Buchanan v. Garza et al
Filing
125
ORDER denying Plaintiff's 103 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part Defendants' 106 Partial Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz on 3/27/12. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(cge)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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WHITTIER BUCHANAN,
CDCR #K-02554
Plaintiff,
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Civil No.
vs.
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E. GARZA; L. FUGA; R. BAKER;
R. LIMON; A. SALCEDO; D. HODGE,
08cv1290 BTM (WVG)
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND GRANTING IN
PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
[ECF Nos. 103, 106]
Defendants.
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I.
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
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Whittier Buchanan (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Kern Valley
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State Prison located in Delano, California, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed
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this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants initially moved to dismiss
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Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint in 2010. The Court issued a ruling in which the Court
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dismissed all claims against Defendants Verkouteren, Garcia, Pederson and Contreras without
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leave to amend. See July 27, 2010 Order at 11. The Court also granted Defendants’ Motion
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to Dismiss Plaintiff’s access to courts claim, conspiracy claim and all state law claims. Id.
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Defendants Sterling and Grannis brought a second Motion to Dismiss as they had been served
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with Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint after the initial Defendants had moved to dismiss the
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claims against them. On October 15, 2010, the Court dismissed all claims against Defendants
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Sterling and Grannis. See Oct. 15, 2010 Order at 12. Accordingly, the only remaining
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Defendants in this action are Garza, Fuga, Baker, Limon, Salcedo and Hodge. The remaining
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claims are Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force, Eighth Amendment deliberate
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indifference to serious medical needs and retaliation claims.
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Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims on August 9, 2011 [ECF
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No. 103]. Defendants Garza, Fuga, Baker, Limon and Salcedo filed a Cross-Motion for Partial
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Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference and retaliation
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claims on September 30, 2011 [ECF No. 106]. The Court notified Plaintiff of the requirements
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for opposing summary judgment pursuant to Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir.
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1988) and Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) [ECF No. 112]. All parties
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have filed an Opposition to the respective Motions [ECF Nos. 108, 114]. Neither party has filed
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a Reply to either Opposition.
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II.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
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In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the events that gave rise to this
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action occurred while he was incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility
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(“RJD”) from February 7, 2007, to October 23, 2007. (See FAC at 1.) In 2007, Plaintiff had
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a pending lawsuit against the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“CSATF”) for
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which he requested that Defendant Sterling, the Legal Technician Assistant, provide him with
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copies of legal documents. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant Sterling’s “lack of legal
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assistance” caused Plaintiff to “miss his Court deadline.” (Id.) Because he claims that
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The Court refers to the following facts based only on Plaintiff’s version of the events as set
forth in his First Amended Complaint. To the extent that Defendants offer a different version of the
facts, that will be noted in the discussion and analysis set forth below.
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Sterling’s actions “hindered his efforts to process his legal claims,” Plaintiff filed an
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administrative grievance against Sterling. (Id.)
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Plaintiff claims that when Sterling became aware of Plaintiff’s grievances, she began to
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lose or misplace Plaintiff’s legal documents and refused him access to the prison law library.
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(Id.) As a result, Plaintiff’s lawsuit was dismissed. (Id.)
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Plaintiff further claims that Defendants Salcedo, Baker and Limon “were not supplying
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Plaintiff with indigent envelopes,” so he filed an administrative grievance against Salcedo,
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Baker and Limon. (Id.) Plaintiff informed Salcedo that he had pending litigation, which is why
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he needed the envelopes, and requested her assistance to process his legal mail. (Id.) Because
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Salcedo refused to do so, Plaintiff filed another administrative grievance against Salcedo. (Id.)
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Plaintiff alleges that “in retaliation, Defendant Salcedo conspired with Defendants’ Baker and
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Limon” to not “pick up/process Plaintiff’s legal mail to the courts.” (Id.)
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On May 30, 2007, Plaintiff was standing outside of the “program office” when
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Defendant Garza emerged from the office and “gave Plaintiff a direct order to ‘stop filing
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602's!’” When Plaintiff attempted to explain why he needed to file the grievances, Garza
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“abruptly cut Plaintiff off yelling ‘[racial expletive], you don’t have any rights, you are a
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criminal, criminals don’t have rights.’” (Id.) Garza continued to use racially derogatory
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language towards him. (Id.) Plaintiff claims Defendant Garza “yanked his [stick] from his
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waistbelt” and ordered Plaintiff to “get down.” (Id.) Plaintiff complied by laying down on his
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stomach at which time Garza ordered Defendant Fuga and “Jane Doe” to “cuff him.” (Id.)
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Plaintiff informed Defendants Fuga and Doe as they “began to jerk Plaintiff’s arms behind his
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back” that he had a medical chrono indicating that Plaintiff had a disability that provided for
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him to be handcuffed in the front and not behind his back due to a herniated disk. (Id.)
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Defendants Fuga and Doe ignored this information and were “kneeing Plaintiff roughly in his
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back, neck and the lower parts” of his body. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that a number of medical
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care employees and correctional officers observed this altercation but failed to protect him from
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injury.
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Plaintiff cried out “you’re hurting me.” (Id. at 6.) “Upon hearing this, Defendant Garza
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gave Defendants Jane Doe and Fuga a direct order to ‘hurt him.’” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that
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Fuga and Doe “became even more malicious and sadistic” by “jerk[ing] twice on Plaintiff’s left
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arm” which resulted in an “audible popping sound.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims Defendant Garza
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continued to yell racial expletives towards him and ordered Fuga and Doe to stand Plaintiff up.
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(Id.) As Plaintiff was crying, he claims that Defendant Garza “saw that he had actually
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‘silenced’ Plaintiff” and ordered Fuga to take Plaintiff back to his cell. (Id.) Plaintiff asked
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Fuga to take him to the infirmary as he was in “extreme pain” but Fuga refused.
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On August 16, 2007, Plaintiff claims that he was asked by Defendant Hodge to “snitch”
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on another inmate. (Id.) When Plaintiff refused, Hodge took Plaintiff’s prescription sunglasses.
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(Id.) Because Plaintiff continued to refuse to be a “snitch,” and due to the fact that Plaintiff
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filed a grievance against him, Hodge began acts of retaliation against Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff
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claims that Hodge would take personal property from Plaintiff and give them to other inmates.
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(Id. at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that Hodge would refuse to allow Plaintiff to attend church services
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or sing in the prison’s gospel choir. (Id.)
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III.
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DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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A.
Summary Judgment -- Standard of Review
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Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
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the moving party is entitled to a judgment as matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The moving
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party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is proper. Adickes v. S.H.
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Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970). The burden then shifts to the opposing party to provide
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admissible evidence beyond the pleadings to show that summary judgment is not appropriate.
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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 324 (1986). The opposing party’s evidence is to
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be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty
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Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).
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However, to avoid summary judgment, the opposing party cannot rest solely on
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conclusory allegations of fact or law. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986);
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Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Instead, the nonmovant
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must designate which specific facts show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477
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U.S. at 256; Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728, 731 (9th Cir. 1989).
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Cross-motions for summary judgment do not necessarily mean that there are no disputed
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issues of material fact, and do not necessarily permit the court to render judgment in favor of
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one side or the other. Starsky v. Williams, 512 F.2d 109, 112 (9th Cir. 1975). Instead, the court
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must consider each motion separately to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact
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exists. Id. A “material” fact is one that is relevant to an element of a claim or defense and
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whose existence might affect the outcome of the suit. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
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Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The materiality of a fact is thus determined by
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the substantive law governing the claim or defense. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Celotex, 477
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U.S. at 322; Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Disputes over irrelevant or
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unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. T.W. Elec. Service, Inc. v.
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Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S.
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at 248).)
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B.
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Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person
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acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue; and (2) that the conduct deprived
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the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the
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United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
General Standards for § 1983 liability
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C.
Retaliation claims
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First, both Plaintiff and Defendants move for summary judgment in their favor as to
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Plaintiff’s retaliation claims. Of fundamental import to prisoners are their First Amendment
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“right[s] to file prison grievances,” Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003), and to
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“pursue civil rights litigation in the courts.” Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir.
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1995). Without those bedrock constitutional guarantees, inmates would be left with no viable
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mechanism to remedy prison injustices. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005).
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“And because purely retaliatory actions taken against a prisoner for having exercised those
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rights necessarily undermine those protections, such actions violate the Constitution quite apart
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from any underlying misconduct they are designed to shield.” Id. (citing Pratt v. Rowland, 65
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F.3d 802, 806 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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“[A] viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An
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assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that
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prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First
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Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional
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goal.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68 (footnote omitted) (citing Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443,
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449 (9th Cir. 2000); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994)).
1.
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First Amendment retaliation claims against Salcedo, Baker and
Limon
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In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff makes allegations that Defendants Salcedo,
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Baker and Limon retaliated against him because he filed administrative grievances complaining
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of actions these Defendants had taken. (See FAC at 4; see also Pl.’s Memo of Ps & As in Supp.
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of MSJ at 16.) Initially, Plaintiff alleges that he requested indigent envelopes from Defendant
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Salcedo after telling her that he had a lawsuit “pending in the courts.” (FAC at 4.) Plaintiff
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alleges that Defendant Salcedo responded to this request by refusing to provide the indigent
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envelopes and refusing to process his legal mail. (Id.)
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On March 1, 20007, Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance claiming that he was “not
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receiving my monthly allotment of indigent envelopes.” (See Pl.’s Opp’n on March 12, 2007,
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Ex. H, Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form, Log. No. RJD-07-907, dated Mar. 1, 2007.) On March
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12, 2007, prior to receiving the response from his previous grievance, Plaintiff submitted an
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administrative grievance claiming Defendant Salcedo refused to process his legal mail. (See
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Pl.’s Mot., Ex. L, Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form, Log. No. RJD-O7-1095, dated Mar. 12, 2007).
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In May of 2007, Plaintiff claims that there were further incidents in which Defendants
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Baker and Limon, “acting in agreement with Defendant Salcedo,” refused to process his legal
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mail because Plaintiff had filed a grievance against Defendant Salcedo on March 12, 2007.
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(FAC at 4.)
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However, there are simply insufficient facts in the record to support a retaliatory claim
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against Defendants Salcedo, Baker or Limon. In order to prevail on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim,
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he “must show that his protected conduct was ‘the substantial or motivating factor behind the
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defendant’s conduct.” Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Soranno’s
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Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)). Plaintiff argues in his moving
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papers and Opposition that it was clear that Defendants were retaliating against him by failing
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to provide indigent envelopes, and he specifically points to the grievance that he filed on March
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1, 2007, as evidence of those acts of retaliation. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 7.) However, the initial
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grievance Plaintiff filed with respect to the alleged lack of indigent envelopes made no mention
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of retaliatory acts nor did it mention any of the Defendants by name. (See Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. H.)
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Nowhere in this grievance did Plaintiff ever indicate that he was being denied indigent
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envelopes by Defendants because he had filed previous civil actions. There is just no evidence
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in the record which would indicate that Defendants were aware of the previous litigation and
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that this hypothetical knowledge was the “substantial and motivating factor” behind the alleged
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denial of indigent envelopes. Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271.
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Second, to the extent that Plaintiff claims that Defendant Salcedo refused to process his
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legal mail on March 12, 2007, because of the grievance he claimed he filed against Salcedo on
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March 1, 2007, again, this allegation is unsupported by the record. As stated above, the
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grievance filed by Plaintiff on March 1, 2007, does not identify any correctional officer by name
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nor is there any evidence that any of the named Defendants were aware that Plaintiff had filed
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this grievance. Plaintiff did file a grievance in which he named Defendant Salcedo on March
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12, 2007. (See Pl.’s Ps & As in Supp. of MSJ, Ex. L). In this grievance, Plaintiff states that
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Defendant Salcedo refused to process his legal mail on March 12, 2007, which he claims
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“den[ied] my access to the court(s).” Id. Nowhere in that grievance does Plaintiff even suggest
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that Defendant Salcedo’s actions were in retaliation for Plaintiff’s exercising his constitutional
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rights. Plaintiff offers no other evidence to support his claims of retaliation. Moreover, Plaintiff
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does not allege nor does he point to any evidence in the record that Defendant Salcedo, herself,
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took any “adverse action” against him following the grievance that he filed on March 12, 2007.
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In addition, both Baker and Limon have declared that they were unaware that Plaintiff
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had filed a grievance against either of them “or any other officer.” (Declaration of R. Baker at
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¶ 8; Declaration of R. Limon at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff’s only allegation with regard to these two
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Defendants is his claim that Salcedo “told [Baker and Limon] that Plaintiff filed a 602 on her”
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but he offers no evidence to support this assertion. (FAC at 4.)
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evidence to support his claim that the alleged refusal to process his legal mail was in retaliation
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for filing previous grievances against other correctional officers. Rather, Plaintiff argues in his
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opposition that his retaliation claim against Baker and Limon is supported by a grievance he filed
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against them on May 23, 2007. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 5-6, Ex. B, Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form,
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Log No. RJD-07-1466, dated May 23, 2007.) This grievance complains of behavior that Plaintiff
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alleges occurred on May 22, 2007, by Defendants Limon and Baker but fails to make any claims
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that their actions were in retaliation for a grievance filed in March of 2007 against Salcedo.
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Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has offered no evidence to create a triable issue of material
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fact with regard to his claims of retaliation against Baker, Limon or Salcedo because he has
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failed to show that his filing of a grievance or previous litigation was the “substantial” or
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“motivating” factor behind their alleged conduct. Soranno’s Gasco, Inc., 874 F.2d at 1314.
Plaintiff has offered no
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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to his retaliation claims against
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Defendants Baker, Limon and Salcedo is DENIED and Defendants’ Limon, Baker and
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Salcedo’s partial Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s
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retaliation claims.
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2.
First Amendment retaliation claims against Hodge
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Defendant Hodge moves for summary judgment as to the retaliation claims against him.
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Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment as to this claim. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
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Hodge wanted Plaintiff to “snitch” on another inmate. (See FAC at 6.) When Plaintiff allegedly
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refused to “snitch,” and following Plaintiff’s filing of a grievance against Hodge, Plaintiff
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alleges Hodge began to take his personal items from him and give them to other inmates. (Id.)
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In support of their Motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged that he was
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exercising his First Amendment rights. (See Defs.’ Memo of Ps & As in Supp. of MSJ at 9.)
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Specifically, Defendants maintain that the act of refusing to “snitch” does not fall under the
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purview of the First Amendment. (Id.) The Ninth Circuit has held, in a matter involving an
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alleged vindictive prosecution, that “there is no constitutional right not to snitch.” Paguio v.
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Acosta, 114 F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 773
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(9th Cir. 1990)). In addition, it is well settled that in the First Amendment context “a prison
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inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner
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or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417
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U.S. 817, 822 (1974). However, while it may be true that the refusal to “snitch” is not
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considered “protected conduct,” Plaintiff has also stated that he was retaliated against for filing
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a 602 against Defendant Hodge. (See FAC at 7.) Thus, it is not the allegation of refusing to
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snitch that forms the sole basis of Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation, it is also his claim that he filed
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an administrative grievance complaining of Defendant Hodge’s insistence that he snitch on a
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fellow inmate that led to further retaliatory acts by Defendant Hodge. (See Pl.’s Memo of Ps &
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As in Supp. of MSJ, Ex. K, Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form, Log. No. RJD-07-2086, dated August
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11, 2007.)
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In their Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants
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acknowledge that Plaintiff’s allegations in his verified First Amended Complaint as to Defendant
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Hodge are “disputed.” (See Defs.’ Opp’n at 5.) They offer the Declaration of Defendant Hodge
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in which he denies every allegation of retaliatory conduct made by Plaintiff. (Id., Hodge Decl.
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at ¶¶ 4-8.) These types of arguments made by Defendants and Plaintiff both would require the
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Court to make credibility determinations that are not permissible at the summary judgment stage.
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See Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus,
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there remains a triable issue of material fact as to whether Defendant Hodge retaliated against
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Plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment rights by filing a grievance against Defendant
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Hodge.
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Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment of his
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retaliation claims against Defendant Hodge and DENIES Defendant Hodge’s Motion for
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Summary Judgment of Plaintiff’s retaliation claims.
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D.
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Plaintiff and Defendants Garza and Fuga move for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s
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Eighth Amendment - Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
claims that they acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.2
1.
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Standard of Review
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The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishment that involves the “unnecessary and wanton
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infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
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U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). The Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause is
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violated when prison officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.
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Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. “Medical” needs include a prisoner’s “physical, dental, and mental
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health.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982).
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To show “cruel and unusual” punishment under the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner must
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point to evidence in the record from which a trier of fact might reasonably conclude that
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Defendants’ medical treatment placed Plaintiff at risk of “objectively, sufficiently serious” harm
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and that Defendants had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” when they either provided or
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denied him medical care. Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation and
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internal quotations omitted). Thus, there is both an objective and a subjective component to an
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actionable Eighth Amendment violation. Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002);.
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Although the “routine discomfort inherent in the prison setting” is inadequate to satisfy
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the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment inquiry, see Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731
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(9th Cir. 1999), the objective component is generally satisfied so long as the prisoner alleges
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facts to show that his medical need is sufficiently “serious” such that the “failure to treat [that]
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condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
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pain.” Clement, 298 F.3d at 904 (quotations omitted).
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Defendants have not moved for summary judgment with regard to Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment excessive force claims.
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However, the subjective component requires the prisoner to demonstrate facts which
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show that the officials had the culpable mental state, which is “‘deliberate indifference’ to a
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substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting
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Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994)). “Deliberate indifference” is evidenced only
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when “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
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official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
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substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S.
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at 837. Inadequate treatment due to “mere medical malpractice” or even gross negligence, does
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not amount to a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Wood v. Housewright, 900
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F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990).
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While deliberate indifference can be manifested if a doctor or prison guard intentionally
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denies or delays access to medical care or otherwise interferes with medical treatment already
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prescribed, see Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05, the delay must also lead to further injury or be
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somehow harmful. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that harm
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caused by delay need not necessarily be “substantial”), overruled on other grounds, WMX
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Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997).
2.
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Application to Plaintiff’s Allegations
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Here, Plaintiff alleges an altercation occurred between himself and Defendants Garza and
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Fuga on May 30, 2007. (See FAC at 6.) Following the altercation, Plaintiff claims he requested
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that Defendant Fuga “take him to the infirmary as [Plaintiff was] in extreme pain.” (Id.)
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Plaintiff further claims that “Defendant Fuga denied Plaintiff’s request for medical care with
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reckless and deliberate indifference.” (Id.) While those are the allegations in Plaintiff’s verified
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First Amended Complaint, Defendants argue that the evidence in the record does not support a
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finding that Plaintiff had a serious medical need on May 30, 2007, and thus cannot overcome the
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first hurdle in establishing an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. (See Defs.’
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Memo of Ps & As in Support of MSJ at 14-15.)
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Defendants submit the Declaration of D. Salinas, Health Records Technician II at Kern
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Valley State Prison to support their claim that Plaintiff has no evidence of a serious medical
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need. Specifically, Defendants contend that while Plaintiff alleges that he suffered from
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shoulder pain and hearing loss as a result of the altercation on May 30, 2007, he did not actually
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request any medical attention until thirteen days later. (See Salinas Decl., Ex. A.) In this
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Exhibit, Defendants attach Plaintiff’s “Requests for Medical Care at R.J. Donovan State Prison,”
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dated after May 30, 2007. (Salinas Decl. at ¶ 5.)
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Defendants maintain that records reflect that Plaintiff’s claims of shoulder and back
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injuries were “pre-existing” and not the cause of the altercation that occurred on May 30, 2007.
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Plaintiff does not dispute this claim and acknowledges that he had these pre-existing medical
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conditions but he contends that the altercation resulted in a “dislocated shoulder” for which
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Defendants refused to provide treatment. (See Pl.’s Memo of Ps & As in Supp. of MSJ at 13.)
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In support of Plaintiff’s claim he submits a document entitled “Comprehensive Accommodation
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Chrono” which has an apparent notation indicating that Plaintiff has a dislocated shoulder on
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July 13, 2007. (See Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ MSJ, Exhibit K, Comprehensive Accommodation
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Chrono, dated July 13, 2007.) Plaintiff also claims it was “days later” that he suffered serious
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back pain. (Pl.’s Memo of Ps & As in Supp. of MSJ at 13, 14.)
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Here, Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, there is no evidence in the record that
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Defendants were aware of a serious medical need on May 30, 2007. The crux of Plaintiff’s
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allegations is the alleged failure of Defendants to provide access to medical treatment on May
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30, 2007. Plaintiff’s submission of a document that suggests a dislocated shoulder several weeks
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after the May 30, 2007, incident, which Defendants correctly point out is not supported by any
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diagnosis in Plaintiff’s medical records, and his own acknowledgment that the back pain came
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“days later,” indicate that there is no evidence in the record to show that Plaintiff suffered from
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a serious medical need on May 30, 2007. (Id.) While Plaintiff in his moving papers and
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Opposition appears to broaden his claim to an allegation of the denial of medical care for the
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weeks following May 30, 2007, his only allegation in his First Amended Complaint is a claim
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of denial of medical care on May 30, 2007, for failing to take him to the infirmary. Plaintiff
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provides no evidence to demonstrate how any of the named Defendants were responsible for his
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medical care in the days, weeks or months following this incident on May 30, 2007. Thus, the
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evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact to show that Plaintiff’s medical
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needs were objectively “serious” on May 30, 2007. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.
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In addition, the record before the Court does not show any triable issue as to the
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subjective component of an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claim against
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Defendants. See Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. In order to justify trial,
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Plaintiff must point to evidence in the record to show that Defendants were “deliberately
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indifferent” to his serious medical needs, i.e, that Defendants knew, yet consciously disregarded
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his pain or the need to provide him constitutionally adequate care. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d
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at1060. This “subjective approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude actually
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was.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839. Because Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence to dispute
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Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff did not have a serious medical need on May 30, 2007, the
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Court finds no genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Defendants acted with
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deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs.
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Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS
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Defendants’ Partial Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
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deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.
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E.
Qualified Immunity
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Defendants move for qualified immunity in regard to Plaintiff’s retaliation claims and
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Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim. (See Defs.’ Memo
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of Ps & As in Supp. of X-MSJ at 17-18.) Because the Court has found no triable issue of fact
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exists as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims or Plaintiff’s retaliation
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claims against Defendants Limon, Baker or Salcedo, it need not reach any issues regarding
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qualified immunity on those claims. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“If no
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constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no
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necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”); County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
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523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (“[T]he better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of
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qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation
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of a constitutional right at all.”).
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However, Defendant Hodge moves for qualified immunity with respect to the remaining
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retaliation claim made by Plaintiff. “Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil
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damages unless their conduct violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
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which a reasonable person would have known.’” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir.
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2001) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). When presented with a
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qualified immunity defense, the central questions for the court are: (1) whether the facts alleged,
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taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, demonstrate that the Defendant’s conduct violated
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a statutory or constitutional right; and (2) whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at
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the time it is alleged to have been violated. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. “These two questions
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may be considered in either order.” Rosenbaum v. Washoe County, 654 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th
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Cir. 2011) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).
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Here, Defendant Hodge makes a very brief argument in support of qualified immunity
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by stating that “Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against him fails as a matter of law, since he does not
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allege that Hodge retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights.” (Defs.’
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Memo of Ps & As in Supp. of MSJ at 19.) This statement is not accurate. Plaintiff alleges in
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his verified First Amended Complaint that Defendant Hodge “retaliated against Plaintiff because
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he would not ‘snitch’ on another inmate, and because he filed a 602 on him concerning that
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incident.” (FAC at 7 (emphasis added).) As stated above, for qualified immunity purposes, the
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Court must review the factual allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff to determine
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whether Defendant Hodge’s conduct violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff claims
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he had adverse actions taken against him by Defendant Hodge for filing an administrative
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grievance against Hodge. (See FAC at 7, 11.) The Court finds that these claims are sufficient
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to deny qualified immunity as to the first prong.
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Defendants provide no argument to support the second prong of the qualified immunity
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analysis, which is whether the right to be free from retaliation was “clearly established” at the
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time it is alleged to have been violated. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. The Ninth Circuit opinion
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clearly setting forth the elements of a retaliation claim in a prison setting was decided in 2005.
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See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005). The factual allegations in this case
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arose in 2007. (See FAC at 1.) Because Defendant Hodge provides no support otherwise, the
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Court finds that the law relating to retaliation claims in the prison setting was “clearly
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established” at the time the alleged acts of retaliation had occurred. Thus, the Court finds that
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Defendant Hodge is not entitled to qualified immunity.
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F.
Eighth Amendment Excessive Force claims
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Finally, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment in his favor as to his Eighth Amendment
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excessive force claims. The “core judicial inquiry,” when a prisoner alleges the excessive use
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of force under the Eighth Amendment, is “not whether a certain quantum of injury was
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sustained, but rather “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
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discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. at 1,
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7 (1992); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319-321, (1986). “When prison officials
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maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm,” the Supreme Court has recognized,
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“contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . whether or not significant injury
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is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter
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how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury.” Hudson, 503
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U.S. at 9; see also Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178-79 (2010) (“An inmate who is
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gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely
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because he has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.”)
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Thus, “[i]n determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary,” the Court
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must “evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the
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amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any
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efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (internal
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quotation marks and citations omitted).
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///
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///
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///
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Here, Plaintiff contends that he was complying with the orders by Defendants when they
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“jerk[ed] his arms behind his back,” and later “jerked twice on his left arm” causing an “audible
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popping sound.” (See FAC at 5-6.; see also Antley Decl., Pl.’s Depo at 14:1-7.) Defendants
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dispute Plaintiff’s version of the incident and have provided declarations in which they state that
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Plaintiff was argumentative, aggressive and they believed Plaintiff was a “threat to [their] safety
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and to the safety and security of the institution and the surrounding staff and other inmates.”
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(See Decl. of E. Garza at ¶ 4.)
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Thus, based on this material contradictory testimony, the Court finds genuine issues of
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material fact exist as to whether Defendants used force in a good faith effort to maintain or
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restore order, or instead, used force with a “malicious” and “sadistic” intent to do Plaintiff harm.
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Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (noting that “[c]redibility
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determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts
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are jury functions, not those of a judge” resolving a motion for summary judgment).
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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment of his Eighth Amendment
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excessive force claims is DENIED. Because Defendants did not move for summary judgment
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as to this claim, this claim remains in the action.
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V.
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CONCLUSION AND ORDER
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For all the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby:
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(1)
DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety [ECF No. 103];
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(2)
GRANTS Defendants’ Limon, Baker and Salcedo’s partial Cross-Motion for
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Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s retaliation claims [ECF No. 106];
(3)
DENIES Defendant Hodge’s partial Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Plaintiff’s retaliation claims;
(4)
GRANTS Defendants’ partial Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims; and
(5)
DENIES Defendant Hodge’s partial Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on
qualified immunity grounds.
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Because there are no remaining claims against Defendants Salcedo, Baker and Limon and
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there is no just reason for delay, the Clerk of Court is directed to enter a final judgment as to
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these Defendants pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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DATED: March 27, 2012
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BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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