Bryant v. Armstrong et al

Filing 109

ORDER Regarding Discovery Motions: It is hereby ordered the Court is Granting 53 Motion to Compel; Granting in Part and Denying in Part 56 Motion to Compel; Granting 66 Motion to Compel; Granting 71 Motion to Compel; Granting in Part and Denying in Part 74 Motion to Compel; Granting 82 Motion to Compel; and Denying as Moot 86 Motion to Compel. The Defendants' discovery responses must be served by June 29, 2012. Signed by Magistrate Judge Ruben B. Brooks on 6/14/2012. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(leh)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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STANFORD PAUL BRYANT,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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T. ARMSTRONG, Correctional
Officer; et al.,

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Defendants.
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Civil No. 08cv02318 W(RBB)
ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY
MOTIONS [ECF NOS. 53, 56, 66,
71, 74, 82, 86]

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On December 12, 2008, Plaintiff Stanford Paul Bryant, a state

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prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint

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pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [ECF No. 1].

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Amended Complaint on March 3, 2009 [ECF No. 3], and a Second

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Amended Complaint on June 23, 2010 [ECF No. 39].

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Bryant filed a First

Following several motions to dismiss, Defendants Armstrong,

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Catlett, Janda, Lizarraga, Ochoa, and Trujillo filed an Answer to

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the Second Amended Complaint on April 29, 2011 [ECF No. 49].

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Court subsequently held a case management conference and the

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parties commenced discovery [ECF Nos. 51-52].

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summary judgment are currently pending [ECF Nos. 91-92].

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The

Cross-motions for
All

08cv02318 W(RBB)

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pretrial dates have been vacated, pending a ruling on the summary

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judgment motions [ECF No. 104].

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Also pending before the Court are Plaintiff's seven motions to

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compel discovery from four of the six remaining Defendants [ECF

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Nos. 53, 56, 66, 71, 74, 82, 86].1

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compel suitable for resolution on the papers, pursuant to Civil

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Local Rule 7.1.

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stated below, Bryant's motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in

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part.

The Court finds the motions to

See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1).

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I.

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For the reasons

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

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The Plaintiff contends in count one that Defendant Armstrong

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violated the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against

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Bryant because of his race.

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39.)2

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African-American inmates to attend the law library during times

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that conflicted with their yard recreation; in contrast, Armstrong

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scheduled Hispanic inmates for law library time that did not

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interfere with yard time.

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(Second Am. Compl. 13, 16-17, ECF No.

The Defendant allegedly scheduled Plaintiff and other

(Id. at 13-17.)

In count two, Bryant argues that Defendant Armstrong

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retaliated against him for submitting an inmate grievance against

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Armstrong for racial discrimination.

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Bryant, Armstrong retaliated by filing a false "Information

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Chrono."

(Id. at 19-20.)

According to

(Id. at 22.)

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The Court will cite to each discovery motion using the page
numbers assigned by the electronic case filing system.
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Because Bryant’s Second Amended Complaint is not
consecutively paginated, the Court will also cite to it using the
page numbers assigned by the electronic case filing system.
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08cv02318 W(RBB)

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The Plaintiff argues in count three that after he and another

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inmate submitted grievances against Armstrong, Defendant Lizarraga

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retaliated against Bryant and other African-American prisoners by

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moving them to more restrictive cell placements, threatening

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Plaintiff, and filing a false disciplinary report and rule

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violation charge against Bryant.

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Defendant Trujillo purportedly falsified a report and refused to

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permit the Plaintiff to call witnesses at his disciplinary hearing.

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(Id. at 34.)

(Id. at 25-30.)

Further,

Defendants Catlett, Janda, and Ochoa sanctioned the

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retaliatory conduct of Armstrong, Lizarraga, and Trujillo.

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41.)

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(Id. at

Finally, in count four, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

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Armstrong, Lizarraga, and Trujillo violated California Civil Code

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sections 52.1, 51.7, and 52(b) by interfering with Bryant's

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constitutional rights because of his race.

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and Lizarraga threatened violence against Plaintiff if he continued

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to discuss or pursue grievances alleging racial discrimination.

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(Id. at 43-44.)

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violence" against Plaintiff by removing legal documents from his

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cell without permission.

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that Defendant Trujillo intimidated Plaintiff by having three

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Hispanic officers surround him in a "menacing manner."

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44-45.)

(Id. at 43.)

Armstrong

Lizarraga is claimed to have "committed an act of

(Id. at 44.)

Similarly, Bryant contends

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II.

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(Id. at

LEGAL STANDARDS

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It is well established that a party may obtain discovery

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regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any claim or

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defense.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

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Relevant information need not

08cv02318 W(RBB)

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be admissible at trial so long as the discovery appears to be

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reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible

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evidence.

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matter that bears on, or reasonably could lead to other matter that

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could bear on, any issue that may be in the case.

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Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (citing Hickman v.

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Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)) (footnote omitted).

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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the propounding

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party to bring a motion to compel responses to discovery.

Id.

Relevance is construed broadly to include any

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Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B).

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burden of resisting disclosure.

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Oppenheimer

Rule 37 of

Fed. R.

292, 299 (C.D. Cal. 1992).

The party opposing the discovery bears the
Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D.

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III.

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DISCUSSION

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A.

Defendant Ochoa: Motion to Compel Responses to Document
Requests 1, 2, 3, and 4 (Set One) [ECF No. 53]

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Plaintiff filed a "Motion for an Order to Compel Discovery,"

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in which he seeks an order compelling Defendant Ochoa to respond to

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requests for production of documents 1, 2, 3, and 4 in set one [ECF

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No. 53].

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an Order to Compel Discovery was later filed, along with a

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declaration of John P. Walters [ECF No. 57].

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Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for an Order to Compel

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Discovery" was also filed [ECF No. 60].

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Defendant T. Ochoa's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for

"Plaintiff's Reply to

In request for production of documents 1, Bryant seeks "[a]ny

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and all documents and writings, as 'writings' is defined by Federal

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Rules of Evidence 1001 that discloses [sic] the contents of any and

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all questions, answers or statements resulting from any and all

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08cv02318 W(RBB)

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inquiries made in Appeal log #CAL-A-08-00207 . . . ."

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Compel Disc. Ochoa 4, ECF No. 53.)

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request 1, except it relates to appeal log #CAL-A-08-00311.

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at 11-12.)

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appeal logs #CAL-A-08-02223 and #CAL-A-08-01027, respectively.

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(Id. at 12.)

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requests are vague and ambiguous.

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states that a diligent search was undertaken and that all

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responsive documents within Ochoa's control have been provided.

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(Mot. Order

Request 2 is identical to
(Id.

Requests 3 and 4 are also identical, but they concern

Defendant Ochoa objects that all four document
(Id. at 16-17.)

Defendant also

(Id.)
In his Motion to Compel, Bryant maintains that Ochoa

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improperly failed to produce any records even though they are part

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of Calipatria's investigative files and therefore in Ochoa's

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possession.

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because Plaintiff has received documents that "indicate that there

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[were] several 'inquiries' conducted as a result of [Bryant's]

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grievances Log Nos. Cal-A-08-00207, #Cal-A-08-00311, and

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#Cal-A-08-01027."

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related "Confidential Supplement to Appeals" documents on April 5,

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2008, and July 27, 2008.

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the documents do not exist, Bryant contends, is therefore evasive.

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(Id. at 6.)

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1.

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Plaintiff submits in his declaration that he served Ochoa with

(Id. at 4.)

Defendant's responses are incomplete

(Id. at 9.)

(Id.)

Plaintiff argues that Ochoa signed

Any attempt by Ochoa to claim that

Timeliness of Defendant's responses and objections

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a set of document requests on June 15, 2010.

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Court subsequently stayed all discovery pending resolution of the

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then-pending motion to dismiss.

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Ochoa did not respond to the discovery until nearly two months

(Id.)

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(Id. at 8.)

This

Yet, according to Bryant,

08cv02318 W(RBB)

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later on June 1, 2011.

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that Ochoa has waived his objections by failing to timely respond

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to the discovery requests.

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(Id. at 5.)

Therefore, Plaintiff urges

(Id.)

In his Opposition, Defendant argues that Bryant misinterprets

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the Court's order staying discovery and he does not specify what

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dates or deadlines he uses to assert the responses were almost two

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months late.

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the Defendant, Plaintiff served the document requests on June 15,

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2010, and on July 14, 2010, the Court issued a minute order staying

(Def. T. Ochoa's Opp'n 2, ECF No. 57.)

According to

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all discovery pending a ruling on the motion to dismiss.

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Then, on January 7, 2011, in its Report and Recommendation, "the

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Court stayed all discovery 'pending the motion to dismiss.'"

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Ochoa represents, "No further details were given."

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Defendant asserts that on February 11, 2011, the district court

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issued an order on the motion to dismiss, and Defendants filed an

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Answer on April 29, 2011.

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(Id.)

(Id.)

(Id.)

(Id.)

Ochoa submits, "Thus, the orders stayed discovery pending the

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motion to dismiss, but did not specify any exact date or method for

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resuming discovery."

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a letter to Bryant concerning the discovery and suggested that,

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because the stay was lifted, Plaintiff's first set of document

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requests be deemed served that day and a response would be due May

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31, 2011.

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objections to the proposal.

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to the discovery requests on May 24, 2011.

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Ochoa maintains that his responses were timely served, and no

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objections were waived.

(Id.)

(Id.)

On May 2, 2011, defense counsel mailed

Counsel asked Plaintiff to advise him of any
(Id.)

Defendant served his responses
(Id.)

Accordingly,

(Id. at 3.)

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08cv02318 W(RBB)

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In his Reply, Bryant urges that Ochoa misstates the record.

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(Pl.'s Reply Defs.' Opp'n 2, ECF No. 60.)

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that this Court specifically stayed discovery until thirty days

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after the district court issued an order on Defendants' motion to

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dismiss.

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claim that he did not have knowledge of this Court's order or the

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specific date that the district court judge issued the order on

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Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, in fact Defendant Ochoa cites the

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specific date which the district court judge issued the order

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. . . ."

(Id.)

Plaintiff points out

Bryant asserts, "The Defendant Ochoa does not

(Id.)

On July 2, 2010, Defendants filed a Motion for a Protective

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Order to Stay Discovery Pending the Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 41].

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On July 15, 2010, this Court issued a temporary stay of discovery,

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pending resolution of the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion for a

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Protective Order [ECF No. 42].

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Order, the Defendants alleged that on June 15, 2010, after

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Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint but before Defendants

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moved to dismiss, Plaintiff served five sets of discovery on

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Defendants.

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No. 41.)

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stayed until their motion to dismiss was resolved.

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In their Motion for a Protective

(Mot. Protective Order Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 2, ECF

The Defendants maintained that all discovery should be
(Id. at 3.)

This Court, on January 7, 2011, recommended that the motion to

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dismiss be granted in part and denied in part and ordered that all

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discovery be stayed [ECF No. 46].

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for a protective order, the Court explicitly stated:

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As to the Defendants' request

Applying these guidelines, a temporary stay on
discovery until resolution of the Motion to Dismiss is
appropriate. Defendants filed this Motion after they
were served with discovery and met with Plaintiff in an
attempt to resolve the issue. Defendants do not seek a

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08cv02318 W(RBB)

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protective order that will remain in effect after their
Motion to Dismiss is resolved, or until any
answer is filed; they merely request that discovery be
stayed until the Motion to Dismiss is ruled upon.

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(Order Granting Defs.’ Mot. Protective Order 42, ECF No. 46

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(internal citations omitted).)

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The Court addressed the duration and extent of the stay as
follows:
Defendants have shown good cause to stay discovery
pending a ruling on their Motion to Dismiss. A stay of
all discovery shall be in effect from the date this
Report and Recommendation is filed until thirty days
after the district court judge issues an order on
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint [ECF No. 40].
(Id. (internal citations omitted).)
In his Opposition, Ochoa references this January 7, 2011 Order

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staying all discovery and represents that "the Court stayed all

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discovery 'pending the motion to dismiss[]'" yet misrepresents that

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"[n]o further details were given."

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No. 57.)

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pending the motion to dismiss, but did not specify any exact date

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or method for resuming discovery."

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misrepresentation of the record.

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failed to read the order to which they repeatedly and explicitly

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rely, or they deliberately misled the Court.

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are disconcerting.

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(Def. T. Ochoa's Opp'n 2, ECF

Ochoa continues, "Thus, the orders stayed discovery

(Id.)

This is a flagrant

Either Defendant and his attorney

Both possibilities

In any event, Defendant Ochoa's responses are untimely.

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Because the district court issued its ruling on the motion to

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dismiss on February 11, 2011 [ECF No. 47], the stay of discovery

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was in effect for thirty days, or until March 14, 2011, as March

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13, 2011, fell on a Sunday.

(See Order Granting Defs.' Mot.

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08cv02318 W(RBB)

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Protective Order 42, ECF No. 46); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.

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6(a)(1)(C); S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(c).

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discovery requests until May 2, 2011, when defense counsel mailed

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Bryant a letter referencing the stay and suggesting that the

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discovery be deemed served that day.

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Attach. #1 Decl. Walters 5, ECF No. 57.)

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Defendant’s objections and responses until June 1, 2011, which is

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seventy-nine days after the stay expired.

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document requests 1, 2, 3, and 4 in set one are untimely.

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Ochoa ignored Plaintiff's

(See Def. T. Ochoa's Opp'n
Plaintiff did not receive

Ochoa's responses to

Unlike Rule 33, which governs interrogatories to parties, Rule

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34 of the Rules of Civil Procedure does not provide that a

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responding party waives an objection not timely stated.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C).

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Nevertheless, generally, when a party fails to provide any response

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or objection to interrogatories or document requests, courts deem

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all objections waived and grant a motion to compel.

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Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir.

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1992) (finding that a party who failed to timely object to

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interrogatories and document production requests waived any

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objections); 7 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice, §

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33.174[2], at 33-106, § 34.13[2][a], at 34-56 to 34-56.1 (3d ed.

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2012).

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discovery requests within the time required constitutes a waiver of

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objection."

Compare

See Richmark

"It is well established that a failure to object to

Richmark, 959 F.2d at 1473.

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Although the discovery stay was in effect through March 14,

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2011, Ochoa did not serve his objections and responses until May

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24, 2011, and Bryant did not receive them until June 1, 2011,

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roughly one and one-half months late.

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Accordingly, Ochoa has

08cv02318 W(RBB)

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waived any objections and Plaintiff's document requests 1, 2, 3,

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and 4 in set one [ECF No. 53].

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In response to a request for production of documents under

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Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is to

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produce all relevant documents in his "possession, custody, or

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control."

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produce a document that is in the possession of a nonparty entity

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if the party has the legal right to obtain the document.

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City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 619 (N.D. Cal. 1995).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1).

A party may be required to

Soto v.
The term

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"control" is broadly construed, and it includes documents that the

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responding party has the legal right to obtain from third parties.

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See id. (citations omitted); 7 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore's

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Federal Practice, § 34.14[2][b], at 34-73 to 34-75 (footnotes

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omitted).

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"[W]hen a response to a production of documents is not a

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production or an objection, but an answer, the party must answer

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under oath."

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§ 34.13[2][a], at 34-57 (footnote omitted).

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responding party contends that documents are not in its custody or

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control, the court may require more than a simple assertion to that

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effect.

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also Schwartz v. Marketing Publ'g Co., 153 F.R.D. 16, 21 (D. Conn.

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1994) (citing cases establishing that the absence of possession,

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custody, or control of documents that have been requested must be

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sworn to by the responding party).

7 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice,
Similarly, if a

See id. § 34.14[2][a], at 34-73 (footnote omitted); see

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Here, Ochoa responded to document requests 1, 2, 3, and 4 by

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stating that he has produced all relevant records that are in his

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possession or control.

It is not clear that the Defendant took

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08cv02318 W(RBB)

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reasonable steps under the above standards to locate relevant

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records.

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requests [ECF No. 53] is GRANTED.

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responses and produce additional documents in his custody or

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control that reflect inquiries and related investigations conducted

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in response to Plaintiff's four grievances, as well as all

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supplemental appeals documents, including any allegedly signed by

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Ochoa.

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possession, custody, or control, after conducting this further

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attempt to locate records, Ochoa must state so under oath and

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describe efforts he made to locate responsive documents.

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Vazquez-Fernandez v. Cambridge Coll., Inc., 269 F.R.D. 150, 155 (D.

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P.R. 2010).

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B.

Plaintiff's Motion to Compel further responses to these
Ochoa must supplement his

If there are no other responsive documents in Defendant’s

See

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Defendant Armstrong: Motion to Compel Responses to
Interrogatories 1, 2, and 3 (Set One) and Document Requests 1,
2, and 3 (Set One) [ECF No. 56]

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Next, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for an Order to Compel

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Discovery” with a supporting brief and a declaration of Stanford P.

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Bryant, in which he seeks an order compelling Defendant Armstrong

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to respond to interrogatories 1, 2, and 3 in set one as well as

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document requests 1, 2, and 3 in set one [ECF No. 56].

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T. Armstrong’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for an Order to

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Compel Discovery was filed in response, along with a declaration of

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John P. Walters [ECF No. 59].

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Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for an Order to Compel Discovery”

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was also filed [ECF No. 70].

Defendant

“Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants’

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1.

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In interrogatory 1, Bryant asks Correctional Officer

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Interrogatory 1

Armstrong, “State any and all reasons why you no longer work for

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08cv02318 W(RBB)

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CDCR at Calipatria State Prison.”

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Armstrong Attach. #2 Decl. Bryant 4, ECF No. 56.)

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objected that the information was not relevant, the interrogatory

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lacks foundation, and it should be excluded under Federal Rule of

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Evidence 403.

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question invades her right to privacy under California Penal Code

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§§ 832.7 and 832.8, and seeks information that is privileged and

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confidential.

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(Id. at 13.)

(Mot. Order Compel Disc.
Armstrong

Defendant further objected that the

(Id.)

In his Motion to Compel, Bryant asserts he believes that

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Defendant no longer works at Calipatria because she was arrested

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for committing criminal acts with, or on behalf of, the "Southern

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California Hispanic Street gang(s)," and she was fired from CDCR as

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a result.

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has conceded in response to document request 1 that she is no

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longer employed by CDCR.

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interrogatory seeks relevant information that could lead to

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evidence bearing on Defendant's intent to discriminate against

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African-American inmates and favor Hispanic inmates.

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(Id. Attach. #1 Br. 3.)

(Id.)

Plaintiff argues that Armstrong

Bryant maintains that this

(Id. at 3-4.)

Although Armstrong raised multiple objections when initially

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responding to the interrogatories, the Court will only address the

21

ones she elected to pursue when opposing this Motion.

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Defendant now argues that interrogatory 1 seeks information

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regarding the personnel records of a correctional officer, which is

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confidential.

25

Armstrong submits, "In the context of disclosure of confidential

26

peace officer records, federal courts are bound by California law."

27

(Id. (citing Cal. Evid. Code § 1043).)

The

(Def. T. Armstrong's Opp'n 2, ECF No. 59.)

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08cv02318 W(RBB)

1
2

a.

Privileged and confidential

As preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether state

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or federal law applies to Defendant's assertion of privilege.

4

Armstrong represents that federal courts must apply state privilege

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law as well as the procedures applicable to peace officers'

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personnel records and Pitchess motions.3

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Opp'n 2, ECF No. 59.)

8
9

(See Def. T. Armstrong's

This is an inaccurate statement of the law.

State privilege law does not govern discovery issues in
federal § 1983 cases.

See Kerr v. U.S. District Court for the N.

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Dist. of Cal., 511 F.2d 192, 197 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 426 U.S.

11

394 (1976); Crowe v. County of San Diego, 242 F. Supp. 2d 740,

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749-50 (S.D. Cal. 2003); Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653,

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655-56 (N.D. Cal. 1987); see also Fed. R. Evid. 501; Miller, 141

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F.R.D. at 299.

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statutes, questions of privilege are resolved by federal law."

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Hampton v. City of San Diego, 147 F.R.D. 227, 228, 230 (S.D. Cal.

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1993) (citing Kerr, 511 F.2d at 197); Miller, 141 F.R.D. at 298-99

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(comparing federal and California discovery rules at length,

19

finding direct conflicts between them, and holding that federal

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discovery rules govern § 1983 civil rights actions).

21

has been interpreted by the Ninth Circuit to include the discovery

22

of personnel files, despite claims of state-created privileges."

23

Miller, 141 F.R.D. at 297.

24

standard altogether when arguing that each request seeks

25

privileged, confidential information.

"In civil rights cases brought under federal

"This theme

Here, Armstrong applies the wrong legal

(See Def. T. Armstrong's

26
27
3

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See Cal. Evid. Code § 1043; Cal. Penal Code § 832.7 (West
2008); Pitchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal.3d 531, 552 P.2d 305, 113
Cal. Rptr. 897 (1974) ("Pitchess").
13

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

Opp'n 2, ECF No. 59).

Notwithstanding this shortcoming,

2

Defendant's objection fails under federal law.

3

Federal common law recognizes a qualified privilege for

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official information, such as information in government personnel

5

files.

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with the procedural requirements for asserting the official

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information privilege.

8

AWI-DLB PC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57973, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6,

9

2012) ("Defendants do not explain how the interrogatory . . . would

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violate official information privilege."); Williams v. Walker, No.

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CIV S-07-2385 WBS GGH P, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122970, at *24-26

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(E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2009) (explaining that to object to

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interrogatories on the basis of the official information privilege,

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an appropriately delegated prison official must personally consider

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the material requested and explain why it is privileged); Gonzalez

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v. City of Calexico, No. 03CV2005 WQH (PCL), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

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93144, at *11-12 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2006) (stating requirements to

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invoke the official information privilege for interrogatories).

19

Kerr, 511 F.2d at 197-98.

Defendant Armstrong must comply

See Rackliffe v. Rocha, No. 1:07-cv-00603-

To determine whether information in government personnel files

20

is subject to the official information privilege, federal courts

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weigh the potential benefits of disclosure against the potential

22

disadvantages.

23

1033-34 (9th Cir. 1990).

24

officials, this balancing approach is moderately "pre-weight[ed] in

25

favor of disclosure."

26

Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027,
In civil rights cases against corrections

Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 661.

Before courts engage in this balancing, however, the party

27

asserting the privilege must make a "substantial threshold

28

showing."

Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613.

14

Specifically, the party must

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

serve an objection to each discovery request that explicitly

2

"invokes the official information privilege by name."

3

F.R.D. at 669.

4

requesting party a privilege log or an equivalent that specifically

5

identifies the information that is purportedly protected from

6

disclosure.

7

objection, the party alleging privilege must submit an affidavit

8

from a responsible official making several specific affirmations as

9

to the confidentiality of the information.

Kelly, 114

The withholding party must also serve the

Hampton, 147 F.R.D. at 230.

To support each

Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at

10

669-70.

11

burden of establishing cause to apply the privilege, the court must

12

order disclosure of the documents; if the party meets this initial

13

burden, the court generally conducts an in camera review of the

14

material and balance each party's interests.

15

613; Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 671.

If the nondisclosing party does not meet this initial

Soto, 162 F.R.D. at

16

In Kelly, the court explained:

17

Unless the government, through competent declarations,
shows the court what interests would be harmed, how
disclosure under a protective order would cause the harm,
and how much harm there would be, the court cannot
conduct a meaningful balancing analysis. And because the
burden of justification must be placed on the party
invoking the privilege, a court that cannot conduct a
meaningful balancing analysis because the government has
not provided the necessary information would have no
choice but to order disclosure.

18
19
20
21
22
23

Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 669; see Chism v. County of San Bernadino, 159

24

F.R.D. 531, 534-35 (C.D. Cal. 1994).

25

Here, assuming she is authorized to assert an official

26

information claim of privilege, Defendant Armstrong has not met her

27

burden of identifying the allegedly privileged information in her

28

personnel file and the specific interests that would be threatened

15

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

by disclosure under a protective order.

2

privilege by name or explain how information concerning the reasons

3

she no longer works for CDCR would violate the federal qualified

4

privilege.

5

claims of harm are insufficient to satisfy the objecting party's

6

burden); see Rackliffe, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57973, at *10.

7

Armstrong also has not satisfied the other requirements for

8

invoking the privilege.

9

She failed to invoke the

See Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 672 (stating that generalized

Because this Court is unable to conduct a meaningful balancing

10

analysis, it overrules the privilege objection and orders full

11

disclosure.

12

("Deputy Rick Roper's (Roper's) declaration in opposition to the

13

motion does not meet the threshold requirements of showing cause

14

why discovery should be denied under the official information

15

privilege.").

16

interrogatory 1 is GRANTED.

Kerr, at 669; see also Chism, 159 F.R.D. at 533

Bryant's Motion to Compel a response to

17

2.

Interrogatory 2

18

Plaintiff asks Defendant in interrogatory 2, “State any and

19

all reasons why you were arrested.”

20

Armstrong Attach. #2 Decl. Bryant 4, ECF No. 56.)

21

objected on relevance, foundation, evidentiary, privacy, privilege,

22

and confidential grounds.

23

however, Defendant only pursues the objections based on relevance,

24

privilege and confidentiality, and vagueness.

25
26

a.

(Mot. Order Compel Disc.

(Id. at 13.)

Again, Armstrong

In her Opposition,

Relevance

The Plaintiff maintains interrogatory 2 seeks relevant

27

information because he believes Defendant was arrested for

28

committing criminal acts in connection with the "Southern

16

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

California Hispanic Street gang(s)" and was fired from CDCR as a

2

result.

3

No. 56.)

4

demonstrating Armstrong's tendency to show preference toward the

5

"Surenos/Hispanic" gang members from Southern California, who are

6

“violently opposed” to African-Americans.

7

Opp'n 4, ECF No. 70.)

8

Defendant's intent to discriminate against Bryant and other

9

African-Americans prisoners.

(Mot. Order Compel Disc. Armstrong Attach. #1 Br. 3, ECF
Bryant argues the question could lead to information

(Pl.'s Reply Armstrong's

The information could also establish

(Id. at 4-5.)

In response, Armstrong

10

argues in a conclusory manner that the reasons she was arrested are

11

irrelevant.

12

(Def. T. Armstrong's Opp'n 3, ECF No. 59.)

Interrogatory 2 seeks information that is relevant to Bryant's

13

accusation that Armstrong intentionally discriminated against him

14

through law library scheduling or lead to the discovery of

15

admissible evidence, even though the evidence may not ultimately be

16

admissible at trial.

17

if Armstrong's prior arrest involved her affiliation with a race-

18

oriented gang, the information could bear on whether she

19

intentionally discriminated against Bryant on the basis of race.

20

See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc., 437 U.S. at 351; see also Hampton, 147

21

F.R.D. at 229 (discussing that personnel files and internal affairs

22

histories may be relevant to issues of credibility or motive).

23

Armstrong's relevance objection is overruled.

24
25

b.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

For example,

Privileged and confidential

Defendant Armstrong objects to interrogatory 2 by stating,

26

"Further, the interrogatory is also objectionable to the extent it

27

seeks disclosure of any information that may be in Armstrong's

28

personnel file."

(Def. T. Armstrong's Opp'n 3, ECF No. 59.)

17

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

Armstrong is incorrect.

2

information in her personnel file.

3

common law recognizes a qualified privilege for official

4

information, Defendant has not properly invoked the privilege.

5

Soto, 162 F.R.D. at 613; Kelly, 114 F.R.D. at 669.

6

is also overruled.

7
8
9

c.

The interrogatory does not seek "any"
As discussed, although federal

This objection

Vagueness

Bryant asks Armstrong to state the “reasons” she was arrested.
(Mot. Order Compel Disc. Armstrong Attach. #2 Decl. Bryant 4, ECF

10

No. 56.)

11

because it calls her to speculate as to the "reasons" she was

12

arrested.

13

The Defendant contends that the interrogatory is vague

(Def. T. Armstrong's Opp'n 3, ECF No. 59.)

“The party objecting to discovery as vague or ambiguous has

14

the burden to show such vagueness or ambiguity.”

15

Sprint Corp., 225 F.R.D. 658, 662 (D. Kan. 2004) (footnote

16

omitted).

17

attribute ordinary definitions to terms in discovery requests.

18

(footnote omitted).

19

entail the legal bases for Defendant's arrest.

20

interrogatory is not vague, and the Motion to Compel a further

21

response to interrogatory 2 is GRANTED.

Swackhammer v.

The responding party should exercise common sense and
Id.

A common sense definition of "reasons" would
See id.

Bryant's

22

3.

Interrogatory 3

23

In interrogatory 3, Plaintiff asks Armstrong, “State where

24

inmate Teklezi H. Gebrezgiaber is presently housed

25

(I[n]stitution/Prison).”

26

Attach. #2 Decl. Bryant 4, ECF No. 56.)

27

this interrogatory because it is not relevant, lacks foundation,

28

and should be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.

(Mot. Order Compel Disc. Armstrong

18

The Defendant objected to

(Id. at

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

13.)

2

not know.”

3

She also stated that without waiving these objections, “I do
(Id.)

Armstrong submits in her Opposition that the dispute regarding

4

interrogatory 3 is moot because defense counsel has since informed

5

Bryant where inmate Gebrezgiabar is housed.

6

Opp'n 3, ECF No. 59.)

7

Reply.

8

(addressing interrogatories 1 and 2).)

9

answered the interrogatory.

10

(Def. T. Armstrong's

Bryant does not indicate otherwise in his

(See Pl.'s Reply Armstrong's Opp'n 4-6, ECF No. 70
In any event, Armstrong

Plaintiff's Motion to Compel a further

response to interrogatory 3 is DENIED as moot.

11

4.

12

In document request 1, Bryant seeks all documents and writings

13

that disclose the "contents of any and all procedures, policies, or

14

directives" revealing "the scheduling of inmates housed in

15

Calipatria State Prison's Administrative Segregation-Building 5 for

16

law library access" that were in effect during Armstrong's tenure

17

as "A5 Building Legal Officer."

18

Attach. #2 Decl. Bryant 8, ECF No. 56.)

19

she lacks possession, custody, or control of the documents, as she

20

is "not employed by CDCR, and has no access to any of the requested

21

documents."

22
23

Request for production of documents 1

a.

(Mot. Order Compel Disc. Armstrong
Armstrong objected because

(Id. at 19.)
Possession, custody, or control

Bryant challenges Defendant's claim that she lacks access to

24

the documents because she is not presently employed by CDCR.

25

Order Compel Disc. Armstrong Attach. #1 Br. 5, ECF No. 56.)

26

deputy attorney general representing Armstrong, John Walters, has

27

access to the records because he represents all of the other

28

Defendants who are presently employed by CDCR.

19

(Mot.
The

(Id.; see Pl.'s

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

Reply Armstrong's Opp'n 6-7, ECF No. 70 (citing Pulliam v. Lozano,

2

No. 1:07-cv-964-LJO-MJS(PC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12593, at *2

3

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2011)).)

4

"have no problem obtaining documents from the CDCR for the purpose

5

of preparing their defense."

6

No. 70.)

7

showing scheduling policies because she is represented by the

8

Attorney General's Office.

9

briefly stating that, as a former employee, she does not have

According to Bryant, the Defendants

(Pl.'s Reply Armstrong's Opp'n 7, ECF

Bryant urges that Armstrong is in control of documents

(Id.)

The Defendant counters by

10

control over company documents.

11

No. 59 (citing 7-Up Bottling Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., 191

12

F.3d 1090, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)).)

13

(Def. T. Armstrong's Opp'n 4, ECF

A party is deemed to have control over documents if he or she

14

has a legal right to obtain them.

15

see also 7 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, §

16

34.14[2][b], at 34-73 to 34-75 (footnote omitted) (“The term

17

‘control’ is broadly construed.”).

18

document request "'cannot furnish only that information within his

19

immediate knowledge or possession; he is under an affirmative duty

20

to seek that information reasonably available to him from his

21

employees, agents, or others subject to his control.'"

22

Parsons, No. 1:03-cv-6700-LJO-GSA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90283, at

23

*11-12 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2009) (citation omitted).

24

See Clark, 181 F.R.D. at 472;

A party responding to a

Meeks v.

Some courts have assumed that a party has control of documents

25

in the possession of another and ordered the party to produce

26

relevant documents.

27

S-05-2315 MCE DAD P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44144, at *11-12 (E.D.

28

Cal. June 7, 2007) (“directing” counsel for defendants to obtain

See Zackery v. Stockton Police Dep’t, No. CIV

20

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

and produce records in the possession of their current employer,

2

the Stockton Police Department).

3

a former employer are further removed from the control of a former

4

employee.

5

(D.D.C. 2008), the district court stated that "[f]ormer employees

6

of government agencies do not have 'possession, custody, or

7

control' of documents held by their former employers.”

8

of establishing control over the documents sought is on the party

9

seeking production.

Yet, records in the possession of

In Lowe v. District of Columbia, 250 F.R.D. 36, 38

The burden

United States v. Int’l Union of Petroleum &

10

Indus. Workers, 870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1989); accord 7 James

11

Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, § 34.14[2][b], at 34-

12

77.

13

Bryant attempts to establish that Armstrong has control over

14

Calipatria's law library scheduling policies by arguing that she

15

and the other Defendants are represented by the Attorney General's

16

Office, and the other Defendants are currently employed by CDCR.

17

Plaintiff's argument would be stronger if the document request was

18

directed at a Defendant who was currently employed by CDCR.

19

Pulliam, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12593, at *2.

20

records from Armstrong, a former CDCR employee.

21

not shown that Defendant has control over records in the custody of

22

her former employer.

23

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50419, at *5 (E.D. Cal. June 2, 2009) ("[A]s a

24

former employee of the Yolo County Public Defender's Office

25

[defendant] neither has possession, custody, or control of

26

documents held by his former employer, nor does he have the present

27

ability to legally demand such documents.")

28

compelled to produce documents from an agency that previously

See

Yet, Bryant seeks the
The Plaintiff has

Lopez v. Chertoff, No. CV 07-1566-LEW, 2009

21

Armstrong cannot be

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

employed her when the records are not in her custody, possession,

2

or control.

3

document request 1 is DENIED.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel a further response to

4

5.

Request for production of documents 2

5

In document production request 2, Bryant seeks all documents

6

and writings that disclose the "contents of any and all questions,

7

answers or statements resulting from any and all inquiries made"

8

concerning the grievance submitted by inmate Teklezgi H.

9

Gebrezgiaber "CDCR# T43976" on January 28, 2008.

(Mot. Order

10

Compel Disc. Armstrong Attach. #2 Decl. Bryant 8-9, ECF No. 56.)

11

The Defendant objected on relevance, foundation, and evidentiary

12

grounds, and because the requests invade inmate Gebrezgiaber's

13

right to privacy.

14

stating that she lacked possession, custody, or control over the

15

requested documents because she is not employed by CDCR and lacks

16

access to any of the material.

17
18

a.

(Id. at 19-20.)

Armstrong further responded by

(Id.)

Possession, custody, or control

Again, Plaintiff challenges Armstrong's contention that she is

19

unable to access inquiries into inmate Gebrezgiaber's grievance

20

because she is no longer employed at CDCR.

21

As discussed above, however, the document request is directed at

22

Defendant Armstrong — a former CDCR employee.

23

compelled to produce responsive records from agencies that

24

previously employed and are not in her custody or possession.

25

Lowe, 250 F.R.D. at 38; see also Lopez, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

26

50419, at *5.

27

to Compel a response to document production request 2 is also

28

DENIED.

(Id. Attach. #1 Br. 5.)

She cannot be

See

Defendant's objection is sustained, and the Motion

22

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

6.

Request for production of documents 3

2

Finally, in document request 3, Plaintiff asks for all

3

documents and writings that reveal the "CDCR-Institution/Prison" in

4

which inmate Teklezgi H. Gebrezgiaber (T43976) is currently housed.

5

(Mot. Order Compel Disc. Armstrong Attach. #2 Decl. Bryant 9, ECF

6

No. 56.)

7

and privacy grounds.

8

lacks possession or control over the records.

9

Armstrong objected on relevance, foundation, evidentiary,
(Id. at 19-20.)

Defendant also asserted she
(Id.)

In her Opposition, Armstrong maintains that this issue is moot

10

because defense counsel has since provided Plaintiff with inmate

11

Gebrezgiabar's current location.

12

No. 59.)

13

assertion that the dispute is moot.

14

Opp'n 6-7, ECF No. 70 (addressing document requests 1 and 2).)

15

Therefore, Plaintiff's request for an order compelling a further

16

response to document request 3 is DENIED as moot.

17

C.

(Def. T. Armstrong's Opp'n 5, ECF

In his Reply, Plaintiff does not contest Defendant's
(See Pl.'s Reply Armstrong's

Defendant Janda: Motion to Compel Responses to Document
Requests 12 and 13 (Set One) ("Amended") [ECF No. 66]

18
19

Next, Plaintiff filed a "Motion to Compel Discovery" seeking

20

further responses from Defendant Janda to document requests 12 and

21

13 in set one ("amended") [ECF No. 66].

22

Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery, along with a

23

declaration of John P. Walters, was filed in response [ECF No. 76].

24

Plaintiff then filed a "Notice of Defendant's Failure to Disclose

25

Discovery" [ECF No. 78].

Defendant G. Janda's

26

1.

27

In document request 12, Bryant asks Associate Warden Janda to

28

Request for production of documents 12

produce all "Calipatria State Prison's ASU #2 group yard tapes"

23

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

from February to July 2008.

2

66.)

3

relevance, and evidentiary grounds.

4

(Mot. Compel Disc. Janda 13, ECF No.

The Defendant objected to the request on foundation,
(Id. at 20.)

Bryant asserts that he put Janda on notice of his request for

5

these yard tapes when he filed a grievance asking Janda to

6

investigate Plaintiff's complaints, which would include reviewing

7

the Administrative Segregation Unit ("ASU") group yard videotapes.

8

(Id. at 4.)

9

preserved.

In the grievance, Bryant asked that the tapes be
(Id.)

Plaintiff also notified Defendant of his need

10

for the tapes on May 28 and June 5, 2008, when Bryant stated in his

11

grievance, Log No. Cal-A-08-01027, that he sought "Group yard

12

videos and yard assignment records," and that he intended to

13

initiate civil litigation and would need the yard videotapes as

14

evidence.

15

the videotapes but did not produce them because they were not in

16

his favor; to now say the tapes do not exist is an attempt to

17

withhold discovery.

18

defense counsel conceded in response to Plaintiff's meet-and-confer

19

letter that the yard tapes are "generally not maintained," yet he

20

did not state that the tapes do not exist.

21

discovery is relevant, according to Bryant, because it will show

22

that "Group yard No. 2" consisted of African-American inmates only,

23

and the tapes will show the disparity of prisoners in ASU two, yard

24

two, compared to the number of inmates in other yards.

25

(Id. at 4-5.)

Plaintiff suspects that Janda likely has

(Id. at 5.)

Moreover, Bryant contends that

(Id. at 4.)

The

(Id. at 6.)

The Defendant counters that Plaintiff has not established that

26

daily videotapes of the exercise yards over a six-month period are

27

relevant to his claims.

28

response to Plaintiff's meet-and-confer letter, Janda reiterated

(Def. G. Janda's Opp'n 2, ECF No. 76.)

24

In

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

his relevance objections.

2

also explain that there were no videos because they are only

3

maintained in response to specific instances that occur on a given

4

day.

5

preserved, which was made in pre-litigation grievances, does not

6

bear on the current discovery requests.

7

misunderstanding, Defendant served Plaintiff a supplemental

8

response to document request 12 stating that there are, in fact, no

9

responsive videos.

10

(Id.)

a.

11

(Id.)

Defense counsel did, however,

Janda asserts that Bryant's request that the tapes be

(Id.)

To clarify any

(Id. at 2-3.)

Relevance

In the Second Amended Complaint, Bryant asserts that there are

12

two yards in "Ad-Seg #2," or ASU two — yard one and yard two.

13

(Second Am. Compl. 13-14, ECF No. 39.)

14

Hispanic prisoners and yard two was comprised of only African-

15

American inmates.

16

Defendant Lizarraga initiated a "campaign" of racially-motivated

17

cell moves targeting African-American prisoners who were assigned

18

to yard two in ASU two.

19

inmates in retaliation to more restrictive cells located in ASU

20

one.

21

two, was reduced to three inmates, but similarly situated prisoners

22

in other yards in ASU two were not moved and the numbers of inmates

23

in those yards did not decrease.

24

moved by Defendant Lizarraga on July 7, 2008.

25

(Id.)

(Id. at 14.)

Yard one consisted of only

The Plaintiff also alleges that

(Id. at 26.)

Lizarraga moved these

As a result, the number of inmates in yard two, of ASU

(Id.)

Bryant was eventually
(Id.)

Document production request 12 seeks videotapes for the "ASU

26

#2 group yard" from February to July 2008.

27

exists, could provide information regarding the races of different

28

inmates, as well as the number of inmates, who attended yard

25

The footage, if it

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

recreation at various times during the six-month period.

It is

2

unclear whether the "group yard" refers to yards one and two.

3

it does, the information could indicate whether yard two in ASU two

4

was comprised of only African-American inmates and whether yard one

5

was comprised of Hispanic inmates, as Plaintiff alleges.

6

footage could also reveal the decreasing number of inmates assigned

7

to yard two as a result of Lizarraga's retaliatory cell moves,

8

compared to the number of prisoners assigned to other yards in ASU

9

two.

If

The

To that extent, document request 12 seeks information that is

10

relevant to Bryant's claim that Lizarraga retaliated against him by

11

moving Plaintiff and the other yard two African-American inmates to

12

more restrictive cell placements.

13

overruled.

14

b.

Janda’s relevance objection is

Possession, custody, or control

15

In his Motion, Plaintiff submits that although Associate

16

Warden Janda initially objected to document request 12 because it

17

does not seek relevant information, defense counsel John Walters

18

later suggested in a letter to Bryant that Janda does not possess

19

the videotapes.

20

the letter, Walters states, "Defendant stands by these objections.

21

Further, as noted above, video tapes are generally not maintained

22

unless a specific event or incident happens on that date, in which

23

case they are maintained as evidence."

(Mot. Compel Disc. Janda 4-5, 33, ECF No. 66.)

In

(Id. at 33.)

24

When a party responds to a document request with an answer as

25

opposed to production or an objection, the party must answer under

26

oath.

27

34.13[2][a], at 34-57 (footnote omitted); see id. § 34.14[2][a], at

28

34-73 (footnote omitted).

7 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, §

If Defendant Janda's response is that

26

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

there is no relevant material in Defendant’s control, he must state

2

so under oath.

3

F.R.D. 150, 155 (D. P.R. 2010).

4

not supplied an answer under oath, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel

5

[ECF No. 66] a further response from Defendant Janda to document

6

request 12 in set one ("amended") is GRANTED.

See Vazquez-Fernandez v. Cambridge Coll., Inc., 269
Nevertheless, because Janda has

7

2.

8

Request 13 asks Defendant to produce all "Calipatria State

9

Request for production of documents 13

Prison's ASU #2 group yard 'Assignment Records,' setting forth the

10

number of inmates assigned to each yard" from February to July

11

2008.

12

"A diligent search is being undertaken for the requested items.

13

Defendant will produce any documents within his possession,

14

custody, or control to the extent any exist."

15

(Mot. Compel Disc. Janda 13, ECF No. 66.)

Janda responded,

(Id. at 20.)

Plaintiff asked Defendant for a specific date by which he

16

would provide the responsive documents.

17

Janda indicated that he would only provide Bryant with an "update"

18

on the progress by a date certain, which was just two days before

19

any motion to compel would have to be filed.

20

Opposition, defense counsel submits that he has been attempting to

21

locate the responsive documents and anticipates serving Bryant a

22

supplemental response in approximately one week.

23

Opp'n 3, ECF No. 76.)

24

response to document request 13 should therefore be denied as moot.

25

(Id.)

26

(Id. at 4.)

(Id.)

In response,

In Janda's

(Def. G. Janda's

Janda argues that the Motion to Compel a

Bryant subsequently filed a "Notice of Defendant's Failure to

27

Disclose Discovery," in which he states that he received the

28

supplemental response counsel referred to in the Opposition, but

27

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

the production is insufficient.

2

Disclose 2, ECF No. 78.)

3

Janda merely produced copies of handwritten notes by prison staff

4

that do not disclose the number of inmates assigned to the yards;

5

the notes only reveal the number of inmates who actually attended

6

the yard on certain days.

7

(Notice Def. Janda's Failure

Specifically, Plaintiff contends that

(Id.)

Document request 13 explicitly sought documents reflecting the

8

yard "'Assignment Records,' setting forth the number of inmates

9

assigned to each yard" from February to July 2008.

(Mot. Compel

10

Disc. Janda 13, ECF No. 66) (emphasis added).

11

to the document request initially or in opposition to the Motion to

12

Compel and has therefore waived any objection.

13

R. 7.1(f)(3)(c).

14

relevant to Bryant’s retaliation claim.

15

still has not disclosed documents showing the number of prisoners

16

assigned to each yard during this time period; his supplemental

17

production is not fully responsive and further production is

18

warranted.

19

two yard assignment records showing the number of inmates assigned

20

to each yard that are in Janda's possession, custody, or control.

21

If there are no other responsive documents, the Defendant must,

22

nevertheless, provide the answer under oath.

23

Fernandez, 269 F.R.D. at 155.

24

further response to document request number 13 is GRANTED.

25

D.

Janda did not object

See S.D. Cal. Civ.

Moreover, the yard assignment records are clearly
Accordingly, the Defendant

Defendant Janda is to provide Bryant with all ASU group

See Vazquez-

Plaintiff's Motion to Compel a

Defendant Lizarraga: Motion to Compel Responses to
Interrogatories 11 and 12 (Set One) [ECF No. 71]

26
27
28

In "Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery,"

Bryant seeks an

order compelling Defendant Lizarraga to respond to interrogatories

28

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

11 and 12 in set one [ECF No. 71].

Lizarraga filed an Opposition,

2

along with a declaration of John P. Walters [ECF No. 77].

3

was filed.

No reply

4

1.

Interrogatories 11 and 12

5

Bryant asks Lizarraga in interrogatory 11 to state the races

6

of the inmates assigned to "Calipatria State Prison - ASU #2's

7

group yard No. 1" from January to July 2008.

8

Lizarraga 13, ECF No. 71.)

9

Lizarraga to state the races of the prisoners assigned to

(Mot. Compel Disc.

In interrogatory 12, Plaintiff asks

10

"Calipatria State Prison - ASU #2's group yard No. 2" from January

11

to July 2008.

12

each interrogatory, his answers were identical:

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

(Id.)

Although Lizarraga responded separately to

I do not know, and I do not have possession,
custody, or control over the documents that may assist in
answering this interrogatory. First, inmates are not
assigned to yard groups based on race. They are assigned
based on affiliations. Second, in order to determine the
race of each inmate in the yard group on each day within
that seven-month period, the Yard Log Books must be
checked for each day for a list of assigned inmates. The
names and CDC numbers of each inmate would then have to
be recorded, and used to check the individual Central
file of each inmate to determine their race. Central
files are maintained [sic] the prison that inmate is
currently housed at.
(Id. at 20.)
Bryant now seeks an order compelling Lizarraga to supplement

22

these answers.

Plaintiff complains that Defendant did not state

23

that he would, at a minimum, conduct a diligent search to locate

24

information that could help him answer the questions.

25

According to Bryant, Lizarraga's claimed lack of knowledge of these

26

inmates' races is disingenuous because he has worked in ASU two for

27

several years.

(Id. at 5.)

(Id. at 4.)

Further, Bryant is only seeking the

28

29

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

races of the inmates within the specific time frame, not how those

2

inmates were assigned to the yard group.

3

(Id.)

The Plaintiff also challenges Lizarraga's asserted inability

4

to obtain responsive information.

5

independently obtained several "Calipatria State Prison-

6

Administrative Segregation Daily Yard Activity" forms from a

7

correctional officer working in ASU two who simply walked over to

8

the computer in the staff's office and downloaded the forms for

9

Plaintiff.

(Id.)

(Id.)

Bryant argues that he

One form indicates that the yard has "Controlled

10

Compatible-Black, Northern Hispanic, and Other" inmates and that

11

"Yard Group No. 2" is comprised of all African-American prisoners.

12

(Id.)

13

reasonably obtain the information because he has access to a

14

computer inside of ASU two, and a counselor is present during the

15

week who can download documents relating to inmate housing.

16

at 6.)

17

In any event, Plaintiff insists that Lizarraga can

(Id.

Defendant Lizarraga counters that his responses to

18

interrogatories 11 and 12 are sufficient.

19

Opp'n 2, ECF No. 77.)

20

asserts he can not answer the questions by reviewing documents

21

because he would have to review a list of the inmates assigned for

22

each day during that time period, record their names and CDCR

23

numbers, and then "cross-check" them with the central files, which

24

are maintained by the prison where each inmate is currently housed.

25

(Id.)

26

Lizarraga to check for the answers to the interrogatories, and

27

Lizarraga could not travel up-and-down the state pulling Central

28

files and investigating Plaintiff's discovery."

(Def. R. Lizarraga's

To determine the inmates' races, Defendant

"In short, there were no readily available sources for

30

(Id. (citing

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

Heilman v. Vojkufka, No. CIV S-08-2788 KJM EFB, 2011 U.S. Dist.

2

LEXIS 26004, at *36 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2011)).)

3

that his response of "I don't know" is therefore sufficient.

4

Lizarraga submits
(Id.)

Defendant responds to Bryant's claim that there is an

5

available source for Lizarraga to obtain responsive information by

6

conceding that the “Daily Yard Activity” form that Plaintiff

7

obtained does, in fact, exist.

8

available for the seven-month period in 2008 at issue; defense

9

counsel alleges that he visited Calipatria and specifically looked

(Id. at 3.)

Yet, this form is not

10

for any available daily yard activity forms from 2008 but was

11

unable to located any.

12

Walters states that he was later informed that staff in the

13

litigation coordinator's office did not have the forms and noted

14

that they were "likely purged."

15

(Id.; see id. Attach. #1 Decl. Walters 2.)

(Id. Attach. #1 Decl. Walters 2.)

Defense counsel states that the only similar items available

16

for that period was the "A5 Yard Gun Log Book" and the

17

"Administrative Segregation Isolation Log Book," which are hard

18

cover journals.

19

relevant 2008 period shows the number of prisoners assigned to each

20

yard, and the isolation log book details each inmate's name, CDCR

21

number, and cell assignment, but not his race.

22

these representations, Lizarraga urges that there is "no available

23

document" for him to review to answer interrogatories 11 and 12.

24

(Def. R. Lizarraga's Opp'n 3, ECF No. 77.)

25

(Id. at 3.)

The yard gun log book for the

(Id.)

Despite

"A party answering interrogatories has an affirmative duty to

26

furnish any and all information available to the party."

7 James

27

Wm. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice, § 33.102[1], at 33-72

28

(footnote omitted).

Interrogatories must be answered "separately

31

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

and fully in writing under oath."

2

responding party is unable to provide the requested information, he

3

may not simply refuse to answer.

4

1:06-cv-1373-LJO-NEW(TAG), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48380, at *5 (E.D.

5

Cal. June 25, 2007) (quoting Hansel v. Shell Oil Corp., 169 F.R.D.

6

303, 305 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).

7

oath that he is unable to provide the information and must describe

8

the efforts he used to obtain the information.

9

Hansel, 169 F.R.D. at 305); see also 7 James Wm. Moore, et al.,

10

Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3).

If a

Haworth v. Suryakant, No.

The responding party must state under

Id. (quoting

Moore's Federal Practice, § 33.102[3], at 33-75 (footnote omitted).

11

Here, although Lizarraga has verified his responses to

12

interrogatories 11 and 12 under oath, he has not explained why he

13

is unable to provide the information or described the efforts he

14

made to obtain the information, as required.

15

statements regarding the availability of the information are

16

unverified and made by defense counsel in letters or in opposition

17

to this Motion to Compel.

18

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

19

Lizarraga's attorney has described the available means to ascertain

20

the names, CDCR numbers, and cell assignments of the inmates housed

21

in each yard for the seven-month period, Defendant has

22

insufficiently asserted an inability to ascertain the races of

23

these prisoners.

24

The subsequent

This is not in compliance with Rule 33
Moreover, although

If Lizarraga is unable to determine the prisoners' races, he

25

must state so under oath and describe the steps taken to answer

26

interrogatories 11 and 12.

27

v. Elk Run Coal Co., 246 F.R.D. 522, 529 (S.D. W. Va. 2007)

28

(finding that a responding party has a "severe duty" to make every

See Frontier-Kemper Constructors, Inc.

32

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

effort to obtain the requested information and, if unsuccessful,

2

must provide an answer detailing the attempts made to ascertain the

3

information).

4

responses.

5

interrogatories 11 and 12 in set one from Defendant Lizarraga [ECF

6

No. 71] is GRANTED.

7

E.

Bryant is entitled to supplemental, verified

Plaintiff's Motion to Compel responses to

8

Defendants Armstrong and Ochoa: Motion to Compel Responses to
Interrogatories 2 and 7 (Set Two) and Document Request 3 (Set
Two) [ECF No. 74]

9

The Plaintiff next filed a "Motion for an Order to Compel

10

Discovery" in which he seeks to compel responses from Defendant

11

Armstrong to interrogatory 2 and document request 3 in set two;

12

Bryant also seeks to compel a response from Defendant Ochoa to

13

interrogatory 7 in set two [ECF No. 74].

14

Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery was filed in response, along

15

with a declaration of John P. Walters [ECF No. 83].

16

file a reply.

17

1.

18

In interrogatory 2, of set two, Plaintiff asks Armstrong to

Defendants' Opposition to

Bryant did not

Armstrong

19

state the dates and times that Armstrong attended training classes

20

from December 2007 to February 2008.

21

& Ochoa 11, ECF No. 74.)

Defendant Armstrong objected on relevance

22

and evidentiary grounds.

(Id. at 21.)

23

interrogatory invades her right to privacy and seeks information

24

that is privileged and confidential.

25

§§ 832.7, 832.8).)

26

(Mot. Compel Disc. Armstrong

She also objected that the

(Id. (citing Cal. Pen. Code

In document production request 3 in set two, Bryant asks

27

Armstrong to produce all "job description, roster or other

28

document(s)" disclosing the dates and times that she attended

33

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

training classes at Calipatria from December 2007 to February 2008.

2

(Id. at 16-17.)

3

right to privacy and improperly seeks her personnel file, which is

4

privileged and confidential.

5

832.7, 832.8).)

6

Armstrong objected because the request invades her

(Id. at 31 (citing Cal. Pen. Code §§

Bryant maintains that the information sought in interrogatory

7

2 and document request 3 is relevant because Armstrong makes

8

several assertions about incidents that Plaintiff insists could not

9

have occurred because Armstrong was at a training class on the date

10

and time she asserts Bryant committed the act.

11

the information is relevant because it bears on Defendant's

12

credibility.

13

that the dispute over interrogatory 2 and document request 3 is

14

moot because after Bryant filed this Motion, defense counsel

15

provided Plaintiff with documents showing the dates and times

16

Defendant Armstrong and other Defendants attended training from

17

December 2007 to July 2008.

18

ECF No. 83.)

19

training class that Armstrong attended from 2006 to September 10,

20

2009, including the date, length, and title of each class.

21

Attach. #1 Decl. Walters 3.)

(Id.)

(Id. at 6.)

Also,

Defendant Armstrong argues in her Opposition

(Defs. Armstrong & Ochoa's Opp'n 2,

The class record produced to Bryant reveals every

(Id.

The Plaintiff is apparently satisfied with Defendant's

22
23

production and has not filed anything contesting counsel's

24

representation that the information provided is responsive to the

25

discovery requests.

26

responses from Defendant Armstrong to interrogatory 2 and document

27

request 3 in set two [ECF No. 74] is DENIED as moot.

28

//

Consequently, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel

34

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

2.

Ochoa

2

In interrogatory 7, Bryant asks Defendant Ochoa to state the

3

reasons the memorandum signed by "former CDCR Secretary Roderick

4

Hickman," dated February 17, 2004, and titled, "'Zero Tolerance

5

Regarding The Code Of Silence,'" was distributed to CDCR employees.

6

(Mot. Compel Disc. Armstrong & Ochoa 43, ECF No. 74.)

7

objected on foundation, speculation, relevance, and evidentiary

8

grounds.

9

answered, "I do not know.

10

(Id. at 29.)

Ochoa

Without waiving the objections, Ochoa

distributing the memo."

I was not involved in authoring or

(Id.)

11

In the Motion to Compel, Plaintiff contends that Ochoa's

12

response is evasive and incomplete because Defendant has resources

13

available to him to assist him in answering the interrogatory.

14

(Id. at 7.)

15

enable Ochoa to answer completely.

16

Defendant maintains that Plaintiff is essentially asking Ochoa to

17

explain why a memorandum that he did not write or distribute was

18

sent to prison staff.

19

83.)

20

reasons that someone else at CDCR wrote or distributed a memorandum

21

in 2004.

22

was sufficient.

Moreover, a simple reading of the memorandum could
(Id.)

In his Opposition,

(Defs. Armstrong & Ochoa's Opp'n 3, ECF No.

Ochoa urges that he also does not have a duty to research the

(Id.)

Therefore, Defendant's answer, "I do not know,"
(Id.)

23

As discussed previously, Ochoa has an affirmative duty to

24

provide Bryant with all responsive information reasonably available

25

to him.

26

33.102[1], at 33-72 (footnote omitted).

27

a duty to search for new information.

28

answer interrogatory 7 by stating the reasons that the memorandum

7 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice, §

35

He does not, however, have

Id.

If Ochoa is unable to

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

was distributed to Calipatria staff, he must provide that answer

2

under oath and must set forth the efforts he made to attempt obtain

3

the answer.

4

(quoting Hansel, 169 F.R.D. at 305); see also Frontier-Kemper

5

Constructors, Inc., 246 F.R.D. at 529.

6

his response, "I do not know," but he did not specify the steps he

7

took to attempt to ascertain the reason for the distribution.

8

(Mot. Compel Disc. Armstrong & Ochoa 50, ECF No. 74.)

9

See Haworth, 2007 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 48380, at *5

Here, Defendant verified

Plaintiff's Motion to Compel a further response from Defendant

10

Ochoa to interrogatory 7 in set two [ECF No. 74] is GRANTED.

11

is to utilize all reasonably available means to determine the

12

reasons the memorandum was distributed.

13

Defendant still is unable to respond to the interrogatory, he must

14

state so under oath and must describe the attempts he made to

15

locate the information.

16

F.

Ochoa

If after doing so,

Defendant Ochoa: Motion to Compel Responses to Document
Requests 1, 2, and 3 (Set Three) [ECF No. 82]

17
18

Bryant also filed a "Motion to Compel Discovery," in which he

19

seeks an order compelling Defendant Ochoa to respond to document

20

requests 1, 2, and 3 in set three [ECF No. 82].

21

Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel in response [ECF No.

22

88].

Ochoa filed an

No reply was filed.

23

1.

Requests for production of documents 1, 2, and 3

24

The three document requests are essentially the same.

25

document request 1 in set three, Plaintiff asks Ochoa to produce

26

any "policy, regulation, directive, or other document(s) which

27

would support" Defendant Ochoa's assertion made in his second level

28

response to Plaintiff's Log No. Cal-A-08-00207 appeal, in which

36

In

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

Ochoa found that Defendant Armstrong did not violate any CDC policy

2

on May 21, 2008.

3

No. 82.)

4

the document request:

5

7
8

10

Defendant provided the following answer in response to

Defendant did not review any specific policy or
regulation in conducting the Second Level Review.
Defendant conducted the review based on the evidence and
circumstances, and on Defendant's general familiarity
with CDCR policy and knowledge that that [sic] staff
should not racially discriminate against inmates.
Therefore, there are no responsive documents.

6

9

(Mot. Compel Disc. Ochoa 10, Nov. 4, 2011, ECF

(Id. at 15.)

Ochoa did not object to the request on any ground and

did not verify his response.

11

(See id. at 15-17.)

Next, Bryant asks Ochoa in document request 2 to produce any

12

"policy, regulation, directive, or other document(s) to support"

13

Ochoa's claim made in his second level response to Plaintiff's Log

14

No. Cal-A-08-00311 appeal, in which Ochoa found that Defendant

15

Armstrong did not violate any CDC policy on May 21, 2008.

16

10.)

17
18
19
20

(Id. at

In response, Defendant provided the following answer:
Defendant did not review any specific policy or
regulation in conducting the Second Level Review.
Defendant conducted the review based on the evidence and
circumstances, and on Defendant's general familiarity
with CDCR policy and knowledge that that [sic] staff
should not racially discriminate, issue false chronos, or
retaliate against inmates. Therefore, there are no
responsive documents.

21
22

(Id. at 15.)

The Defendant did not object to the request and did

23

not verify his response.

(See id. at 15-17.)

24

Finally, in document request 3, Plaintiff asks Ochoa to

25

produce any "policy, regulation, directive, or other document(s)

26

which support" Ochoa's claim made in his "'Second Level Response'"

27

to Plaintiff's Log No. Cal-A-08-01027 appeal, in which Ochoa found

28

that Defendant Armstrong did not violate any CDC policy on

37

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1
2
3
4
5

September 4, 2008.

(Id. at 10-11.)

Defendant did not review any specific policy or
regulation in conducting the Second Level Review.
Defendant conducted the review based on the evidence and
circumstances, and on Defendant's general familiarity
with CDCR policy and knowledge that that [sic] staff
should not racially discriminate or retaliate against
inmates. Therefore, there are no responsive documents.

6

(Id. at 15.)

7

also did not verify his response.

8

Ochoa answered:

Again, Ochoa did not object.

(See id. at 15-17.)

He

(See id.)

Plaintiff argues that Defendant's responses are evasive and

9

incomplete because Bryant simply asks Ochoa for the policies that

10

would support his conclusion that Armstrong and Lizarraga did not

11

violate CDCR policy.

12

indicated in a subsequent letter that "while it is generally policy

13

that racial discrimination is prohibited, there is no written

14

regulation or policy."

15

that counsel did not also state that there is no policy or

16

regulation prohibiting retaliation against inmates.

17

(Id. at 4.)

Further, defense counsel

(Id. at 27.)

Yet, notably, Bryant argues

(Id. at 5.)

Ochoa contends that his responses are sufficient because they

18

informed Bryant that Defendant did not review any particular policy

19

or regulation when considering and denying Plaintiff's inmate

20

appeals.

21

Defendant properly answered the document request by stating that

22

there are no responsive documents and later informed Bryant that

23

there are no relevant written policies.

24

to Ochoa, Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant to identify policies

25

to show whether other Defendants violated CDCR policies; to this

26

extent, the requests improperly seek a legal conclusion and

27

potentially attorney work product.

(Def. Ochoa's Opp'n 2, Nov. 28, 2011, ECF No. 88.)

(Id.)

The

Moreover, according

(Id.)

28

38

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

As discussed previously, when a response to a production of

2

documents is an answer instead of production or an objection, the

3

party must answer under oath.

4

Federal Practice, § 34.13[2][a], at 34-57 (footnote omitted); see

5

id. § 34.14[2][a], at 34-73 (footnote omitted).

6

requests explicitly seek documents that would support Ochoa's

7

decision on Bryant's second level appeal.

8

unsworn answer to the document requests stating that he did not

9

actually review any policy when making his determination is

7 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore’s

The document

Thus, Defendant’s

10

insufficient.

11

that there are no written policies or regulation prohibiting racial

12

discrimination is also inadequate because it was not made by Ochoa

13

under oath and does not address policies regarding retaliation.

Defense counsel's subsequent statement to Plaintiff

14

Bryant's Motion to Compel Ochoa to provide supplemental

15

responses to document requests 1, 2, and 3 in set three [ECF No.

16

82] is GRANTED.

17

response to the three document requests that also includes the

18

Defendant's attempts to locate responsive documents.

19

G.

Ochoa shall provide Bryant with a verified

Defendant Janda: Motion to Compel Responses to Document
Requests 3, 4, and 5 (Set Three) [ECF No. 86]

20
21

The Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Compel Discovery," in which

22

he moves for an order compelling Defendant Janda to respond to

23

document requests 3, 4, and 5 in set three [ECF No. 86].

24

filed an Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and a

25

declaration of John P. Walters [ECF No. 89].

26

reply.

Janda

Bryant did not file a

27

Document request 3 in set three asks Associate Warden Janda to

28

produce all "grievances, complaints, or other documents received by

39

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

prison staff Defendant Ochoa or his agents" at Calipatria since

2

June 7, 2007, regarding the "mistreatment of inmates by Defendants

3

Lizarraga, Catlett, Armstrong, or Trujillo," as well as the

4

corresponding investigative files and documents created in

5

response.

6

Defendant objected because the request is vague, overbroad, and

7

irrelevant.

8

respond if Bryant narrowed the request to claims related to the

9

ones in this lawsuit.

10

(Mot. Compel Disc. Janda 12, Nov. 21, 2011, ECF No. 86.)

(Id. at 17.)

Janda indicated that he would, however,

(Id.)

In document request 4 in set three, Bryant asks Defendant to

11

provide him with all inmate "grievances, complaints, or other

12

documents" received by Janda or his agents at Calipatria regarding

13

"allegations of racial discrimination or retaliation by staff on

14

inmates since June 7, 2007."

15

overbreadth and relevance grounds, but indicated he would provide a

16

supplemental response if Bryant narrowed the request.

17
18

(Id. at 13.)

Defendant objected on

(Id. at 18.)

In document request 5 in set three, the Plaintiff asks Janda
to disclose the following:

19

Any and all personnel files of Defendant Ochoa,
Janda, Trujillo, Catlett, Lizarraga, and Armstrong that
relate to discipline and/or training of the individual
defendants. (Meaning training records, disciplinary
records which include, but are not limited to, employee
performance appraisals or information related to
defendants' ethics, interpersonal relationships, decision
making abilities, promotions, interviews with respect to
internal investigations and work and safety habits.)

20
21
22
23
24

(Id. at 13.)

Janda objected because the request seeks information

25

that is not relevant and invades his right to privacy.

26

18.)

27

did note, however, that he would supplement his response if Bryant

28

narrowed the request.

Moreover, the request is vague and ambiguous.

(Id. at

(Id.)

Janda

(Id.)

40

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

In the Opposition, defense counsel submits that the dispute as

2

to all three document requests is moot, and Bryant's Motion should

3

therefore be denied.

4

89.)

5

still engaged in the meet-and-confer process.

6

the Motion, Bryant agreed to narrow his requests to records

7

relating to the discipline or training of the individual

8

Defendants.

9

Janda 28, Nov. 21, 2011, ECF No. 86.)

(Def. Janda's Opp'n 2, Dec. 5, 2011, ECF No.

Plaintiff filed this Motion to Compel while the parties were
(Id.)

After filing

(Id. Attach. #1 Decl. Walters 2; see Mot. Compel Disc.
In a subsequent letter,

10

Defendant's counsel responded by stating that Janda would provide

11

supplemental responses to the extent the requests for records were

12

limited to discipline of the Defendants for conduct similar to that

13

claimed in the case, retaliation and discrimination.

14

Opp'n Attach. #1 Decl. Walters 2, Dec. 5, 2011, ECF No. 89.)

15

Counsel states that he then provided Bryant with some of the

16

supplemental responses and intended to provide him with the

17

remaining responses shortly; because Bryant never responded to

18

Walters's letter, counsel assumed there was an agreement as to the

19

limited scope.

20

dispute is moot.

21

(Id. at 2-3.)

(Def. Janda's

Therefore, Janda explains that the

The Plaintiff has not filed a reply or any brief contesting

22

the statements made by defense counsel, and there is no indication

23

that Bryant considers the issue still in dispute.

24

attached to the Motion and the Opposition are consistent with

25

counsel's representations.

26

supplemental responses from Janda to document requests 3, 4, and 5

27

in set three [ECF No. 86] is DENIED as moot.

28

//

The documents

Consequently, Bryant's Motion to Compel

41

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1
2
3

IV.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motions to Compel are GRANTED in part and DENIED
in part for the reasons set forth above.

4

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

5

1.

Plaintiff's Motion to Compel further responses by

6

Defendant Ochoa to document requests 1, 2, 3, and 4 in

7

set one [ECF No. 53] is GRANTED.

8

2.

The Motion to Compel responses from Defendant Armstrong

9

to interrogatories 1, 2, and 3 in set one and document

10

requests 1, 2, and 3 in set two [ECF No. 56] is GRANTED

11

in part and DENIED in part.

12

interrogatories 1 and 2, the Motion is GRANTED, but for

13

interrogatory 3, the Motion is DENIED as moot.

14

document requests 1 and 2, Bryant's request is DENIED,

15

and for document request 3, Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED

16

as moot.

17

3.

With respect to

For

Bryant's Motion to Compel responses from Defendant Janda

18

to document request 12 and 13 in set one ("amended") [ECF

19

No. 66] is GRANTED.

20

4.

Plaintiff's request for an order compelling responses to

21

interrogatories 11 and 12 in set one from Defendant

22

Lizarraga [ECF No. 71] is GRANTED.

23

5.

The Motion to Compel responses from Defendant Armstrong

24

to interrogatory 2 and document request 3 in set two and

25

responses from Defendant Ochoa to document request 3 in

26

set two [ECF No. 74] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in

27

part.

28

Armstrong to interrogatory 2 and document request 3 is

The request for an order compelling responses from

42

08cv02318 W(RBB)

1

DENIED as moot; for interrogatory 7 to Ochoa, Bryant’s

2

Motion is GRANTED.

3

6.

Plaintiff's request for an order compelling Ochoa to

4

provide supplemental responses to document requests 1, 2,

5

and 3 in set three [ECF No. 82] is GRANTED.

6

7.

Bryant's Motion to Compel supplemental responses from

7

Defendant Janda to document requests 3, 4, and 5 in set

8

three [ECF No. 86] is DENIED as moot.

9
10

The Defendants' discovery responses must be served no later
than June 29, 2012.

11
12

DATE:

June 14, 2012

13
14

cc:

__________________________________
RUBEN B. BROOKS
United States Magistrate Judge

Judge Whelan
All Parties of Record

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16
17
18
19
20
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22
23
24
25
26
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