Acosta v. California Highway Patrol

Filing 80

ORDER DENYING 66 MOTION TO REMAND TO STATE COURT. Signed by Judge Beth Labson Freeman on 09/12/2019.(blflc3S, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 9/12/2019)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN JOSE DIVISION

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CRISTOBAL ACOSTA,
Plaintiff,

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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
REMAND TO STATE COURT

v.
CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, et al.,
Defendants.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

Case No. 18-cv-00958-BLF

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Before the Court is Cristobal Acosta’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion To Remand Entire Action To

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State Court. Motion, ECF 66. On August 19, 2019, mere weeks before the long-scheduled trial

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date in this action, Plaintiff filed his motion for remand on the ground that because this Court has

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granted summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff’s federal claims, leaving only state law claims, the

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Court should exercise its discretion and remain the entire case to state court. See id. For the reasons

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discussed below, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

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I.

BACKGROUND

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On the night of January 8, 2017, Plaintiff sat in his car stopped at the side of the road with a

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mechanical breakdown that caused “backfiring.” Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶ 5, ECF

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39. Two California Highway Patrol (“CHP”) officers responded to an on-duty sergeant’s report of

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an explosion from the car or possible “shots fired,” and approached Plaintiff’s stopped car. Hill

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Decl. ¶ 2-4, Ex. 2 to ECF 45-1. After hearing a loud sound coming from Plaintiff’s car, one officer

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exclaimed “Shots fired!” and “Get back.” See generally Morasco Decl. ECF 46-5, Bleisch Decl.

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ECF 46-3. After hearing a second loud sound from Plaintiff’s car seconds later, both officers opened

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fire, believing that the loud sounds coming from Plaintiff’s car were gunfire. Id. One of the bullets

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struck Plaintiff. Hill Decl. ¶ 9. There is no evidence that Plaintiff possessed a gun during the

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encounter.

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Arising from the incident described above, Plaintiff filed this action in California state court

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on January 17, 2018, against the CHP, Sergeant Daniel Hill, Officer David Morasco, Jr., and Officer

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Jonas Bleisch (collectively, “Defendants”). See Compl., Ex. A to Notice of Removal, ECF 1. On

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February 14, 2018, Defendants removed the action to federal court. See Notice of Removal.

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Plaintiff brought the following five causes of action:

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(1) Violation of Civil Rights secured by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (against Officers Morasco and Bleisch);

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(2) False Arrest and Imprisonment pursuant to Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 815.2(a) & 820.4 (against

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the CHP and Officers Morasco and Bleisch);

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(3) Battery pursuant to California state law and Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2(a) (against the CHP

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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and Officers Morasco and Bleisch);

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(4) Violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 (against the CHP and

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Officers Morasco and Bleisch); and

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(5) Negligence under California law and Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 815.2(a) & 820.4

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(against all Defendants).

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See generally SAC. On September 6, 2018, this Court issued its Case Management Order,

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setting this matter for jury trial on September 30, 2019. ECF Doc 34.

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Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on January 24, 2019, seeking judgment

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in their favor on all claims. See ECF 45. The Court held a hearing on Defendants’ motion for

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summary judgment on May 2, 2019. On June 24, 2019, this Court issued its Order Granting in Part

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and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing all of Plaintiff’s

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federal claims and leaving only Plaintiff’s state-law claims for battery1 and negligence. ECF 58.

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In their Opposition to this Motion, Defendants inform the Court that “Plaintiff’s counsel has

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recently advised [Defendants’ counsel] that Plaintiff is abandoning his state-law Battery claim.”
Opp’n. at 4, n. 1. Whether or not the battery claim remains in this case does not impact the
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Plaintiff has chosen not to appeal the Court’s Summary Judgment Order. Motion at 3.

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On August 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed this Motion. Three days later, on August 22, 2019, this

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Court held its Final Pretrial Conference. ECF 75. On September 3, 2019, Defendants filed their

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opposition to the motion for remand. Opp’n, ECF 78. Plaintiff did not file a reply brief. Jury

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selection is to commence on September 27, 2019—two weeks from the date of this Order.

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II.

LEGAL STANDARD

28 U.S.C. § 1331 gives original jurisdiction to the federal court where a civil action arises

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under federal law, while 28 U.S.C. § 1441 establishes when cases brought in a state court of which

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the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed to federal courts.

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District courts have the power to extend their jurisdiction over state-law claims when those claims

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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“derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” as the federal-law claims, “such that [a plaintiff]

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would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.” Mine Workers v. Gibbs,

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383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).

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28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) allows district courts to decline supplemental jurisdiction where “(1)

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the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over

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the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has

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dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there

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are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). But, § 1367(c) does

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not require district courts to relinquish jurisdiction. “The decision whether to continue to exercise

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supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed lies

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within the district court’s discretion.” Satey v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 521 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th

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Cir. 2008) (quoting Foster v. Wilson, 504 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007)); see also Anderson v.

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Allstate Ins. Co., 630 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1980) (“It is […] well-established that the dismissal of

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the federal claim does not deprive a federal court of the power to adjudicate the remaining pendent

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state claims.”).

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In deciding whether to maintain jurisdiction over the state claims, courts “should consider

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Court’s decision on whether to remand this case to California state court.
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and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy,

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convenience, fairness, and comity” and should decline the exercise of jurisdiction “[w]hen the

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balance of these factors indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as when the federal-law

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claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain.”

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Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (emphasis added).
III.

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In his Motion, Plaintiff’s sole argument for remand is that “factors of fairness and comity

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weigh heavily in favor of remand” because “Plaintiff’s negligence claim, which survived summary

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judgment, is grounded in state law.” Motion at 4. In Plaintiff’s view, “[a]ny inefficiency caused by

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the fact that two different courts would end up presiding over this case would be greatly outweighed

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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DISCUSSION

by the advantages, in terms of fairness and comity, of having the state court preside over a uniquely

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state law claim.” Id. at 5. Defendants respond that “[a]t this late stage of this litigation, where the

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parties are literally days away from beginning the trial of this matter, judicial economy and fairness

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weigh in favor of this Court retaining pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s negligence claim and

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proceeding to trial on September 27, 2019.” Opp’n at 3. The Court agrees with Defendants.

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First, judicial economy weighs heavily against remanding this case. Plaintiff recognizes that

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“this Court has invested significant time and effort in this case” but argues that “those efforts will

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not have been wasted in the event of a remand.” Motion at 4. The Court disagrees. This Court is

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closely familiar with the facts and issues in this case because the parties have been before it for a

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case management conference, two settlement conferences (before Magistrate Judge DeMarchi), a

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motion hearing, and a pre-trial conference. See ECF 32, 43, 54, 62. Further, this Court has issued

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a Summary Judgment Order in this case regarding all of Plaintiff’s claims. ECF 58. The parties

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have proposed, and the Court has reviewed jury instructions. ECF 77. If remanded, the state court

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will undoubtedly have to familiarize itself with the facts and remaining issues and prepare for a trial.

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Such outcome is inconsistent with principles of judicial economy.

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Second, values of convenience and fairness weigh in favor of moving forward with trial in

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this Court, which is to commence in two weeks. Fairness dictates that Defendants are entitled to a

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timely resolution of this case. Plaintiff does not explain how proceeding with trial would be unfair
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to him. See generally Motion. Presumably, Plaintiff’s interests would also be served by resolving

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this case sooner rather than later. In fact, both parties had originally requested a trial in March

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2019—six months before the now-scheduled trial. ECF 31. The case could be delayed up to two

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years as it waits in line for a trial date in a busy state trial court.
Moreover, the parties have undoubtedly spent many hours preparing for trial. See e.g.,

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Opp’n at 3 (“[D]efense counsel has expended approximately 72 hours of time (excluding time for

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preparing this Opposition) in preparing Pretrial Conference materials for this case and preparing this

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matter for trial to begin on September 27, 2019.”). At this late stage, the parties have prepared

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pretrial statements (ECF 70), witness list (ECF 70-1), exhibit list (ECF 70-2), proposed jury

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instructions (ECF 77), and other pre-trial materials. The Court expects that the parties have also

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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nearly completed their review and preparation of evidence and witnesses. If remanded, all such

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efforts will necessarily be duplicated because the parties would be required to prepare for another

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trial at a later date and in accordance with state court’s rules and procedures.

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Finally, comity does not tip the scale in favor of remand. Plaintiff argues that “negligence

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claim, which survived summary judgment, is grounded in state law that provides a basis for recovery

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in police shooting cases that is significantly broader than what is allowed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

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Motion at 4. While considerations of comity typically weigh in favor of allowing state courts to

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rule on state-law issues, on balance, judicial economy, convenience, and fairness weigh heavily in

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favor of denying remand. See Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350 (“[T]he doctrine of pendent

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jurisdiction ... is a doctrine of flexibility, designed to allow courts to deal with cases involving

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pendent claims in the manner that most sensibly accommodates a range of concerns”).

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IV.

CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 12, 2019
______________________________________
BETH LABSON FREEMAN
United States District Judge
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