Hilltop Ranch and Vineyard, LLC v. County of Monterey et al

Filing 20

ORDER SEVERING AND REMANDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS TO STATE COURT; STAYING FEDERAL CASE; TERMINATING 10 DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS AS MOOT AND VACATING HEARING SCHEDULED FOR MARCH 29, 2018. Signed by Judge Beth Labson Freeman on 2/23/2018. (blflc2S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 2/23/2018)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN JOSE DIVISION

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HILLTOP RANCH AND VINEYARD,
LLC,
Plaintiff,

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

v.
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COUNTY OF MONTEREY, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-00415-BLF
ORDER SEVERING AND REMANDING
PETITION FOR WRIT OF
ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS;
STAYING FEDERAL CASE;
TERMINATING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS AS MOOT

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On December 15, 2017, Plaintiff Hilltop Ranch and Vineyard, LLC (“Hilltop”) filed a

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Verified Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus and Complaint in the Monterey County

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Superior Court. See ECF 1 at 7-20. On January 19, 2018, Defendant County of Monterey

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(hereafter, the “County”) removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal

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question jurisdiction, because the Complaint contains a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

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§ 1983, as well as alleged violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

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Constitution. See ECF 1.

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On January 26, 2018, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) Why the Court

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Should not Sever and Remand the Petition for Writ of Mandate to State Court, and set a briefing

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schedule. See ECF 9. The Court informed the parties that if it determines that partial remand is

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appropriate, it would stay the federal claims pending resolution of the writ of mandate proceeding.

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Id. The County responded, arguing that Hilltop’s constitutional claims are so intertwined with its

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claim for administrative mandamus, that to sever and stay the federal due process claims would

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result in duplicative litigation and risk obtaining conflicting results. See ECF 14.1 The County

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does not explain how there would be potentially duplicative results if the federal claims were

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stayed while the overlapping issues in relation to the mandamus action proceeded in state court.

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Hilltop responded to the OSC as well, and requested that the Court sever and remand the

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administrative mandamus action brought pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”)

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§ 1094.5 because it is an exclusively state procedural remedy involving complex issues of state

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law. See ECF 18. Moreover, Hilltop pointed out that its claims not only implicate the federal

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Constitution but also arise under Article I, § 7 of the California Constitution. Id. at 3 (“That
Hilltop insists its due process rights were violated under the United States Constitution does not

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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vitiate or obfuscate Hilltop’s claims brought pursuant to the California Constitution and CCP §

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1094.5.”)

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The parties agree that it is within the discretion of the Court to exercise supplemental

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jurisdiction over the California mandamus action. See ECF 14, 18. CCP § 1094.5 “is a state

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remedy, not a federal remedy,” and this Court therefore “has no jurisdiction to hear [a 1094.5]

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claim.” Clemes v. Del Norte County Unified School District, 843 F. Supp. 583, 596 (N.D.Cal.

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1994), overruled on other grounds by Maynard v. City of San Jose, 37 F. 3d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir.

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1994). The only basis for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over Hilltop’s administrative

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mandamus claim is to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
A federal court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

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Section 1367(a) provides that “in any civil action of which the district courts have original

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jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so

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related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case

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Regardless of how the County characterizes Hilltop’s claims, the County cannot dispute that the
petition for writ of administrative mandamus is a state law claim. Even if the asserted bases for
issuance of the writ are the County’s alleged violations of both federal and state law, the claim
remains a state law claim. See Rains v. Criterion Systems, Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 346 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding when a state law claim “can be supported by alternative and independent
theories—one of which is a state law theory and one of which is a federal law theory—federal
question jurisdiction does not attach because federal law is not a necessary element of the claim”).
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or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Under

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§ 1367(c), however, a district court has the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental

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jurisdiction over a state law claim where one or more of the following circumstances exists:

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(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

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(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district
court has original jurisdiction,

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(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). The Ninth Circuit has held that § 1367 requires that the court exercise

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supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to § 1367(a) unless such exercise would destroy diversity

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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jurisdiction or one of the specifically enumerated exceptions set forth in § 1367(c) applies.

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Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 24 F.3d 1545, 1555-

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56 (9th Cir. 1994). While discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law

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claims is triggered by the presence of one of the conditions in § 1367(c), that discretion is further

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informed by “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity”—the Gibbs factors. Acri v.

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Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997); see United Mine Workers of Am. v.

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Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

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The Court finds that § 1367(c)(1) and (4) apply to the administrative mandamus claim in

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this case. Hilltop’s petition for a writ of mandate pursuant to CCP § 1094.5 involves complex

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issues of state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). CCP § 1094.5 provides a state procedure by which to

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challenge an administrative decision through a writ of administrative mandamus. See, e.g.,

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Environmental Prot. Info. Ctr. v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Prot., 44 Cal.4th 459, 516,

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80 Cal.Rptr.3d 28, 187 P.3d 888 (2008) (“Administrative agency decisions in which discretion is

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exercised may generally be challenged by a writ of administrative mandamus pursuant to Code of

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Civil Procedure section 1094.5.”). This is exclusively a state procedural remedy, and involves

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complex issues of state law. See, e.g., Tomlinson v. County of Monterey, 2007 WL 2298038, at *2

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(N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2007) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a mandamus claim,

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noting that “grounds to decline jurisdiction over plaintiff’s mandamus action exist under 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1367(c)(1),” and “[s]imply because other courts have elected to decide state mandamus claims ...

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does not persuade this court that it should do the same”); City Limits of N. Nev., Inc. v. County of

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Sacramento, 2006 WL 2868950, at *3, (E.D. Cal. Oct.5, 2006) (declining to exercise supplemental

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jurisdiction over a mandamus claim pursuant to § 1367(c)(1) because the “state claim involves

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mandamus proceedings that are uniquely in the interest and domain of state courts.”)

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Accordingly, even if Hilltop is ultimately able to plead a federal civil rights claim in this

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Court, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Hilltop’s state law mandamus

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claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1).

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The Court further finds that issues of “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity” weigh in favor of remanding the administrative mandamus action to state court. “A

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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California citizen is suing a California governmental entity under California law.” Mory v. City of

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Chula Vista, 2011 WL 777914 at *2 (S.D. Cal. March 1, 2011). As such, California has an

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overwhelming interest in adjudicating the administrative mandamus action in its state courts. Id.

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Even if this Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the California mandamus action

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while the federal claims are pending, doing so “raises serious considerations regarding comity and

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federalism.” Clemes, 843 F.Supp. at 596. Federal district courts routinely decline to exercise

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supplemental jurisdiction over California writ of mandate claims for reasons of judicial economy,

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convenience, fairness, and comity. See, e.g., Mory, 2011 WL 777914 at *2 (S.D. Cal. March 1,

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2011); Fresno Unified Sch. Dist. v. K.U. ex rel. A.D.U., 980 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1184 (E.D. Cal.

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2013); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. City of Walnut Creek, 428 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2006).

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Thus, in addition to the complex issues of state law raised by the petition, “other

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compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction” also exist. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4); see also Clemes,

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843 F. Supp. 596 (finding that “[i]t would be entirely inappropriate for a federal court, through

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exercise of its supplemental jurisdiction, to impose itself upon [writ of mandate] proceedings.”)

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

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Hilltop’s petition for writ of administrative mandamus. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), (4). Since the

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state claim involves mandamus proceedings that are uniquely in the interest and domain of state

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courts, and the parties do not dispute that the Court may decline to exercise supplemental
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jurisdiction, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
(1)

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The administrative mandamus petition is hereby SEVERED and REMANDED to
the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Monterey;

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(2)

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Because the administrative mandamus action and Hilltop’s civil complaint seek to

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remedy alleged harm that the parties agree are “intertwined” with each other, the

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Court STAYS the remaining federal action in its entirety pending the outcome of

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the administrative mandamus proceeding in state court;
(3)

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proceeding within seven (7) days of a decision;

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(4)

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The County’s pending Motion to Dismiss is TERMINATED AS MOOT and may
be re-filed or re-noticed within fourteen (14) days of the lifting of the stay;2

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

Hilltop is hereby ORDERED to notify this Court of the outcome of the mandamus

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The Clerk is directed to sever only the petition for writ of administrative mandamus
from this action and remand it to the Monterey County Superior Court.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: February 23, 2018
______________________________________
BETH LABSON FREEMAN
United States District Judge

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The hearing on the County’s motion to dismiss scheduled for March 29, 2018 is VACATED
accordingly and will be rescheduled upon the County re-filing or re-noticing a motion to dismiss.
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