Sandigo v. OCWEN Loan Servicing, LLC et al

Filing 73

ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART 68 DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM NONDISPOSITIVE PRETRIAL ORDER OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE. Signed by Judge Beth Labson Freeman on 8/20/2018. (blflc2S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 8/20/2018)

1
2
3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

4

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

5

SAN JOSE DIVISION

6
7

PHYLLIS SANDIGO,
Plaintiff,

8
9
10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

Case No. 17-cv-02727-BLF

v.
OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING IN PART AND
GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
NONDISPOSITIVE PRETRIAL ORDER
OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
[Re: ECF 68]

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Defendant Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (“Defendant”) filed a Motion for Relief from
Magistrate Judge Nathanael M. Cousins’ Nondispositive Pretrial Order. Mot., ECF 68; Order, ECF
67. It argued, in part, that the Order as to Requests for Production Nos. 25 and 27 (“RFPs”)

disproportionately burdens Defendant because it requires production of certain Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act “complaints”—a term Defendant argues is undefined and might require
Defendant to review millions of documents. See Mot. at 5. This Court ordered additional briefing
on the issue. See ECF 69. In her response, Plaintiff Phyllis Sandigo (“Plaintiff”) argues that she
made Defendant aware that the term “complaints” is “limited to judicial or administrative actions
initiated against Defendant with the time period of 2016–2017.” Opp., ECF 70, at 1–2. For
purposes of resolving this discovery dispute, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s clarification that narrows
and defines “complaints” to include only “judicial or administrative actions.” In its reply,
Defendant argues that the requests are unduly burdensome, specifically because RFP No. 27
requests “all documents related to” such complaints, and because Defendant does not maintain
records that would easily allow it to determine which documents are relevant to the requests. See
Reply, ECF 71, at 1–2.

1

A district court may refer nondispositive pretrial matters to a magistrate judge under 28

2

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The district court “may reconsider any pretrial matter under this

3

subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is clearly erroneous or

4

contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). On review of a

5

nondispositive order, “the magistrate’s factual determinations are reviewed for clear error, and the

6

magistrate’s legal conclusions are reviewed to determine whether they are contrary to law.” Perry

7

v. Schwarzenegger, 268 F.R.D. 344, 348 (N.D. Cal. 2010). This standard is highly deferential—

8

the district judge may not simply substitute his or her judgment for that of the magistrate judge.

9

Grimes v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 241 (9th Cir. 1991).

10

In regard to RFP No. 25, Judge Cousins clearly applied the appropriate legal standard

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) in determining whether the RFP was disproportionate to the needs

12

of the case, as he limited the relevant RFPs with respect to the time period. Moreover, Judge

13

Cousins’ Order was a proper exercise of his discretion and was not contrary to law, given that the

14

term “complaints” is limited to “judicial or administrative actions initiated against Ocwen” from

15

2016 to 2017 (Opp. at 4). See Grimes, 951 F.2d at 241 (“The reviewing court may not simply

16

substitute its judgment for that of the deciding court.”).

17

However, the Court is concerned that the Order may not have properly applied the

18

proportionality standard to RFP No. 27. RFP No. 27 requests “ALL DOCUMENTS RELATED

19

TO any complaints regarding any state attorney general’s office against YOU, regarding credit

20

reporting, including YOUR investigation in response to those complaints . . . .” Defendant argues

21

that RFP No. 27 is so broad as to require it to produce all documents it has reviewed in relation to

22

any such complaints. See Reply at 1. It suggests that in regard to state agency complaints, vast

23

numbers of its 1.3 million loan servicing files could be implicated, which would “cripple Ocwen’s

24

business operations.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff argues that the Order considered these arguments and

25

rejected them under the proper legal standard and that this Court should not merely substitute its

26

judgment for that of the Magistrate Judge. See Opp. at 2–3.

27
28

At this juncture, the Court is unable to determine whether Defendant is crying wolf or
whether there are so many attorney general complaints that Defendant’s response to RFP No. 27
2

1

would overwhelm the company. In order to insure that Rule 26’s proportionality standard is

2

properly considered, and in light of the fact that fact discovery extends to November 30, 2018 and

3

trial is set for June 24, 2019, the Court will bifurcate this portion of the discovery request.

4

Defendant shall fully respond to RFP No. 25 no later than September 10, 2018. Thereafter,

5

Plaintiff shall identify those complaints as to which she requests production under RFP No. 27.

6

Defendant’s response will be due 30 days later. If Defendant continues to object based on lack of

7

proportionality, it may reassert that objection to Judge Cousins. At that point, the Court will be

8

able to realistically assess the number of responsive documents involved and the number of loan

9

files implicated.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for relief is DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN

10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12

PART.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

13
14
15
16

Dated: August 20, 2018
______________________________________
BETH LABSON FREEMAN
United States District Judge

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
3