Juicero, Inc. v. iTaste Co. et al

Filing 104

REDACTED ORDER DENYING 35 JUICERO INC.'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION. Signed by Judge Beth Labson Freeman on 10/5/2017. (patentlcsjS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/17/2017)

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1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 JUICERO, INC., Plaintiff, 8 v. 9 10 ITASTE CO., et al., ORDER DENYING JUICERO INC.'S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Defendants. 11 United States District Court Northern District of California Case No. 17-cv-01921-BLF 12 Plaintiff Juicero, Inc. (“Juicero”) seeks a preliminary injunction to prevent Defendants 13 14 iTaste Co. et al. (collectively, “iTaste”) from making, using, offering to sell, or selling within the 15 United States, or importing into the United States, the Juisir product or any product not more than 16 colorably different due to the alleged infringement of claim 3 of U.S. Patent No. 9,493,298 (the 17 “’298 patent”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Juicero’s motion. 18 19 I. BACKGROUND Juicero is a San Francisco-based company that was founded in 2013. Rosenthal Decl. ¶ 2, 20 ECF 35-6. It employs 120 people. Id. ¶ 3. Until recently, Juicero manufactured and sold the 21 Juicero Press, a high-end cold-press juicer which it touts as requiring zero post-juicing clean-up. 22 Katz Decl. ¶ 3, ECF 35-7; see also Rosenthal Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8, ECF 35-6. Juicero eliminates the need 23 for clean-up by pre-packaging the fruit and vegetables that will be juiced in sealed pouches called 24 “Produce Packs.” Katz Decl. ¶ 5, ECF 35-7. The Juicero Press only works with Juicero’s 25 proprietary Produce Packs, which customers must buy directly from Juicero. See Exs. 16, 17, 28 26 to Opp, ECF 45-17, -18, -29. They cannot fill their own pouches. See id. 27 28 Juicero owns the ’298 patent, which is entitled “Juicing Systems and Methods.” It issued to Doug Evans, Juicero’s founder, and Paul Katz on November 15, 2016. It generally relates to 1 “[j]uicing methods and apparatuses for extracting juice from food matter using juicer cartridges.” 2 ’298 patent, Abstract. Independent claim 3 recites: 3 3. A juicer comprising: a region configured to receive one or more compressible juicer cartridges including an outlet and food matter contained therein; a pressing element configured to apply pressure to the one or more juice cartridges, wherein the region and the pressing element are configured and arranged to dispense fluid extracted from the one or more juicer cartridges without the extracted fluid or the food matter directly contacting the region or pressing element; and a dispensing point associated with the region, wherein the dispensing point is configured and arranged to receive the outlet of each juicer cartridge of the one or more juicer cartridges, wherein the region and pressing element are constructed so that the outlet of each juicer cartridge of the one or more juicer cartridges extends beyond the region and pressing element. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Id., col. 33 l. 44-col. 34 l. 9. United States District Court Northern District of California 11 Defendant iTaste Co., Ltd. (“iTaste”) is a Chinese company based in Shanghai. See Ex. 1 12 to Mot. at 1, ECF 35-9. Defendant Froothie USA (“Froothie”) is iTaste’s exclusive distributor in 13 the United States. Nawfal Decl. ¶ 2, ECF 44-7. Roughly in fall 2017, Defendants expect to sell 14 the Juisir, a cold-press juicing machine which it also touts as requiring zero clean-up. Id. ¶ 3; Ex. 15 24 to Mot. at 2, ECF 35-32. It effects this by using reusable food-grade juicing bags, which users 16 fill themselves with their own fruit and vegetables. Id. 17 Juicero initiated this lawsuit on April 6, 2017, alleging patent, trademark, and trade dress 18 infringement, as well as unfair competition. ECF 1. It amended its complaint on April 14 to add 19 additional aliases for iTaste. ECF 19. Roughly one month later, on May 19, 2017, Juicero 20 brought the instant motion for a preliminary injunction, based only on its patent claim. ECF 35. 21 22 II. LEGAL STANDARD “A preliminary injunction is a ‘drastic and extraordinary remedy that is not to be routinely 23 granted.’” National Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian P. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 24 (quoting Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). It “is not a 25 preliminary adjudication on the merits but rather a device for preserving the status quo and 26 preventing the irreparable loss of rights before judgment.” Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix 27 Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984). As such, the basic function of a preliminary 28 injunction is “to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be 2 1 held.” Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). A party seeking a preliminary injunction must show: “(1) it is likely to succeed on the 2 3 merits; (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; (3) the balance of 4 hardships weighs in its favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest.” Apple v. Samsung, 5 695 F.3d 1370, 1373-74 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 6 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). The plaintiff bears the burden of making a clear showing on these elements 7 and on entitlement to this extraordinary remedy. Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 469 8 (9th Cir. 2010). “These factors, taken individually, are not dispositive; rather, the district court 9 must weigh and measure each factor against the other factors and against the form and magnitude of the relief requested.” Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 The Federal Circuit, however, has placed particular emphasis on the first two factors: “a movant 12 cannot be granted a preliminary injunction unless it establishes both of the first two factors, i.e., 13 likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm.” Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1350 14 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, “[w]hile granting a preliminary injunction requires analysis 15 of all four factors, a trial court may . . . deny a motion based on a patentee’s failure to show any 16 one of the four factors—especially either of the first two—without analyzing the others.” Jack 17 Guttman, Inc. v. Kopykake Enters., Inc., 302 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Chrysler 18 Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951, 953 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“If the 19 injunction is denied, the absence of an adequate showing with regard to any one factor may be 20 sufficient, given the weight or lack of it assigned the other factors, to justify the denial.”). 21 III. 22 DISCUSSION The Court looks to the four Winter factors to determine whether Juicero has met its moving 23 burden. As discussed below, the Court finds that Juicero has failed to establish that it is likely to 24 suffer irreparable harm, which alone can be a sufficient basis to deny its motion. Jack Guttman, 25 302 F.3d at 1356. However, even considering the other three factors and weighing all factors 26 collectively, a preliminary injunction is not warranted here. 27 A. 28 A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction “must make a clear showing that it is at risk of Irreparable Harm 3 1 irreparable harm, which entails showing a likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable 2 injury.” Apple Inc., 695 F.3d at 1374. “[T]o satisfy the irreparable harm factor in a patent 3 infringement suit, a patentee must establish both of the following requirements: (1) that absent an 4 injunction, it will suffer irreparable harm, and (2) that a sufficiently strong causal nexus relates the 5 alleged harm to the alleged infringement” Id. “To show irreparable harm, it is necessary to show 6 that the infringement caused harm in the first place.” Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 7 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Further, deciding whether a plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm 8 absent an injunction involves an inquiry into whether money damages would adequately make the 9 plaintiff whole. See Celsis in Vitro, Inc. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 664 F.3d 922, 930 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he irreparable harm inquiry seeks to measure harms that no damages payment, however 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 great, could address.”). 12 Juicero has failed to make a clear showing that it is at risk of irreparable harm. In its 13 original motion and at the August 24, 2017 hearing, Juicero advanced several theories: (1) loss of 14 sales and market share, which Juicero argued was particularly strong because Defendants 15 positioned themselves to directly compete with Juicero; (2) a diminished ability to fund research 16 and development; and (3) reputational harm. Mot. 18-21; Hrg. Tr. 7:18-18:4, ECF 97. However, 17 on August 31, 2017, the Juicero board of directors voted to suspend the sale and production of the 18 Juicero Press and Produce Packs and to pursue acquisition by a third party to either (1) purchase 19 the Juicero business as a whole and continue running it, or (2) purchase Juciero’s intellectual 20 property and hard assets. Rosenthal Decl. ¶ 3, ECF 98-1. The Court invited supplemental briefing 21 to allow Juicero the opportunity to demonstrate continued irreparable harm in light of the changed 22 circumstances. ECF 95. In its supplemental brief Juicero asserts that, even with its suspended 23 operations, it will still suffer irreparable harm because it considers the ’298 patent “one its most 24 valuable pieces of property” and Defendants’ continued infringement will diminish the value of 25 the ’298 patent to a prospective buyer. Supp Br. 2-5, ECF 98. Juicero also argues that, to the 26 extent its purchaser wishes to practice the ’298 patent through Juicero (rather than on its own), 27 Juicero stands to suffer the same irreparable harm described in its original motion. Id. 28 Neither of Juicero’s current theories of irreparable harm is persuasive. Taking them in 4 1 reverse order, Juicero’s second theory that, if a potential purchaser wished to practice the ’298 2 patent through Juicero, it would suffer irreparable harm is pure speculation. Juicero offers no 3 evidence that there are prospective buyers for the ’298 patent, much less that these buyers wish to 4 practice the ’298 patent through Juicero. As such, it does not qualify as “immediate irreparable 5 injury.” Apple Inc., 695 F.3d at 1374. This only leaves Juicero’s first theory: that it will be irreparably harmed because 6 7 Defendants’ alleged infringement will diminish the value of the ’298 patent. This theory fails for 8 several reasons. First, it too is speculative. Juicero offers no evidence that there are prospective 9 buyers for the ’298 patent, or that these buyers place value on whether the ’298 patent serves as the basis for a preliminary injunction against Defendants. Instead, it bases this argument on 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 attorney argument and vague assertions from its CFO. See generally Supp. Br., ECF 98; 12 Rosenthal Decl., ECF 98-1. Thus, it is not “immediate irreparable injury.” Apple Inc., 695 F.3d at 13 1374. 14 Second, even if the Court were to look past the speculative nature of this argument, Juicero 15 fails to show that is harm is “likely in the absence of an injunction.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 21-22. 16 As the Supreme Court has explained, a moving party must show that injury is likely; “[i]ssuing a 17 preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with [its] 18 characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a 19 clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. Here, Juicero’s assertion that the 20 value of the ’298 patent stands to be diminished is, at best, mere possibility. As discussed above, 21 Juicero offers no evidence of prospective buyers or their valuation preferences. In the absence of 22 such concrete evidence, Juicero also does not attempt a less specific task of, for example, 23 explaining why a preliminary injunction would be valuable for the technology area of the ’298 24 patent or the market for juicers like the Juicero Press or Juisir. In short, Juicero provides the Court 25 with no basis upon which it could find that a diminishing of the value of the ’298 patent is likely. 26 Indeed, if anything, it actually seems unlikely that the denial of a preliminary injunction 27 here would diminish the value of the ’298 patent. Even if Defendants were not prevented from 28 selling the Juisir through a preliminary injunction, this litigation would continue and, if successful, 5 1 there is nothing that would prevent a future purchaser of the ’298 patent from receiving 2 infringement damages or seeking a permanent injunction. There is also nothing that would 3 prevent a future purchaser of the ’298 patent from asserting that patent against other potential 4 infringers. As such, the ’298 patent will retain its power as an instrument of exclusivity regardless 5 of whether or not this Court issues a preliminary injunction. Thus, it seems unlikely in this case 6 that Defendants’ alleged infringement diminishes its value. 7 Finally, even if the Court were to accept Juicero’s theory that Defendants’ alleged 8 infringement is likely to decrease in value of the ’298 patent, Juicero has failed to show that it 9 would not be possible for money damages to make it whole. See Celsis in Vitro, 664 F.3d at 930 (“[T]he irreparable harm inquiry seeks to measure harms that no damages payment, however 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 great, could address.”). Instead, here, it actually appears that money damages will be a sufficient 12 remedy. This is especially true in light of the fact that Juicero is off the market and up for sale— 13 valuation will be developed for sale and can form the basis of a future recovery. Thus, even if 14 Juicero were to suffer a reduction in the value of its ’298 patent, money damages can provide 15 redress. Accordingly, for all of these reasons, Juicero has failed to make a clear showing that it is 16 at risk of irreparable harm. 17 Juicero’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. Juicero’s primary support for its 18 position is that another district court cited a similar patent valuation-based theory of irreparable 19 harm. Supp Br. 2-5, ECF 98. In Joyal Prod., Inc. v. Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc., a District of New 20 Jersey court awarded a permanent injunction to a patentee because, even though it had ceased 21 manufacturing operations, “allowing [the defendant] to continue to import and sell infringing 22 products in the United States would irreparably harm [the patentee’s] ability to sell [its patent].” 23 No. CIV. A. 04-5172 JAP, 2009 WL 512156, at *11 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2009), aff’d, 335 F. App’x 24 48 (Fed. Cir. 2009). This case is different. Rather than a permanent injunction, this case involves 25 a preliminary injunction, the purpose of which is simply “to preserve the status quo and to protect 26 the respective rights of the parties pending a determination on the merits.” Cordis Corp. v. 27 Medtronic, Inc., 780 F.2d 991, 994 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In the specific context of a preliminary 28 injunction, the Federal Circuit has made clear that “[a]pplication of a concept that every patentee 6 1 is always irreparably harmed by an alleged infringer’s pretrial sales would . . . disserve the patent 2 system.” Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Grip-Pak, Inc., 906 F.2d 679, 683 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Juicero’s 3 theory commits precisely this fallacy, as any patentee in any case could make the argument that 4 pretrial infringement diminishes the value of its patent. Thus, Joyal does not compel issuing a 5 preliminary injunction on the facts here. 6 In sum, Juicero’s arguments that it will suffer irreparable harm are speculative at best and 7 unpersuasive at worst. Either way, this is not enough to justify the extraordinary relief of a 8 preliminary injunction. Thus, the Court finds that Juicero has failed to meet its burden of making 9 a “clear showing” that it stands to suffer “substantial and immediate irreparable injury.” Apple Inc., 695 F.3d at 1374. Because Juicero has not met this burden, the Court need not address 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 whether it has satisfied the additional requirement that there be a causal nexus between the 12 infringement and the alleged harm. 13 B. 14 Juicero’s failure to show irreparable harm is alone sufficient to permit the Court to, in its 15 discretion, deny Juicero’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Jack Guttman, 302 F.3d at 1356 16 (“a trial court may . . . deny a motion based on a patentee’s failure to show any one of the four 17 factors—especially either of the first two—without analyzing the others”); see, e.g., Chestnut Hill 18 Sound Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 15-261-RGA, 2015 WL 6870037, at *2 (D. Del. Nov. 6, 2015) 19 (denying a motion for a preliminary injunction without reaching the merits because moving party 20 failed to establish irreparable harm); Standard Innovation Corp. v. Lelo (Shanghai) Trading Co., 21 No. 15-CV-04858-BLF, 2015 WL 6828317, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2015) (in the context of a 22 temporary retraining order, same). Nevertheless, to facilitate review, the Court will assess the 23 remaining Winter factors. Even considering these factors and weighing all four Winter factors 24 collectively, a preliminary injunction is not warranted here. 25 26 27 28 Remaining Factors i. Likelihood of Success on the Merits a. Infringement To prevail on infringement, Juicero must show that the Juisir “meets every claim limitation either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.” Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharm., USA, Inc., 429 7 1 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Juicero argues that, construing each of the terms in the patent 2 according to their plain and ordinary meaning, the Juisir infringes claim 3. Mot. 12-16. 3 Defendants, on the other hand, argue that the Juisir does not infringe because it does not include a 4 “juicer cartridge” or “dispensing point . . . ,” if these terms are correctly construed. Opp. 16-18. 5 6 1. Claim Construction Before turning to questions of infringement, the Court addresses the parties’ competing 7 claim construction positions. The Court assesses these positions only for the purpose of deciding 8 this motion; its conclusions are neither preliminary nor final constructions of these terms. 9 Here, the parties disagree as to the proper construction of two terms: “juicer cartridge” and “dispensing point . . . configured and arranged to receive the outlet of each juicer cartridge.” 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 Compare Mot. 12-16, with Opp. 16-18. Beginning with “juicer cartridge,” Defendants contend 12 that this term should be construed to mean a “sealed, rigid yet compressible container enclosing 13 food matter and possessing an outlet from which juice may be expressed when the cartridge is 14 compressed.” Opp. 17-18. Juicero, on the other hand, argues that this term should be given its 15 plain and ordinary meaning. Mot. 12. Assessing these competing positions, the Court finds 16 Defendants’ position too narrow. The specification discloses a number of embodiments of the 17 “juicer cartridge,” not all of which are “sealed” and/or “rigid.” See, e.g., ’298 patent, col. 22 ll. 18 10-11 (“a reusable cartridge may be compressible instead of rigid”); id., col. 7 ll. 59-63 19 (describing how “[i]n some instances” and “in some embodiments, an outlet of a juicer cartridge 20 may be sealed . . .”). “[A] claim interpretation that excludes a preferred embodiment from the 21 scope of the claim is rarely, if ever, correct.” On-Line Techs., Inc. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer 22 GmbH, 386 F.3d 1133, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Thus, the Court rejects Defendants’ proposed 23 construction and instead gives “juicer cartridge” its plain and ordinary meaning. See Phillips v. 24 AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he words of a claim are generally given 25 their ordinary and customary meaning.”) (internal quotations omitted). 26 Turning to “dispensing point . . . configured and arranged to receive the outlet of each 27 juicer cartridge,” Defendants argue that this term “requires a housing nook or opening closely 28 tailored to the shape of and in direct contact with the cartridge and its outlet.” Opp. 18. Juicero, 8 1 on the other hand, advocates for plain and ordinary meaning. Mot. 12. In addition, at the hearing, 2 the parties presented an additional dispute: whether “receive” required the “outlet” of the “juicer 3 cartridge” to extend beyond the “dispensing point,” as opposed to extending only beyond the 4 “region” and the “pressing element” but not beyond the “dispensing point.” ECF 93, 94, 96. 5 Juicero argued for the former, while Defendants argued for the latter. Id. As to the first dispute, 6 Defendants are incorrect that “dispensing point” requires the housing nook or opening they 7 describe. Defendants’ only support for their position are two figures, which the specification 8 makes clear are “nonlimiting embodiments.” ’298 patent, col. 12 ll. 54-55. There is no reason the 9 claims should be restricted to only these embodiments. See Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is improper to read a limitation from the specification 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 into the claims.”). As to the second dispute, however, Defendants are correct that “receive” does 12 not require that the “outlet” extend beyond the “dispensing point.” The claim language requires 13 the “dispensing point” to “receive” the “outlet,” but it does not place any structural limitations on 14 the shape or length of the “outlet.” See ’298 patent, col. 33 l. 44-col. 34 l. 9. Moreover, if 15 anything, its explicit requirement that the “outlet . . . extends beyond the region and the pressing 16 element” implies that the same is not required of the “dispensing point,” as the applicants knew 17 how to specify the relative positions of these components, could have done so with respect to 18 “outlet” and “dispensing point,” and chose not to. Thus, the Court rejects Defendants’ proposed 19 construction and Juicero’s narrower view of “receiving” and instead gives “dispensing point . . . 20 configured and arranged to receive the outlet of each juicer cartridge” its plain and ordinary 21 meaning. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (“[T]he words of a claim are generally given their 22 ordinary and customary meaning.”) (internal quotations omitted). 23 24 2. Infringement Having addressed the parties’ claim construction disputes, the Court turns to infringement. 25 After considering the evidence, the Court finds that there is a high likelihood that Juicero will 26 prevail in showing that the Juisir infringes claim 3. As mentioned above, claim 3 recites a “juicer” 27 comprising three main elements: (1) a “region . . . to receive . . . compressible juicer cartridges . . 28 . ,” (2) a “pressing element,” and (3) a “dispensing point.” There is a high likelihood that Juicero 9 will be able to show that the Juisir satisfies each of these limitations. First, the Juisir appears to 2 contain a “region” that “receive[s] one or more compressible juicer cartridges:” the slot at the top 3 of the Juisir which receives its compressible “J-Packs.” See Ex. 19 to Mot. at 6, ECF 35-27; Ex. 4 20 to Mot. at 6, ECF 35-28; Answer ¶¶ 15, 17, ECF 28. The “J-Packs” appear to include an 5 “outlet” (the elephant’s nose) and “food matter contained therein” (the fruits and vegetables added 6 by the user). Id. Second, the Juisir seems to contain a “pressing element,” and that “pressing 7 element” and the “region” are “configured and arranged to dispense fluid . . . without the extracted 8 fluid or the food matter directly contacting the region or pressing element.” For example, 9 Defendants tout the Juisir as exerting “about 8 tonnes of force” and “work[ing] with our uniquely 10 designed juicing bags” so that “JUISIR itself never needs to be cleaned.” Ex. 19 to Mot. at 8, ECF 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 1 35-27; Ex. 20 to Mot. at 8, ECF 35-28; see also Answer ¶ 17, ECF 28. Third, the Juisir appears to 12 have a “dispensing point”—the opening that allows the elephant’s trunk to poke through. See Ex. 13 19 to Mot. at 6, ECF 35-27; Ex. 20 to Mot. at 6, ECF 35-28; Answer ¶ 17, ECF 28. This 14 “dispensing point” is “associated with the region” (the slot at the top of the Juisir) because it is 15 positioned at the end of the slot. See Answer ¶ 22, ECF 28. It is also “configured and arranged to 16 receive the outlet of each juicer cartridge” because the elephant’s trunk (the “outlet of each juicer 17 cartridge”) hangs down through the opening. See Answer ¶ 17, ECF 28. For this same reason, it 18 is also the case that the “outlet of each juicer cartridge” (the elephant’s trunk) extends beyond the 19 “region” and the “pressing element.” See Answer ¶¶ 17, 22, ECF 28. Thus, it seems likely that 20 Juicero will prevail in proving infringement. 21 Defendants’ noninfringement arguments do not alter this conclusion. Defendants argue 22 that the Juisir does not infringe because it does not include a “juicer cartridge” or “dispensing 23 point . . . .” Opp. 16-18. However, both arguments are based on overly narrow claim construction 24 positions which the Court does not find persuasive. Accordingly, these arguments fail. 25 26 b. Validity Defendants argue that claim 3 of the ’298 patent is invalid. At trial, Defendants will bear 27 the burden of overcoming the statutory presumption of validity with clear and convincing 28 evidence. At this stage, however, the Court need “not resolve the validity question, but rather 10 1 must . . . make an assessment of the persuasiveness of [Defendants’ evidence]” recognizing that 2 further evidence favoring either side may be presented at trial. Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New 3 Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The Federal Circuit directs the Court to 4 “first weigh the evidence both for and against validity” as available at the preliminary injunction 5 stage, then to assess whether there is a “substantial question” concerning the validity of the patent, 6 “meaning that the alleged infringer has presented an invalidity defense that the patentee has not 7 shown lacks substantial merit . . . .” Id. at 1379. 8 9 Defendants’ primary invalidity theory is that the ’298 patent is obvious over U.S. Patent No. 5,277,810 to Shepard (“Shepard”) in view of U.S. Provisional Application No. 61/814,015 to Wettlaufer et al. (“Wettlaufer”). Opp. 19-22. Defendants have failed to show that this raises a 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 10 substantial question of validity. First, Defendants have only briefed how this combination 12 discloses one element (“wherein the region and the pressing element are constructed . . .”) of claim 13 3. See Opp. 20-21. They rely on the examiner’s conclusions for the remainder, which are not 14 necessarily binding on the Court. See Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1322 15 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[A] court is not bound by the PTO’s actions and must make its own 16 independent determination of patent validity.”). Second, even if the references did disclose every 17 element, Defendants have not provided any evidence that “one of skill in the art would have 18 combined these particular references to produce the claimed invention.” Metalcraft of Mayville, 19 Inc. v. The Toro Co., 848 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming district court finding of no 20 substantial question of invalidity where the moving party provided “no explanation or reasoning 21 for concluding that one of skill in the art would have combined these particular references to 22 produce the claimed invention”). Obviousness requires such a showing; merely showing that 23 certain elements are disclosed in certain references is not enough. Id. (“The district court correctly 24 acknowledged that it is not enough for Toro to merely demonstrate that elements of the claimed 25 invention were independently known in the prior art.”). Finally, the Court’s view of validity is 26 bolstered by the fact that at least Shepard was considered by the examiner during prosecution. Ex. 27 37 to Opp. at 4, ECF 45-38. In such cases where the challenger relies on art that the examiner 28 already considered, the presumption of validity is the strongest. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. 11 1 P’ship, 546 U.S. 91, 111 (2011). Defendants have also failed to show that the other combinations of references cited in their 3 brief raise a substantial question of validity. As with Shepard and Wettlaufer, Defendants provide 4 no evidence for any of these combinations that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have 5 been motivated to combine these references. Metalcraft of Mayville, 848 F.3d at 1367 (“[I]t is not 6 enough . . . to merely demonstrate that elements of the claimed invention were independently 7 known in the prior art.”). Further, as Juicero correctly points out, at least some material aspects of 8 these other references are cumulative of prior art that was already considered by the PTO. For 9 example, like Sheppard, U.S. Patent No. 4,442,767 (“Johnson”) discloses a press that contacts 10 fruit. Compare Johnson, 5:4-24 with Sheppard, 8:28-37. Similarly, European Patent No. 2 057 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 2 922 B1 (“Huber”) and WO Patent No. 03094680 (“Rasmussen”) disclose flexible, compressible 12 containers for fruit. See Huber, Abstract, ¶ 9; Rasmussen, 1:3-6. Prior art references considered 13 by the examiner, such as U.S. Patent Nos. 1,676,102, 2,688,914, 3,159,096, and 3,334,790, also 14 disclosed compressible containers. Accordingly, on balance, Defendants have failed to show that 15 there is a “substantial question” regarding the validity of the ’298 patent. 16 In sum, because Juicero is likely to succeed in showing that the ’298 patent is infringed 17 and Defendants are unlikely to succeed in its affirmative defenses or showing the ’298 patent is 18 invalid, Juicero’s likelihood of success is high. 19 20 ii. Balance of Hardships The balance of hardships weighs against granting a preliminary injunction. Juicero has 21 suspended operations and no longer seeks to sell the Juicero Press or its Produce Packs. Thus, at 22 most, the only hardship that Juicero stands to suffer is an alleged reduction in the value of the ’298 23 patent. As discussed above, this harm is speculative, and, if anything, unlikely. 24 25 By contrast, Defendants have moved forward with plans to bring the Juisir to market. According to iTaste, Liu Decl. ¶ 11, ECF 55-7. An injunction would cause 26 Id. According to Froothie, an injunction 27 28 would cause Nawfal Decl. ¶ 7, 12 1 ECF 44-7. This is not only because Froothie would be prevented from selling the Juisir, but also 2 because Id. 3 Id. Taken together, Defendants stand to suffer substantial hardship 4 5 if the Court were to issue a preliminary injunction. Thus, the balance of hardships weighs against 6 this result. 7 iii. Public Interest The public interest factor does not affect the outcome in this case. While it is true that 8 “[t]he public is best served by enforcing patents that are likely valid and infringed,” Abbott Labs v. 10 Andrx Pharm., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006), this principle is not without limit. The 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 9 Federal Circuit has directed that a “district court must weigh and measure each factor against the 12 other factors and against the form and magnitude of the relief requested.” Hybritech, 849 F.2d at 13 1451. If the public interest in protecting patent rights were a sufficient basis for granting an 14 injunction, “then a patentee would be entitled to an injunction any time a patent is found to be 15 valid and infringed.” Presidio Components Inc. v. Am. Tech. Ceramics Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 16 1284, 1339 (S.D. Cal. 2010), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 702 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012). This 17 cannot be correct. Further, it seems likely that granting an injunction here could work a small 18 disservice to the public because it would deprive the public of what may be its only option for 19 cold-press, no mess juicing: the Juisir. While it is possible that other companies do or will offer 20 this kind of juicer (or something comparable), it would hurt the public to restrict its choice in 21 solutions. Accordingly, this weakens the relative strength of the public interest in protecting 22 patent rights in this case. 23 IV. 24 CONCLUSION Accordingly, Juicero has failed to show that it stands to suffer irreparable harm, which 25 alone is sufficient to deny its motion. Nevertheless, even proceeding to assess the remaining 26 Winter factors, a preliminary injunction is not warranted. Although it appears that Juicero is likely 27 to succeed in showing that the ’298 patent is valid and infringed, it has not carried its burden in 28 demonstrating that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm or that the balance of hardships weighs in 13 1 2 its favor. For these reasons, the court DENIES Juicero’s motion for a preliminary injunction. IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 4 5 6 Dated: October 5, 2017 ______________________________________ ________ _ _______ _ _______ ____________________ __ ____ _ ______________ _ _ BETH LABSON FREEMAN LABSON S United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14

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