In Re: MacBook Keyboard Litigation
Filing
248
ORDER GRANTING #221 MOTION TO DISMISS. Signed by Judge Edward J. Davila on 10/13/2020. (ejdlc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 10/13/2020)
Case 5:18-cv-02813-EJD Document 248 Filed 10/13/20 Page 1 of 7
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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SAN JOSE DIVISION
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IN RE: MACBOOK KEYBOARD
LITIGATION
Case No. 5:18-cv-02813-EJD
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS
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Re: Dkt. No. 221
United States District Court
Northern District of California
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Before the Court is Defendant Apple Inc.’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
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Consolidated Class Action Complaint (“SAC”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 221 (“Motion”). Specifically, Apple seeks to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for
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violation of the California Unfair Competition Law in its entirety, and Plaintiffs’ remaining claims
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to the extent that they seek equitable relief, on the ground that Plaintiffs do not and cannot plead
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that they lack an adequate remedy at law. The Court took the matter under submission for
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decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). Having considered the
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arguments of the parties, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion.
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I.
Background
Plaintiffs are eleven consumers from California, Massachusetts, New York, Illinois,
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Florida, Washington, New Jersey, and Michigan. Second Amended Consolidated Class Action
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Complaint, Dkt. No. 219 (“SAC”) ¶¶ 8-18. Plaintiffs bring this proposed class action against
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Defendant Apple, Inc. (“Apple” or “Defendant”) on behalf of purchasers of allegedly defective
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MacBook laptops with butterfly keyboards.
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Each Plaintiff alleges to have purchased a MacBook or MacBook Pro with the butterfly
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keyboard. Id. ¶¶ 25, 31, 39, 49, 56, 63, 71, 77, 85, 95, 103. Each one alleges to have made the
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purchase after being exposed to representations on specific Apple websites that the butterfly is
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“more responsive.” Id. ¶¶ 26, 32, 40, 50, 57, 64, 72, 78, 86, 96, 104. Plaintiffs allege that their
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keyboards failed within a year of purchase. Id. ¶¶ 27, 33, 41, 51, 58, 65, 73, 79, 87, 97, 105. Each
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Plaintiff alleges that he consulted with or complained to Apple about the faulty keyboards, but
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Apple failed to provide effective troubleshooting or repairs, an operable replacement laptop free of
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charge, or a refund. Id. ¶¶ 28-29, 36-37, 42-27, 52-54, 60-62, 66-69, 74-75, 80-83, 88-93, 98-101,
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106-08. Plaintiffs all allege that after having their laptops repaired or replaced, the defect
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returned. Id. Several Plaintiffs allege that they were forced to spend money out of pocket for
AppleCare service, insurance, or a new non-Apple laptop. Id. Plaintiffs allege that had they been
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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aware of the keyboard defect, they would not have bought their computer or would have paid
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significantly less for it. Id. ¶¶ 30, 38, 48, 55, 62, 70, 76, 84, 94, 102, 109.
Plaintiffs assert claims on behalf of a proposed nationwide class and subclasses under
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California law and six other states’ laws. In particular, Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and
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restitution under California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.
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(“UCL”). They further seek unspecified injunctive relief under the Consumers Legal Remedies
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Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq. (“CLRA”) and equivalent state statutes.1
II.
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Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with sufficient
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specificity to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
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it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929
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(2007) (internal quotations omitted). A complaint which falls short of the Rule 8(a) standard may
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Plaintiffs’ fifth through tenth claims for relief are brought under the Washington Consumer
Protection Act, Wash. Rev. Code § 19.86.010, et seq. (“WCPA”), Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq. (“FDUTPA”), the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 505/1, et seq. (“ICFA”), New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1 (West), et seq. (“NJCFA”), New York General
Business Law § 349, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349, and the Michigan Consumer Protection Act,
Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.901, et seq. (“MCPA”).
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be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual
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matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
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556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550
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U.S. at 570). A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
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the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
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Id. Dismissal “is proper only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient
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facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.
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2001).
III.
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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Defendant seeks to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims for equitable relief on the ground that
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Plaintiffs do not and cannot plead that they lack an adequate remedy at law. Defendant’s motion
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relies on the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 F.3d 834,
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843–44 (9th Cir. 2020). In that case, the Sonner similarly brought a diversity suit under
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California’s UCL and CLRA. Following a last-minute amendment of her complaint before trial,
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plaintiff dropped her damages claim and sought only restitution and equitable relief. Id. at 838–
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39. The district court then granted a motion to dismiss, finding that Sonner could not proceed on
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her equitable claims for restitution in lieu of a claim for damages. Specifically, the district court
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concluded that claims brought under the UCL and CLRA remained subject to California’s
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inadequate-remedy-at-law doctrine, and that Sonner failed to establish that she lacked an adequate
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legal remedy for the same past harm for which she sought equitable restitution.
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Discussion
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed on different grounds, relying on principles of federal
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common law rather than state law. The Ninth Circuit explained that while a state may authorize
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its courts to give equitable relief without the restriction that an adequate remedy at law be
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unavailable, the state law “cannot remove th[at] fetter[ ] from the federal courts.” Id. at 843–44
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(citing Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105–06, 65 S. Ct. 1464, 89 L. Ed. 2079 (1945)).
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Guided by the reasoning in York, the Ninth Circuit held “that the traditional principles governing
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equitable remedies in federal courts, including the requisite inadequacy of legal remedies, apply
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when a party requests restitution under the UCL and CLRA in a diversity action.” Id. at 844. The
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court went on to find that Sonner’s claims for equitable relief were properly dismissed because she
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failed to allege the lack of an adequate legal remedy. Id.
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Apple argues that under Sonner, a plaintiff in federal court must allege the lack of an
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adequate legal remedy in order to state a claim for equitable relief and that Plaintiffs have failed to
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do so. Plaintiffs argue that (1) Defendant’s motion is premature; (2) Sonner does not apply to
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injunctive relief; and (3) even if Sonner applies, Plaintiffs adequately alleged that they have no
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adequate remedy at law in this case.
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Plaintiffs argue that Apple’s motion is premature for two reasons. Their first reason—that
United States District Court
Northern District of California
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the court should refrain from deciding the motion until after the Ninth Circuit had decided the
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pending petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc in Sonner—was mooted by the Ninth Circuit’s
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denial of the rehearing petition. See Statement of Recent Decision, Dkt. No. 230. Plaintiffs
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further assert that the motion is premature because they are not required to make a binding election
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of remedies at this early stage in the proceedings. Opp. p. 5. But this is not an election of
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remedies issue. The question is not whether or when Plaintiffs are required to choose between two
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available inconsistent remedies, it is whether equitable remedies are available to Plaintiffs at all.
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In other words, the question is whether Plaintiffs have adequately pled their claims for equitable
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relief, and that question is not premature on a motion to dismiss.
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Plaintiffs next argue that Sonner does not require dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims for
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injunctive relief because where “state law authorizes the issuance of a permanent injunction, there
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is no requirement that a plaintiff proceeding in federal court show an inadequate remedy at law to
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obtain relief.” Opp. p. 5. This argument is foreclosed by Sonner. The Sonner court emphasized
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that the Supreme Court has recognized the “fundamental principle for well over a century that
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state law cannot expand or limit a federal court’s equitable authority,” and explained that “a state
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statute does not change the nature of the federal courts’ equitable powers.” Sonner, 971 F.3d at
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841 (citation omitted). The court expressly found that “even if a state authorizes its courts to
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provide equitable relief when an adequate legal remedy exists, such relief may be unavailable in
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federal court because equitable remedies are subject to traditional equitable principles unaffected
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by state law.” Id. (citing York, 326 U.S. at 105–06 & n.3).
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Plaintiffs cite to pre-Sonner cases in which federal courts applied state law to determine
whether an injunction was warranted. None of those cases involved a state statute that purported
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to expand the court’s equitable powers; rather, in each case the requirements for injunctive relief
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under state law were coextensive with the federal common law requirements. See, e.g., Nomadix,
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Inc. v. Guest-Tek Interactive Entm’t, Ltd., No. 2:19-CV-04980-AB-FFM, 2020 WL 1939826, at
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*1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2020) (granting injunctive relief only after finding, among other things, that
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“pecuniary compensation would not afford adequate relief”); Brocade Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v. A10
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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Networks, Inc., No. C 10-3428 PSG, 2013 WL 890126, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2013) (“To
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prevail on its request for a permanent injunction . . . includes a showing that remedies at law are
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inadequate, and that other equitable considerations warrant entry of an injunction”).
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Plaintiffs acknowledge that Sonner precludes them from seeking restitution but argue that
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Sonner should not be extended to preclude claims for injunctive relief. While “[i]njunctive relief
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[was] not at issue” in Sonner, 971 F.3d at 842, nothing about the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning
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indicates that the decision is limited to claims for restitution. In fact, numerous courts in this
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circuit have applied Sonner to injunctive relief claims. See e.g., Gibson v. Jaguar Land Rover N.
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Am., LLC, No. CV2000769CJCGJSX, 2020 WL 5492990, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2020)
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(dismissing plaintiff’s UCL claims for an injunction and restitution because Sonner “very recently
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made clear” that the requirement to establish an inadequate remedy at law “applies to claims for
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equitable relief under both the UCL and CLRA.”); Teresa Adams v. Cole Haan, LLC, No.
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SACV20913JVSDFMX, 2020 WL 5648605, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2020) (“The Sonner court
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derived its rule from broader principles of federal common law . . . this broad analysis of the
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distinction between law and equity [does not] create an exception for injunctions as opposed to
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other forms of equitable relief. The clear rule in Sonner that plaintiffs must plead the inadequacy
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of legal remedies before requesting equitable relief therefore applies”); Schertz v. Ford Motor
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Co., No. CV2003221TJHPVCX, 2020 WL 5919731, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2020) (dismissing
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claims for an injunction and restitution under the UCL because plaintiff failed to allege the lack of
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an adequate legal remedy as required under Sonner). This Court agrees with our fellow courts that
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under Sonner, Plaintiffs are required to allege that they lack an adequate remedy at law in order to
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seek injunctive relief.
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Finally, Plaintiffs argue that they have sufficiently alleged that no adequate legal remedy
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exists here. They argue that because Apple’s repair program is deficient, their alleged injury is
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“continuing” such that class members with faulty keyboard “seeking to be made whole in the
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future could only sue Apple repeatedly.” Opp. p. 10. Plaintiffs do not explain why those
consumers could not sufficiently be “made whole” by monetary damages. Courts generally hold
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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that monetary damages are an adequate remedy for claims based on an alleged product defect, and
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reject the argument that injunctive relief requiring repair or replacement is appropriate. See
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Philips v. Ford Motor Co., No. 14-CV-02989-LHK, 2016 WL 7428810, at *25 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
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22, 2016), aff’d, 726 F. App’x 608 (9th Cir. 2018) (the ordinary and more appropriate relief is
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monetary damages, “not a mandatory injunction requiring Ford to uniformly repair and/or replace”
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a defect in every vehicle); see also Victorino v. FCA US LLC, No. 16CV1617-GPC(JLB), 2018
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WL 2455432, at *20 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2018) (“monetary damages is the appropriate form of
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damages” where plaintiffs’ claimed injury was the “overpayment of the purchase price of their
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Class Vehicles”).
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Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that class members overpaid for their allegedly defective
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laptops and incurred various expenses in their attempts to resolve the deficiencies. SAC ¶¶ 273,
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285, 298, 310, 323, 331. Plaintiffs suggest in the Complaint that Apple could have “offer[ed]
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refunds . . . to consumers with failed keyboards.” Id. ¶¶ 201, 221. Because Plaintiffs’ claims rest
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on their alleged overpayments and Apple’s failure to issue refunds, the Court finds that monetary
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damages would provide an adequate remedy for the alleged injury. Moreover, the Court finds that
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the availability of an adequate legal remedy is clear from the face of the SAC and thus further
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amendment of the complaint would be futile. See Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042,
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1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (where a plaintiff fails to survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny and “it is clear that
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the complaint could not be saved by amendment,” “[d]ismissal without leave to amend is
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proper.”); Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296-97 (9th Cir. 1990) (an “amended
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complaint may only allege other facts consistent with the challenged pleading”).
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Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they lack an adequate remedy at law, as required
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to state a claim for equitable relief. Plaintiffs’ UCL claim is therefore dismissed in its entirety and
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the remaining claims are dismissed to the extent they seek an injunction, restitution, or other
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equitable relief.
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IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
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UCL claim (Claim 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice. The remaining claims are DISMISSED
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with prejudice to the extent they seek an injunction, restitution, or other equitable relief.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 13, 2020
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EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge
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