Redd-Oyedele v. Santa Clara County Office of Education et al

Filing 103

ORDER ON 95 96 MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Signed by Judge Susan van Keulen on 5/6/2022. (svklc1, COURT STAFF) (Filed on 5/6/2022)Any non-CM/ECF Participants have been served by First Class Mail to the addresses of record listed on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF)

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

3
4

ANN GERTHELIA REDD-OYEDELE,

Case No. 20-cv-00912-SVK

Plaintiff,

5

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.

6
7

SANTA CLARA COUNTY OFFICE OF
EDUCATION, et al.,

8

Re: Dkt. Nos. 95, 96

Defendants.
9
10

Plaintiff Ann Redd-Oyedele, who has been employed by Defendant Santa Clara County

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

Office of Education (“SCCOE”) since June 1991, claims that she was subjected to age

12

discrimination, retaliation, and race discrimination in connection with her unsuccessful 2019

13

application for a promotion to an Assistant Director position in SCCOE’s District Business and

14

Advisory Services (“DBAS”) department. Dkt. 49 (“Third Amended Complaint” or “TAC”); see

15

also Dkt. 49-1 (Plaintiff’s Decl. in Support of TAC) ¶¶ 38-39. All parties have consented to the

16

jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. Dkt. 5, 11.
Now before the Court are (1) Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 95 (“Pl.

17
18

MSJ”)) and (2) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication (Dkt. 96

19

(“Def. MSJ”)). The Court held a hearing on April 12, 2022 via Zoom. After considering the

20

parties’ submissions, arguments at the hearing, the case file, and relevant law, and for the reasons

21

discussed below, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED and SCCOE’s motion for

22

summary judgment is GRANTED.

23

I.

24
25
26

BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background
1.

The Parties

Plaintiff is an African-American female who was 56 years old when she applied for the

27

Assistant Director-DBAS position in 2019. Dkt. 98-1 ¶ 7. Plaintiff graduated from San Jose State

28

University in 1984 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Accounting. TAC ¶¶ 4-5, 19. According

1

to Plaintiff, she is not a Certified Public Accountant (“CPA”) but she has acquired other

2

certifications and attended several work-related courses and workshops. Dkt. 49-1 ¶ 15; Dkt. 98-1

3

¶ 16.

4

Plaintiff has been employed by Defendant SCCOE since June 1991. TAC ¶ 16. At all

5

relevant times, Plaintiff has been employed in SCCOE’s DBAS department. TAC ¶ 17.

6

According to Plaintiff, she was promoted twice during her employment with SCCOE but has been

7

denied promotion on several other occasions, including in 2019. TAC ¶ 17; Pl. MSJ at 9. In

8

2000, Plaintiff filed a race discrimination claim against SCCOE with the Equal Employment

9

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which led to a district court action and an appeal to the Ninth

10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11
12

Circuit that concluded in approximately 2003. TAC ¶¶ 64-67.
2.

SCCOE’s Merit System

SCCOE’s Personnel Commission employs a Merit System for employment decisions.

13

Dkt. 96-2 (Munshi Decl.) ¶¶ 3-4. Under the Merit System, the hiring process for certain positions,

14

including the Assistant Director-DBAS position at issue in this case, include a Qualifications

15

Appraisal Interview (“QAI”). Id. ¶ 8 and Ex. 1. During the QAI, which is also known as the

16

panel interview or first interview, a panel of qualified persons evaluate candidates through a

17

scored assessment of their responses to a standard set of questions. Id. ¶ 9. Oral panel

18

examinations assess the relevance and quality of an applicant’s experience, training, skills, and

19

education, as well as the applicant’s specific job knowledge and abilities for the position. Id. ¶ 10.

20

An applicant’s final score is based on all examinations during the hiring process. Id. ¶ 11.

21

Under Merit System Rule 8.11, service credits, or seniority, are added to the “final passing

22

scores of promotional candidates.” Id. ¶ 12 and Ex. 1. If a candidate for promotion fails to attain

23

a passing score during the QAI, the candidate’s service credits are not added to the employee’s

24

score. Id. ¶ 13.

25

3.

2019 Assistant Director-DBAS Job Opening

26

In approximately 2019, SCCOE posted a job listing for the position of Assistant Director

27

in the DBAS department. Dkt. 95-22. SCCOE formed a panel consisting of John Gray, Francie

28

Heim, and Stephanie Gomez to conduct QAI interviews of the candidates for the position.
2

1
2

Dkt. 96-5 (Gray Decl.) ¶ 3; Dkt. 96-3 (Heim Decl.) ¶ 3; Dkt. 96-4 (Gomez Decl.) ¶ 3.
Plaintiff applied for the Assistant Director-DBAS position in April 2019. See Ex. 2 to
Bengston Decl. The panel interviewed Plaintiff on May 7, 2019. Gray Decl. ¶ 4; Heim Decl. ¶ 4;

4

Gomez Decl. ¶ 4. During the interview regarding her qualifications for the position, the panelists

5

asked Plaintiff eight standardized questions that were asked of all candidates. Gray Decl. ¶ 5;

6

Heim Decl. ¶ 5; Gomez Decl. ¶ 5. Each panelist awarded scores between 50 and 100 for each

7

answer. Id. Each panelist added his or her scores and divided by eight (representing the number

8

of questions) to calculate the interviewer’s average score. Gray Decl. ¶ 6; Heim Decl. ¶ 6; Gomez

9

Decl. ¶ 6. Mr. Gray gave Plaintiff an average score of 71.25. Gray Decl. ¶ 7 and Ex. 4. Ms.

10

Heim gave Plaintiff an average score of 69.375. Heim Decl. ¶ 7 and Ex. 4. Ms. Gomez gave

11

United States District Court
Northern District of California

3

Plaintiff an average score of 67.50. Gomez Decl. Gray Decl. ¶ 7 and Ex. 4. To determine

12

Plaintiff’s final AQI interview score, an average score was calculated by adding together the three

13

panelists’ average scores and dividing by three. Munshi Decl. ¶ 14. Plaintiff’s final AQI

14

interview score was 69.38%. Bengston Decl. ¶ 4 and Ex. 7; Munshi Decl. ¶ 17 and Ex. 8.

15

An overall average score of 70% was required to advance in the selection process. Munshi

16

Decl. ¶ 15. Because Plaintiff’s score was 69.38%, she did not pass the QAI exam and could not

17

move forward to the second round of interviews. Id. ¶ 17 and Ex. 8. Pursuant to Merit System

18

Rule 8.11, Plaintiff’s service (seniority) credits were not added to her QAI score because she did

19

not obtain a passing score. Id. ¶ 16.

20

The candidate who was selected for the Assistant Direct-DBAS position was Shanny Yam.

21

Gray Decl. ¶ 8; Heim Decl. ¶ 8; Gomez Decl. ¶ 8. Ms. Yam obtained a QAI score of 73.75 in her

22

initial interview and advanced to the second round of interviews. Gray Decl. ¶ 6; Heim Decl. ¶ 6;

23

Gomez Decl. ¶ 6. According to SCCOE, it ultimately hired Ms. Yam for the position because she

24

has a Bachelor of Science Degree in Accounting, served as a Senior Accountant and a Budget

25

Analyst, and is a Certified Public Accountant. Def. MSJ at 4; see also Gray Decl. ¶¶ 14-15; Heim

26

Decl. ¶¶ 14-15; Gomez Decl. ¶¶ 13-14.

27

B.

Procedural History

28

Before filing this lawsuit, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the California Department of Fair
3

1

Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) concerning her non-selection for the Assistant Director-

2

DBAS position. Dkt. 49-2. The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

3

(“EEOC”) issued a right-to-sue letter on November 7, 2019. Dkt. 49-3. Thereafter, Plaintiff

4

timely filed this lawsuit. Dkt. 1. The original complaint named SCCOE and its Superintendent of

5

Schools, Mary Ann Dewan, as Defendants. Id. Plaintiff’s original complaint asserted two causes

6

of action against both Defendants: (1) retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

7

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Dkt. 1.

8

Both Defendants moved to dismiss the original complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Dkt. 8.
The Court denied the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claim against Defendant SCCOE and

10

granted the motion to dismiss the Title VII claim against Dewan without leave to amend. Dkt. 22

11

United States District Court
Northern District of California

9

at 7, 13. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress

12

against Defendant SCCOE without leave to amend because Plaintiff had failed to comply with the

13

pre-suit notification requirement of the California Government Claims Act, Cal. Gov’t C.

14

§§ 912.4, 945.4 (“CGCA”) and because SCCOE is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on

15

that cause of action. Id. at 9-10, 14. As to the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress

16

against Dewan, the Court granted the motion to dismiss because if Dewan was sued in her official

17

capacity, Plaintiff’s cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress would be barred

18

by Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the California Government Claims Act, and Dewan would

19

also be entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 10-12, 14-15. However, the Court noted

20

that the original complaint and Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss referred to also suing

21

Dewan in her personal or individual capacity. Id. at 15. Accordingly, the Court granted Plaintiff

22

leave to amend her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against Dewan to allow

23

Plaintiff an opportunity to state a claim against Dewan in her individual capacity. Id.

24

Plaintiff then filed the First Amended Complaint (Dkt. 23 (“FAC”)), and Defendant

25

SCCOE filed an answer (Dkt. 25). The FAC contained a claim against Dewan for

26

“Intentional/Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.” Dkt. 23 at 16. Dewan filed a motion to

27

dismiss the claim against her in the FAC, arguing that (1) she had been sued in her official

28

capacity rather than her individual capacity, and therefore the claim against her should be
4

1

dismissed because Plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a claim

2

against SCCOE under the CGCA; and (2) Plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action for

3

intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. Dkt. 24. The Court granted in part and

4

denied in part Dewan’s motion to dismiss. Dkt. 31. The Court held that the allegations of the

5

FAC were sufficiently clear that Plaintiff had sued Dewan in her individual capacity and therefore

6

denied the motion to dismiss on that ground. Id. at 5. However, the Court granted the motion to

7

dismiss on the ground that the FAC failed to state a claim for either intentional or negligent

8

infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 5-9. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a Second

9

Amended Complaint. Id. at 9-10.
Plaintiff thereafter filed a Second Amended Complaint. Dkt. 32 (“SAC”). In addition to

10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

the claims for age discrimination, race discrimination, and retaliation against SCCOE, the SAC

12

contained a single cause of action against Dewan for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id.

13

at 15-18. Dewan then moved to dismiss the claim against her in SAC. Dkt. 34. The Court

14

rejected Dewan’s argument that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over her but granted her

15

motion to dismiss the claim against her for failure to state a claim, without leave to amend. Dkt.

16

41.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed the TAC, which contains claims against SCCOE for (1) violation

17
18

of the Age Discrimination in employment Act (“ADEA”), (2) race discrimination in violation of

19

Title VII, and (3) retaliation in violation of Title VII. Dkt. 49. SCCOE filed an answer to the

20

TAC. Dkt. 50.

21

Following discovery and numerous discovery disputes, Plaintiff filed a motion for

22

summary judgment (Dkt. 95 (Pl. MSJ)), and Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment or

23

summary adjudication (Dkt. 96 (Def. MSJ)).

24

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

25

A party may move for summary judgment on any claim or defense, or for partial summary

26

judgment on part of a claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate

27

if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the party is

28

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. A fact is material if it may affect the outcome of the
5

1

case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1985). A genuine dispute of material

2

fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving

3

party. Id.

4

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of

5

the basis for the motion and identifying portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to

6

interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material

7

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

8
9

Where the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of persuasion at trial, such
as where the moving party seeks summary judgment on its own claims or defenses, the moving
party must establish “beyond controversy every essential element of its [claim].” So. Cal. Gas Co.

11

United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Where the moving

12

party seeks summary judgment on a claim or defense on which the opposing party bears the

13

burden of persuasion at trial, “the moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential

14

element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not

15

have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.”

16

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If the

17

moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce

18

evidence supporting its claims or defenses. Id. at 1103. If the nonmoving party does not produce

19

evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to summary

20

judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

21

“The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw

22

all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor.” City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750

23

F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014). However, the party opposing summary judgment must direct the

24

court’s attention to “specific, triable facts.” So. Cal. Gas, 336 F.3d at 889. “[T]he mere existence

25

of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position” is insufficient to defeat a motion for

26

summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “Where the record taken as a whole could not

27

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”

28

City of Pomona, 750 F.3d at 1049-50 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
6

1

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

2

III.

DISCUSSION

3

A.

4

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2), a party may object to the opposing party’s

5

declarations and evidentiary material if such material “cannot be presented in a form that would be

6

admissible in evidence.” In its opposition to Plaintiff’s MSJ, SCCOE objects to three items of

7

evidence cited in support of Plaintiff’s MSJ. The Court discusses each objection in turn.
1.

8
9

Evidentiary Objections

Declaration of Pat Blanson (Dkt. 95-18)

SCCOE objects to the entirety of the Declaration of Pat Blanson submitted with Plaintiff’s
MSJ on the grounds that Blanson’s employment with SCCOE ended in 2007, and the statements

11

United States District Court
Northern District of California

10

in the declaration do not relate in any way to the May 2019 hiring decision at issue in this case.

12

Dkt. 97 at 8. The Court SUSTAINS the objection on relevance grounds.
2.

13
14

Declaration of Marilyn Derouen (Dkt. 49-5)

SCCOE objects to the entirety of the Declaration of Marilyn Derouen submitted with

15

Plaintiff’s MSJ on the grounds that Derouen was employed in a different department than

16

Plaintiff, she was supervised by different SCCOE employees, and she played no role in the May

17

2019 hiring decision at issue in this case. Dkt. 97 at 8-9. The Court SUSTAINS the objection on

18

relevance grounds.
3.

19
20

Timeline of Events (Dkt. 49-6)

SCCOE objects to a timeline filed by Plaintiff as an exhibit to the TAC (Dkt. 49-6), which

21

is referenced in Plaintiff’s MSJ (Pl. MSJ at 17, 18), on the grounds that the timeline is not a

22

declaration, it lacks foundation, and it is hearsay. Dkt. 97 at 9. This objection is SUSTAINED as

23

to lines 1-5 (directed at positions not the subject of this litigation) on relevance grounds and

24

OVERRULED as to lines 6-7 which are directed at the subject position and about which SCCOE

25

could have questioned Plaintiff in deposition in mitigation of concerns regarding foundation and

26

credibility.

27

B.

Issues Remaining in Case

28

Plaintiff’s MSJ discusses alleged acts of discrimination and/or retaliation that occurred
7

1

before 2019. See, e.g., Pl. MSJ at 8-9. SCCOE argues that only Plaintiff’s unsuccessful

2

application for a promotion to the Assistant Director-DBAS position in 2019 remains at issue.

3

Dkt. 97 at 2-3; see also Def. MSJ at 16. SCCOE is correct.

4

This case arises out of Plaintiff’s EEOC claim concerning her application for the 2019

5

Assistant Director-DBAS position, as distinct from her previous EEOC claims concerning other

6

positions. See TAC at ¶¶ 74-79 and Exs. P1 and P2 to TAC (Dkt. 49-2, 49-3). In a CMC

7

Statement filed in January 2022, Plaintiff identified the legal issues in this case as concerning her

8

non-promotion in 2019. Dkt. 83 at 3. Plaintiff acknowledges in her reply in support of her motion

9

for summary judgment that “the anecdotal facts narrated in Plaintiffs’ MSJ” are simply

10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

“[h]istorical background and introductory facts.” Dkt. 98 at 3.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims in this case concern her application for the Assistant

12

Director-DBAS position in 2019, and the Court now considers whether either party is entitled to

13

summary judgment on those claims.

14

C.

Age Discrimination Claim

15

Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for any employer to take an adverse action against an

16

employee “because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). Where, as in this case, there is

17

no direct evidence of discrimination, courts generally employ the three-step burden-shifting

18

framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) in

19

deciding motions for summary judgment in age discrimination cases. Shelley v. Geren, 666 F.3d

20

599, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Krylova v. Genentech, 37 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1163 (N.D. Cal.

21

2014). In a failure-to-promote case, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of age

22

discrimination by showing that: (1) at the time of the alleged employment action, she was 40 years

23

old or older; (2) she was qualified for the position for which she applied; (3) she was denied the

24

position; and (4) the promotion was given to a substantially younger person. Shelley, 666 F.3d at

25

608. The proof necessary for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case within the McDonnell

26

Douglas framework is “minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of

27

the evidence.” Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994). The plaintiff need

28

only offer evidence that “gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Id. (citation
8

1
2

omitted).
If the plaintiff proves her prima facie case, the burden of production then shifts to the

3

employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged action. Shelley, 666

4

F.3d at 608. If the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the

5

articulated reason is pretextual. Id. A plaintiff may demonstrate pretext either directly by

6

persuading the court that discriminatory reasons more likely motivated the employer or indirectly

7

by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is “unworthy of credence.’” Id. at 609

8

(citations omitted).
The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the employer intentionally

10

discriminated remains at all times with the plaintiff. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,

11

United States District Court
Northern District of California

9

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).

12

1.

13

Prima Facie Case

Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff was over 40 years old when she applied for the

14

Assistant Director-DBAS position in 2019 or that she was denied the promotion in favor of

15

Ms. Yam, who was substantially younger. See Def. MSJ at 1. However, SCCOE argues that

16

Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination because she was not qualified

17

for the Assistant Director position, as evidenced by the fact that Plaintiff obtained a non-passing

18

score on the QAI Interview. Id. at 10. SCCOE also suggests that Plaintiff cannot establish a

19

prima facie case of age discrimination because the selection board members were not aware of her

20

age at the time they selected another candidate for the Assistant Director position. Id. at 5.

21

For purposes of determining whether an applicant meets the “qualified” requirement for a

22

prima facie case of employment discrimination, objective rather than subjective criteria apply.

23

Nicholson v. Hyannis Air Service, Inc., 580 F.3d 1116, 1123 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, SCCOE offers

24

no evidence that Plaintiff was not objectively qualified for the Assistant Director-DBAS position.

25

SCCOE cites Plaintiff’s score on the QAI test, but such a test result does not mean that Plaintiff

26

was not objectively qualified. See Hines v. Cal. Public Util. Commn., No. C 07-04145 CW, 2010

27

WL 2985536, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2010). To the extent SCCOE argues that the candidate

28

selected for the position, Ms. Yam, was more qualified than Plaintiff, that argument pertains not to
9

1

Plaintiff’s burden to make out a prima facie case but instead to whether SCCOE has met its burden

2

of showing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiffs’ non-selection and is addressed in

3

the discussion below. See id.; see also Oliphant v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, No. C-08-

4

5048-MMC, 2010 WL 1875711, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2010).

5

Any suggestion by SCCOE that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case because the

6

hiring panelists were unaware of her age also fails. It is true that a plaintiff “cannot make a prima

7

facie case where a decision-maker is unaware of the basis for discrimination.” Wong v. Wells

8

Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 20-CV-00249-YGR, 2021 WL 4243398, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 17, 2021).

9

Here, however, Plaintiff has presented evidence that at least one member of the selection panel

10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

may have been aware of her age. Dkt. 99-1 ¶ 15.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of age discrimination. Plaintiff

12

was objectively qualified for the Assistant Director-DBAS position she applied for in 2019, as

13

evidenced by the undisputed fact that she was eligible to apply for the position. Additional

14

undisputed objective evidence of Plaintiff’s qualifications are the similar job descriptions for the

15

Senior Advisor position held by Plaintiff (Dkt. 95-20) and the Assistant Director-DBAS position

16

(Dkt. 95-22) at the center of this dispute. Dkt. 95 at 11. Plaintiff’s non-passing score on the QAI

17

Interview does not establish her lack of objective qualifications for the position, although it is

18

relevant to SCCOE’s argument, addressed below, that the candidate it selected was more qualified

19
20

2.

Non-Discriminatory Justification

In articulating a non-discriminatory justification for Plaintiff’s non-promotion, SCCOE

21

“‘need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons,’ but simply

22

has the burden to ‘raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the

23

plaintiff.’” Howard v. Cumulus Media Inc., No. C 12-4880 CRB, 2013 WL 5913754, at *5 (N.D.

24

Cal. Nov. 1, 2013) (quoting Tex. Dep. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)).

25

SCCOE claims that it hired Ms. Yam instead of Plaintiff because of Ms. Yam’s superior

26

qualifications. Def. MSJ at 4, 10-11; see also Gray Decl. ¶¶ 14-15; Heim Decl. ¶¶ 14-15; Gomez

27

Decl. ¶¶ 13-14. Specifically, SCCOE cites Ms. Yam’s previous audit experience, including

28

experience as supervisory auditor for an accounting firm with extensive public school auditing
10

1

experience, as well as the fact that she is a CPA. Id. Notably, Ms. Yam also obtained a higher

2

QAI score than Plaintiff during the interview process. Gray Decl. ¶ 15; Heim Decl. ¶ 15; Gomez

3

Decl. ¶ 15.

4

SCCOE’s proffered justification for selecting Ms. Yam instead of Plaintiff for the

5

Assistant Director-DBAS position is sufficient to satisfy its burden of demonstrating a non-

6

discriminatory justification for its hiring decision. See generally Shelley, 666 F.3d at 609.

7

Accordingly, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to demonstrate that SCCOE’s proffered reasons

8

are pretexts for discrimination. Id.

9
10

3.

Pretext

As explained above, a plaintiff may establish pretext either directly by persuading the court

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the

12

employer's proffered explanation is “unworthy of credence.” Shelley, 666 F.3d at 609. If direct

13

evidence of discrimination is offered, “a triable issue as to the actual motivation of the employer is

14

created even if the evidence is not substantial.” Godwin, 150 F.3d at 1221. In contrast, if a

15

plaintiff offers circumstantial evidence of discrimination in support of pretext, “it must be specific

16

and substantial ... to create a triable issue” regarding the employer’s intent. Id. at 1222 (citations

17

omitted). Here, Plaintiff falls short on both fronts.

18

Plaintiff has not offered direct evidence of discrimination. Moreover, the circumstantial

19

evidence cited by Plaintiff does not demonstrate that the SCCOE’s proffered reasons for selecting

20

Ms. Yam are “unworthy of credence.” Rather the circumstantial evidence cited by Plaintiff boils

21

down to Plaintiff’s refrain that she believes she was more qualified than Ms. Yam for the Assistant

22

Director-DBAS position. See, e.g., Pl. MSJ at 9-10 (citing Plaintiff’s seniority, work longevity,

23

relevant work experience, ranking in other job applications, and performance of same duties as

24

Assistant Director). The focus of many of Plaintiff’s complaints is that she had more seniority

25

than Ms. Yam (id.), but as explained above under SCCOE’s Merit System Rule 8.11, an

26

applicant’s seniority points are not added to his or her score unless the applicant passes the QAI

27

assessment, which Plaintiff did not do. Munshi Decl. ¶¶ 12-13, 16 and Ex. 1.

28

Accordingly, SCCOE is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s age discrimination
11

1

claim.

2

D.

Race Discrimination Claim

3

To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, Plaintiff must show: (1) she is a

4

member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) she experienced an adverse

5

employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside Plaintiff’s protected class were

6

treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give

7

rise to an inference of discrimination. Hermange v. County of Santa Clara, No. 16-cv-02847-

8

BLF, 2019 WL 1245149, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2019) (citing Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc.,

9

615 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2010)).
Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of race discrimination. She is a member of a

10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

protected class (African-American individuals); as discussed above, she was objectively qualified

12

for the Assistant Director-DBAS position for which she applied; and she experienced an adverse

13

employment action by losing the promotion to someone outside her protected class.
Again, however, SCCOE has offered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for hiring

14
15

Ms. Yam rather than Plaintiff for the Assistant Director position, specifically Ms. Yam’s superior

16

qualifications. Plaintiff has failed to rebut that showing. See Section III.C., supra.
Accordingly, SCCOE is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s race discrimination

17
18

claim.

19

E.

Retaliation Claim

20

A prima facie claim for retaliation requires Plaintiff to demonstrate that: (1) she engaged

21

in protected activity; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) there exists a

22

causal link between the protected activity and the employer’s action. McAlindin v. Cty. Of San

23

Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1238 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 201 F.3d 1211

24

(9th Cir. 2000).

25

Plaintiff provided no admissible evidence that any of the panel members were aware of her

26

2000 EEOC complaint. See Dkt. 100 at 3-4, citing Dkt. 96-1, Ex. 18. Moreover, it is undisputed

27

that the hiring panel in Plaintiff’s case used standardized non-discriminatory criteria to award the

28

position. In addition, many years elapsed between Plaintiff’s 2000 EEOC complaint and the 2019
12

1

hiring decision at issue in this case. As such, Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of

2

retaliation. See Arakaki v. Brennan, 771 Fed. Appx. 783, 784 (9th Cir. 2019).
Even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case, as with her discrimination claims,

3
4

SCCOE offers a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action—the successful applicant’s

5

superior qualifications for the Assistant Director-DBAS position—and Plaintiff must then provide

6

evidence of pretext. McAlindin, 912 F.3d at 1238. Again, Plaintiff cannot meet her burden. See

7

Section III.C., supra.
Accordingly, SCCOE is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

8
9

IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment

10

United States District Court
Northern District of California

11

and GRANTS SCCOE’s motion for summary judgment. All dates and deadlines are vacated,

12

judgment will be entered in favor of SCCOE, and the Clerk of Court shall close the file in this

13

matter.

14
15

SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 6, 2022

16
17
SUSAN VAN KEULEN
United States Magistrate Judge

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
13