Carvalho v. Cane Creek Cycling Components, Inc.

Filing 6

ORDER Remanding Action to State Court: This action is REMANDED to the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Diego. Signed by Judge M. James Lorenz on 1/20/2009. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(Certified copy mailed to San Diego Superior Court).(mjj)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 BRIAN CARVALHO, 11 12 v. 13 CANE CREEK CYCLING COMPONENTS, INC., 14 Defendant. 15 16 Plaintiff, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil No. 09cv95-L(BLM) ORDER REMANDING ACTION TO STATE COURT UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

On January 16, 2009, Defendant filed a notice of removal, removing this product liability

17 action from State court. The notice of removal is based on diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 18 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. 19 The federal court is one of limited jurisdiction. See Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y.,

20 790 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1986). It possesses only that power authorized by the Constitution 21 or a statute. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). It is 22 constitutionally required to raise issues related to federal subject matter jurisdiction, and may do 23 so sua sponte. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998); see Indus. 24 Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990). 25 "Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a

26 State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 27 removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the 28 district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. §1441(a).
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1 Original jurisdiction exists in cases of complete diversity, where each of the plaintiffs is a citizen 2 of a different state than each of the defendants, and the amount in controversy exceeds $ 75,000. 3 28 U.S.C. §1332; Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). 4 The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,

5 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992); see also O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 6 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). "Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of 7 removal in the first instance." Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. "The strong presumption against removal 8 jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is 9 proper." Id.; see also Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assoc., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th 10 Cir. 1990); O'Halloran, 856 F.2d at 1380; Rockwell Int'l Credit Corp. v. U.S. Aircraft Ins. 11 Group, 823 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds, Partington v. Gedan, 923 12 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1991). 13 A notice of removal must contain "a short and plain statement of the grounds for

14 removal." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). While Defendant alleged its state of incorporation, it failed to 15 allege its principal place of business. (Notice at 2.) For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, "a 16 corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of 17 the State where it has its principal place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). A notice of removal 18 which fails to state the removing corporation's principal place of business is insufficient to 19 establish removal jurisdiction. Luehrs v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 20 1971). 21 Furthermore, the complaint does not allege damages in excess of $75,000, but only that

22 they exceed $25,000. (Compl. at 1, 3.) Defendant asserts that "the matter in controversy 23 apparently exceeds the sum of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs." (Notice at 2.) It does 24 not state any factual basis for this allegation, which is not supported by the complaint. This 25 "allegation, although attempting to recite some `magical incantation,' neither overcomes the 26 `strong presumption' against removal jurisdiction, nor satisfies [the removing party's] burden of 27 setting forth, in the removal petition itself, the underlying facts supporting its assertion that the 28 / / / / /
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1 amount in controversy exceeds [the jurisdictional minimum]." Gaus, 980 F.2d at 577 (emphasis 2 and quotations in original). 3 Defendant has failed to meet its burden of establishing removal jurisdiction. "If at any

4 time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the 5 case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Accordingly, this action is REMANDED to the 6 Superior Court of the State of California for the County of San Diego. 7 8 9 DATED: January 30, 2009 10 11 12 COPY TO: M. James Lorenz United States District Court Judge IT IS SO ORDERED.

HON. BARBARA L. MAJOR 13 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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