Arunachalam v. United States Patent and Trademark Office et al

Filing 35

ORDER granting 18 Motion to Dismiss; denying 26 Motion to Disqualify Judge. The Clerk shall close this file. Signed by Judge Edward J. Davila on 09/14/2017. (ejdlc3, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/14/2017) Modified on 9/14/2017 (ejdlc1S, COURT STAFF).

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN JOSE DIVISION

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LAKSHMI ARUNACHALAM,

Case No. 5:17-cv-03325-EJD

United States District Court
Northern District of California

Plaintiff,
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

v.
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UNITED STATES PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, et al.,

RE: DKT. NOS. 18, 26

Defendants.

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I. INTRODUCTION

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Pending before the Court are two motions. First, Plaintiff Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam

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(“Plaintiff”) seeks recusal of the undersigned judge pursuant to Judicial Canons 2 and 3 and 28

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U.S.C.§§144, 455. Although the basis for Plaintiff’s motion is not entirely clear, it appears that

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Plaintiff’s assertions of lack of impartiality, bias, and prejudice are based upon rulings by the

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undersigned that Plaintiff perceives as unfavorable. The motion is denied. Judicial rulings are not

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a proper ground for recusal. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).

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Second, Defendants United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), Patent Trial

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and Appeal Board (“PTAB”), and United States move to dismiss Plaintiff Dr. Lakshmi

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Arunachalam’s complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and (b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. The Court finds it

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appropriate to take the motion under submission for decision without oral argument pursuant to

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Case No.: 5:17-cv-03325-EJD
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
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Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

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GRANTED.

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II. BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff’s complaint in this case is substantially similar to the complaints filed in

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Arunanchalam v. U.S. et al, C16-6591 EJD and Arunanchalam v. Andrews et al, C17-3383 EJD.

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Plaintiff alleges that she is an inventor and owns several patents relating to technology underlying

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Web applications, and that she has been deprived of her patents in violation of her constitutional

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rights. Plaintiff asserts claims for breach of contract, treason, conspiracy and denial of due

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process, which are all predicated on actions taken by the PTAB during its review of Plaintiff’s
patents. Among other things, Plaintiff alleges that the PTAB denied her electronic filing

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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privileges, refused to docket her pleadings, and issued rulings that were adverse to her. In the

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prayer for relief, Plaintiff seeks to void all USPTO and PTAB orders against her, and requests an

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award of damages in excess of $250 billion.

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III. STANDARDS

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Rule 12(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P., allows a defendant to challenge a court’s subject matter

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jurisdiction. A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of

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claims alleged in the complaint. Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th

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Cir. 1995). Dismissal “is proper only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of

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sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732

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(9th Cir. 2001). The complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

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Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

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Pro se pleadings must be construed liberally. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th

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Cir. 2000). The Court “need not give a plaintiff the benefit of every conceivable doubt” but “is

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required only to draw every reasonable or warranted factual inference in the plaintiff’s favor.”

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McKinney v. De Bord, 507 F.2d 501, 504 (9th Cir. 1974). The Court “should use common sense

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in interpreting the frequently diffuse pleadings of pro se complainants.” Id. A pro se complaint

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Case No.: 5:17-cv-03325-EJD
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
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should not be dismissed unless the court finds it “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

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of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

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519, 521 (1972).
IV. DISCUSSION

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Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco,

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502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (federal judges have absolute immunity from civil liability for acts taken

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in their judicial capacity); see also Jones v. U.S. Supreme Court, 2010 WL 2975790 (N.D. Cal.

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2010) (judicial immunity bars claims that are based upon allegations concerning judicial officer’s

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decision-making while presiding over cases and acts performed in judicial capacity). Judicial
immunity applies even where “the action [the judge] took was in error, was done maliciously, or

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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was in excess of his authority; rather he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the

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‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828

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F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987), quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978). In

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Butz v. Economou, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), the Supreme Court extended judicial immunity to

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administrative judges, reasoning that “adjudication within a federal administrative agency shares

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enough of the characteristics of the judicial process that those who participate in such adjudication

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should also be immune from suits from damages.”
In the present case, Plaintiff alleges that the PTAB judges denied her electronic filing

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privileges, refused to docket her pleadings, and issued rulings in contravention of the doctrines of

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patent prosecution history estoppel and res judicata. The PTAB was clearly acting within its

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judicial capacity when taking these alleged actions. Accordingly, judicial immunity applies.

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Further, sovereign immunity applies to claims against the United States or its agencies. United

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States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983); see also Balser v. Dept. of Justice, 327 F.3d 903, 907

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(9th Cir. 2003) (any lawsuit against an agency of the U.S. is an action against the U.S.).

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Case No.: 5:17-cv-03325-EJD
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
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V. CONCLUSION

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Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Because any amendment to the complaint

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would be futile, the dismissal is with prejudice. Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293,

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1298 (9th Cir. 1998); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 14, 2017
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EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Case No.: 5:17-cv-03325-EJD
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
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