Martin

Filing 163

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND CONTEMPT CITATION by Judge Beth Labson Freeman.Denying 143 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (tshS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 7/24/2020)Any non-CM/ECF Participants have been served by First Class Mail to the addresses of record listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF)

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
GEORGE MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
W. MUNIZ, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 17-01690 BLF (PR)
ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND
CONTEMPT CITATION
(Docket No. 143)

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Plaintiff, a California inmate, filed the instant pro se civil rights
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against prison officials at Salinas
Valley State Prison (“SVSP”). The operative complaint is the second
amended complaint, Dkt. No. 129, and the only claim in this matter is the
Eighth Amendment claim concerning Plaintiff’s pain management,
including the denial of corrective surgery to address the chronic pain,
against Defendants Dr. Kim R. Kumar, Dr. Darrin M. Bright, Tuan Anh
Tran, Dr. Edward Miles Birdsong, and Dr. Jennifer Villa. Dkt. No. 137 at
7. Before Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment, Dkt. No.
149, Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary

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restraining order. Dkt. No. 143. Defendants filed opposition. Dkt. No.
146.

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DISCUSSION

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Standard of Review
The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) restricts the
power of the court to grant prospective relief in any action involving
prison conditions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a); Oluwa v. Gomez, 133 F.3d
1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 1998). Section 3626(a)(2) applies specifically to
preliminary injunctive relief. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). In civil actions
with respect to prison conditions it permits the court to enter a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction “to the extent otherwise
authorized by law” but also requires that such an order “must be narrowly
drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court
finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means
necessary to correct that harm." Id. The court must give “substantial
weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a
criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief.” Id.
“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he
is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips
in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Where
the court concludes the movant has failed to show a likelihood of success
on the merits, the court, in its discretion, need not consider whether the
movant would suffer irreparable injury. Guzman v. Shewry, 552 F.3d
941, 948 (9th Cir. 2009).

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United States District Court
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A.

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“A preliminary injunction is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy,
one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing,
carries the burden of persuasion.’” Lopez v. Brewer, et al., 680 F.3d
1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). The
standard for issuing a TRO is similar to that required for a preliminary
injunction. See Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. v. United States Dist.
Court, 650 F.2d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 1981) (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction against not only the
Defendants in this action, but against non-parties, including the CDCR
Secretary Ralph Diaz, Warden W. Muniz, and numerous medical staff, to
prohibit them from: (1) forcing him to take medication in crush and float
form, Dkt. No. 143 at 3-4; (2) withholding certain pain medications, id. at
4; (3) depriving him of a “safe secure ADA vehicle,” id. at 5; (4)
cancelling his transfer to a different medical facility, id. at 6; (5) using an
allegedly fraudulent document to change his medical status from high risk
to medium, id. at 7; and (6) interfering with transfers to a facility “for a
higher level of medical stabilize care,” id. at 8. Lastly, Plaintiff seeks the
Court to “refrain” Defendants and counsel from submitting any
documents to the Court without holding an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 89. Plaintiff also seeks “criminal contempt citations” against Defendants
for “acts of obstruction of justice by way of perjury and falsifying
documents.” Id. at 10.
Defendants first object to Plaintiff’s request for an injunction
regarding crush and float medications because he cannot demonstrate a
likelihood of success on the merits. Dkt. No. 146 at 3. Defendants point
out that in a previous order in this matter, the Court found Plaintiff had

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failed to establish a likelihood of success on nearly an identically
presented issue because it was unlikely that he had managed to
successfully exhaust administrative remedies and therefore would not be
able to proceed on the merits. Id.; Dkt. No. 74. Those circumstances
have not changed. Furthermore, Plaintiff also fails to establish that he is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief
where, as Defendants point out, he has provided no persuasive evidence
that the “crush and float” manner of ingesting his pain medication is in
any way harmful. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to
carry his burden of persuasion by a clear showing that a preliminary
injunction with respect to crush and float medication is warranted. See
Lopez, 680 F.3d at 1072.
Secondly with respect to the withholding of pain medication,
Defendants also argue that the Court previously denied injunctive relief
on a similar motion because it was “too general and vague” and as such,
the parameters of the requested relief were unclear. Dkt. No. 146 at 4.
Defendants argue that the current motion suffers from similar
deficiencies. Id. Plaintiff mentions that on October 9, 2015, some sort of
pain medication was recommended but fails to provide any further details
or explain what specific action he seeks. Dkt. No. 143 at 4. The Court
agrees that it is again unclear as to what relief Plaintiff is requesting, and
therefore no basis for issuing any “narrowly drawn” order to correct
uncertain harm. Accordingly, a preliminary injunction is not warranted
on this basis.
Defendants assert that the remainder of Plaintiff’s requests must
also be denied because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of
success on the merits in connection with the claims and they are unrelated

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to the issues raised in this action. Dkt. No. 146 at 5. Defendants are
correct. As stated above, the only claim in this action is the “Eighth
Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,
i.e., Plaintiff’s chronic pain related to certain longstanding injuries to his
neck and back and failure to provide corrective surgeries to address that
pain.” See supra at 1; Dkt. No. 137 at 6. A plaintiff is not entitled to an
injunction based on claims not pled in the complaint. Pacific Radiation
Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 2015).
“[T]here must be a relationship between the injury claimed in the motion
for injunctive relief and the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint.
This requires a sufficient nexus between the claims raised in a motion for
injunctive relief and the claims set forth in the underlying complaint
itself.” There is a sufficient nexus if the interim order “would grant
‘relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally.’” Id.
(citation omitted); see, e.g., id. at 636-38 (district court properly denied
plaintiff’s request for an injunction to prevent HIPAA violation, where
plaintiff had not asserted a claim for a HIPAA violation). Here, even if
Plaintiff prevailed in this action, he would not be granted any relief
involving an ADA vehicle, transfer to a different medical facility, change
in medical status, or the Attorney General’s office. See supra at 3.
Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief based on these
other grounds.
Lastly, with respect to Plaintiff’s request for a “contempt citation,”
he fails to identify the specific court order that Defendants are allegedly
violating. Dkt. No. 143 at 10-19. Contempt is only available when the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a party violated a
specific and definite order of the court. Parsons v. Ryan, 949 F.3d 443,

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United States District Court
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452 (9th Cir. 2020) (violation of order to show cause is grounds for
contempt, unlike violation of a stipulation that is not also a court order).
Plaintiff makes repeated references to a previous case and medical
records from several years pertaining to that prior matter, but no specific
court order in this matter. Accordingly, he fails to persuade this Court by
clear and convincing evidence that Defendants violated a specific and
definite order of the court. Id. The motion is therefore DENIED.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary
injunction and TRO and motion for contempt order are DENIED.
This order terminates Docket No. 143.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: ___July 24, 2020_______
________________________
BETH LABSON FREEMAN
United States District Judge

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Order Denying Mot. for PI&TRO
PRO-SE\BLF\CR.17\01690Martin_deny.pi

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