAC is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The

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cause of action for violation of HIPAA is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. All

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other causes of action are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and WITH LEAVE TO

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AMEND.

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Any amended complaint must be filed on or before January 27, 2017, and must be

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consistent with the above discussion. Plaintiff should observe the court has only permitted her to

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amend certain causes of action previously asserted in the FAC; she may not assert new causes of

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action or add new defendants without obtaining leave of court to do so in advance.

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Plaintiff is advised the court will dismiss this action without further notice if an amended

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complaint is not filed by the designated deadline. Plaintiff is further notified the court will review

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any amended complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2).

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In addition, because Plaintiff has now filed several lawsuits with similar allegations against

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various defendants, Plaintiff is reminded of her obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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11. By signing an amended complaint, Plaintiff certifies she has made reasonable inquiry and has

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Case No.: 5:16-cv-07000-EJD
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

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evidentiary support for her allegations. In particular, Plaintiff must abide by the prohibition on

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filing pleadings that are “presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary

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delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). Violation of Rule 11

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may result in sanctions sufficient to deter repetition of offensive conduct, including a finding that

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Plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and the imposition of a pre-filing restriction.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 6, 2017
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EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case No.: 5:16-cv-07000-EJD
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT