O'M and Associates, LLC et al v. Ozanne et al

Filing 177

ORDER denying defendant Matthew Stoen's 120 Amended Motion for Order to Show Cause why Plaintiffs and/or Peter Hilger should not be held in contempt of court for violation of the January 3, 2011 protective order. Plaintiffs' request that the Court strike the Amended Motion for Order to Show Cause is also denied. Signed by Magistrate Judge Ruben B. Brooks on 06/01/11. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(cge) (mam).

Download PDF
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 14 O’M AND ASSOCIATES, LLC, an Illinois limited liability company, d/b/a O’Malley and Associates; PRESERVE CAPITAL, LLC, an Illinois limited liability company; and MBM SETTLEMENTS, LLC, an Illinois limited liability company, 15 Plaintiffs, 16 v. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 BRENDAN K. OZANNE, BRIAN C. DAWSON, AND DAWSON & OZANNE, a California general partnership, as escrow agent; MATTHEW STOEN, individually and as manager and agent for KODIAK FAMILY, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; KODIAK FAMILY, LLC, individually and as agent for XYZ CORPORATION, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil No. 10cv2130 AJB(RBB) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT MATTHEW STOEN’S AMENDED MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY PLAINTIFFS AND/OR PETER HILGER SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR VIOLATION OF THE JANUARY 3, 2011 PROTECTIVE ORDER [ECF NO. 120] 24 25 On February 23, 2011, Defendant Matthew Stoen filed a Motion 26 for Order to Show Cause Why Plaintiffs and/or Peter Hilger Should 27 Not Be Held in Contempt of Court for Violation of the January 3, 28 2011 Protective Order [ECF No. 111]. 1 Stoen asked that the Court 10cv2130 AJB(RBB) 1 issue an order to show cause why Plaintiffs and Hilger should not 2 be held in contempt of court, and that the Limited Temporary 3 Restraining Order issued by United States District Court Judge 4 Marilyn E. Huff be dissolved. 5 111.) 6 Court, vacated the motion hearing, and reset the hearing for April 7 4, 2011, at 10:00 a.m. before this Court [ECF No. 116].1 8 9 (Mot. Order Show Cause 6, ECF No. On March 1, 2011, Judge Huff referred the Motion to this On March 3, 2011, Defendant Matthew Stoen filed an Amended Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Plaintiffs and/or Peter Hilger 10 Should Not Be Held in Contempt of Court for Violation of the 11 January 3, 2011 Protective Order, along with Exhibit A and a 12 redacted version of Exhibit B [ECF No. 120]. 13 subsequently lodged the confidential version of Exhibit B with the 14 Court, pursuant to the Protective Order entered on January 3, 2011 15 [ECF Nos. 72-73, 118-119]. The Defendant 16 On March 18, 2011, Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to 17 Defendant’s Amended Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Plaintiffs 18 and/or Peter Hilger Should Not Be Held in Contempt of Court for 19 Violation of the January 3, 2011 Protective Order was filed, along 20 with the Affidavit of Peter Hilger [ECF No. 125]. 21 2011, this Court vacated the April 4, 2011 motion hearing and 22 reset it for May 23, 2011, at 10:00 a.m. 23 Defendant Stoen’s Reply and a redacted exhibit was filed on May 24 16, 2011 [ECF No. 159]. 25 confidential version of the Reply and exhibit with chambers [ECF 26 Nos. 160, 164]. On March 28, A redacted version of The next day, Defendant Stoen lodged a The Court found Defendant Stoen’s Motion suitable 27 28 1 This case was transferred to United States District Court Judge Anthony J. Battaglia on March 15, 2011 [ECF No. 124]. 2 10cv2130 AJB(RBB) 1 for resolution on the papers, pursuant to Southern District of 2 California Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), and vacated the hearing set 3 for May 23, 2011, at 10:00 a.m. [ECF No. 168]. 4 The Court has reviewed Defendant’s Amended Motion and 5 exhibits, Plaintiffs’ Opposition and Affidavit of Peter Hilger, 6 and Defendant’s Reply and exhibit. 7 Defendant’s Amended Motion for Order to Show Cause is DENIED. For the reasons stated below, 8 I. 9 BACKGROUND 10 On January 3, 2011, Judge Marilyn Huff granted the parties’ 11 Joint Motion for Entry of Protective Order. (Joint Mot. Entry 12 Protective Order 1, ECF No. 72; Order Granting Joint Mot. 13 Protective Order 1, ECF No. 73.) 14 to Show Cause, Defendant Matthew Stoen generally argues that Peter 15 Hilger, a member of Plaintiff Preserve Capital, LLC [ECF No. 120], 16 violated the Protective Order by deliberately and wrongfully 17 disclosing confidential information to Stoen’s father-in-law, Jon 18 Monson. 19 No. 159.) 20 default against him was set aside, he produced confidential 21 information to Plaintiffs’ counsel in compliance with the Limited 22 Temporary Restraining Order [ECF Nos. 36-37, 96, 100]. 23 Order Show Cause 3, ECF No. 120.) 24 February 17, 2011, Peter Hilger sent an e-mail to Stoen’s father- 25 in-law disclosing the signatory on a bank account into which a 26 portion of the disputed funds had been deposited. 27 response, Plaintiffs argue that the mere identity of the holder of 28 the account into which the funds were deposited is not In his Amended Motion for Order (Am. Mot. Order Show Cause 5, ECF No. 120; Reply 2, ECF Stoen claims that on January 31, 2011, after the 3 (Am. Mot. The Defendant alleges that on (Id. at 5.) In 10cv2130 AJB(RBB) 1 “confidential information” within the meaning of the Protective 2 Order. 3 Peter Hilger’s belief that it did not constitute confidential 4 information was a reasonable interpretation of the Protective 5 Order, and any violation was unintentional. 6 #1 Hilger Aff. 2.) 7 A. 8 9 (Opp’n 3, ECF No. 125.) Even if it is, Plaintiffs assert, (Id.; see id. Attach. The November 2, 2010 Limited Temporary Restraining Order On October 13, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Verified Motion for Temporary Restraining Order with supporting affidavits attached 10 [ECF No. 4]. 11 Defendants from spending or disbursing approximately $700,000 in 12 escrowed funds that had been wired into the Defendants’ IOLTA 13 account until further court order. 14 ECF No. 4.) 15 Temporary Restraining Order [ECF Nos. 36-37], instructing the 16 following: 17 Plaintiffs sought an order prohibiting the (Verified Mot. TRO 4-6, 10, On November 2, 2010, Judge Huff granted a Limited (1) Brendan Ozanne and Dawson & Ozanne and its principals, including but not limited to Matthew Stoen, individually and as agent of Kodiak Family, LLC, are enjoined and restrained from directly or indirectly transferring the Deposited Funds plus any interest earned thereon, or any portion thereof, from any account over which any of Defendants have ownership, possession, or control and into which the Deposited Funds have been identifiably transferred; (2) Ozanne, Dawson & Ozanne, Stoen and Kodiak are to provide, within 10 days from the effective date of this order, all relevant information regarding all accounts to which the Deposited Funds were transferred and are now held, including but not limited to: the location and identity of the transferee account, the date on which the funds were transferred, the accounts to which they were transferred, the reason for the transfer, and the identities of all signatories to the account to which the funds were transferred; 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 10cv2130 AJB(RBB) 1 (3) 2 Discovery may commence in this matter immediately and be expedited as to accounting and issues raised in the application for the temporary restraining order . . . . 3 4 (Order Granting Limited TRO 3-4, ECF No. 36; Mem. Decision 5 Granting Limited TRO 8-9, ECF No. 37.) 6 B. 7 The Protective Order On January 3, 2011, the parties filed a Joint Motion for 8 Entry of Protective Order. 9 ECF No. 72.) (Joint Mot. Entry Protective Order 1, That same day, the Court issued an Order Granting 10 Joint Motion for Entry of Protective Order as Modified by the 11 Court. 12 73.) 13 information or documents shall be used by the receiving party 14 solely for litigation purposes. 15 the dissemination of “confidential information.” 16 (Order Granting Joint Mot. Protective Order 1, ECF No. The Protective Order states that all confidential 1. 17 18 19 20 21 (Id. at 2.) The Order limited For purposes of this Order, “Confidential Information” shall mean information or data of any kind or description containing proprietary, competitively sensitive, and/or financial or customer information which is produced by any party or third party, is confidential to the producing party in that it is not generally available to the public or third persons, and is designated in good faith by the producing party as “Confidential,” including, but without limitation, tax returns, financial statements, bank account records and statements, and other financial information. 22 . . . . 23 3. 25 Except as expressly stated herein or by further Order of this Court, Confidential Information shall not be given, shown, made available, communicated, or disclosed to anyone other than: 26 (a) 24 27 (b) The attorneys of record in this action, and their legal assistants and staff members; the parties to this action; 28 5 10cv2130 AJB(RBB) 1 (c) 2 3 4 5 6 (d) 7 (e) 8 9 (f) 10 11 Independent consultants and/or experts retained by the parties to work on the action, provided that before any such consultant or expert is shown or receives any Confidential Information he must read a copy of this Order and agree to abide by same by executing an affidavit specifying that such person has read a copy of the Order and agrees to abide by same; Stenographic reporters engaged for depositions or other proceedings necessary to the conduct of this action; Such persons as counsel for the parties may mutually consent to in writing or on the record prior to the proposed disclosure; and The Court and appropriate Court personnel. (Id.) 12 II. 13 LEGAL STANDARDS 14 “‘Civil contempt . . . consists of a party’s disobedience to 15 a specific and definite court order by failure to take all 16 reasonable steps within the party’s power to comply.’” 17 Racing Ass’n v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2006) 18 (quoting In re Dual-Deck Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig., 10 19 F.3d 693, 695 (9th Cir. 1993)). 20 protective order, a district court may impose the remedies it 21 deems appropriate. 22 Holtzinger, P.C., 992 F.2d 932, 934-35 (9th Cir. 1993); Lew v. 23 Kona Hosp., 754 F.2d 1420, 1426-27 (9th Cir. 1985); see Yates v. 24 Applied Performance Techs., Inc., 205 F.R.D 497, 500 (S.D. Ohio 25 2002) (citing 6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 26 26.108[2] (3d ed. 1997)). 27 28 Reno Air When a party violates a Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Newman & Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes district courts to impose a wide range of sanctions, including 6 10cv2130 AJB(RBB) 1 contempt, on a party that fails to comply with a discovery order 2 or a protective order. 3 Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 992 F.2d at 934-35 (citing support for 4 the proposition that Rule 37(b)(2) should provide for enforcement 5 of Rule 26(c) joint protective orders); United States v. Nat’l 6 Med. Enters., Inc., 792 F.2d 906, 910 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding a 7 Rule 37(b) sanction for a party’s violation of the protective 8 order); see O’Phelan v. Loy, No. 09-00236, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9 129030, at *7-8 (D. Haw. Dec. 6, 2010); Mora v. Target Corp., No. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vii); 10 07cv719 MMA (WMc), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123681, at *2-3 (S.D. 11 Cal. Nov. 22, 2010); Lambright v. Ryan, No. CV-87-235-TUC-JMR, 12 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52781, at *14-15 (D. Ariz. May 4, 2010) 13 (citations omitted); contra Lipscher v. LRP Publ’g, Inc., 266 F.3d 14 1305, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that violating a protective 15 order is not sanctionable under Rule 37(b)(2) because a protective 16 order is not an order “to provide or permit discovery”). 17 “‘Civil contempt is a refusal to do an act the court has 18 ordered for the benefit of a party; the sentence is remedial. 19 Criminal contempt is a completed act of disobedience; the sentence 20 is punitive to vindicate the authority of the court.” 21 Ward, 100 F.3d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting In re Sequoia 22 Auto Brokers Ltd., 827 F.2d 1281, 1283 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987)). 23 the Ninth Circuit, a contempt order is for civil contempt if the 24 sanction coerces compliance with a court order or compensates the 25 injured party for losses sustained. 26 N.V. v. KXD Tech., Inc., 539 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2008). 27 Civil contempt sanctions are often imposed against individuals who 28 violate protective orders. Bingman v. In Koninklijke Philips Elecs., 6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s 7 10cv2130 AJB(RBB) 1 Federal Practice § 26.108[2], at 26-570 (3d ed. 2011); see Quinter 2 v. Volkswagen of Am., 676 F.2d 969, 975 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding 3 that the court properly imposed a civil contempt sanction when the 4 expert witness disclosed confidential information to another 5 attorney). 6 Defendant Stoen seeks an award of fees incurred to address 7 Hilger’s conduct, monetary sanctions, and the dissolution of the 8 Limited Temporary Restraining Order. 9 6, ECF No. 120.) (Am. Mot. Order Show Cause Although Stoen does not specify whether he seeks 10 an order holding Hilger in civil or criminal contempt, the failure 11 to comply with a protective order or other discovery order in 12 these circumstances would give rise to civil contempt. 13 Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 26.108[2], at 26-570 14 (citing Quinter, 676 F.2d at 975); see Reno Air Racing Ass’n, 452 15 F.3d at 1130. 16 6 James “The party alleging civil contempt must demonstrate that the 17 alleged contemnor violated the court’s order by ‘clear and 18 convincing evidence,’ not merely a preponderance of the evidence.” 19 In re Dual-Deck Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig., 10 F.3d at 20 695; Vertex Distrib., Inc. v. Falcon Foam Plastics, Inc., 689 F.2d 21 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1982). 22 contempt sanction only if there is clear and convincing evidence 23 that “(1) the contemnor violated a court order, (2) the 24 noncompliance was more than technical or de minimis (substantial 25 compliance is not punishable as contempt), and (3) the contemnor’s 26 conduct was not the product of a good faith or reasonable 27 interpretation of the violated order.” 28 Moore’s Federal Practice § 37.51[7], at 37-109 (footnotes Therefore, a court may impose a civil 8 7 James Wm. Moore et al., 10cv2130 AJB(RBB) 1 omitted); see United States v. Bright, 596 F.3d 683, 694 (9th Cir. 2 2010) (quoting Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. County Metro. 3 Trans. Auth., 564 F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 2009)). 4 as to whether these requirements have been met in a particular 5 case must be resolved in favor of the party accused of the civil 6 contempt.” 7 37.51[7], at 37-109 (footnote omitted). “Any doubts 7 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 8 III. 9 DISCUSSION 10 Defendant argues that the information Peter Hilger disclosed 11 to Stoen’s father-in-law, Jon Monson, was confidential, and the 12 disclosure was wrongful. 13 No. 120; Reply 2, ECF No. 159.) 14 Plaintiffs a “Compliance Document” and bank statements identifying 15 the account into which funds were transferred, in accordance with 16 the Limited Temporary Restraining Order requiring that Stoen 17 produce the identities of the signatories to the transferee 18 accounts. 19 Order Granting Limited TRO 3, ECF No. 36); see Order Granting Def. 20 Matthew Stoen’s Mot. Set Aside Default 6-7, ECF No. 100; Notice 21 Compliance Ct.’s Order 1-2, ECF No. 103.) 22 that the signatory to the transferee account falls within the 23 definition of “confidential information” in the Protective Order. 24 (Reply 2-3, ECF No. 159.) 25 (Am. Mot. Order Show Cause 2-3, 5, ECF On January 31, 2011, Stoen served (Am. Mot. Order Show Cause 3, ECF No. 120 (quoting The Defendant argues Even if the information was not confidential, Stoen contends 26 the information was still designated confidential by defense 27 counsel in good faith, and Plaintiffs did not challenge the 28 designation. (Id.; see Am. Mot. Order Show Cause 3-5, ECF No. 120 9 10cv2130 AJB(RBB) 1 (citing id. Attach. #1 Ex. A, at 2).) 2 seal and lodged with the Court a confidential version of a copy of 3 the e-mail sent from Hilger to Monson disclosing the identity of 4 one of the transferee accounts. 5 No. 120; see id. Attach. #2 Ex. B, at 2.) 6 disclosure, Defendant asks that the Court issue an order to show 7 cause why Peter Hilger should not be held in contempt and to 8 ultimately find him in contempt. 9 ECF No. 120; Reply 4, ECF No. 159).) 10 Defendant Stoen filed under (Am. Mot. Order Show Cause 5, ECF Based on this (Am. Mot. Order Show Cause 6, In response, the Plaintiffs argue that the identity of the 11 holder of the account into which funds were transferred is not 12 “confidential information.” 13 point to the language in the Protective Order describing 14 “confidential information” as including “bank account records and 15 statements, and other financial information,” to demonstrate that 16 Hilger did not disclose confidential information. 17 (Opp’n 3, ECF No. 125.) Plaintiffs (Id. at 2-3.) Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that any violation was 18 unintentional because Hilger did not believe he was disclosing 19 information he could not share. 20 Hilger Aff. 2.) 21 actual bank statements and similar financial documents constituted 22 confidential information, which is a good faith interpretation of 23 the Protective Order. 24 the Court to strike paragraphs eight and nine in Defendant’s 25 Amended Motion as “irrelevant and unsubstantiated” and to strike 26 Stoen’s request that the Limited Temporary Restraining Order be 27 dissolved. 28 asking the Court to strike the Amended Motion in its entirety or, (Id. at 3; see id. Attach. #1 Plaintiffs contend that Hilger believed that the (Opp’n 3, ECF No. 125.) (Id. at 4.) The Plaintiffs ask Plaintiffs conclude their Opposition by 10 10cv2130 AJB(RBB) 1 alternatively, to find that an order to show cause should not 2 issue. 3 A. 4 (Id.) Violation of a Court Order Defendant Stoen must show by clear and convincing evidence 5 that Peter Hilger violated a court order. In re Dual-Deck 6 Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig., 10 F.3d at 695. 7 Protective Order defines confidential information as “information 8 or data of any kind or description containing proprietary, 9 competitively sensitive, and/or financial or customer information The 10 . . . including, but without limitation, tax returns, financial 11 statements, bank account records and statements, and other 12 financial information.” 13 Protective Order 2, ECF No. 73.) 14 the Compliance Document and the bank statements as confidential, 15 and Plaintiffs did not object in writing to the designations as 16 required by the Protective Order. 17 Show Cause Attach. #1, at 2, ECF No. 120; see also Reply 3, ECF 18 No. 159.) 19 expressly required Defendant Stoen to disclose information 20 regarding “the identities of all signatories to the account to 21 which the funds were transferred.” 22 ECF No. 36.) (Order Granting Joint Mot. Entry Defense counsel designated both (Id. at 3-4; see Am. Mot. Order Additionally, the Limited Temporary Restraining Order (Order Granting Limited TRO 3, 23 There is clear and convincing evidence that the definition of 24 “confidential information” in the Protective Order is broad enough 25 to include the identity of a transferee account holder. 26 Accordingly, Peter Hilger violated the Order. 27 Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig., 10 F.3d at 695. See In re Dual-Deck 28 11 10cv2130 AJB(RBB) 1 B. 2 Substantial Compliance “‘Substantial compliance’ with the court order is a defense 3 to civil contempt, and is not vitiated by ‘a few technical 4 violations’ where every reasonable effort has been made to 5 comply.” 6 891). 7 Defendant Stoen produce the identities of the transferee account 8 holders to Plaintiffs; their identities is among the confidential 9 information relevant to this lawsuit. Id. at 695 (citing Vertex Distrib., Inc., 689 F.2d at The Limited Temporary Restraining Order required that (See Order Granting Limited 10 TRO 3, ECF No. 36; Order Granting Def. Matthew Stoen’s Mot. Set 11 Aside Default 6-7, ECF No. 100.) 12 to set aside the default judgment entered against him on January 13 26, 2011, Judge Huff ordered him to “provide Plaintiffs with 14 information regarding all accounts to which deposited funds were 15 transferred” within five days, or by January 31, 2011. 16 Granting Def. Matthew Stoen’s Mot. Set Aside Default 6-7, ECF No. 17 100.) 18 transferee account holders to Jon Monson is a violation of the 19 Protective Order. 20 Litig., 10 F.3d at 695. 21 been produced to Plaintiffs, Hilger wrongfully disclosed one item 22 of confidential information. 23 the court order. 24 convincing evidence of more than a technical violation. 25 C. After granting Stoen’s request (Order Hilger’s disclosure of the identity of one of the See In re Dual-Deck Cassette Recorder Antitrust Although much financial information has He is in substantial compliance with Therefore, Defendant has not produced clear and See id. Based on a Good Faith and Reasonable Interpretation 26 Finally, Defendant Stoen must demonstrate by clear and 27 convincing evidence that Hilger’s disclosure was not based on a 28 12 10cv2130 AJB(RBB) 1 good faith interpretation of the protective order. 2 695; Vertex Distrib., Inc., 689 F.2d at 889. 3 See id. at The Plaintiffs state that Hilger’s belief that the actual 4 bank statements and similar financial information constitute 5 confidential information is a good faith interpretation of the 6 Protective Order. 7 “Mr. Hilger did not believe he was disclosing information he could 8 not share, as well as the fact that he understood that such 9 information (which he could not share) existed.” (Opp’n 3, ECF No. 125.) They further allege, (Id.) Peter 10 Hilger contends, “In the e-mail to [the third party], I did not 11 disclose any confidential information or documents; I specifically 12 told [Jon Monson] I could not.” 13 (Id. Attach. #1 Hilger Aff. 2.) Stoen disputes Hilger’s claim that any disclosure of 14 confidential information was unintentional; Defendant argues that 15 Hilger’s conduct was “willful, deliberate, and wrongful.” 16 3-4, ECF No. 159.) 17 his knowledge that he is prohibited from disclosing the 18 information” in the e-mail. 19 120.) 20 there was something (the Protective Order) that prohibited him 21 from disclosing the information. 22 would supply the information to Monson when he could ‘legally 23 release’ it.” 24 (Reply The Defendant notes that Hilger “alludes to (Am. Mot. Order Show Cause 6, ECF No. Stoen further maintains, “Hilger was acutely aware that Hilger said it himself -– he (Reply 4, ECF No. 159.) The Court has reviewed the e-mail sent by Peter Hilger on 25 February 17, 2011, that was filed under seal in support of 26 Defendant’s Motion. 27 identity of the transferee account holder, Hilger stated, “[W]ill 28 be able to share info with you shortly.” In the sentence that precedes disclosing the 13 (Am. Mot. Order Show 10cv2130 AJB(RBB) 1 Case Attach. #2 Ex. B, at 2, ECF No. 120.) 2 support of Stoen’s Reply, he submitted an earlier e-mail sent from 3 Peter Hilger to Monson on January 25, 2011. 4 A, at 2, ECF No. 159.) 5 legally release the massive amount of info to you I will so you 6 can see the facts.” 7 Additionally, in (Reply Attach. #1 Ex. There, Hilger explained, “As soon as I can (Id.) Defendant Stoen submitted new material, the January 25, 2011 8 e-mail, with his Reply. “It is improper for a moving party to 9 introduce new facts or different legal arguments in the reply 10 brief than those presented in the moving papers.” 11 ex rel. Giles v. Sardie, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1127 (C.D. Cal. 12 2000) (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 894-95 13 (1990)); see Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) 14 (“The district court need not consider arguments raised for the 15 first time in a reply brief.”). 16 provides, “[C]opies of all documentary evidence which the movant 17 intends to submit in support of the motion, or other request for 18 ruling by the court, must be served and filed with the notice of 19 motion.” 20 Stoen improperly submitted additional new evidence in the Reply, 21 depriving Plaintiffs of their opportunity to respond. 22 however, does not prejudice Plaintiffs or Hilger. 23 contrary, the January 25 and February 17 e-mails show that Hilger 24 consistently intended to comply with the Protective Order. 25 United States Further, Civil Local Rule 7.1 S.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7.1(f)(2)(a). Therefore, Defendant The e-mail, On the Stoen has not produced clear and convincing evidence that 26 Peter Hilger’s violation was based on an unreasonable 27 interpretation of the Protective Order. 28 the two e-mails demonstrate that he knew a protective order was in 14 Hilger’s statements in 10cv2130 AJB(RBB) 1 place. 2 the identity of a transferee account holder was not confidential 3 information. 4 with you shortly,” and “[a]s soon as [he] can legally release the 5 massive amount of info” to Monson, he will. 6 Case Attach. #2 Ex. B, at 2, ECF No. 120; Reply Attach. #1 Ex. A, 7 at 2, ECF No. 159.) 8 financial information that was confidential and could not be 9 shared at that time; his disclosure of the identity of one of the 10 transferee account holders is consistent with Hilger’s belief that 11 this piece of information was not confidential. 12 Peter Hilger’s acknowledgment suggests that he believed Hilger stated that he “will be able to share info (Am. Mot. Order Show Hilger understood there was a large amount of A good faith and reasonable reading of the Protective Order 13 is that it applied to confidential financial records, “including, 14 but without limitation, tax returns, financial statements, bank 15 account records and statements, and other financial information.” 16 (Order Granting Joint Mot. Protective Order 2, ECF No. 72); see In 17 re Dual-Deck Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig., 10 F.3d at 695 18 (“For the protective order to comply with common sense, a 19 reasonable reading must connect its prohibitions to its purpose . 20 . . .”) 21 Order as applying to actual bank statements and financial 22 documents, but not to the general identity of an account holder. 23 Defendant Stoen has not established by clear and convincing 24 evidence that Peter Hilger’s interpretation of the Protective 25 Order was unreasonable. 26 889. It is not unreasonable to construe the language of the Id.; Vertex Distrib., Inc., 689 F.2d at Doubts must be resolved in Hilger’s favor. 27 28 15 10cv2130 AJB(RBB) 1 2 CONCLUSION There can no longer be any question that the identity of a 3 transferee account holder is confidential information covered by 4 the definition set forth in the Protective Order. 5 disclosed this confidential information to a third party who is 6 not among the categories of persons to whom disclosure is 7 permitted. 8 Nonetheless, the Defendant has failed to establish by clear and 9 convincing evidence that at the time of the disclosure, Peter 10 Hilger’s conduct was not based on a good faith and reasonable 11 interpretation of the Order. 12 Recorder Antitrust Litig., 10 F.3d at 695. 13 reasons, Defendant Matthew Stoen’s Motion for Order to Show Cause 14 is DENIED. 15 Motion for Order to Show Cause, or portions thereof, is also 16 DENIED. 17 Peter Hilger Accordingly, he violated the Protective Order. See In re Dual-Deck Cassette For all of these Plaintiffs’ request that the Court strike the Amended IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 19 DATED: June 1, 2011 Ruben B. Brooks, Magistrate Judge United States District Court 20 21 22 cc: Judge Battaglia All Parties of Record 23 24 25 26 27 28 K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\O'M2130\OrderDenyAmMotionForOSC.wpd 16 10cv2130 AJB(RBB)

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.


Why Is My Information Online?