Martin v. Naval Criminal Investigative Service et al
Filing
116
ORDER: Plaintiff's Objections to Discovery Dispute Order No. 1 (Doc. 96 ) are OVERRULED. Plaintiff's Objections to Discovery Dispute Order No. 2 (Doc. 102 ) are SUSTAINED. The Magistrate Judge's 1/22/2013 Order is VACATED. Within thi rty (30) days of the date of this Order, Plaintiff may file a renewed motion to extend the deadline to file amended pleadings. Signed by Judge William Q. Hayes on 6/11/2013. (mdc)(Modified on 6/12/2013 - Notified appeals clerk re this filing.)(mdc)(jrd)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
CAROLYN MARTIN,
12
Plaintiff,
vs.
NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE
SERVICE, (“NCIS”); MARK D.
CLOOKIE, NCIS Director; WADE
JACOBSON, NCIS Acting Special Agent
in Charge; MARINE CORPS WEST
FIELD OFFICE; SEAN SULLIVAN,
Staff Judge Advocate; MARINE CORPS
RECRUIT DEPOT SAN DIEGO;
GERALD MARTIN, “Jerry,” NCIS
Special Agent; RAY MABUS, Secretary
of the Navy; UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA; and JOHN DOES 1-7,
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
HAYES, Judge:
21
22
25
26
ORDER
Defendants.
The matters before the Court are Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s
Orders Determining Joint Motions for Discovery Disputes. (ECF Nos. 96, 102).
23
24
CASE NO. 10CV1879 WQH
(MDD)
BACKGROUND
I.
Complaint
On September 9, 2010, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages against Defendants. (ECF No. 1).
27
Plaintiff alleges that she has worked as a federal contract investigator for the past
28
ten years, performing mostly personnel security investigations and military criminal
-1-
10cv1879 WQH (MDD)
1 defense investigations. See id. at ¶ 17. Plaintiff alleges that, [s]ince around June 2009,
2 military law enforcement personnel, including [Naval Criminal Investigative Service
3 (‘NCIS’)] Special Agent [Gerald] Martin, an unknown agent ... and various Military
4 Police ... have harassed and intimidated [Plaintiff] on account of her defense
5 investigations.” Id. at ¶ 26.
6
Plaintiff alleges that her vehicle was pulled over by Military Police Officers on
7 three occasions in June and July of 2009 as she came to and from Camp Pendleton for
8 work. Id. at ¶ 27-29. Plaintiff alleges that she was detained by Military Police Officers,
9 purportedly for speeding, when she attempted to leave Camp Pendleton on July 23,
10 2009. See id. at ¶ 29-37. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Agent Gerald Martin (“Agent
11 Martin”) arrived after an hour and forty-five minutes and told Plaintiff that a Military
12 Police Officer reported that she “had presented NCIS credentials at the Camp Pendleton
13 gate.” Id. at ¶ 37. Plaintiff denies that “false allegation.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that her
14 Defense Intelligence Agency credentials were confiscated and she was then escorted off
15 the military base. See id. at ¶ 38. Plaintiff alleges that the California Bureau of Security
16 and Investigative Services sent Plaintiff a cease and desist letter on August 17, 2009,
17 ordering her to stop operating as a private investigator.
18
See id. at ¶ 44.
Plaintiff alleges that, on May 3, 2010, Agent Martin and the Military Police
19 Officer who detained Plaintiff on July 23, 2009 appeared at Plaintiff’s home. See id.
20 at ¶ 48. Plaintiff alleges that Agent Martin threw a piece of paper at her – a District
21 Court Violation Notice purporting to charge her with impersonating a federal officer at
22 Camp Pendelton on July 23, 2009. See id. at ¶ 49-50. Plaintiff alleges that the
23 document “str[uck] [Plaintiff] in the face” and that Agent Martin muttered “‘You’ve
24 been served.’” Id. at ¶ 49. Plaintiff alleges that the notice was defective and that she
25 “has never received a court date or other further notice regarding this purported charge.”
26 Id. at ¶ 50.
27
Plaintiff alleges that Lt. Col. Sean Sullivan “recently informed the chief military
28 defense counsel at [the Marine Corps Recruit Depot] San Diego that [Plaintiff] was
-2-
10cv1879 WQH (MDD)
1 banned from Building 12 at [the Marine Corps Recruit Depot] San Diego which
2 includes the military criminal defense office, the legal assistance office, and the
3 courtroom at [the Marine Corps Recruit Depot] San Diego.” Id. at ¶ 53.
4
The Complaint purports to assert the following claims for relief: (1) retaliation
5 for protected speech in violation of the First Amendment against Defendants Agent
6 Martin, Doe 1, Mabus, NCIS, Clookie and Jacobson; (2) unreasonable search and
7 seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment against Defendants Agent Martin and
8 Does 1-7; (3) unreasonable interference with employment in violation of the Fifth
9 Amendment against Defendants NCIS, Clookie, Jacobson, Mabus, Agent Martin, and
10 Doe 1; and (4) interference with right of access to court in violation of the First
11 Amendment against Defendant Sullivan.
12 II.
Motions to Dismiss the Complaint / Qualified Immunity
13
On December 17, 2010, Agent Martin filed a Motion to Dismiss the claims of
14 retaliation in violation of the First Amendment and unreasonable search and seizure in
15 violation of the Fourth Amendment. (ECF No. 31). On that same day, the United
16 States of America (“United States”) filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for
17 retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, unreasonable interference with
18 employment in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and interference with right of access
19 to court in violation of the First Amendment on behalf of Defendants Naval Criminal
20 Investigative Service, Mark D. Clookie; Wade Jacobson, Marine Corps West Field
21 Office; Sean Sullivan, Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego, and Ray Mabus. (ECF
22 No. 32).
23
On August 3, 2011, the Court issued an Order granting in part and denying in
24 part the motions to dismiss (ECF Nos. 31, 32) filed by Defendants Agent Martin and
25 the United States.
(ECF No. 42).
The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for
26 unreasonable interference with employment in violation of the Fifth Amendment
27 against Defendants NCIS, Clookie, Jacobson and Mabus.
The Court dismissed
28 Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim and request for damages against Agent Martin
-3-
10cv1879 WQH (MDD)
1 pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
2 U.S. 388 (1971). The Court further concluded that Agent Martin was not entitled to
3 qualified immunity on the First Amendment claims at that time because “a claim of
4 qualified immunity is more appropriately resolved at summary judgment as opposed to
5 the motion to dismiss stage of proceedings.” See ECF No. 42 at 15 (citing Morley v.
6 Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 760-61 (9th Cir. 1999)).
On October 3, 2011, Agent Martin gave notice that he was appealing to the Court
7
8 of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from this Court’s August 3, 2011 Order (ECF No. 42
9 at 15) denying qualified immunity. (ECF No. 48) (citing Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S.
10 299 (1996); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)). This appeal remains pending.
11 See ECF No. 86 (Ninth Circuit’s August 7, 2012 Order noting that briefing on the
12 appeal is complete).
13 III.
First Supplemental Complaint
14
On May 3, 2012, the Court issued an Order granting Plaintiff’s request for leave
15 to file a supplemental complaint, and denying Defendants’ motion to stay the
16 proceedings pending resolution of Agent Martin’s appeal. (ECF No. 67). The Court
17 stated:
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
[T]he claim for damages against Agent Martin in his individual capacity
pursuant to Bivens due to alleged violation of First Amendment rights is
on appeal and is not within the jurisdiction of the Court. Agent Martin’s
likelihood of success on appeal would only effect his qualified immunity
defense to the claim against him in his individual capacity for damages
pursuant to Bivens. Agent Martin will not be subject to discovery on the
claim against him in his individual capacity for damages pursuant to
Bivens due to alleged violation of the First Amendment until the appeal is
concluded. Defendants other than Agent Martin have not established that
they will suffer any hardship or inequity if a stay is not granted.
Defendants will be subject to discovery regardless of the outcome of
Agent Martin’s appeal. A stay of the entire case may impede the
collection of information through the discovery process and will delay the
timely resolution of this case. The public has an interest in the timely
adjudication of alleged government misconduct. See Sammartino v. First
Judicial D. Ct., 303 F.3d 959, 974 (9th Cir. 2002).
(ECF No. 67 at 7). On August 7, 2012, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
issued an Order denying Agent Martin’s motion to stay all discovery as to all parties
pending appeal. See ECF No. 86.
-4-
10cv1879 WQH (MDD)
On May 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed the First Supplemental Complaint against the
1
2 United States pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d). (ECF No. 68). The
3 First Supplemental Complaint alleges “the occurrence of jurisdictional facts occurring
4 after the original complaint was filed,” id. at 2, and purports to assert the following
5 claims against the United States for damages pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act
6 (“FTCA”): (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (2) battery; (3) malicious
7 trespass; (4) abuse of process; and (5) false imprisonment. Id. at 3-5.
On June 11, 2012, the United States filed a motion to dismiss the First
8
9 Supplemental Complaint. (ECF No. 78). On August 1, 2012, the Court denied the
10 motion in its entirety. (ECF No. 85).1
11 IV.
Discovery Disputes
12
On December 14, 2012, the Magistrate Judge issued an Order limiting Plaintiff’s
13 ability to discover certain United States Attorneys’ Office (“USAO”) research and
14 internal communications. (ECF No. 94). On January 22, 2013, the Magistrate Judge
15 issued a protective order limiting Plaintiff’s ability to depose certain witnesses
16 identified by the United States until after the deadline for filing amended pleadings.
17 (ECF No. 99). Plaintiff filed Objections to both orders.
APPLICABLE STANDARD
18
19
“Where a magistrate is designated to hear a discovery motion, ‘[a] judge of the
20 court may reconsider any pretrial matter ... where it has been shown that the
21 magistrate’s order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.’” Rockwell Int’l, Inc. v.
22 Pos-A-Traction Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
23 § 636(b)(1)(A)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (“[t]he district judge in the case must
24 consider timely objections [to nondispositive matters] and modify or set aside any part
25 of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.”). “Matters concerning
26 discovery generally are considered ‘nondispositive’ of the litigation.” See Thomas E.
27
1
On September 27, 2012, on joint motion of the parties, the Magistrate Judge
28 entered a protective order governing the dissemination of certain confidential
documents as the case proceeds through discovery. (ECF No. 91).
-5-
10cv1879 WQH (MDD)
1 Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1990). “Review under the
2 clearly erroneous standard is significantly deferential, requiring a definite and firm
3 conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Concrete Pipe & Prod. v. Constr.
4 Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993) (quotation omitted); see also
5 Hernandez v. Tanninen, 604 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010) (same). “[T]he magistrate
6 judge’s decision ... is entitled to great deference by the district court.” United States v.
7 Abonce-Barrera, 257 F.3d 959, 969 (9th Cir. 2001).
8
9
DISCOVERY DISPUTE NO. 1
On December 4, 2012, Plaintiff and the United States filed a Joint Motion for
10 Determination of Discovery Dispute. (ECF No. 92). According to the parties, the
11 United States identified former Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) Rees
12 Morgan (“Morgan”) as a potential witness in its initial disclosures; the parties stated:
13 “Morgan, formerly an AUSA, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of California,
14 advised NCIS on the criminal prosecution of Plaintiff, involved in the issuance of a
15 citation to Plaintiff. Mr. Morgan is no longer with the U.S. Attorney’s Office.”
16 According to the parties, Plaintiff had issued a subpoena for Morgan’s deposition, and
17 served a subpoena duces tecum on the United States Attorneys’ Office (“USAO”)
18 custodian of records, seeking various documents related to the criminal investigation
19 of Plaintiff. Id. The parties stated that they agreed to the following: “(a) Mr. Morgan
20 may be deposed regarding the investigation, (b) Plaintiff’s counsel may inquire into any
21 communications between Mr. Morgan and NCIS agents concerning the investigation,
22 and (c) Plaintiff may inquire into communications between NCIS agents and AUSAs
23 as well as NCIS ROIs.” However, the parties stated that they “disagree[d] about the
24 discoverability of (a) communications or information within the USAO concerning the
25 investigation, (b) research and attorney notes, and (c) grand jury materials. The parties
26 also disagree[d] about the discoverability of [AUSA Rees Morgan’s] impressions about
27 the investigation of Plaintiff.” Id. at 3.
28
On December 14, 2012, the Magistrate Judge issued an Order granting
-6-
10cv1879 WQH (MDD)
1 “Plaintiff’s motion to disclose the grand jury materials relating to the criminal
2 investigation of Plaintiff, pursuant to the protective order in this case.” (ECF No. 94
3 at 5) (citing ECF No. 91).
Regarding the disclosure of USAO research and
4 communications, the Magistrate Judge: (1) denied without prejudice the United States’
5 assertion of the deliberative process privilege; (2) found that “any document that
6 includes opinion work product ... is entitled to work product immunity” and “the
7 mental impressions of former AUSA Rees Morgan are not subject to discovery during
8 the deposition”; and (3) concluded that the United States had not waived its work
9 product immunity. Id. at 5-7.
10
On December 28, 2012, Plaintiff filed Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Order
11 Determining Joint Motion for Discovery Dispute (“Objections to Discovery Dispute
12 Order No. 1”), contending that the Magistrate Judge’s decision to prohibit Plaintiff from
13 discovering certain USAO research and communications was clearly erroneous and
14 should be reversed. (ECF No. 96 at 8-18). On January 14, 2013, the United States filed
15 an opposition. (ECF No. 98). On January 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed a reply. (ECF No.
16 100).
17 I.
Work Product Doctrine
18
The Magistrate Judge’s December 14, 2012 Order stated:
19
The USAO argues that a government attorney’s report, memoranda,
email or other internal documents made in connection with investigating
or prosecuting a case is exempted from disclosure. It describes the
documents at issue as centering on the issue of whether to prosecute
Plaintiff and if so, for what crimes. While this general description may be
accurate, the court finds that a privilege log would be more useful here.
See Bozzuto v. Cox, 255 F.R.D. 673, 677 (C.D. Cal. 2009). In any event,
because Plaintiff does not focus on her substantial need for the materials
and inability to obtain them without undue hardship, the USAO’s general
assertion of work product immunity remains unrebutted.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
The court finds that the USAO has made an initial claim of work
product immunity. The USAO must now provide a privilege log to
Plaintiff to legitimize that claim so that Plaintiff can assess it. The court
finds, though, that any documents that include opinion work product, i.e.
any one of the USAO attorney’s strategies, legal impressions or mental
impressions, or a compilation of any facts that would reveal those
strategies or impressions, is entitled to work product immunity. Similarly,
the mental impressions of former AUSA Rees Morgan are not subject to
discovery during the deposition.
-7-
10cv1879 WQH (MDD)
1 (ECF No. 94 at 8).
2
Plaintiff contends that “the magistrate judge’s ruling on the USAO information
3 should be overturned as contrary to law or clearly erroneous” on the grounds that “the
4 USAO is not a party to this case” and “the work product rule does not apply to materials
5 not prepared for this case or a party to this case.” (ECF No. 96 at 8). The United States
6 contends that USAO attorney notes and research, as well as internal USAO
7 communications, constitute privileged attorney work product because the United States
8 became a Defendant when Plaintiff added her FTCA claims. (ECF No. 98 at 6).
9
“Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are
10 prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its
11 representative (including the other party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor,
12 insurer, or agent).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A). “But ... those materials may be
13 discovered if: (i) they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1); and (ii) the party
14 shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case and cannot,
15 without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.” Id.
16
The United States has been a party to this case since May 7, 2012, when Plaintiff
17 filed the First Supplemental Complaint (ECF No. 68) alleging five claims under the
18 FTCA. In opposition to Plaintiff’s Objections to Discovery Dispute Order No. 1, the
19 United States submitted a privilege log and related declarations. In the privilege log,
20 the United States lists 43 USAO documents that it contends are privileged pursuant to
21 the work product doctrine. After review of the privilege log, the Court finds that the
22 documents described in the privilege log were prepared “in anticipation of litigation”
23 by the USAO – a “representative” of the United States. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A).
24 Accordingly, to the extent the Magistrate Judge’s December 14, 2012 Order found that
25 “the USAO has made an initial claim of work product immunity,” the Court does not
26 find that the decision of the Magistrate Judge was “clearly erroneous or contrary to
27 law.” Rockwell Int’l, Inc., 712 F.2d at 1325.
28 II.
Waiver of Work Product Doctrine
-8-
10cv1879 WQH (MDD)
1
Plaintiff asserts that the United States “has repeatedly claimed Plaintiff was the
2 subject of legitimate criminal investigation rather than a campaign of retaliation and
3 harassment” as a defense in this case. (ECF No. 96 at 5). Plaintiff contends that any
4 privilege arising under the work product doctrine was waived when the United States
5 placed the legitimacy of the investigation into Plaintiff’s conduct at issue and
6 selectively disclosed materials related to the investigation.
7
The United States asserts that “[t]he issue is NCIS’ motive for investigating
8 Plaintiff; not the USAO’s motive for prosecuting Plaintiff. All of the issues pertaining
9 to the USAO subpoena must be evaluated in this context.” (ECF No. 98 at 6). The
10 United States contends that it has not selectively produced documents, but rather, “has
11 produced communications between NCIS and AUSAs ... [that] could be considered
12 relevant to possibly indicate NCIS’ motive or intent. Communications within the
13 USAO, with no involvement from NCIS, would have no bearing on NCIS’ motive or
14 intent.” Id. The United States asserts that it is only invoking the “advise of counsel”
15 defense regarding the allegedly wrongfully issued citation, and acknowledges that “it
16 has waived its privileges ... as to the issuance of the citation.” Id. at 6. The United
17 States “seeks a protective order only to the extent Plaintiff seeks to ask Morgan about
18 his mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories extending beyond the
19 issue of the citation.” Id. at 7.
20
“Subject matter waiver is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 502, which
21 applies to disclosures of information covered by attorney-client privilege and work
22 product protection.” Century Aluminum Co. v. AGCS Marine Ins. Co., 285 F.R.D. 468,
23 470-71 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Fed. R. Evid. 502. Pursuant to Rule 502(a), a waiver of the
24 attorney-client privilege or work product protection “extends to an undisclosed
25 communication or information in a federal ... proceeding only if: (1) the waiver is
26 intentional; (2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern
27 the same subject matter; and (3) they ought in fairness to be considered together.” Id.
28
The Magistrate Judge’s December 14, 2012 Order stated:
-9-
10cv1879 WQH (MDD)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Plaintiff argues that because ‘the government’ waived privilege it
cannot now claim work product: ‘the government cannot invoke privilege
to withhold additional materials that provide context for understanding the
disclosed information.’ Pl.’s Mem. Ps&As, p.8.
There are several problems with Plaintiff’s argument. First, she
conflates the rules of attorney and client and confuses attorney-client
privilege with work product immunity. For example, Plaintiff uses the
word ‘government’ interchangeably with defendant NCIS, and
Defendant’s attorney, the USAO. Defendant NCIS apparently waived
certain aspects of its attorney-client privilege held between it and the
USAO, when it produced communications between it and the USAO
regarding the criminal investigation of Plaintiff. NCIS turned over those
files because the motives of NCIS are at the center of Plaintiff’s
complaint, and such documents could reflect the motives of NCIS. But
defendant NCIS held that privilege, not the USAO.
By NCIS waiving attorney client privilege, that waiver never
extended as a waiver to the USAO’s work product immunity, which
Plaintiff argues. The USAO is the only one with authority over its own
work product. The USAO has never waived work product immunity.
NCIS’s disclosure of attorney-client privileged information cannot operate
as a waiver of the USAO’s work product.
Second, the USAO is not a defendant here. Plaintiff did not file any
claims against the USAO, and the USAO has not asserted any defenses to
the substance of the claims against NCIS. Therefore, the USAO has never
‘placed its advice to NCIS at issue.’ Further, NCIS has not invoked an
‘advice of counsel’ defense. Because the advice from the USAO is not at
issue, there is no waiver of work product immunity.
(ECF No. 94 at 9).
In this case, the United States has provided information that AUSA Morgan had
regarding the issuance of the citation to Plaintiff because the “advice of counsel”
defense has been asserted as to that issue. While the Magistrate Judge’s December 14,
2012 Order incorrectly stated that “NCIS has not invoked an ‘advice of counsel’
defense,” this finding has no effect on the Court’s ruling (ECF No. 94 at 9).
Pursuant to Rule 502(a), any waiver of the work product doctrine in this case,
besides on the citation issue, encompasses only what has been disclosed to Plaintiff
throughout the course of this litigation, i.e. USAO information conveyed to NCIS
regarding the USAO’s investigation of Plaintiff.
Work product documents not
conveyed to NCIS are not probative to determine NCIS’ motive or intent for
investigating Plaintiff. The Court does not find that the decision of the Magistrate
Judge was “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Rockwell Int’l, Inc., 712 F.2d at
- 10 -
10cv1879 WQH (MDD)
1 1325.
2 III.
Deliberative Process Doctrine
3
“[T]he deliberative process privilege permits the government to withhold
4 documents that ‘reflect[] advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
5 comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and polices are
6 formulated.’” Hongsermeier v. C.I.R., 621 F.3d 890, 904 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting
7 NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975)). Documents must be both
8 “predecisional” and “deliberative” to qualify for this privilege; a document is
9 predecisional if it was “‘prepared in order to assist an agency decisionmaker in arriving
10 at his decision,’” and deliberative if its release would “‘expose an agency's
11 decisionmaking process in such a way as to discourage candid discussion within the
12 agency and thereby undermine the agency’s ability to perform its functions.’”
13 Hongsermeier, 621 F.3d at 904 (citing Carter v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 307 F.3d
14 1084, 1089 (9th Cir.2002); Assembly of Cal. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916,
15 920 (9th Cir.1992)). “[I]n order to protect a document as ‘deliberative’ under the
16 deliberative process privilege, an agency must show enough detail so that the court can
17 determine ‘how each document fits into the deliberative process.’” California Native
18 Plant Soc'y, 251 F.R.D. at 413 (quoting Parke, Davis & Co. v. Califano, 623 F.2d 1, 6
19 (6th Cir. 1980)).
20
The Magistrate Judge denied without prejudice the USAO’s assertion of the
21 deliberative process privilege as a defense, finding “that there is not enough information
22 before it to determine the availability of the deliberative process privilege. The USAO
23 has not provided a privilege log to help determine which items are predecisional and
24 deliberative.” (ECF No. 94 at 7). Because the Magistrate Judge was not provided with
25 a privilege log, the Court does not find that the Magistrate Judge’s decision was “clearly
26 erroneous or contrary to law.” Rockwell Int’l, Inc. v. Pos-A-Traction Indus., Inc., 712
27 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Cal. Native Plant Soc’y v. United States EPA,
28 251 F.R.D. 408 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding privilege logs did not include sufficient detail
- 11 -
10cv1879 WQH (MDD)
1 to identify deliberative material); De Abadia-Peixoto, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164388
2 (finding privilege log insufficient and ordering in camera review of all documents
3 asserted to be protected by deliberative process privilege).
4
The privilege log submitted by the United States in opposition to Plaintiff’s
5 Objections to Discovery Dispute Order No. 1 lists six documents, each written by
6 Morgan, that purportedly fall within both the deliberative process privilege and the
7 work product doctrine. See ECF No. 98-1. In light of the Court’s determination that
8 the Magistrate Judge did not clearly err in determining that these documents are
9 protected work product, the Court need not consider at this time whether the
10 deliberative process privilege would also apply.
11
The Court overrules Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Order on
12 Discovery Dispute No. 1.
13
14
DISCOVERY DISPUTE NO. 2
On January 4, 2013, Plaintiff and the United States filed the Joint Motion for
15 Determination of Discovery Dispute No. 2. (ECF No. 97). The parties stated: “Plaintiff
16 has named one individual, NCIS Special Agent Gerald Martin in his individual
17 capacity. Plaintiff also sues seven Doe Defendants in their individual capacities.
18 Plaintiff has not ruled out seeking to amend the complaint to add witnesses as
19 defendants in their individual capacities.” (ECF No. 97 at 2). The parties stated:
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
This dispute arose in November 2012, after Plaintiff served three
deposition notices on current and former federal employees who are not
parties to this lawsuit, but who appear on the government’s list of potential
witnesses provided to Plaintiff through initial disclosures. On November
7, 2012, counsel for Agent Martin sent an e-mail to Plaintiff’s counsel
asking that Plaintiff either (1) name witnesses as individual-capacity
defendants, so that they could assert a qualified immunity defense, or (2)
stipulate that Plaintiff will not seek to name those witnesses as individualcapacity defendants in the future.... Plaintiff’s counsel responded that it
is premature, and that it would be professionally irresponsible, to either
seek to name witnesses as individual-capacity defendants or to stipulate
to never name them as individual-capacity defendants. Based on this
dispute, the first round of depositions were postponed.
After meeting and conferring on November 14, 2012, the parties
were able to partially resolve the dispute with the following agreement: if
Plaintiff represented in good faith that based on the information now
known to her, she had no current intention of adding a deponent as a
- 12 -
10cv1879 WQH (MDD)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
defendant, the government would not object to that deposition moving
forward. Plaintiff made this representation for three government
employees, two of whom were deposed in December 2012.
The remaining dispute centers on the proposed depositions of two
other government employees: Richard Pandis, a special agent with the
Office of Inspector General for the Office of Personnel Management, who
investigated Plaintiff for improper use of government credentials; and Will
Schmitt, a former Special Assistant United States Attorney who advised
NCIS on its investigation of Plaintiff.... The government has no objection
to allowing these and future depositions to proceed if Plaintiff represents
that she has no current intention of adding these deponents as defendants
based on the information provided in discovery to date. Plaintiff states
that she is not in a position to make such a representation for Pandi,
Schmitt, and possibly others.
Consequently, the government seeks a protective order that
precludes Plaintiff from deposing these and other witnesses until after the
deadline to amend pleadings. The government also concurrently seeks and
extension of the discovery deadline to allow Plaintiff sufficient time after
that deadline to depose any additional witnesses.
12 Id. at 2-3. The United States requested a protective order precluding Plaintiff from
13 deposing Pandis, Schmitt and other witnesses until after the deadline to amend
14 pleadings in order “to ensure that its employees retain their right to assert qualified
15 immunity before they are compelled to provide testimony that may later be used against
16 them in this lawsuit.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff contended that she has sought to depose fact
17 witnesses, i.e. Pandis and Schmitt, on claims for which qualified immunity does not
18 apply. See id. at 4.
19
On January 22, 2013, the Magistrate Judge issued an Order granting the United
20 States’ request for a protective order. (ECF No. 99). The Magistrate Judge found that,
21 “based on the allegations in the complaint and Defendants’ initial disclosures, it seems
22 highly probable that [Special Agent] Pandis is the Doe 1 defendant [named in the
23 Complaint].” Id. at 5. The Magistrate Judge stated:
24
25
26
27
28
If SA Pandis is added as a defendant and sued in his individual
capacity, as a government employee he would be entitled to assert
qualified immunity, just as SA Martin has done. The district court has
said that it will resolve whether SA Martin has qualified immunity at the
summary judgment stage. In the pending interlocutory appeal, however,
the Ninth Circuit is determining whether qualified immunity is available
for SA Martin at this point in the litigation. Given this appeal and
potential for availability of qualified immunity, the district court
prohibited discovery of SA Martin with regards to the first amendment
Bivens claim. If SA Pandis is added as a defendant, he should receive the
- 13 -
10cv1879 WQH (MDD)
same treatment and not be subject to discovery of the Bivens claim until
the appeal is resolved.
1
2
While SA Pandis is currently subject to discovery as a witness for
the FTCA and injunctive relief claims, the court will allow him to be
deposed only one time. If Plaintiff chooses to depose him before the
deadline to file amended pleadings, she may not inquire as to any issues
that could relate to the first amendment Bivens claim (even if they also
relate to the FTCA and injunctive relief claims), and, she cannot depose
him again. Otherwise, Plaintiff can wait to depose SA Pandis and other
witnesses who are potential Defendants until after the deadline to amend
the pleadings has passed, and when the Ninth Circuit has confirmed
whether qualified immunity is available at this time....
3
4
5
6
7
Good cause exists to grant Defendants’ protective order because if
any of the witnesses seeking to be deposed are later added as Defendants,
they will suffer irreparable harm in losing their right to not be subject to
discovery until qualified immunity is resolved....
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Id. The Magistrate Judge stated: “If Plaintiff seeks to amend the pleadings to substitute
in [potential defendants Pandis and Schmitt] as Doe Defendants, she must do so by
February 15, 2013. The March 29, 2013 deadline remains in place, though, for the
substitution of other Doe Defendants.” Id. The Magistrate continued the deadline to
conduct factual discovery of any individuals whom Plaintiff substitutes in place of Doe
Defendants until 60 days past March 29, 2013.
On February 5, 2013, Plaintiff filed the Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Order
Determining Joint Motion for Discovery Dispute No. 2 (“Objections to Discovery
Dispute Order No. 2”). (ECF No. 102). On February 25, 2013, the United States filed
an opposition. (ECF No. 105). On March 11, 2013, Plaintiff filed a reply. (ECF No.
107).
I.
Contentions of the Parties
Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge’s January 22, 2013 Order “is contrary
to law and clearly erroneous.” (ECF No. 102 at 16). Plaintiff contends that the doctrine
of qualified immunity applies only to named defendants in their individual capacities,
and that the United States “cannot prevent the depositions of fact witnesses on claims
to which qualified immunity does not apply,” such as claims for injunctive relief under
the First Amendment and claims for damages under the FTCA. Id. Plaintiff contends:
The witnesses identified by the government will suffer no prejudice from
- 14 -
10cv1879 WQH (MDD)
1
2
3
4
complying with their duty to testify in the same way as any other witness.
Even if the witnesses were named as defendants and prevailed on qualified
immunity, they would have to give the same testimony at deposition,
because the claims against the government overlap with the facts
underlying any potential Bivens claim. The depositions must therefore
occur sooner or later, and there is no basis for the government’s continued
obstruction of routine discovery.
5 Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge’s ruling “frustrates the Court’s
6 orders and unjustifiably impedes discovery allowed by the court.” Id. at 19.
7
The United States contends that the Magistrate Judge’s ruling is not clearly
8 erroneous:
9
10
11
12
13
14
[A]s the Magistrate Judge correctly recognized, ‘if any of the witnesses
seeking to be deposed are later added as Defendants, they will suffer
irreparable harm in losing their right not to be subject to discovery until
qualified immunity is resolved.’ [(ECF No. 99 at 5)]. The Magistrate
Judge’s ruling adheres to a long line of Supreme Court precedent that
qualified immunity requires government employees to be given an
opportunity to seek dismissal of the claims against them before they are
subjected to discovery. Notably, the Magistrate Judge did not preclude
Plaintiff from deposing anyone, and the Magistrate Judge even set
procedures to allow Plaintiff to immediately depose the witnesses at the
center of the current dispute.
15 (ECF No. 105 at 6).
16 II.
Discussion
17
The Magistrate Judge has discretion to weigh the interests of the parties and to
18 set deadlines for amending the complaint and taking depositions. However, the Court
19 finds no legal basis to support the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Pandis and
20 Schmitt, if deposed before the deadline to amend pleadings, “will suffer irreparable
21 harm in losing their right to not be subject to discovery until qualified immunity is
22 resolved.” (ECF No. 99 at 5). Pandis and Schmitt cannot assert qualified immunity at
23 this stage of the proceedings because they have not been named as defendants. See
24 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (“Qualified ... immunity is an
25 affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official.”). Even if Pandis
26 and/or Schmitt were named as defendants, depositions may at times be taken before
27 qualified immunity issues can be resolved. See Crawford–El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,
28 593 n. 14 (1998) (“Discovery involving public officials is indeed one of the evils that
- 15 -
10cv1879 WQH (MDD)
1 Harlow aimed to address, but neither that opinion nor subsequent decisions create an
2 immunity from all discovery. Harlow sought to protect officials from the costs of
3 broad-reaching discovery, and we have since recognized that limited discovery may
4 sometimes be necessary before the district court can resolve a motion for summary
5 judgment based on qualified immunity.”) (quotation omitted). Moreover, even if
6 qualified immunity is granted to Martin and/or other unnamed defendants, i.e. Pandis
7 and Schmitt, those individuals are subject to deposition as non-parties on claims arising
8 from the same set of factual allegations underlying the Bivens claims, including
9 Plaintiff’s FTCA claims for damages and her First Amendment claim for injunctive
10 relief. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 312 (1996) (explaining that the “right to
11 [qualified] immunity is a right to immunity from certain claims, not from litigation in
12 general”); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n. 6 (1987) (noting that
13 if the defendants’ actions are not those that a reasonable officer could have believed
14 lawful and “if the actions [defendant] claims he took are different from those the
15 [plaintiffs] allege (and are actions that a reasonable officer could have believed lawful),
16 then discovery may be necessary before [defendant]’s motion for summary judgment
17 on qualified immunity grounds can be resolved.”); Meiners v. University of Kansas, 359
18 F.3d 1222, 1233 n. 3 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that qualified immunity is applicable
19 only against claims for monetary damages, and has no application to claims for
20 declaratory or injunctive relief; also explaining that qualified immunity is applicable
21 only to claims against officers in their individual capacities, and that official-capacity
22 claims, being the equivalent of a claim against an entity, are not subject to qualified
23 immunity).
24
The Court sustains Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s decision on
25 Discovery Dispute No. 2, and vacates the January 22, 2013 Order.
26
On April 12, 2013, the Magistrate Judge issued an Order denying Plaintiff’s
27 request to extend the deadline to file amended pleadings to add new parties, stating:
28
Plaintiff mad[e] no showing that she attempted to comply with [the]
- 16 -
10cv1879 WQH (MDD)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
deadline set. Rather, she made a tactical decision not to depose any
witnesses or move to add any new Bivens defendants in compliance with
[the Court’s] deadlines.... The denial, however, is without prejudice, in the
event the district judge sustains Plaintiff’s objections and allows her to
depose potential Bivens defendants on Bivens claims before they are
named as Bivens defendants in this lawsuit.
(ECF No. 112 at 3). The Court granted Plaintiff’s request to continue the fact discovery
cutoff “to 60 days following the issuance of [a] ruling on both of Plaintiff’s objections
to this court’s discovery orders.” Id. at 4.
Due to the Court’s decision to sustain Plaintiff’s objections and allow the
depositions of potential but currently unnamed Defendants, Plaintiff may file a renewed
motion to extend the deadline to file amended pleadings within thirty days of the date
of this Order.
CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Objections to Discovery Dispute
Order No. 1 (ECF No. 96) are OVERRULED. Plaintiff’s Objections to Discovery
Dispute Order No. 2 (ECF No. 102) are SUSTAINED. The Magistrate Judge’s January
22, 2013 Order is VACATED. Within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order,
Plaintiff may file a renewed motion to extend the deadline to file amended pleadings.
18
DATED: June 11, 2013
19
20
WILLIAM Q. HAYES
United States District Judge
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
- 17 -
10cv1879 WQH (MDD)
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?