Taylor v. San Diego County et al
Filing
21
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 20 . Plaintiff's petition is denied in its entirety. A Certificate of Appealability is denied. Signed by Judge Larry Alan Burns on 11/28/11.(All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(kaj)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
RONALD WAYNE TAYLOR,
12
CASE NO. 10-CV-1122-LAB (PCL)
Plaintiff,
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION
vs.
13
14
PAM AHLIN, Executive Director of
Coalinga State Hospital,
Defendant.
15
16
Taylor filed a habeas petition on May 21, 2010 challenging his civil commitment to the
17
18
19
20
21
22
California Department of Mental Health pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act. The
petition was referred to Magistrate Judge Lewis for a report and recommendation. Judge
Lewis issued a thorough and well-reasoned R&R on August 12, 2011 recommending that
Taylor’s petition be denied in its entirety. This Order ADOPTS that recommendation.
I.
This Court has jurisdiction to review the R&R pursuant to Rule 72 of the Federal Rules
23
24
25
26
27
28
Legal Standards
of Civil Procedure. “The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate
judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to. The district court may accept, reject,
or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
The district judge “must
review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made,
//
-1-
1
but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
2
banc).
3
Because Taylor is a prisoner and is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his
4
pleadings liberally and affords him the benefit of any doubt. See Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police
5
Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). That said, “[p]ro se litigants must follow the same
6
rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.
7
1987). That includes opposing Judge Lewis’s R&R, which Taylor failed to do by the date
8
allowed (September 9, 2011) even though he was warned that “failure to file objections
9
with[in] the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal . . . .”
10
(R&R at 20.)
11
II.
Discussion
12
Taylor’s petition asserts five claims, each of which Judge Lewis’s R&R considers in
13
substantial detail and finds inadequate. Taylor’s failure to oppose the R&R lends gravity to
14
Judge Lewis’s conclusions, which the Court has carefully reviewed and here affirms. First,
15
the fact that the SVPA’s commitment protocol was not formally adopted through the
16
Administrative Procedures Act is not a violation of federal due process entitling Taylor to
17
habeas relief. The denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable
18
application of, clearly established federal law. Second, Taylor’s ineffective assistance of
19
counsel claims (all five) fail to provide a basis for habeas relief under Strickland v.
20
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), for the reasons Judge Lewis gives in his R&R.
21
Third, there is no clearly established federal law that bars the SVPA from placing the burden
22
on Taylor to show he is no longer a danger to society before his commitment may be
23
terminated. In fact, as the R&R explains, to the extent there is clearly established federal
24
law on this issue, it cuts against Taylor’s position. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463
25
U.S. 354, 356–57 (1983). Taylor’s fourth claim is that the SVPA violates the federal
26
guarantee of equal protection because it treats defendants like him differently from offenders
27
civilly committed under other statutory schemes. The appellate court’s denial of this claim
28
was objectively reasonable, and indeed, the Ninth Circuit has respected the distinction
-2-
1
California draws between mentally disordered offenders and SVPA detainees. See Hubbart
2
v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 773, 781–82 (9th Cir. 2004). Finally, Taylor’s fifth claim—that the SVPA
3
violates ex post facto principles--- is without merit in light of Seiling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250
4
(2001) and Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
5
III.
Conclusion
6
The Court ADOPTS the R&R and DENIES Taylor’s petition in its entirety. Because
7
Taylor hasn’t made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” a certificate
8
of appealability is DENIED. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
9
322, 327 (2003) (articulating standard for issuance of a certificate of appealability).
10
11
12
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 28, 2011
13
14
HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS
United States District Judge
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-3-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?