Bush v. Vaco Technology Services, LLC et al

Filing 103

Order by Judge Beth Labson Freeman Denying 97 Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, to Strike. (mdllcS, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/12/2020)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN JOSE DIVISION

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CHRISTIANA BUSH,

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Plaintiff,
v.

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VACO TECHNOLOGY SERVICES, LLC,
et al.,

United States District Court
Northern District of California

Defendants.
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Case No. 17-cv-05605-BLF
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, TO STRIKE CLASS
CLAIMS FROM THE FOURTH
AMENDED COMPLAINT
[Re: ECF 97]

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Plaintiff Christina Bush brings this putative class action against Vaco Technology

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Services, LLC (“VTS”) and Google, LLC (“Google”), alleging various wage and hour violations

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by both Defendants. The complaint in this case has now undergone three rounds of motions to

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dismiss and amendment. Now before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the

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Alternative, to Strike Class Claims from the Fourth Amended Complaint. ECF 97. The matter is

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fully briefed and suitable for decision without oral argument. For the reasons that follow, the

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Court DENIES Defendants’ motion.

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I.

BACKGROUND
As in prior motions to dismiss, the issue in the instant motion is the scope of Plaintiff’s

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putative classes. The Court has thrice dismissed Plaintiff’s class claims on the ground that

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Plaintiff’s factual allegations were insufficient to support claims brought on behalf of broadly-

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defined classes. See Bush v. Vaco Tech. Servs., LLC, No. 17-CV-05605-BLF, 2018 WL 2047807,

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at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2018) (order regarding First Amended Complaint); Bush v. Vaco Tech.

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Servs., LLC, No. 17-CV-05605-BLF, 2018 WL 6308193, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2018) (order

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regarding Second Amended Complaint); Bush v. Vaco Tech. Servs., LLC, No. 17-CV-05605-BLF,

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2019 WL 3290654, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2019) (order regarding Third Amended Complaint).

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For instance, in the Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), Plaintiff sought to represent a class of

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“All persons directly employed by Vaco who worked in hourly or non-exempt positions in

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California” (the “Vaco Class”). ECF 65 (“TAC”) ¶ 13. As the Court repeatedly explained,

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Plaintiff’s allegations of misconduct by Defendants were specific to her experiences and job duties

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at Google. See 2018 WL 6308193 at *3; 2019 WL 3290654 at *5; 2019 WL 3290654 at *5.

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Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants had the same policies and practices as to class members

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working at other companies and performing other job duties were conclusory and therefore not

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plausible. See, e.g., In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (A court

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need not accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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unreasonable inferences.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The Court gave Plaintiff multiple opportunities to allege additional facts supporting her

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proposed classes. Finally, in its order regarding the Third AC, the Court found that Plaintiff’s

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proposed classes remained too broad, and that further leave to amend the factual allegations would

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be futile. 2019 WL 3290654 at *5. The Court held that Plaintiff’s claims could proceed only on

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behalf of a narrowed class:

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Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a putative class (or three distinct
classes) of individuals who were employed at Google in each of
Plaintiff’s three prior roles: Expedition Team Leader, Order Audit
Operation Specialist, and Content Bug Technician. As such,
Defendants’ motions are GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
for Plaintiff to narrow her class allegations to those encompassing
only employees staffed in these three positions.
2019 WL 3290654 at *6.
Plaintiff has now filed the Fourth Amended Complaint (“4AC”). ECF 87 (“4AC”). The

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4AC alleges three nationwide classes: (1) the “Google Expedition Class,” (2) the “Order Audit

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Operation Specialist Class,” and (3) the “Content Bug Technician Class.” Id. ¶ 13. The 4AC also

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alleges four California Sub-Classes: one corresponding to each of the nationwide classes—the

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“Google Expedition California Sub-Class,” the “Order Audit Operation Specialist California Sub-

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Class, and the “Content Bug Technician California Sub-Class”—and a UCL class combining the

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other three. Id. In her briefing on the instant motion, Plaintiff “withdraws the national classes

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plead [sic] in the 4th AC as to the Order Audit Operations [sic] Specialist and Content Bug
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Technician claims.” ECF 98 (“Opp.”) at 1. Accordingly, the only nationwide class remaining in

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the 4AC is the Google Expedition Class, which Defendants do not challenge.

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II.

DISCUSSION
Defendants’ motion concerns only the Order Audit Operation Specialist and Content Bug

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Technician California Sub-Classes.1 ECF 97 (“Mot.”) at 2. The 4AC defines these classes as

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follows:
Order Audit Operation Specialist California Sub-Class: All
persons employed directly by Google and/or through any staffing
agencies (including Vaco) who input data into Google system
concerning which movies and television shows to go live in California
during the Relevant Time Period.

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Content Bug Technician California Sub-Class: All persons
employed directly by Google and/or through any staffing agencies
(including Vaco) who conducted quality assurance for YouTube Live
in California during the Relevant Time Period.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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4AC ¶ 13. Defendants argue these sub-classes are overbroad for two reasons. First, Defendants
object to the inclusion of persons “employed . . . through any staffing agencies.” Mot. at 3.
According to Defendants, this Court has already ruled that Plaintiff cannot represent individuals
hired through staffing agencies other than VTS. Id. Second, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s

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class definitions are “amorphous” and based on “imprecise job duties,” and are therefore in

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contravention of this Court’s prior order requiring Plaintiff to narrow these classes to encompass

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only individuals employed as Order Audit Operation Specialists and Content Bug Technicians,
respectively.

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As the first argument, Defendants believe this Court has already rejected Plaintiff’s
attempts to represent individuals hired through staffing agencies other than VTS. Mot. at 3 (citing

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2018 WL 6308193 at *3). It is true that this Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against

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“all Vaco Defendants except VTS” because Plaintiff’s allegations were “limited to one staffing

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agency—VTS.” 2018 WL 6308193 at *3. In other words, Plaintiff’s factual allegations regarding

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VTS’s actions were insufficient to support an inference that staffing agencies other than VTS

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Defendants’ arguments regarding the nationwide Order Audit Operation Specialist and Content
Bug Technician Classes are moot, as Plaintiff has withdrawn those classes. See Opp. at 1.
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committed similar violations.
Google, however, may be liable for violations committed against individuals hired through

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other staffing agencies. As the 4AC makes clear, Plaintiff is pursuing a theory of joint employer

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liability against Google. 4AC ¶¶ 21-26; see Johnson v. Serenity Transportation, Inc., 141 F. Supp.

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3d 974, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (joint employer doctrine available under both the Fair Labor

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Standards Act and California’s labor laws). The joint employer doctrine recognizes that “a worker

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may be employed by more than one entity at the same time.” Guifu Li v. A Perfect Day

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Franchise, Inc, 281 F.R.D. 373, 400 (N.D. Cal. 2012). If that is the case, each of the employers is

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subject to obligations under the Fair Labor Standards Act and California’s labor laws. See id.;
Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists, Inc., 220 Cal. App. 4th 701, 728 (2013) (explaining that

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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California law “imposes an affirmative obligation on every employer”—i.e., all joint employers—

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“to authorize and provide legally required meal and rest breaks”). Hence, Google’s liability is not

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necessarily limited to individuals were hired through VTS; it may extend to individuals hired

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through another staffing agency or directly by Google. The Court therefore DENIES the motion

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to dismiss or strike the sub-classes to the extent they represent persons “employed . . . through any

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staffing agencies.”

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The Court likewise rejects Defendants’ second objection. The Court is satisfied that

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Plaintiff has complied with the Court’s instruction to narrow the classes to the three roles Plaintiff

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held at Google. Although Plaintiff has used job duties rather than job titles to define the sub-

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classes, the Court believes the sub-classes are sufficiently definite to advance past the pleading

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stage. Courts have repeatedly allowed classes to be defined by job duties. See, e.g., Frausto v.

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Bank of Am., Nat’l Ass’n, No. 18-CV-01202-LB, 2019 WL 6493983, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3,

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2019); Lewis v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 08-02670 CW, 2009 WL 1033823, at *3 (N.D. Cal.

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Apr. 16, 2009). The proposed class definitions are not “so vague or ambiguous that Defendant[s]

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cannot reasonably prepare a response” to the 4AC or participate in pre-certification discovery.

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Lewis, 2009 WL 1033823, at *3; see also In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Wage & Hour Litig., 505 F.

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Supp. 2d 609, 614-15 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (denying as premature defendants’ motion to dismiss or

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strike the class allegations on the ground that “a fact-intensive inquiry” is necessary “in order to
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determine the scope of each putative subclass”). Through discovery, Plaintiff should further refine

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the precise job duties and titles of putative class members. Any further objections regarding class

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definition may then be brought at the class certification stage.

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For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Strike
Class Claims from the Fourth Amended Complaint is hereby DENIED.

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Dated: February 12, 2020
______________________________________
BETH LABSON FREEMAN
United States District Judge

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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