Ellis v. National Renewable Energy Center

Filing 58

Order by Judge Lucy H. Koh Denying 51 Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment.(lhklc4, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/30/2019)

Download PDF
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 SAN JOSE DIVISION United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 TERRACE ELLIS, Case No. 17-CV-00497-LHK Plaintiff, 13 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT v. 14 15 ENERGY ENTERPRISES USA, INC., 16 Defendant. Re: Dkt. No. 51 17 18 Before the Court is the motion of Defendant Energy Enterprises, USA, Inc. (“Defendant”) 19 to set aside default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Having considered the 20 submissions of the parties, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court DENIES 21 Defendant’s motion to set aside default judgment. 22 I. 23 BACKGROUND On January 31, 2017, Plaintiff Terrace Ellis (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed the 24 instant lawsuit against National Renewable Energy Center (“NREC”). ECF No. 1. The case was 25 originally assigned to United States Magistrate Judge Howard Lloyd. Id. Plaintiff alleged a single 26 cause of action for violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 27 227. Id. In brief, Plaintiff alleged that without Plaintiff’s consent, NREC placed 16 telemarketing 28 1 Case No. 17-CV-00497-LHK ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 1 calls to Plaintiff’s cell phone between November 25, 2014 and January 8, 2015. Id. ¶ 15. Of those 2 16 calls, 14 occurred after Plaintiff asked NREC to cease calls to Plaintiff’s cell phone. Id. ¶ 21. 3 On March 9, 2017, NREC’s attorney Linda Lucero called Plaintiff to inform Plaintiff that 4 Lucero’s client was in the process of closing its doors and that Lucero was helping NREC wrap 5 things up. Ellis Decl. ¶ 13. 6 On May 18, 2017, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against Renewable Energy 7 Center, LLC, “doing business as National Renewable Energy Center.” ECF No. 11 at 1. Plaintiff 8 alleged that “[a]ccording to the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder office, ‘National 9 Renewable Energy Center’ is actually a fictitious name for a California corporation known as 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 Energy Enterprises USA, Inc.” Id. at ¶ 18. On June 5, 2017, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint against Defendant, doing business as National Renewable Energy Center and Canopy Energy California. ECF No. 17. 13 On July 27, 2017, the Clerk entered default against Defendant. ECF No. 25. 14 On July 25, 2017, Plaintiff filed her first motion for default judgment against Defendant. 15 ECF No. 26. On November 27, 2017, Judge Lloyd set aside the Clerk’s entry of default against 16 Defendant and denied as moot Plaintiff’s first motion for default judgment because it was unclear 17 if Defendant, who had multiple business names, had been served with the summons and 18 complaint. ECF No. 27. 19 On December 18, 2017, Plaintiff filed a third amended complaint against Defendant 20 Energy Enterprises USA, Inc, doing business as National Renewable Energy Center and Canopy 21 Energy California. ECF No. 30. 22 23 24 On April 13, 2018, the Clerk entered default against Defendant. ECF No. 35. On June 4, 2018, the case was reassigned to United States Magistrate Judge Virginia DeMarchi. ECF No. 36. On July 24, 2018, Plaintiff filed a second motion for default judgment against Defendant. 25 ECF No. 37. On October 2, 2018, Plaintiff filed an amended declaration and exhibits in support of 26 her second motion for default judgment. ECF No. 41. 27 28 On November 20, 2018, Judge DeMarchi issued a report and recommendation to grant 2 Case No. 17-CV-00497-LHK ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 1 Plaintiff’s second motion for default judgment, and the case was reassigned to the undersigned. 2 ECF No. 43. On December 6, 2018, Plaintiff served Judge DeMarchi’s report and 3 recommendation on Defendant. ECF No. 46. Defendant did not object to the report and 4 recommendation. 5 On December 21, 2018, the Court adopted Judge DeMarchi’s report and recommendation 6 and granted Plaintiff’s second motion for default judgment in the amount of $8,557. ECF No. 47. 7 The Court entered judgment against Defendant that same day. ECF No. 48. 8 On January 28, 2019, the Clerk issued a writ of execution against Defendant. ECF No. 50. 9 On April 30, 2019, Defendant filed the instant motion to set aside the default judgment. ECF No. 51. On May 14, 2019, Plaintiff filed her opposition, ECF No. 53 (“Opp.”), and on May 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 21, 2019, Defendant filed its reply. ECF No. 56 (“Reply”). 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 Rule 60(b) allows a court to set aside a judgment where one or more of the following is 14 shown: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 15 which by due diligence could not have been discovered before the court's decision; (3) fraud by 16 the adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied; (6) any other 17 reason justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Sch. Dist. 1J v. ACandS Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 18 (9th Cir. 1993). In the Ninth Circuit, “[o]ur starting point is the general rule that default 19 judgments are ordinarily disfavored. Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever 20 reasonably possible.” NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 21 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986)). 22 III. 23 DISCUSSION Defendant’s motion to set aside default judgment raises only one ground for relief under 24 Rule 60(b). Specifically, Defendant contends that its former counsel’s health problems qualify as 25 “mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect” or “any other reason justifying relief.” Mot. at 2, 6. 26 Defendant contends that it forwarded “the complaint and related documents” to its former counsel, 27 Linda Lucero, “who did not file any responsive pleadings because of her health problems.” Id. at 28 3 Case No. 17-CV-00497-LHK ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 1 2 5. However, the record contradicts Defendant’s representations. First, Lucero’s own 3 declaration establishes that Lucero did not have health problems until March 2018, 14 months 4 after Plaintiff filed and served her January 31, 2017 complaint on Defendant. ECF No. 51-1 5 (“Lucero Decl.”), ¶ 8. During the time between January 2017 and March 2018, Plaintiff filed and 6 served her first, second, and third amended complaints and her first motion for default judgment. 7 ECF Nos. 111, 17, 26, 30. Defendant offers no explanation for how Lucero’s March 2018 illness 8 constitutes excusable neglect for the 14 months prior to March 2018 during which Defendant 9 failed to respond to three complaints and the first motion for default judgment. 10 Lucero’s declaration provides no specific dates or details. However, Plaintiff alleges that United States District Court Northern District of California 11 on March 9, 2017, Lucero called Plaintiff to inform Plaintiff that Lucero’s client was in the 12 process of closing its doors and that Lucero was helping NREC wrap things up. Ellis Decl. ¶ 13. 13 Second, the entry of default judgment against Defendant post-dates Lucero’s 14 representation of Defendant. Specifically, Lucero declares that she ceased representing Defendant 15 in November 2018. However, Plaintiff served on Defendant Judge DeMarchi’s report and 16 recommendation, which recommended granting Plaintiff’s second motion for default judgment, on 17 December 6, 2018—after Lucero’s representation of Defendant ceased. Lucero Decl. ¶ 5; see 18 ECF No. 46 (proof of service on Defendant). On December 21, 2018, the Court granted Plaintiff’s 19 motion for default judgment. ECF No. 47. 20 Thus, even after Lucero ceased representing Defendant in November 2018, Defendant 21 failed to object to the report and recommendation. Defendant offers no explanation for that 22 failure, which post-dates Lucero’s representation of Defendant. In her declaration, Lucero herself 23 asserts that Defendant was unaware of the entry of default against Defendant and Plaintiff’s 24 requests for default judgment until mid-December 2018. Lucero Decl. ¶ 8. The Court notes that 25 mid-December is before December 21, 2018, when this Court entered default judgment against 26 Defendant. Moreover, Lucero cannot speak to Defendant’s knowledge, and no representative of 27 Defendant has filed a declaration in this case. Furthermore, Lucero ceased representing Defendant 28 4 Case No. 17-CV-00497-LHK ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 1 in November 2018 and does not explain how she was aware of her former client’s knowledge in 2 mid-December 2018. 3 Defendant’s failure to participate in this lawsuit for 14 months before Lucero had health 4 problems in March 2018 or after Lucero ceased representing Defendant in November 2018 5 undermines Defendant’s claim that Lucero’s health problems are to blame for the entry of default 6 judgment against Defendant. Certainly, as explained below, Defendant’s allegations do not rise to 7 the level of gross negligence, as required in the Ninth Circuit to set aside default judgment because 8 of counsel’s conduct. 9 The Ninth Circuit has held that only the “gross negligence” of counsel may justify setting aside a default judgment. Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 default judgment may be set aside “where the client has demonstrated gross negligence on the part 12 of his counsel.” Id. at 1169. 13 In Tani, for example, the defendant’s attorney repeatedly failed to comply with court 14 orders, including a “direct order” from the court to serve an answer on another party and a court 15 order to contact a party for settlement talks. 282 F.3d at 1170. In the instant case, Lucero did not 16 fail to comply with any court orders. Moreover, in Tani, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 17 record demonstrated that the defendant only had its “first inkling” of its attorney’s deficient 18 performance after default judgment was entered against the defendant. Id. at 1171. 19 By contrast, in the instant case, the record contradicts Defendant’s representations about 20 why Defendant failed to litigate the instant case for 14 months before Lucero had health problems 21 in March 2018. Furthermore, Lucero ceased representing Defendant before Defendant received 22 Judge DeMarchi’s report and recommendation that recommended entry of default judgment 23 against Defendant and before Defendant failed to object to the report and recommendation. 24 Moreover, Defendant did not file the instant motion until April 30, 2019—more than four months 25 after Defendant allegedly learned in mid-December 2018 that default had been entered against 26 Defendant and that Plaintiff had requested default judgment against Defendant. The Court notes 27 that mid-December is before December 21, 2018, when this Court entered default judgment 28 5 Case No. 17-CV-00497-LHK ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 1 2 against Defendant. Defendant cites no case law that would support set aside of default judgment under these 3 circumstances. The Court notes that Plaintiff, who is pro se, cites more extensive case law than 4 Defendant, who is represented by counsel. See Opp. at 9–10. 5 Defendant has not identified any basis under Rule 60(b) to set aside the default judgment 6 against Defendant in the amount of $8,557. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion 7 to set aside default judgment. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: August 30, 2019 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 ______________________________________ LUCY H. KOH United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 6 Case No. 17-CV-00497-LHK ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?