AdTrader, Inc. v. Google LLC

Filing 150

ORDER DENYING SEALING MOTIONS AT ECF 132 AND 142 . Signed by Judge Beth Labson Freeman on 5/8/2019. (blflc3S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/8/2019)

Download PDF
1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 ADTRADER, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, 8 GOOGLE LLC, [Re: ECF 132, 142] Defendant. 11 United States District Court Northern District of California ORDER DENYING SEALING MOTIONS AT ECF 132 AND 142 v. 9 10 Case No. 17-cv-07082-BLF 12 13 Before the Court are two related administrative motions to seal portions of the briefing and 14 exhibits in connection with Plaintiffs’ motion for subsequent case management conference. 15 ECF 132, 142. Plaintiffs’ motion at ECF 132 seeks to seal portions of five documents based 16 solely on Google’s designations—i.e., Google is the sole designating party. See Plaintiffs’ Motion 17 at 1, ECF 132. Plaintiffs argue that neither good cause nor compelling reasons exist to seal any of 18 this information. See id. Google’s response (which was filed as a motion) at ECF 142 seeks to 19 seal narrowed portions of only three of the five documents. See Google’s Motion at 1, ECF 142. 20 21 22 For the reasons stated below, both motions to seal are DENIED. I. LEGAL STANDARD “Historically, courts have recognized a ‘general right to inspect and copy public records 23 and documents, including judicial records and documents.’” Kamakana v. City & Cty. Of 24 Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 25 U.S. 589, 597 & n. 7 (1978)). Accordingly, when considering a sealing request, “a ‘strong 26 presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.” Id. (quoting Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 27 Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). Parties seeking to seal judicial records relating to 28 motions that are “more than tangentially related to the underlying cause of action” bear the burden 1 of overcoming the presumption with “compelling reasons” that outweigh the general history of 2 access and the public policies favoring disclosure. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., 809 F.3d 3 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2016); Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178–79. However, “while protecting the public’s interest in access to the courts, we must remain 5 mindful of the parties’ right to access those same courts upon terms which will not unduly harm 6 their competitive interest.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 727 F.3d 1214, 1228–29 (Fed. 7 Cir. 2013). Records attached to motions that are “not related, or only tangentially related, to the 8 merits of a case” therefore are not subject to the strong presumption of access. Ctr. for Auto 9 Safety, 809 F.3d at 1099; see also Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (“[T]he public has less of a need 10 for access to court records attached only to non-dispositive motions because those documents are 11 United States District Court Northern District of California 4 often unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action.”). Parties moving 12 to seal the documents attached to such motions must meet the lower “good cause” standard of 13 Rule 26(c). Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (internal quotations and citations omitted). This 14 standard requires a “particularized showing,” id., that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the 15 information is disclosed. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 16 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by 17 specific examples of articulated reasoning” will not suffice. Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 18 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992). A protective order sealing the documents during discovery 19 may reflect the court’s previous determination that good cause exists to keep the documents 20 sealed, see Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179–80, but a blanket protective order that allows the parties 21 to designate confidential documents does not provide sufficient judicial scrutiny to determine 22 whether each particular document should remain sealed. See Civ. L.R. 79-5(d)(1)(A) (“Reference 23 to a stipulation or protective order that allows a party to designate certain documents as 24 confidential is not sufficient to establish that a document, or portions thereof, are sealable.”). 25 In addition to making particularized showings of good cause, parties moving to seal 26 documents must comply with the procedures established by Civ. L.R. 79-5. Pursuant to Civ. L.R. 27 79-5(b), a sealing order is appropriate only upon a request that establishes the document is 28 “sealable,” or “privileged or protectable as a trade secret or otherwise entitled to protection under 2 1 the law.” “The request must be narrowly tailored to seek sealing only of sealable material, and 2 must conform with Civil L.R. 79-5(d).” Civ. L.R. 79-5(b). In part, Civ. L.R. 79-5(d) requires the 3 submitting party to attach a “proposed order that is narrowly tailored to seal only the sealable 4 material” which “lists in table format each document or portion thereof that is sought to be 5 sealed,” Civ. L.R. 79-5(d)(1)(b), and an “unredacted version of the document” that indicates “by 6 highlighting or other clear method, the portions of the document that have been omitted from the 7 redacted version.” Civ. L.R. 79-5(d)(1)(d). “Within 4 days of the filing of the Administrative 8 Motion to File Under Seal, the Designating Party must file a declaration as required by subsection 9 79-5(d)(1)(A) establishing that all of the designated material is sealable.” Civ. L.R. 79-5(e)(1). 10 II. DISCUSSION United States District Court Northern District of California 11 The instant sealing motions are brought in connection with documents that do not relate to 12 the merits of the case, and thus the “good cause” standard applies. Google’s proposed redactions 13 are directed to a specific monetary amount that Google apparently is seeking to issue as a credit to 14 certain advertisers using Google’s platform. Plaintiffs argue that “the amount of [Google’s] 15 proposed refund is not the type of information that courts keep hidden from the public” and that 16 Google has not shown good cause to seal the specific amount. See Opp’n at 1, ECF 145. 17 The Court agrees that the specific monetary amount and surrounding proposed redactions 18 are not subject to sealing. Google’s declaration in support of sealing claims that “[p]ublic 19 disclosure of this information would cause significant competitive harm to Google.” See Chang 20 Decl. ¶ 4, ECF 142-1. However, the “good cause” standard requires a “particularized showing”— 21 that “specific prejudice or harm will result” if the information is disclosed, see Phillips ex rel. 22 Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, Google 23 asserts only broad allegations of harm tied to the specific monetary amount and surrounding 24 proposed redactions, “unsubstantiated by specific examples of articulated reasoning.” See 25 Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992). Indeed, “[t]he mere fact 26 that the [information to be sealed] may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or 27 exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” 28 Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006). Such is the case 3 1 here. The Court’s rulings on the sealing requests are set forth in the table below. 2 3 ECF No. Document to be Sealed: 4 132-3 142-6 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Subsequent Case Management Conference and Motion for Rule 23(d) Relief 5 6 7 10 132-5 142-7 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 13 Declaration of Randolph DENIED as to the Gaw in support of portion identified at Plaintiffs’ Motion 1:19. DENIED as to the remainder. 12 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Google has failed to show good cause to seal the identified portions. Google, the designating party, does not seek to seal the remainder of this document. Ex. 1 to Gaw Declaration DENIED. Google, the designating party, does not seek to seal this document. See ECF 142 at 1. 132-8 Ex. 2 to Gaw Declaration DENIED. Google, the designating party, does not seek to seal this document. See ECF 142 at 1. 16 17 Google, the designating party, does not seek to seal the remainder of this document. 132-6 14 15 Reasoning DENIED as to the Google has failed to show good portions identified at cause to seal the identified 1:9, 1:15-16, 3:10, 3:24, portions. 5:1. DENIED as to the remainder. 8 9 Result 132-10 Ex. 3 to Gaw Declaration DENIED as to the 142-8 portions identified at 86:7, 86:12-15, 86:2122, 86:24, 102:5, 102:17-18, 229:3-15, 229: 9-22, 295:10- 23, 296:2, 296:4, 296:7, 296:9- 22, 302:3-17, 303:1. DENIED as to the remainder. 25 26 27 28 4 Google has failed to show good cause to seal the identified portions. Google, the designating party, does not seek to seal the remainder of this document. 1 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion at ECF 132 is DENIED, and Google’s motion 2 at ECF 142 is DENIED. The submitting party must file the unredacted documents into the public 3 record no earlier than 4 days and no later than 10 days from the filing of this order. Civ. L.R. 79- 4 5(e)(2). 5 6 7 8 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: May 8, 2019 ______________________________________ BETH LABSON FREEMAN United States District Judge 10 United States District Court Northern District of California 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 5

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?