Barker v. Insight Global, LLC

Filing 98

ORDER DENYING 93 MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM NONDISPOSITIVE PRETRIAL ORDER. Signed by Judge Beth Labson Freeman on 8/2/2017. (blflc4, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/2/2017)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN JOSE DIVISION

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JOHN BARKER,
Plaintiff,

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v.

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Case No. 16-cv-07186-BLF

INSIGHT GLOBAL, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

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ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM NONDISPOSITIVE
PRETRIAL ORDER
[Re: ECF 93]

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for relief from a nondispositive order (“Order”)

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issued by Magistrate Judge Howard R. Lloyd, which granted Plaintiff’s motion to compel

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responses to interrogatories and requests for production relating to class action allegations. See

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Order, ECF 88. Plaintiff John Barker (“Barker”) was an employee of Insight Global, LLC

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(“Insight”), a staffing services company specializing in placing people in IT, accounting, and

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finance positions. Barker was the head of Insight’s San Francisco/San Jose office when Insight

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terminated him “for cause” on October 26, 2016. Barker then obtained new employment with

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Beacon Hill Staffing Group, LLC (“Beacon Hill”), an Insight competitor. In the complaint,

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Barker alleges that Insight failed to pay him certain compensation and seeks a declaration that

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certain provisions of his employment agreement with Insight are unlawful and void. With respect

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to the latter claim, he seeks class action relief on behalf of other Insight employees who were

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subject to the same or similar agreement provisions. Barker filed his class certification motion on

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June 20, 2017, set for hearing in November 2017. The Court has considered Judge Lloyd’s order

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and Defendants’ motion. For the reasons discussed below, the motion is DENIED.

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I.

LEGAL STANDARD
A district court may refer nondispositive pretrial matters to a magistrate judge under 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The district court “may reconsider any pretrial matter under this

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subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or

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contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). On review of a

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nondispositive order, “the magistrate’s factual determinations are reviewed for clear error, and the

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magistrate’s legal conclusions are reviewed to determine whether they are contrary to law.” Perry

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v. Schwarzenegger, 268 F.R.D. 344, 348 (N.D. Cal. 2010). This standard is highly deferential –

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the district judge may not simply substitute his or her judgment for that of the magistrate judge.

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Grimes v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991).

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II.

DISCUSSION
Judge Lloyd’s Order stems from Barker’s efforts to obtain class discovery. Back in March

2017, Barker propounded to Insight interrogatories and requests for production of documents, in

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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hopes of obtaining contact information on the putative class members among other discovery.

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Insight objected to these discovery requests, arguing that the matter is not appropriate for class

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treatment. Joint Discovery Letter 6, ECF 82. Insight also argued that information belonging to

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putative class members should not be produced without conducting an “Opt-Out” notice process

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as set forth in Belaire-W. Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 4th 554, 561 (2007).

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Joint Discovery Letter 7.

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On July 18, 2017, Magistrate Judge Lloyd granted Barker’s motion to compel the class

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discovery at issue. See Order, ECF 88. Finding Insight’s objection tantamount to requesting an

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order disposing the class claims, Judge Lloyd was not persuaded by Insight’s argument as a basis

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to deny class discovery. Id. at 2. As to the request to implement an “Opt-Out” process, Judge

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Lloyd found that the procedure complex, time-consuming, and not necessary. Id.

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In filing this motion for relief, Insight requests this Court to modify Judge Lloyd’s Order in

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two respects. Mot., ECF 93. First, it asks that the Order be modified to require an “Opt-Out”

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notice prior to the production of personally-identifying information of putative class members. Id.

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at 2-3. Second, it requests the Court to narrow the scope of information requested by

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Interrogatories 4 and 5, and Document Request 71. Id. at 4.

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With regard to the request for an “Opt-Out” process, the Court recognizes that Judge Lloyd
did not analyze in detail the holdings of Belaire-W. Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal.
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App. 4th 554, 561 (2007), and the cases that relied on it, as pointed out by Insight. However,

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Judge Lloyd’s decision not to impose an “Opt-Out” process requirement fell well within his

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discretion and was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. “Numerous Courts in this District

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have allowed pre-certification discovery of putative class members’ confidential information

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subject to a protective order, without requiring prior notice to the putative class members.”

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Holman v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 11-0180-CW, 2012 WL 1496203, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Apr.

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27, 2012); see also Benedict v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 13-0119-LHK, 2013 WL 3215186, at *2

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(N.D. Cal. June 25, 2013) (denying request to impose an opt-out notice requirement prior to

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discovery). Further, the parties’ protective order should be able to adequately protect the putative
class members’ right of privacy. In the event Plaintiff’s counsel contacts any putative class

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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members, the Court encourages counsel to inform them of their right not to be contacted and to

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terminate contact if they elect not to talk to counsel.

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Turning to Insight’s request to narrow the scope of certain discovery requests that are

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purportedly overbroad, this argument was not properly raised before Judge Lloyd, and there is no

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explanation for why it was not presented to him. See Mot. 4 n.4. This Court need not, and

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ordinarily should not address arguments raised for the first time in a motion for relief from a

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magistrate judge’s order. See Greenhow v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 863 F.2d 633, 638

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(9th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hardesty, 977 F.2d 1347, 1348

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(9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the position that “the Magistrates Act was intended to give litigants an

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opportunity to run one version of their case past the magistrate, then another past the district

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court”). Therefore, the Court declines to consider the request to narrow the scope of

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Interrogatories 4 and 5, and Document Request 71.

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Accordingly, the motion for relief from Judge Lloyd’s order is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: August 2, 2017
______________________________________
BETH LABSON FREEMAN
United States District Judge
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