Arakji v. Microchip Technology, Inc.,

Filing 111

ORDER DENYING 110 PLAINTIFF MAZEN ARAKJI'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM FINAL JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge Beth Labson Freeman on 5/9/2022. (blflc4, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/9/2022)Any non-CM/ECF Participants have been served by First Class Mail to the addresses of record listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SAN JOSE DIVISION

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MAZEN ARAKJI,
Plaintiff,

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MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY, INC.,,
Defendant.

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
RELIEF FROM FINAL JUDGMENT

v.

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Case No. 19-cv-02936-BLF

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Before the Court is Plaintiff Mazen Arakji’s Motion for Relief from Final Judgment under

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 in this hiring discrimination case. See Motion, ECF No. 110.

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Mr. Arakji seeks relief from the Court’s judgment in favor of Defendant Microchip Technology,

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Inc. (“Microchip”) following the Court’s order granting Microchip’s summary judgment motion.

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See ECF Nos. 108, 109. Under Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds that Mr. Arakji’s motion can be

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resolved without oral argument. Based on the below reasoning, the Court DENIES Mr. Arakji’s

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motion.

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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a court may relieve a party from a final

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judgment for one of the following reasons: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable

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neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been

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discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called

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intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is

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void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment

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that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any

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other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

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Microchip’s summary judgment motion was directed to Mr. Arakji’s sole remaining claim

for discrimination under the Fair Employment and House Act (“FEHA”). See Summary Judgment

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Motion, ECF No. 100.

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discrimination claims, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See

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McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If the plaintiff succeeds, then the

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burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the

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plaintiff’s rejection. See id. If the defendant meets its burden, then the plaintiff must show that the

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defendant’s stated reason for the plaintiff’s rejection was in fact pretext for discrimination. See id.

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Mr. Arakji alleged that Microchip discriminated against him based on his religion, national

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origin, race, and disability by declining to hire him for a Senior Engineer position. See First

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Amended Complaint, ECF No. 22; see also ECF No. 42. In its summary judgment motion,

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Microchip argued that Mr. Arakji had not established a prima facie discrimination case because

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Microchip did not have actual knowledge of his religion, national origin, race, or disability,

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including because Mr. Arakji’s interviewers at Microchip did not notice his alleged disability (an

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issue with his left hand). See Summary Judgment Motion, ECF No. 100 at 13–17. Further,

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Microchip argued that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for declining to hire Mr. Arakji,

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including lack of relevant experience and gaps in his employment history. See id. at 18–22. In its

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order granting Microchip’s summary judgment motion, the Court found that while there were

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disputes of material fact as to whether Mr. Arakji had established a prima facie case of

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discrimination, there were no disputes of fact that Microchip had articulated legitimate,

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nondiscriminatory reasons for Mr. Arakji’s rejection. See Order, ECF No. 108 at 12–13. Further,

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the Court found that Mr. Arakji provided no evidence that Microchip’s articulated reasons were

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pretextual. See id. at 13–15. Accordingly, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of

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Microchip.

Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for

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In his motion for relief from the Court’s final judgment, Mr. Arakji argues that “there is no

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way” his disability would have gone unnoticed to his interviewers at Microchip. See Motion,

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ECF No. 110 ¶ 2. Otherwise, Mr. Arakji provides rambling and incomprehensible briefing on

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“[c]orruption in government,” which has no relevance to the present case. See id. at 1–4.

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The Court finds that Mr. Arakji has not met his burden for showing that he is entitled to
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relief from the Court’s judgment. Mr. Arakji’s only relevant argument is that his interviewers at

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Microchip must have noticed his disability. See Motion, ECF No. 110 ¶ 2. Mr. Arakji’s argument

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is insufficient to meet his burden on a Rule 60 motion for two reasons. First, Mr. Arakji’s argument

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does not fit into any of the categories of reasons that can justify relief from a final judgment under

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Mr. Arakji already raised the argument that his interviewers

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must have noticed his disability in his opposition to Microchip’s summary judgment motion. See

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Opposition, ECF No. 103 ¶¶ 21–24. Courts decline to grant Rule 60 motions based on previously

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raised arguments. See Amer. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. Amer. Const. Corp., 248 F.3d 892,

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899 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming denial of Rule 60(b) motion where movants “simply reargued their

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case and offered no basis for withdrawal of the . . . order” at issue).

United States District Court
Northern District of California

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Second, Mr. Arakji’s argument relates to his prima facie case for discrimination—which was

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not the basis for the Court’s summary judgment order. As outlined above, the Court found that there

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were disputes of material fact regarding whether Mr. Arakji had made a prima facie case for

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discrimination. See Order, ECF No. 108 at 10–12. Accordingly, the Court’s summary judgment

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order was not based on Mr. Arakji’s prima facie case. Rather, the Court granted summary judgment

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in favor of Microchip because it found that there were no disputes of material fact that Microchip

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had articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for declining to hire Mr. Arakji. See id.

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at 12–13. Additionally, the Court found that Mr. Arakji provided no evidence to indicate that

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Microchip’s articulated reasons were pretextual. See id. at 13–15. Mr. Arakji fails to provide

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arguments or evidence challenging the Court’s findings regarding Microchip’s legitimate,

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nondiscriminatory reasons for declining to hire Mr. Arakji. Accordingly, even if the Court were to

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agree with Mr. Arakji—that “there is no way” his disability would have gone unnoticed during his

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interviews with Microchip—this would not change the ruling of its summary judgment order.

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Based on the above reasoning, the Court DENIES Mr. Arakji’s Motion for Relief from Final
Judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: May 9, 2022
______________________________________
BETH LABSON FREEMAN
United States District Judge

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United States District Court
Northern District of California

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